This monograph examines mass and elite opinion before and during the Prague Spring era with a unique collection of survey datasets. This research has four key findings. First, public opinion on the eve of the Prague Spring reforms in 1967 was politically engaged and was in favour of change. Second, citizens’ political attitudes in May 1968 were supportive of key features of multiparty democracy, and these attitudes are broadly similar to those evident in the Czech Republic today. Third, public support for political reform was complex where citizens exhibited hopes for greater liberalization but were cognizant of the limits constraining reform. Fourth, the Prague Spring elite differed in terms of background but exhibited consensus with regard to political outlook. This empirical research fits with the new wave of historical work that emphasizes the importance of social change in understanding the Prague Spring era, and demonstrates the continuity in Czech citizens’ political attitudes under both communism and liberal democracy.

Cover photograph was taken in a park in Prague on July 29 1968. The caption on the pram declares “Dubcek don’t give up.” Photograph courtesy of ČTK Fotobanka.

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Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

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Prague 2009
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Abstract

This monograph explores public and elite opinion toward events associated with the Prague Spring of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. This investigation is based on analyses of a unique collection of aggregate and individual level survey datasets. Much of this data has effectively been lost to scholars for four decades and has to date never been analysed within a common framework. In sum, the research presented in this volume is based on examinations of four main sources of survey data.

First, aggregated opinion statistics are derived primarily from a series of almost forty mass surveys many of which were undertaken by the Institute of Public Opinion Research (ÚVVM) between January 1968 and June 1969. This aggregated survey data facilitates comparison of opinions across subgroups (age, sex, education, occupation, area of residence) and membership of political parties (KSČ, ČSL and ČSS). Second, young citizens’ perceptions of the future are examined in a unique cross-national survey fielded in Czechoslovakia in June 1967 on the eve of the Prague Spring era. This individual level survey data allows exploration of the important question of Czechoslovak citizens’ predisposition toward embracing the Prague Spring reforms through comparison with respondents in other communist states and liberal democracies. Third, a single national representative survey of political attitudes fielded in May 1968 facilitates exploring key features of citizenship and representative democracy during the reform process. A replication survey implementing many of the original questions was undertaken in May 2008 thereby facilitating an investigation of opinion differences across time. Fourth, elite opinion is explored using a unique survey of political, mass media, and intellectual ‘opinion makers.’ This research was fielded in the first half of 1969 during the very final stages of the Prague Spring era. In addition, there is some aggregated attitudinal data for delegates at communist party conferences held during the summer of 1968.

The central goal of this study is to illustrate how the survey evidence from the 1967 to 1969 period may increase understanding of the Prague Spring era. More specifically this study integrates theories associated with the Prague Spring era and public support for the various reforms proposed. In addition, there is a comparison of political attitudes expressed by Czech citizens towards the communist regime of 1968 and the liberal democratic system of governance present in 2008. This comparison of political attitudes across time provides an invaluable opportunity to study the stability of values associated with democracy.
Acknowledgements

I would like also to take this opportunity to express of my thanks to those who have contributed suggestions and advice during the research and writing of this study. Special thanks are due to the PhDr. Zdenka Mansfeldová CSc. (Head of Department of Political Sociology, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague) and my project colleagues, Alžběta Bernardyová Bc., PhDr. Lukáš Linek Ph.D., and PhDr. Petra Rakušanová Guasti M.A., Ph.D. Gratitude is also due to Mgr. Jindřich Krejčí Ph.D. for advice and access to publications from the Prague Spring era.

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The survey data used in this research study comes from a variety of sources. In this respect, I am indebted to those involved in the Mlynár team survey (1968) and most especially doc. PhDr. Lubomír Brokl and to Ing. Josef Bečvář. I am similarly grateful to Michal Illner JUDr. and Professor Charles Kadushin (Brandeis University, MA, USA) for access to the Czechoslovak Opinion Makers Survey (1969). The World in the Year 2000 survey dataset was kindly provided by UK Data Archive, University of Essex and the Social Data Archive, Cologne, Germany.

On a personal note, I would like to make a special mention of the support given by Eve Cullen, Bernard Lyons, Paula Lyons, Maria and Paddy Devenny, and Ben Lyons. This work is dedicated to the memories of Pauline (Nolan) Lyons and Dan Lyons. Any errors of fact or interpretation in use of the survey data and academic works cited in this study lie with the author.

Pat Lyons
December 2009
Prague
Acronyms and Key Terms

**Acronyms and Key Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Agreement Ratio statistic. For example, with a ‘Cantril optimism-pessimism scales’ point ‘1’ indicates being very optimistic and point ‘9’ denotes strong pessimism. One way of summarizing these survey responses is to do the following: ((Sum points 6 to 9) minus (Sum points 1 to 4) / (Sum points 6 to 9) plus (Sum points 1 to 4)). The resulting ‘agreement’ scale ranges from +1 to -1. Here +1 indicates optimism, -1 denotes pessimism, and zero indicates neither optimism nor pessimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Czech Republic (Czech lands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSČ</td>
<td>Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistická strana Československa, 1921-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSS</td>
<td>Czechoslovak Socialist Party (Československá strana socialistická, 1874-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSSD</td>
<td>Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická, 1993-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSSR</td>
<td>Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1960-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Don’t Know statistic (proportion of survey responses who have no strong opinions stemming from ambivalence, equivocation, or lack of knowledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Exploratory Factor Analysis. EFA is very similar to PCA except that the variability to be partitioned between the factors is what is held in common among the survey questions analysed. The unique variability of each of the survey questions is excluded from the analysis. Thus, it is the correlation between each variable and the latent factor which is examined. EFA derived factor loadings are generally lower than those extracted using PCA because EFA only examines the common correlation between the variables examined and the latent factors extracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAN</td>
<td>There are various possible translations of this acronym, e.g. Club of Non-Party Engages, Club of non-party partisans, or Club of committed non-party members (Klubem angažovaných nestraníků, 1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU-ČSL</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová, 1992-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSČ</td>
<td>Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistická strana Československa, 1921-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSČM</td>
<td>Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, 1989-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSS</td>
<td>Slovak Communist Party (Komunistická strana Slovenska, 1939-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K231</td>
<td>Club of former political prisoners seeking rehabilitation (who had in many cases been wrongly convicted under a law to protect the People’s Democratic Republic No. 231/1948 Coll.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Multi-Dimensional Scaling. This is a procedure for obtaining survey respondents' judgements about the similarity of objects. These may be real or conceptual depending on the survey question. The key advantage of MDS is that the perceptual maps generated derive solely from the respondents' answers. MDS uses the similarity between responses to construct a simplified spatial representation of the underlying relationship between a set of variables, where items that are similar are represented as being closer together (typically) in a two-dimensional map. MDS and MDU differ from EFA and PCA because it is the respondents rather than the researcher who identifies underlying dimensions in a dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDU</td>
<td>Multi-Dimensional Unfolding. This is a modelling technique that explores if individual policy attitude scales and the preferences can be effectively represented geometrically in a low-dimensional space. Technically, unfolding involves placing both individual respondents and political attitude scales in a joint psychological space. In this space, individuals are assumed to select the response option (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree) that is closest to their ideal point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalisation</td>
<td>A term used to refer to the period of political repression following the Prague Spring era. It is typically defined as having started in 1969 and ended in 1987 and coincides with Gustáv Husák’s leadership of the KSČ. However, many scholars would apply a shorter time frame where the political repression policies were most severe, i.e. 1969-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, 1991-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>The Perceptual Agreement statistic indicates the degree to which there is public consensus on the opinions expressed, e.g. optimism or pessimism. The scale ranges from +1 to -1 where +1 indicates complete public consensus, -1 denotes complete disagreement, and zero indicates a uniform distribution where all points on the scale were chosen by equal numbers of respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Principal Components Analysis. This is a statistical method for identifying a set of latent constructs such as political values measured by a set of survey questions. The goal of PCA is to provide the simplest representation of the association between the responses measured using a set of survey questions (typically Likert scales). The observed shared variance exhibited by all the survey items examined is assumed to arise from an underlying pattern in the data. Unlike EFA, PCA takes into account both the shared and unique variances of the variables examined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Slovak Republic (Slovakia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIB</td>
<td>State Security (Státní bezpečnost)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UV KSČ</td>
<td>Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Public Security (Veřejná bezpečnost)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following is a brief chronological overview of official mass surveying in post-war Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. The naming of organisations is confusing as different polling institutions sometimes used the same title. In order to differentiate between different state polling organisations, and their associated survey reports, it is necessary to specify a date and where the organisation was located.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ČÚVVM</td>
<td>Czechoslovak Institute of Public Opinion Research (Československý ústav pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 1945-1950). This organisation was known at the time as ÚVVM. This surveying organisation was affiliated to a government department. Political polling ceased in 1948 and all surveying ceased in 1950.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVVM</td>
<td>Institute of Public Opinion Research, Institute of Sociology, ČSAV (Ústav pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 1967-1972). This organisation undertook much of the survey work reported in this study for the Prague Spring period. This institute ended political polling in 1969 and was subsequently disbanded as part of the normalisation process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVVM</td>
<td>Institute for Public Opinion Research, Czechoslovak Federal Statistical Office (Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 1972-1977). With normalisation a new state polling agency was created for the purpose of providing information to the government. Much of this data especially that which related to political affairs was only circulated to senior KSČ members. This surveying organisation was removed from ČSAV and placed within the Federal Statistics Office (Federální statistický ústav) for political reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KVVM</td>
<td>Office of Public Opinion Research, Czechoslovak Statistical Office (Kabinet pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 1978-1990). This organisation housed in the Federal Statistics Office (Federální statistický ústav) remained operational until February 1990 when the post-communist process led to its replacement with IVVM. This organisation fielded between 150 and 200 surveys during the late 1970s and 1980s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVVM</td>
<td>Institute for Public Opinion Research, Czechoslovak Statistical Office (Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 1990-2000). This first post-communist surveying agency was based at the state statistics office (Federální statistický ústav, Český statistický úřad). During the 1990s it undertook national polls in most months of each year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVVM</td>
<td>Centre for Public Opinion Research, Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences (Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 2001- ). Following the closure of IVVM in late 2000 the state polling agency was moved to the Institute of Sociology which is part of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Sociologický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i.). CVVM like its predecessor undertakes polls on most months of each year on issues of public concern providing independent survey data to citizens via the media as a public service.</td>
</tr>
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Introduction

Democratic socialism, when understood as real participation of citizens in social decisions, cannot be imagined without public opinion research (...) Public opinion can become an effective instrument for the democratisation of our life. It is able to find by objective methods, very quickly and in a reliable way, what problems the public has, what are its fundamental needs, interests and desires. The organs of the social system gain from this research one of the safest supports for their decisions, and they can confront their intentions with the existing state of the social psyche and find to what degree the measures are acceptable to society.

Jaroslava Zapletalová, Director of ÚVVM, December 1968

One of the most common themes in the extensive literature on the events of 1968 is that Czechoslovak public opinion fully supported the Prague Spring reforms of Alexander Dubček and the KSČ. Is this true, or was public opinion more differentiated? Did public opinion in 1968 support the reform proposals of the writers external to the regime, or did popular sentiment prefer the plans put forward by political insiders? Perhaps these questions are now best left to historians. In this respect, from a political science perspective one might legitimately ask: Why in the twenty-first century should we study public opinion toward reforms proposed in 1968 that were never implemented in a political regime (and state) that no longer exists? What general lessons can be learned from such an exercise in excavating the archaeological remains of mass surveys of a now extinct political system?

There are two answers to these questions. First, many of the historical and theoretical analyses of the Prague Spring reforms are based on assertions about Czechoslovak public opinion. There is a need to demonstrate using the extant survey evidence what were the opinions and preferences of citizens, and compare them to those of elites. Second, public attitudes toward democracy in 1968 provide valuable information about the “democratic legacy” that formed the foundations for the post-communist transition process of the 1990s.

The question of the democratic legacy of 1968 has important consequences for our understanding of both the significance of the Prague Spring at the level of the citizen and the nature of the post-communist transition process. One fun-
damental question that arises from analysis of public opinion toward democracy under communism: Is the ‘tabula rasa’ argument that Czech citizens had to “learn democracy” from scratch in the nineties a valid assumption, or is it more correct to think that contemporary Czech democracy is based on experiences derived from the First Republic (1918-1938)?

Consequently, this study will explore the nature of public opinion toward “socialist democracy” in 1968 and make direct comparison with the opinions expressed within “liberal democracy” in 2008. The goal of this research is to determine the extent to which Czechoslovak citizens’ attitudes toward central features of democracy such as pluralism are characterised by stability or change. This research is important because it provides insight into the general nature of political attitudes and their stability under different political regimes.

At present, there is little research within political science on the link between political regime type and political attitudes among the same public across time. Much of the literature simply assumes that citizens in all post-communist states learned democracy after 1990 where little account is given of pre-communist political experience. The Czechoslovak case is both unique and important. Czechoslovakia is unique in being the only communist state to survive as a democracy during the inter-war period, and is important in allowing scholars the opportunity to explore the stability of political attitudes under a regime that attempted to repress within “liberal democracy” in 2008. The goal of this research is to determine the extent to which Czechoslovak citizens’ attitudes toward central features of democracy such as pluralism are characterised by stability or change. This research is important because it provides insight into the general nature of political attitudes and their stability under different political regimes.

One fascinating implication of this research is that Czechs’ democratic attitudes were independent of the adjective used to describe the prevailing political regime type, i.e. ‘socialist’ or ‘liberal’ democracy. For reasons stemming from limits in the survey data available for analysis across time, i.e. between 1968 and 2008, this monograph will focus primarily on the stability of political attitudes in the Czech Republic. Some limited comparison between Czechs and Slovaks will be presented for 1968 and this provides some important evidence on: (1) the homogeneity of ‘Czechoslovak’ opinions in 1968 and, (2) the long term foundations of the ‘Velvet Divorce’ of 1993 when Czechoslovakia dissolved into its two main component parts.

Having outlined the central research questions to be addressed in this study the remaining part of this introductory chapter is divided into six sections. The first section will give an overview of the empirical measurement of political attitudes in Czechoslovakia. The following two sections will focus on survey research among both citizens and elites during the Prague Spring era. The penultimate section will present a profile of opinion polling in Czechoslovakia between 1967 and 1989, and demonstrate why mass surveying during 1968 was unique. In the final section there is a road map of the research reported in this study.

Mass Political Attitudes Research in Czechoslovakia

At the opening of this chapter it was asked if there was public support for reforms associated with the Prague Spring movement. Four key events suggest that there was widespread support for the reform programme: (1) the May Day parade of 1968 in Prague’s historical Wenceslas Square, (2) popular opposition to the Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968 and the unprecedented permanent stationing of Soviet military bases in Czechoslovakia, (3) mass attendance at the funeral in January 1969 of student Jan Palach who through self-immolation offered himself as a martyr against the policy of political repression known perversely as ‘normalisation’, (4) rioting following the Czechoslovak victory over the Soviet hockey team in March 1969.

Such crowd based measures of public opinion give little sense of the details or contours of citizen attitudes in Czechoslovakia toward the so-called ‘Prague Spring 1968’ reforms. Did the public really want to embrace capitalism, a multiparty system, complete freedom of expression, and tolerance of all political and social ideas? Fortunately, it is possible using public opinion poll data to ascertain what ordinary citizens were thinking during this period. The undertaking of mass survey research in Czechoslovakia prior to the political changes on January 5 1968, with the ascent of Alexander Dubček, was very limited for two reasons.

First, knowledge of public opinion was seen by the Antonín Novotný regime (1957-1968) to be the prerogative of the Communist government and this leader was unwilling to allow any organisation to gather such sensitive information for fear of undermining the incumbent regime. Second, mass surveying was seen to be ideologically suspect because of its links to the previous political administration (i.e. the National Front government, 1946-1948) and Western social science more generally was anathema to Soviet inspired communist orthodoxy, not least be-

2 A brief chronology of the different regimes that have existed in Czechoslovakia during the twentieth century is given in the appendix in order to provide some clarity to the complicated history of regime change. In addition, brief biographies of the main reformers discussed in this study are also presented in the appendix.

3 The term ‘Prague Spring’ is a popular rather than accurate label for the reform process. The reform era began in January 1968 and not the spring time, it spanned all of Czechoslovakia and not just the capital, it was not a uniform process and encompassed important geographical variations, and proceeded through a number of distinct phases and was thus not a single event [Paul 1974: fn. 6, pp. 722-3]. For the sake of convenience the term ‘Prague Spring’ will be retained because of its familiarity to a wide audience.
cause many leading political figures such as Presidents Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1918-1935) and Edvard Beneš (1935-1948) had been social science academics.

Nonetheless, mass surveying and knowledge of polling methods never completely disappeared in Czechoslovakia during the first decade of communism. The research that was undertaken avoided political issues such as popular support for the regime or its public policies. Survey work concentrated on technical issues that facilitated economic planning. However, with the death of Stalin in 1953 and the emergence of economic problems; interest in the use of empirical social science methods such as mass surveying increased. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that knowledge of empirical research methods from the United States was present among Czechoslovak researchers and academics [e.g. Klofáč and Tlustý 1959]. This formed one strand in the proposals for reform voiced during the Prague Spring era.

Empirical social research during the First Republic (1918-1938)

Czechoslovakia during the interwar period was unique in that many of its leading political figures such as Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Edvard Beneš and Antonín Švehla (Presidents and Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia respectively) were sociologists. For this reason, one might expect that the study of citizens’ attitudes toward politics might have been a central concern within the interwar Czechoslovak social sciences. However, there is no evidence that any representative sample surveys were undertaken during the First Republic. It should be noted that the first “opinion polls” occurred in the United States in 1935, and later crossed the Atlantic to Britain in 1937 [King, Wybrow and Gallup 2001: vii-x].

Apart from the innovation of using national representative samples to measure public opinion based on respondents self-reports, the divisions within academic sociology in Czechoslovakia may not have been conducive to embracing the new methodology. This was because within Czechoslovak social sciences there was a division between those in the Brno School who adopted a theoretical orientation and those in the Prague School who adopted an empirical approach [Nešpor 2007b]. The empirical social research that was undertaken during this era used non-random samples, or census data. A good example of such work was Otakar Machotka’s [1936] influential study of poverty in Prague where almost twelve thousand respondents were interviewed regarding the social characteristics of urban poverty.4

4 Machotka like many Czechoslovak sociologists was politically active. He played a central role in the Prague Uprising of May 5-8 1945; and was thereafter a leader in President Beneš’ (centre left Czechoslovak National Socialist) party. Because of his ardent anti-communist stance he left Czechoslovakia with the Communist takeover in 1948 – a fate that presaged the destruction of the social sciences.

Emergence of mass survey research (1945-1948)

The first political mass survey research using representative national samples in Czechoslovakia was undertaken in December 1945. Curiously, the initial impetus for the undertaking of political opinion polling in Czechoslovakia came from two writers, Josef Kopta and Vladislav Vančura during the German occupation, who learned about mass survey research listening illicitly to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio Moscow [Adamec and Viden 1947: 548]. After end of hostilities, Josef Kopta became a senior official in the first post war Czechoslovak government and was instrumental in the founding of a state opinion polling agency, the Czechoslovak Institute of Public Opinion (Československý ústav pro výzkum veřejného mínění, hereafter ČÚVVM).5

The two main driving forces behind ČÚVVM were Čeněk Adamec and Ivan Viden. Both visited the United States on study trips in late 1945 and witnessed first hand the theory and practice of mass surveying at two top American polling organisations (i.e. Office of Public Opinion Research and the American Institute of Public Opinion) directed by Hadley Cantril and George Gallup respectively.

Initially ČÚVVM faced three important problems. The first was financial where resources for political attitude research were restricted due to priority being given to reconstruction in the immediate post-war phase. Secondly, there were concerns over the feasibility of undertaking mass survey research where Czechoslovak citizens would be suspicious of any interviewer seeking to gain information about political preferences in a situation where the memory of Gestapo surveillance operations was still fresh in the general publics’ mind. Thirdly, the German occupation had destroyed interpersonal communications networks within Czechoslovakia linked to the government in exile in London. As a result there were fears that it would be pointless to examine public opinion in an environment where citizens were uninformed about politics and public policy [Adamec and Viden 1947; Hen 1998: 229-230].

In order to allay public fears, the goals of ČÚVVM’s public opinion research were explained to the public in the print and radio media prior to the initial surveying work. Interestingly, the interviewers used during the first surveys were volunteers who wanted to help establish a free Czechoslovak democratic government. The topics examined in the first national surveys adhered to two key

5 This organisation was known by the acronym UVVM. However, in order to avoid confusion here with a successor organisation formed in early 1987 and also called UVVM the earlier organisation is identified as ČÚVVM. See the Acronyms and Key Terms section located close to the beginning of this study for a brief chronological overview of all official polling organisations in Czechoslovakia during the post-war period.
principles: (1) the questions asked must be of public interest, and (2) all surveys were to be politically neutral and eschewed any hint of propaganda or ideology.

The first mass surveys in Czechoslovakia: The first surveys were undertaken at the request of various government departments (e.g. food, industry, interior, and social welfare), nationalised industries (e.g. the Bata Shoe Company), and the American Embassy in Prague. All these early surveys were undertaken for free as a public service. Technically, ČÚVVM used a quota sampling procedure controlling for age, sex, social class, community size, and region, with typical samples of about one thousand three hundred respondents. All interviewing was face-to-face. The results of this surveying research were collated by the Czechoslovak Statistical Office and the results were published independently by ČÚVVM in its own journal entitled ‘Veřejné mínění’ (Public Opinion), and subsequently within the print media and on radio [see, Adamec 1966a,b].

Initially, surveying was limited to Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia and hence there were no results for Slovakia. One reason for this limitation related to the legal status of the ČÚVVM. It took some time for the National Constitutional Assembly to decide if there should be one single polling agency for all of Czechoslovakia. Within a short time, ČÚVVM became an independent scientific institution that was funded by the state whose central purpose was to provide data on public attitudes toward institutional reforms (e.g. local, district and regional government) and public policy-making. In addition, poll questions inquired about public satisfaction with government performance and the popularity of party leaders and ministers [Henn 1998: 230].

Political opinion polling: The first pre-election poll undertaken in Czechoslovakia by ČÚVVM was conducted prior to the general election of May 26 1946. In this last election before the communist takeover on February 25 1948 there were eight parties (four each in the Czech lands and Slovakia), where five parties formed a pre-electoral coalition called the National Front (Národní fronta). In effect, the election was not strongly competitive as there was no effective opposition to the National Front. The elections themselves are interesting in that they represented a breakthrough for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) where it gained 40 per cent of the popular vote in the Czech lands, and 30 per cent in Slovakia making it the largest party in Czechoslovakia (31 per cent). In contrast, within Slovakia the Democrat Party (Demokratická strana) which was a coalition of all non-communist parties won 62 per cent of the popular vote and was more than twice as popular as its nearest rival the Slovak Communist Party (KSS) which garnered 30 per cent support.

The ČÚVVM survey was remarkably accurate in predicting the election result to within a single percentage point [Adamec and Viden 1947]. This success led to a dramatic increase in the number of mass surveys on political attitudes and preferences undertaken by ČÚVVM in the following twenty months until the communist putsch of February 25 1948. Political opinion polls in the lead up to the next scheduled national elections for the summer of 1948 indicated that electoral support for the KSČ was declining. This may have been one of the reasons why the communists decided to seize power in February before the decline in their popular support became evident in the next general election that was actually held on May 30 [Adamec 1966b: 398; Gitelman 1977: 84]. Unfortunately for ČÚVVM, the new communist regime considered all mass surveying to be politically sensitive most especially since the party did not attract majority support from the electorate. As a result, ČÚVVM was closed and political opinion polling effectively ceased until the mid-to-late 1960s. This formed part of a more general Soviet inspired policy where “bourgeois pseudo-sciences” were banned.

Empirical social research under communism (1948-1969)

The first two decades under communism in Czechoslovakia may be divided into two phases. Between 1948 and the early 1960s there was very little government support for empirical social research because the disciplines of sociology and political science were seen to be strongly influenced by developments in capitalist states such as the United States and Britain; and were thus labelled ‘bourgeois pseudo-sciences’ [Ulč 1978: 422-424]. The officially sanctioned Marxist-Leninist conceptions of the social sciences taught in Czechoslovak universities during the period were not orientated to the study of Western or Eastern Europe; and the few research projects undertaken were not of a new or innovative nature. In 1968, when the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia took place, this overall policy was relaxed again and the study of Eastern European issues was encouraged once more [Zemanek 1994a: 19-29].

6 The National Front had its origins in the latter part of World War Two where Czechoslovak parties attempted to form a united front against Nazi occupation. It formally came into existence with the Kőszeg Conference and eponymous programme in April 1945. This coalition was dominated by leftist parties (i.e. communists and socialists). Initially, it was envisaged that the National Front would exist for the 1946 election and thereafter political parties would compete independently for votes. With the communist takeover in February 1948 the National Front became a permanent feature of the Czechoslovak political system until the Velvet Revolution of 1989.

7 For simplicity this study will use the acronym KSČ to refer to the communist party in a generic sense. Strictly speaking there were two communist parties: one in Czechoslovakia and one Slovakia denoted by the KSČ and the KSS respectively.
the 1950s exhibited little direct interest in the theories and methods associated with mass survey research.

However, the tradition of empirical social research survived despite official disapproval. One channel through which quantitative work in the United States became known to some Czechoslovak academics was through contacts with colleagues in Poland where official tolerance of mass survey research and social psychology theories was much less restrictive. A second channel through which knowledge and support for empirical methods increased in Czechoslovakia was the demand for accurate empirical indicators by middle ranking members of the communist regime who supported economic reforms.

Without getting into the details of how and why empirical social research re-emerged in Czechoslovakia during the early 1960s, the key point to be made here is that much of the proposals underpinning the official economic reform programme (later associated with the “Prague Spring”) were undertaken at the instigation of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (hereafter, ÚV KSČ) some years before the ascension of Alexander Dubček as First Secretary in January 1968.

This was evident in the work of a number of key researchers who often headed specialist inter-disciplinary “teams” who were charged with drafting expert proposals for public policy reforms. All of this research was completed with the goal of improving the Czechoslovak socialist state. The strategy of using expert research commissions as a means of formulating reform proposals for the ÚV KSČ came from orthodox ‘old school’ communists such as Jiří Hendrych and Vladimír Koucký [Mlynar 1980: 84; Skilling 1976: 31, 36]. Five research commissions were established in 1963 and these dealt primarily with economic, technological, legal and ideological questions. Two additional ad hoc commissions were created after the Thirteenth Party Congress of 1966 to examine political reform. All members of these research commissions such as Ota Šik, Radovan Richta, Zdeněk Mlynář and Vladimír Klokočka were committed KSČ party members, but few were members of the decision-making elite in the Pre-sidium (Politburo) of the ÚV KSČ [Brown 1966: 460; Williams 1997: 7].

In short, internal KSČ reformers operated under the patronage and protection of senior party officials such as Secretaries within the Central Committee of the KSČ whose careers were often intertwined with the political repressions of the 1950s. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that these reform commissions had a strong strategic component where the intended purpose of ‘reform’ varied across political actors and evolved over time [Mlynar 1980: 72-76; Barnard 1991: 29-30].

It is important to note that these research teams were hand picked and their activities were undertaken with considerable discretion in order to minimise fall out from intra-party conflict. More will be said on the theoretical underpinnings of this important stream of research in the next chapter. Before discussing political opinion polling during 1968, it is sensible first to compare the political attitudes expressed during the Prague Spring era with those expressed two decades earlier in 1948.

Re-emergence of mass survey research (1965-1967)

According to orthodox Marxist theory, public opinion and party doctrine are the same. Under such a monist perspective mass surveying was not only unnecessary, but likely to be manipulated by those who wished to undermine Czechoslovakia’s socialist democracy by revealing a plurality of opinions [Gitelman 1977: 88-89]. With the revival of empirical sociological research in the 1960s in the Soviet Union, there was less official resistance to the use of techniques such as mass surveying [Lewin 1975: 256, 260]. Moreover, many Czechoslovak scholars were introduced to empirical methods used in the United States through the writings of their Polish and Czech colleagues [Gitelman 1977: 86; Klofáč and Tlustý 1959; Petrusék 1968].

By 1966 there was open criticism, by intellectuals working in the media and government such as Miroslav Galuška (later Minister for Culture and Information, April 1968 to June 1969), of the fact that “public opinion,” as expressed in the media was different from the “opinion of the public” where the authentic attitudes of citizens were excluded from the public sphere. Implicit recognition by senior members of the KSČ that there was a pragmatic need to know the attitudes, values, and beliefs of the Czechoslovak public combined with the willingness of a new generation of empirically oriented researchers to do this task.

Religion, politics and generational effects: Some of the earliest known attitude surveys were undertaken by scholars examining religious beliefs and practices [Fazík 1967]. Although the topics examined were ostensibly non-political, it became obvious from the research results that the data revealed important things about popular attitudes toward the communist political system. For example, a communist party commissioned survey of religious beliefs and activity in Northern Moravia in 1963 proved to be influential in the study of religion in communist states [Kadlecová 1965, 1967; Nešpor 2007a]. This research was later replicated in the Czech lands (1966) and in Slovakia (November 1968), and indicated
Social stratification and power: In November-December 1967, one of the first large scale academic surveys undertaken in Czechoslovakia explored the nature of social stratification and mobility [Machonin et al. 1969; Machonin 1970]. This survey fielded by the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office had a sample of 13,215 heads of households and information on a further 24,466 household members. In addition, there was a smaller sample survey (N=1,431) dedicated to the study of social prestige and subjective perceptions of social position in Czechoslovak society [Machonin et al. 1969: 49]. This seminal research on the eve of the Prague Spring reforms not only painted a detailed portrait of the structure and attitudes of Czechoslovak citizens, but also amongst other things revealed popular perceptions of power, authority, and influence within this “socio-political democracy” [Brokl 1969: 235ff.; Strmiska and Vaváková 1972: 248-255]. Overall, this research indicated that popular perceptions of inequality were likely to have been an important factor in citizen support for greater political rights during 1968 [Machonin 1992: 111]. More will be said about this research in later chapters.

Stability of Czechoslovak attitudes between 1948 and 1968

A unique piece of social research undertaken by an American anthropologist, David Rodnick, examined the prevailing attitudes and culture present in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1969. The bulk of this fieldwork was undertaken in 1948. In-depth interviews were undertaken with 492 individuals most of whom were asked questions on between two and four occasions. Details of the questionnaire and sampling methodology were not reported suggesting that the respondents were subject to semi-structured interviews, and were not selected randomly. The primary basis for selecting respondents appears to have been social class (i.e. farmers, working, and professional classes) and place of residence (i.e. urban, rural, Czech lands or Slovakia).

With the caveat that this invaluable comparison of political attitudes between 1948 and 1969 may suffer from selection bias, the central finding of Rodnick’s [1970] book is that political attitudes in Czechoslovakia exhibited considerable stability between 1948 and 1969. The key mechanism used to explain stability in political attitudes was socialisation. In essence, the political attitudes and values of the First Republic (1918-1938) appear from the evidence presented to have survived largely intact until the Prague Spring era. Equally striking is the ambivalence in Czechoslovak public opinion toward “socialism” and “capitalism” [Rodnick 1970: 15, 30, 62, 202]. It is important to note here that these two terms appear to have been interpreted by the Czechoslovak public in specific ways.

The word “socialism” seems to have been associated with the welfare state and “capitalism” with the exploitation of workers. In general, Czechoslovak public opinion seems to have favoured a social democratic vision rather than communist or free market capitalist perspectives. Moreover, Rodnick’s [1970] work suggests that these general values were stable across time, i.e. between 1948 and 1969; and hence not strongly influenced by life under communism. One of the research questions explored in this study of the importance and legacy of the Prague Spring era is: Are the pattern of values evident in May 1968 also visible four decades later in 2008?

Political Attitudes Research during the Prague Spring Era

Following a seminar on public opinion research organised by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAV) in March 1966, one of the early pioneers of polling in Czechoslovakia, Čeněk Adamec, proposed creating a new institute of opinion polling. As a result of academic pressure and the changing political cli-
mate, a new Institute of Public Opinion Research (ÚVVM) was founded on January 1 1967. ÚVVM was given independence within ČSAV and had a small staff (<20) where the goal was to undertake academic research. Initially in 1967, both the undertaking and reporting of mass survey work had to be approved by members of the UV KSČ, but thereafter this system of oversight was removed. ÚVVM established two interviewer teams with two hundred and fifty members each, i.e. a total network of 500. Having two teams of interviewers gave ÚVVM flexibility in undertaking large national samples quickly and accurately. Consequently, ÚVVM had the capacity to undertake two large national samples (N=1,800) simultaneously, or complete one very large sample (N=3,600) within a week. Interviewers were selected carefully so as to be broadly representative of the population to be interviewed. Moreover, interviewers could not be members of any political party (e.g. KSČ, CSL, CSS, etc.), or be students, in order to avoid interviewer bias effects.

Some trial polling was done with both probability and quota sampling. Probability sampling is generally considered to yield more accurate and reliable survey estimates, and has been the methodology of choice in the United States since 1948 when use of quota samples led to incorrect predictions of the Presidential Election due among other things to (a) interviewer bias, and (b) problems with choice of ‘appropriate’ quota variables [Scheaffer, Mendenhall and Ott 1990: 29-33]. Notwithstanding these methodological concerns, ÚVVM in 1967 decided against using probability sampling for two main reasons. First, a complete national list of citizens’ home addresses was not available making probability sampling difficult. Second, quota sampling although methodologically inferior did guarantee respondents anonymity; and this was an important consideration when many people feared answering in public questions on politics [Gitelman 1977: 87].

An inventory of opinion polls for the 1967 to 1971 period is presented in Table 1. This table shows that at least thirty-four surveys were undertaken in 1968. Twenty-one of these were fielded by ÚVVM, and three-in-four of these polls (n=14) dealt with political issues. Additional polls on political issues were undertaken by Institute of Political Science within the ÚV KSČ and the Central Committee of the National Front. Senior figures in ÚVVM such as Adamec and Zapletalová believed that opinion polls not only promoted democracy, but also respondents anonymity; and this was an important consideration when many people feared answering in public questions on politics [Gitelman 1977: 87].

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Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

The evidence presented in Table 1 reveals a fairly extensive survey research programme. In 1968 there were about twenty national surveys of the Czechoslovak population. Additional surveys focussed on public opinion in the Czech lands (n=7) and Slovakia (n=4), or the opinions of members of political parties, i.e. the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC), Czechoslovak Peoples Party (CSL), and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (CSS).

Many of the results of these surveys were published in national daily newspapers such as Rudé právo and Lidová demokracie and most especially in more reform oriented journals such as Literární listy and Reporter. Thus the fact that opinion polls were being undertaken must have been familiar to a majority of the public. Whether readers had knowledge of the poll results is less certain as there are no empirical data to examine this question. The survey mode (i.e. how the interviewing was done) appears to be a good indicator of who undertook the various polls.

UVVM used face-to-face interviewing with large teams of interviewers, while others tended to use smaller questionnaires more suited to using a postal survey technique. The content of the survey questions asked during 1968 tended to reflect the main issues of the day. For example, the surveys of late April, May, and June explored the publics’ opinion toward the Action Programme; while later during the summer of 1968 the focus moved toward the likelihood of a Warsaw Pact invasion.

During the spring and summer of 1968 cross-national survey work began to emerge. For example, an ambitious multi-wave surveying project undertaken in the United States, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Slovenia) examined general personal orientations and participation in local politics and adult education programmes [Agger et al. 1970]. This research work appears to have involved Miroslav Disman (Charles University) and Radovan Richta (CSAV). Only the first wave was implemented and the data was not archived.

Immediately prior to the Warsaw Pact invasion the Central Committee of the National Front commissioned a surveying programme that asked the same set of political questions to members of the public and members of all the main parties in the National Front (i.e. the KSC, ČSL, and CSS). Some of these results are reported in chapter two and offer a unique insight into public support for reform of political institutions. In general, very few survey questions other than the popularity of key political figures were asked repeatedly across 1968; and so it is difficult to be certain of the dynamics of attitude change during the Prague Spring era, as highlighted by Svitak [1971]. Data from the surveys summarised in Table 1 only exist today in the form of aggregated results which appeared in the Czech and Slovak media during 1968-1969. Some of this data were (re)published later in academic books and journals during the 1970s and 1980s outside of Czechoslovakia [Piekalkiewicz 1972; Skilling 1976; Gitelman 1977: 83-103].

To date, there have been no publications that have used the surviving mass and elite survey data to test support for the reform proposals put forward in 1968. This monograph aims to address this important gap in the literature on the Prague Spring era, and to address more general questions regarding the long term development of societies who were subject to communist systems of governance. Given the disparate sources of survey data used in the following chapters, it is fundamentally important to outline the logic and structure of the research work presented, so as to demonstrate how all of the chapters form part of a coherent framework.

Logic and Structure of this Research Study

A key question arises when a specific study is made of opinion polling during the period associated with the Prague Spring reform movement: How different was the research undertaken during 1968 to subsequent opinion polling, and what is the significance of such differences? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to classify the content of the survey questions asked between 1967 and 1989. Although the actual mass survey estimates are an invaluable source of data, it is also fundamentally important to know which topics were deemed worthy to be the subject of opinion polls.

Before embarking on such an analysis, it is instructive first to briefly examine an inventory of opinion polls known to have been fielded in Czechoslovakia between June 1967 and late November 1971. The evidence presented earlier in Table 1 demonstrates both the scale and scope of polling during the Prague Spring era. During 1968 at least thirty-four surveys were undertaken many of which...
were national samples. This represents almost two-thirds (65 per cent) of all the polls undertaken in the 1967-1971 period. Undoubtedly, this rapid expansion of surveying from less than a handful of polls in 1967 to a similarly small number in 1970 and 1971 reveals important features of the political and polling climates. The topics examined in the surveys shown in the final column of the Table 1 illustrate how politics dominated the study of public opinion during 1968, and reveals an increased openness to using empirical social science methods to examine political life.

However, an important caveat must be highlighted at this point. The undertaking of opinion polls does not necessarily imply that (a) there was a great media demand for mass survey results, and (b) opinion poll results had a significant effect on political developments. A content analysis of the information published by Rudé právo, the most popular and influential newspaper in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring era, is shown in Figure 1.

This evidence warns against overstating the political importance of an ‘explosion’ of mass surveying during 1968. It is crucial to keep in mind that polling results had to compete with a news agenda driven by heated political debates and
salient events. Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence capable of demon-
strating in a methodologically sound manner that poll results had a measurable
impact on the views of either citizens or elites. Consequently, as noted earlier the
main goal of this study is to show how survey data can improve understanding
of the Prague Spring era.

Public opinion polling and the political climate

The content analysis evidence from Rudé právo reveals that opinion poll results
represented only a very small portion of the total media agenda. Perhaps the most
important consideration regarding opinion polls in Czechoslovakia was the fact
that they were undertaken at all, as conservative members of the Communist elite
were generally opposed to them. In this respect, the scale and scope of opinion
polling regardless of its dissemination in the media is an important indicator of

Figure 2 Classification of characteristics of opinion poll design with prevailing political climate
and models of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantive content of survey questions</th>
<th>Format of survey question</th>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Expressive</th>
<th>Evaluative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>1. Democratic centralism</td>
<td>2. Democratic centralism</td>
<td>3. Democratic centralism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>7. Liberal/socialist pluralism</td>
<td>8. Liberal/socialist pluralism</td>
<td>9. Liberal/socialist pluralism; Populism (direct democracy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note this descriptive typology relates two central features of survey design: (a) question format, and
(b) substantive content of items with three different conceptions of democratic governance that were
prominent in political debates in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring era. In this simple model
question format is a measure of the informational potential of survey items, while substantive content
is an indicator of potential public input into public policy-making and governance more generally. This
typology should be interpreted as follows. Cells one to nine represent an ordinal scale of both the open-
ness and salience of mass surveying. Under democratic centralism surveying plays a minimal role on
government, and in contrast plays a maximal role under direct democracy. Allocation of democratic vi-
sions to specific cells reflects minimal positions that encompass all previous cells and thus follows the
logic of a Guttman scale. For example, the political models in cell nine support all surveying character-
istics represented in cells one to eight.

the political climate. Additionally, elite evaluations of the merits of mass survey-
ing provide important insights into the competing political visions promoted dur-
ing 1968. More will be said on this topic in the next chapter.

However, in order to obtain a sense of perspective on why opinion polling during
the Prague Spring era is important it is reasonable to examine the link be-
tween questionnaire design, political climate, and models of governance. The ty-
ology shown in Figure 2 attempts to reduce this complex set of relationships to
two key features of questionnaire design: (1) question format, and (2) substan-
tive content of the questions asked. It is necessary here to outline briefly and sim-
ply why questionnaire design provides an important insight into contemporary
politics.

It seems reasonable to assume that all survey questionnaires represent a sam-
ple of all items that might have been asked. Therefore, survey organisations con-
structing a questionnaire must decide which questions are (a) most important,
and (b) appropriate for inclusion in a national survey. Given significant changes
in the political context and opinion polling climate it is not surprising to observe
different survey questions being asked at different time points. This is a normal
feature in all national opinion polling contexts [Page and Shapiro 1992; King,
Wybrow and Gallup 2001].

Given the political sensitivity toward political opinion polling within commu-
nist states such as Czechoslovakia, it is even more important to track changes in
the content of surveys across time as this pattern provides unique insight into
the nature of political change at both the mass and elite levels. At the risk of pre-
empting the discussion presented in the next chapter, the typology presented in
Figure 2 suggests that competing political models of governance will be asso-
ciated with dissimilar question format and content profiles. The logic expressed
in this figure suggests that conservative communists who favoured the Soviet
‘democratic centralist’ model of governance would have favoured surveys (if un-
dertaken) that primarily addressed non-political topics such as social issues; and
ideally only asked informational questions. In contrast, proponents of a more
pluralist vision of politics are represented in Figure 2 as supporting all kinds of
questions and most especially political items that evaluated leaders, institutions,
and public policy. On the basis of the (admittedly simplified) theoretical expec-
tations expressed in this typology, one would expect the profile of opinion poll-
ing to vary in systematic ways between 1967 and 1989.
Evaluation of mass survey questions

As noted earlier, the simplest method of investigating changes in opinion polling is to examine how questions were asked and what was the content of the question. In this respect, two criteria may be used to evaluate change in the nature of questionnaire design across time: question format, and substantive content of the survey questions. These two aspects of question design provide a simple means of thinking about how a respondent would have interpreted an item during an interview. Procedural format denotes the interrogatory style of the question asked. Here one may identify three main question formats: evaluative, expressive, and informational. In contrast, the substantive content of survey questions refers to the general issue domain being addressed in the item. Here a simple descriptive classification system may be used to chart trends over time for political, economic, and social issues.

Quite obviously, as Figure 2 highlights, question format and substantive content are interrelated where for example questions with an evaluative format were often used with items that dealt with politics. Therefore, a simultaneous high ‘evaluative’ and ‘political’ score is indicative of a more open political context and freer opinion polling climate. Looking first at how questions were asked in Czechoslovakia in selected years over a two decade period between 1968 and 1989, one may immediately identify from the pattern evident in window (a) of Figure 3 that the Prague Spring era is characterised by many more evaluative questions.

The presence of a large number of information items in 1970 coincides with the initial phases of the repressive ‘normalisation’ period. Interestingly, the situation was somewhat different a decade later when almost one-in-four of all questions asked was evaluative. Moreover, this trend toward asking more evaluative questions continued until the eve of the Velvet Revolution of 1989. Switching attention now to the actual content of the questions asked one can from decipher from window (b) of Figure 3 that the Prague Spring era (1968) is characterised by a high proportion of political questions. Thereafter, with normalisation it is social questions that dominate; and this pattern continued until the mid 1980s.10

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10 During the normalisation period some evaluative political questions were asked in the regular KVVM and IVVM (successors to ÚVVM) surveys. The results for these items were circulated only among very senior members of the KSČ. There is also evidence of a secret survey being undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1986 on behalf of exiled Czech social scientists [see, Šiklová 2004].
In the final two years of window (b) of Figure 3 the evidence presented reveals a swing back toward asking increasing numbers of political questions. It is tempting to speculate that one of the reasons for this change was the Czechoslovak communist regimes’ increasing worries that Mikhail Gorbachev’s post-1986 policies of ‘glasnost’ (openness) and ‘perestroika’ (restructuring) in the Soviet Union might foment political discontent in Czechoslovakia in a similar manner to the Prague Spring era. One of the interesting features of window (b) of Figure 3 is the relatively small number of economic questions asked over the entire period examined. One possible reason for the scarcity of economic questions may stem from the fact that such items are often difficult to answer, where respondents may feel unwilling to offer opinions beyond their own daily experiences [note, Berinsky 2004; Berinsky and Tucker 2006; Caplan 2007].

Taking the patterns evident in both windows of Figure 3 altogether one can immediately see that the opinion polling undertaken during 1968 reflected the unique political climate associated with the Prague Spring era. With the rapid emergence of support for various pluralist and populist visions of democracy, this era is characterised by relatively large proportions of evaluative and political survey questions. This fits with the logic of the typology presented in Figure 2. Furthermore, the normalisation period with its adherence to the tenets of democratic centralism is associated with surveys characterised by a focus on social issues using an informational question format. Another key finding of the analyses presented in Figure 3, is that the trend in polling in Czechoslovakia during the late 1970s and 1980s reveals a return to the profile observed in the more open political climate of 1968.

In summary, the simple explanatory model presented in Figure 2 which has been examined using a simple cross-time analysis of questionnaire design reveals the unique nature of the mass surveys fielded during the Prague Spring era. In addition, this evidence supports the argument that opinion poll data does have the potential to provide important insights into the nature and causes of the momentous changes that occurred. This is one of the main themes addressed in this monograph.

**Overall structure of this research study**

Having outlined the basic logic of how the survey data is conceptualised in this study, it is now necessary to demonstrate how the various components, or chapters, of this study fit together. This introductory chapter has shown the political importance of survey research methods within a state where political power was based on a single public whose views were represented by a single organisation. Any attempt to reform such a monist view of democracy had to theoretically justify dismantling the status quo. In a political system where competing elite factions sought to control the degree of pluralism (from zero, to some, or lots); mass surveying represented a core element of debate.

For this reason, it is sensible to begin this study with an examination of the development of mass survey methodology in Czechoslovakia during the post-war period because it directly reflects the state of political competition. This introduction to the main empirical evidence explored in this monograph, shown at the top of Figure 4, forms the necessary foundation for the theories of political reform outlined in chapter one. Showing the logic of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ theories and proposals for changing Czechoslovakia’s system of governance as centring on preferences for greater pluralism; this approach provides the theoretical framework guiding the data analysis, which commences in chapter two with aggregate survey data.

Having demonstrated the essential heterogeneity of citizens’ attitudes varying in systematic ways on the basis of political preferences as is evident in the impact of partisanship, the analysis thereafter moves in two directions as shown in the centre of Figure 4. On the left of this figure, the mass data analysis stream is shown to operate according to a number of different research logics: (1) comparison across space, cross-nationally in 1967 and between Czech lands and Slovakia in 1968; (2) cross-time comparison in the case of Czech Republic for 1968 and 2008.

These two dimensions of analysis facilitate making more powerful inferences about the mass attitudes measured in 1967, 1968 and 2008. This stems from the analytical leverage provided by having: (1) comparisons across different systems of governance (communist, liberal democratic, and authoritarian) in chapter three, and (2) comparison across time of changes within the same society (Czech lands) which lived under two very different sets of political institutions in chapters four and seven. On the right of Figure 4, the elite survey data analysis progresses logically from identifying who were the Czechoslovak elites in chapter five to mapping out their values and preferences in chapter six.
Within chapters four, six, and seven the question of how to interpret the survey evidence, or what theory of data to adopt, is explored through the use of two different data analysis methodologies. The central purpose of raising these methodological questions is that interpretation of the survey data results depends critically on what the data are seen to represent: values or preferences? This has fundamental implications for the substantive interpretations placed on the empirical patterns observed, and hence any judgements of the link between the theories of reform outlined in chapter two and the survey data presented. For this reason, the methodological decisions adopted in each of the data chapters are kept close to the substantive arguments presented. The concluding chapter, as the bottom of Figure 4 shows, pulls together the main substantive results arising from the mass and elite streams of analysis, and this structure facilitates integrating the findings of the present study within the wider research literature on the Prague Spring era.

### Roadmap of this Study

The two central questions addressed in this monograph are: (1) How can mass and elite surveys contribute to our understanding of the Prague Spring era? (2) What does the survey evidence say about the evolution of societies who were subject to a communist system of governance? To date only one volume has examined political developments during 1968 in Czechoslovakia from the public opinion perspective. Piekalkiewicz's [1972] analysis of public opinion during 1968 is based on an analysis of aggregated public opinion poll data where interpretations were derived from frequency counts and cross-tabulations of subgroups. In contrast, there have been no publications using the elite survey undertaken in the first half of 1969.

Piekalkiewicz's [1972] pioneering work is extended here in four key ways. First, the survey evidence examined involves a larger set of aggregate data. Second, this study examines individual level data facilitating the construction of more comprehensive explanatory models. Third, access to both mass and elite data provides an opportunity to present different perspectives. Fourth, the survey data presented in this study is explored in an analytical manner where some of the Prague Spring reform theories are confronted with appropriate survey data for the first time.

As this monograph is primarily concerned with survey data analysis, this raises many methodological issues as noted at the end of the last sub-section. These technical questions are addressed separately in each chapter as they arise. This is because it is not possible to deal with all methodological issues within the theo-
retical rubric of a single chapter. Unfortunately, this form of presentation means that the reader will be confronted with discussions that they may feel distract from the substantive questions addressed. The only defence against breaking the fluidity of the argument presented is the authors’ wish to make the analytical assumptions adopted transparent. This is very important because the technical decisions involved in data analysis have a strong impact on the substantive conclusions reported.

This study starts off in chapter one by exploring the different proposals (and associated theories) for reform associated with public opinion during the Prague Spring era. Two broad streams of reform are identified. The first denoted as ‘internal’ reform examines the theories and plans made by those who were working within the Communist Party who wanted to incrementally change Czechoslovak society. The second source of reform thinking is called ‘external’ and refers to ideas originating outside the KSC that sometimes advocated breaking the party’s monopoly on power. Both streams of reform form the basis of the analyses presented in the following chapters. This chapter demonstrates two key points: (a) there was no single theory of reform but many different proposals that varied in both tone and content, and (b) none of the reform proposals were compatible with the Soviet inspired model of democratic centralism.

In chapter two, attention switches away from theory toward the results of the more than three dozen opinion polls undertaken during 1968. Here the focus is on total public opinion and cross-tabulations of attitudes of specific subgroups. Relatively few questions were asked on more than one occasion, and so the survey data provides snapshots of public attitudes and preferences on a wide range of topics. The aggregate survey evidence reveals that there was no single public attitude toward reform in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring era. The public supported greater liberalism and pluralism where reform was to be implemented in an incremental manner. Overall, the patterns evident in the survey data are consistent with the view that Czechoslovak citizens were rationally conservative, preferring to support the status quo.

The third chapter presents the first of the individual level survey datasets examined in this monograph. Using a national survey undertaken in June 1967 a number of explanatory models of the citizen origins of the Prague Spring reform movement are outlined showing the dominance of the social group perspective. As a prelude to the (future) testing of these social group explanations this chapter adopts a comparative approach. This part of the monograph reveals that Czechs and Slovaks had very similar general political orientations and levels of political knowledge, a finding that contrasts with much of the literature which stresses differences. Overall, this chapter reveals that one of the key structural explanations of political attitudes based on nationality (i.e. Czechs vs. Slovaks) does not appear to be a key source of division within Czechoslovak opinion on the eve of the Prague Spring era.

In the following fourth chapter, there is an exploration of general political attitudes at the individual level using the Mlynář team survey undertaken in early May 1968. The evidence presented in this chapter again reveals that Czech and Slovak citizens exhibited very similar political values (participation, pluralism, sense of efficacy) and preferences (socialism: pluralism vs. monism). The dimensional analyses of political values presented demonstrate the link between attitude structure and the theoretical debates surrounding the Prague Spring reform process discussed in chapters one and two.

Chapters five and six switch attention to the elite level using a survey of key Czechoslovak opinion makers undertaken in the final months of the Prague Spring era. In the first of this pair of chapters there is an exploration of the profile of elite membership, and this is followed by an investigation of their general political orientation. Some attention is paid to the nature of interaction among Czechoslovak elites using social network analysis. The evidence presented suggests that the Prague Spring elite were relatively unified in their values and preferences; and thus the potential of regime collapse through conflict between conservative and progressive factions seems unlikely.

The penultimate chapter addresses the question of the stability of political attitudes across the generations by comparing the survey responses for Czechs in 1968 and 2008. This comparative analysis reveals unsurprisingly some differences in political attitudes across four decades. However, these differences are in most cases not large; and are only observed for a subset of items examined. Cohort analysis reveals that the differences in opinion observed mainly from true opinion change rather than demographic replacement. This implies that changes in attitudes observed across four decades are due to citizens changing their minds and is not a product of change in the composition of the public.

In the concluding chapter there is an examination of how Czech citizens view the importance of the Prague Spring era in comparison to other periods in Czechoslovak history. This polling evidence reveals that Czech citizens do not see the events of 1968 as being very important. Examining the historiography of the Prague Spring period reveals that the survey data fits best with the evolutionary perspective, which argues that modern Czechoslovak history is best characterised as a process of continuity. After outlining the central findings from the survey data analysis represented in chapters two to seven some general concluding remarks are made.
1. Proposals for Reforming Czechoslovakia: The Prague Spring Movement of 1968


Ivan Sviták [1988]

The many proposals for reform associated with the Prague Spring era were never implemented – with the notable exception of federalisation enacted in October 1968. For this reason, the extensive literature on the theories of reform has a counterfactual quality. From a public opinion perspective this has important consequences for any evaluation of the mass surveys undertaken during 1968; and those undertaken decades later dealing with the historical legacy of the Prague Spring in terms of the Velvet Revolution of 1989, and transition process of the 1990s. In short, the Prague Spring reform movement has a strong ideational quality where public perceptions are a defining feature [note, Wydra 2007].

Within this chapter the goal is to outline some of the main theories of reform associated with the Prague Spring movement in terms of their observable implications for public opinion. Consequently, there will be a focus on those theories or proposals for reform that were: (1) key themes in the poll questions asked during 1968; and (2) allow specific predictions to be made of systematic differences in attitudes across subgroups such as age, level of education, nationality, and communist party membership. For this reason, discussion of the intense intellectual debates associated with the 1968 reform movement will not be examined in detail as this has been the subject of a number of previous studies [e.g. Kusin 1970; Skilling 1976; Hruby 1980; Barnard 1991; Karabel 1995].

The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that there was no single Prague Spring reform theory. There were in fact many different theories and proposals that varied in orientation, level of detail, and style of presentation. The main dividing line between reformers was the Communist Party’s continued monopoly over political power. Internal reformers supported a continued “leading role” for the KSČ, while some external reformers demanded a multiparty system of political competition. In essence, the debate centred on the one hand between

1 Profile of Ivan Sviták in an article entitled ‘Chico Journal; If it’s exile, at least it’s not Siberia,’ by Richard Bernstein in the New York Times, January 7, 1988. Quote is attributed to Sviták’s laconic view of the history of Marxist philosophy.
monist and pluralist visions of socialist democracy; and on the other hand the argument was more existential in questioning the Soviet model of governance.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, there will be an overview of ‘internal’ theories and proposals for reform from within the communist regime. Section two will then outline some of the main external approaches toward change by those not directly part of the government, or the KSČ. The third and final section will draw together the key themes from both the internal and external streams of the Prague Spring reform process and place these in the context of the reform of communism more generally. Thereafter, there are some concluding remarks regarding the theories of reform examined and the available public opinion poll data.

Internal Reform Proposals

The defining feature of ‘internal’ reform theories and proposals was that they were generally drafted under the auspices of the communist regime with the goal of influencing the public policy-making agenda. The authors of these internal reforms may be characterised as “reform communists” whose experience of Czechoslovakia (and in some cases life in the Soviet Union as students at university in Moscow) during the 1950s led them to view change as being both necessary and inevitable. Although rarely explicitly stated, considerations of public opinion often formed the basis as to why reform of the Czechoslovak regime was required. In short, this may be summarised as recognition of the fact that the communist government’s failure to meet the Czechoslovak public’s expectations would lead to the regime’s inevitable demise unless remedial action were taken.

The literature examining reform movements within the KSČ suggests there were three main goals at the heart of the Dubček government’s ‘Prague Spring’ programme: restructuring the economy, managing technological change, and introduction of greater political pluralism. In each of these areas the central goal was to produce a theoretical model of change and a blueprint for implementing reforms. These ‘official theories’ underpinning the Prague Spring reforms were essentially exercises in applied socialist theory. Significantly, neither the Communist Party nor the government bureaucracy was given the task of producing these ‘official theories’. Advocated that modern economies were based on technological evolution where the central value of labour would shift from the physical to mental domains. This evolution in the labour market would lead to fundamental social change.

This work was delegated to lawyers, philosophers, and social scientists (i.e. economists, sociologists, and political scientists) working as research experts within the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (ČSAV). A brief summary of the work of these research teams is presented in Figure 1.1. In general, these inter-

1. Proposals for Reforming Czechoslovakia: The Prague Spring Movement of 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key researcher</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Institution*</th>
<th>Key themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ota Šik</td>
<td>Economic change</td>
<td>Institute of Economics, ČSAV</td>
<td>Creation of a regulated market economy based on use of high technology. Advocated for a “third way” between free market capitalism and communist central planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radovan Richta</td>
<td>Social implications of a socialist high technology economy</td>
<td>Institute of Philosophy, ČSAV</td>
<td>Advocated that modern economies were based on “technological evolution” where the central value of labour would shift from the physical to mental domains. This evolution in the labour market would lead to fundamental social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavel Machonin</td>
<td>Social stratification, status and power</td>
<td>Institute of Sociology, ČSAV</td>
<td>Differences in social status revealed that Czechoslovakia was stratified mainly on the basis of type of work. Socio-politically bureaucratic and technical elites (i.e. KSČ party members) were seen to monopolise power where most citizens felt they had little political influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zdeněk Mlynář</td>
<td>Political power, citizen rights, democratisation</td>
<td>Institute of State and Law, ČSAV</td>
<td>The future of communism and KSČ control in Czechoslovakia depended on both economic and political reform. The essential feature of political reform was granting citizens greater freedom. Incremental reform of political institutions (over a decade) should precede rather than follow democratic elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimír Klokočka</td>
<td>Electoral reform</td>
<td>Faculty of Law, Charles University</td>
<td>Reform of the Czechoslovak electoral system to allow multi-party competition with proportional representation using a candidate rather than party list ballot format</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note ČSAV denotes the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences

* Many researchers including these key academics had more than one institutional affiliation, e.g. Pavel Machonin was also a member of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (renamed Institute of Social and Political Sciences in 1968) and Charles University. Zdeněk Mlynář was also a leading political figure through his role as a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party during the Prague Spring era. The key works published by all of these researchers are discussed in the text.
disciplinary research teams were led by one key academic who had strong party contacts. In effect as noted earlier in the introductory chapter, the research work and the final reports were patronised by members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (ÚV KSČ) who shielded the researchers from political interference by granting the academicians an official imprimatur.

Interestingly, it was often senior ‘conservative’ party figures such as Vladimír Koucký (for the Mlynář team) and Jiří Hendrych (for the Radovan Richta team) who were most influential in promoting this form of policy formulation [Mlynář 1980: 72ff.]. Ironically, it was under the conservative leadership of Antonín Novotný that many of the strands of internal reform had their origins.

In this section, the focus will be on the results of five research teams that dealt with (1) the economy; (2) society within the framework of high technology; (3) social stratification, status and power in a communist society; (4) political power, citizen rights, and democratisation; and (5) electoral reform. Each of these facets of the internal reform agenda will now be briefly examined in turn with a specific emphasis on their public opinion aspects.

1. A ‘New Economic Model’

The central weakness of the Czechoslovak regime in the mid-1960s was its inability using centralised planning to solve the structural problems bedevilling the Czechoslovak economy. Much of the immediate impetus for reform stemmed from the economic crisis of 1963, which was judged to be the most severe recession in any industrial country since the Second World War [Feiwel 1968: 82, 103-104; Page 1973: 1]. Senior members within the KSČ realised that if living standards in Czechoslovakia did not begin to improve, and the comparison here tended to be with advanced industrial economies (e.g. Britain and West Germany) rather than other communist states, then public support for the communist regime would decline leading to political instability.

The most influential proposals for reform of the Czechoslovak economy were drafted by Ota Šik, an influential economist and KSČ functionary, in two key book length analyses: (1) ‘The Problems of Commodity Relations in a Socialist Economy’ (K problematicte socialistických zbožních vztahů, 1964), and (2) ‘Plan and Market under Socialism’ (Plán a trh za socialismu, 1968). The ideas expressed in these two works were the theoretical basis for an influential policy document entitled ‘Draft Principles of a System for Improving the Economy’s Planned Management’ (1964) that became the basis for economic reforms initiated in January 1967. The essential problem identified by Šik was that the imposition of the Soviet economic model for industrialising an agrarian society was destroying both Czechoslovakia’s economic competitiveness and ability to innovate.

The only viable future for the Czechoslovak economy was seen to be adoption of automated mass production techniques using the latest technological advances in electronics and computing. According to Šik this economic transformation, which was necessary for political stability, required a fundamental change in the conceptualisation of economic activity under socialism. In this respect, liberalisation of economic decision-making was seen to be crucial where enterprise managers, appointed on the basis of expertise rather than political reliability, would be free to change the productive processes to match consumption demands and simultaneous drives toward greater efficiency. Šik did not propose a free market within socialism, but he did advocate for greater economic freedom within specified centrally determined limits.

In keeping with the central tenets of socialism, ownership of economic enterprises would not be based on individual profit seeking; but on collective (social) ownership. Just as in large capitalist corporations, the ownership and management of enterprises would be separated where management would be motivated through material incentives to maximise the income and profits of an enterprise. Here it would be society that would reap the dividends rather than exploitative capitalists.

From the perspective of the orthodox socialist economic ideas espoused in the Soviet Union, Šik’s economic theory and proposals deviated significantly from the modus operandi evident in most other communist states except Yugoslavia. These economic reform plans had a number of important implications: (1) redistribution of power away from central bureaucratic organisations toward economic sectors and enterprises; (2) promotion of mass consumption based on individual material interests; (3) deliberately creating greater social differentiation within a socialist society; and (4) delimiting the power of the Communist Party primarily to the political sphere.

From a public opinion perspective, one would expect that popular support for Šik’s economic reforms would be greatest among the higher educated professional classes who could have expected to gain from the new economic rules, and by skilled workers who could expect greater income and choice of goods in the future. In contrast, older citizens and those with outdated skills would have been less supportive of Šik’s liberalising proposals along with (long standing) conservative members of the Communist Party. Moreover, one would reasonably expect to see important differences between Czechs and Slovaks on the basis that economic enterprises in the Czech lands would have been in a better position to take advantage of a more liberal economic regime than the heavily subsidised industries located in Slovakia.
2. Social implications of a socialist high technology economy

In tandem with Šík’s proposals for the creation of a cutting-edge technology and science based economy, the research team led by Radovan Richta [1966, 1969] produced a study entitled ‘Civilisation at the Crossroads’ (Civilizace na rozcestí, 1966) that outlined the social characteristics of a post-industrial socialist society. Individuals would be motivated to subscribe to a high technology economy where they would be expected to accept life-long learning and flexible labour force participation in order to benefit from higher salaries and greater consumer choice.

Public support for the Czechoslovak socialist state would be guaranteed by increasing personal consumption. Such a process would in turn make economic enterprises more profitable and the socialist state ever richer in material terms. Increasing levels of consumerism was seen to promote the personal development of citizens, i.e. making them happier and more fulfilled. A consumer driven high technology socialist society would attain a central goal of communism, i.e. the removal of class conflict, because all citizens would attain equal consumption power [Richta 1969: 75, 165, 168].

However, in the process of creating a high technology socialist society it would be necessary to provide the technical experts needed to create such an economy and virtuous cycle of social development with material incentives. The implication here is that the Czechoslovak public would have to accept giving greater material and status rewards to a technical and managerial elite in the transition period between socialism and fully fledged classless communism [Richta 1969: 231-233, 275].

This deliberate social differentiation on the basis of level of skill contribution to a high technology socialist economy was envisaged as leading to a number of political problems. Although, a socialist government was defined by its working class nature it would be necessary for a transition period to give a technocratic elite greater say in order to provide the technical and managerial expertise needed to improve overall efficiency in society [Rich-ta 1969: 251]. This suggests that the representatives of the working class in the KSC would be compelled to cede considerable power to technocrats. However with the emergence of communism, Richta [1969] argued that social differentiation would decline as all workers became increasingly skilled; and as Marx predicted the need for a formal government would disappear in a classless society.

3. Social stratification, status and power

The social differentiation evident in the theories and reform proposals of Ota Šík and Radovan Richta was explored more directly though survey research methods by a team led by sociologist, Pavel Machonin. This research, already described briefly in the introduction, explored the actual nature of social stratification in a socialist state such as Czechoslovakia. What Machonin et al. [1969] reported in their ‘Czechoslovak Society’ (Československá společnost) study did not tally with the official KSC picture of socialism. After almost twenty years of communist rule, Czechoslovak society was demonstrably stratified on the basis of type of work rather than income, where different sections of the labour force held sys-

3 In a number of articles in Rudé právo in early 1968, Mlynář envisaged democratisation in Czechoslovakia primarily in terms of intra-party democracy and legal guarantees of civil liberties. In contrast, Havel [1968] completely rejected the view that greater internal party democracy within the KSC. He argued that it was democracy in society which guaranteed intra-party democracy and not vice versa. This is because without external political control internal party democracy would inevitably become impotent over time. A similar point was made earlier by Schatzteiner [1942: 58] regarding the desirability of greater intra-party democracy in the United States.
tematically different opinions. However, as long as the Communist Party maintained a monopoly on power, these diverging components within public opinion would remain dormant.

Crucially in light of the political developments that occurred in January 1968, Machonin’s research revealed that if the existing “bureaucratic-egalitarian order” ever lost its monopoly on power, it was likely that a diverse range of interest groups would seek wide ranging changes to redress grievances. Moreover, just as Šik and others argued the results presented in ‘Czecholovak Society’ (1969) reveal that there was public dissatisfaction with the communist regime’s inability to meet expectations with regard to standard of living. In this respect, the Machonin team’s research on social stratification in late 1967 provides invaluable information on the political situation in Czecholovakia on the eve of the Prague Spring.4

The large survey undertaken by Machonin’s team in the final months of 1967 included a special module on perceptions of power within Czecholovak society on the basis of employment, communist party membership, and elected position. Individual’s perceptions of having power within these various positions was examined in terms of three key socio-demographic attributes, i.e. age, income, and level of education. This survey work demonstrated that Czecholovak public opinion saw society as being composed of three parts: (1) a small political elite with lots of power; (2) an intermediate groups with varying levels of power; and (3) a majority of citizens with little power [Brokl 1969: 238].

More specifically the stratification of power was divided between those who were members of the Communist Party, and those who were not. Within the ranks of the ordinary party membership there was further discrimination on the basis of being part of the “cadre elite”, or at the pinnacle of power through membership of the “core elite” [Brokl 1969: 253, 257-259]. The results of the Machonin team survey from 1967 highlight a number of important features of public opinion on the basis of being part of the “cadre elite”, or at the pinnacle of power through membership of the “core elite” [Brokl 1969: 253, 257-259]. The results of the Machonin team survey from 1967 highlight a number of important features of public opinion on the basis of employment, communist party membership, and elected position. Individual’s perceptions of having power within these various positions was examined in terms of three key socio-demographic attributes, i.e. age, income, and level of education. This survey work demonstrated that Czecholovak public opinion saw society as being composed of three parts: (1) a small political elite with lots of power; (2) an intermediate groups with varying levels of power; and (3) a majority of citizens with little power [Brokl 1969: 238].

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Public support for reform (and not replacement) of the communist regime through greater liberalisation and democratisation was most evident among those who were least satisfied and most frustrated with the communist regime. In practice, this meant individuals who were compelled to work in occupations for which they were over qualified; and thereby losers under communism in terms of income and status [Machonin 1992: 111-113].

However, it should be emphasised that Machonin et al. [1969] found considerable differences in political opinion among all subgroups examined. In short, position within Czecholovak society was not the only determinant of political attitudes. Adherence to the political values of the First Republic (1918-1938) and the communist regime along with subjective evaluations of living standards and lifestyle were also important. A key group here was the large pre-1948 “middle class” whose loyalty to the communist regime was not automatic.

4 The link between political stability, social structure, and political attitudes had been a feature of Machonin’s original theoretical symposium in 1963 which lay the foundations for the survey work. This symposium included work by Zdeněk Mlynář (see next subsection) and Vladimír Pavliček on interest group conflict and representative institutions, and the theory of political parties [Rohan 1966].

5 Mlynář’s interdisciplinary research team, based at the Institute of State and Law, was supposed to produce about two dozen theoretical studies between 1966 and 1973. These studies were to explore a wide range of topics such as the position of the KSČ, elite decision-making, the operation and role of national committees, industrial democracy, and the role of the legal system in the Czecholovak socialist state.
ceptual model of political reform; (2) gauging public opinion through mass survey research and; (3) shaping discussion on political reforms over the next five to seven years, i.e. 1966-1973, using the results of their theoretical and empirical work.

The Mlynář team never presented any of their survey results in public, as this research project was cancelled following the Warsaw Pact invasion. However, the central themes of the proposed political reforms are evident in three sources: Mlynář’s treatise on the ‘State and Man: Reflections on Political Management under Socialism’ (Stát a člověk: Úvahy o politickém řízení za socialismu, 1964), a report of the discussion of the Mlynář Commission published in Rudé právo in July 1967, and the Action Programme of April 1968 where Mlynář was one of the main authors.

It should be noted that similar ideas were expressed by Mlynář’s colleague at the Institute of Law and State, Michal Lakatoš (a Slovak legal theorist). Lakatoš [1968a: 92-104] dealt more directly with public opinion by arguing that public opinion was both a necessary and sufficient feature of a democratic state. Interestingly, Lakatoš distinguished between “top down” and “bottom up” facets of public opinion. The former referred to the opinions expressed by elites in public and reported (or censored) by the mass media. In contrast, the latter denoted the expression of opinions by citizens. The ideas of Lakatoš are of intrinsic interest, but they also illustrate the effect of not having an official position, as in the case of Mlynář, where as an “outsider” (external reformer) he was freer to express more critical ideas.6

It should be noted that Mlynář was an adherent of the view that “politics is the art of the possible” where he tended to adopt a pragmatic approach in his public proposals for reform. For this reason his views evolved over time in light of political developments [Mlynar 1980: 77-78; Kusin 1971: 106]. As a result, he may be characterised as a “reform communist” in that he accepted the leading role of the party; but was willing to use non-orthodox Marxist reforms to ensure economic efficiency, and thus public support for the Czechoslovak communist regime. This blending of pragmatism, reformism, and deference to socialist theory resulted in a set of proposals that mixed elements of socialism, liberalism, and pluralism. More will be said about the details of Mlynář’s theory of democracy and citizenship in later chapters. The focus here will be on how Mlynář’s ideas dovetailed with Šik’s and Richta’s proposals for economic and technological reform.

Both Šik and Mlynář agreed that popular discontent with communism in Czechoslovakia stemmed from limits placed on economic freedoms and the absence of individual legal rights. This situation sprang from the fact that the primary unit in socialist theory and practice was not the individual (as in liberal democracy and capitalism), but class. In contrast, to the direct democracy presented in orthodox Marxism (e.g. the Paris Commune, 1871); Mlynář argued that effective representation under socialism was best organised through institutions such as the KSC. Given the importance of having a successful economy for political stability, Mlynář [1964] adopted the same position as both Šik [1964, 1968] and Richta [1966] on the need to create a technocratic elite that would manage the economic transformation process.

The proposal to create a ‘technical managerial elite’ who would have power independent of the Communist Party and workers was at variance with the Marxist model of the transition from socialism to communism. This implied increasing rather than decreasing social inequality where the “dictatorship of the proletariat” would be significantly circumscribed in the economic sphere. From a public opinion perspective, it seems reasonable to think that the “winners” in this reform process, i.e. those with high education in the technical or management spheres would favour Mlynář’s technocratic elite proposals. In contrast, workers and those who adhered to the orthodox tenets of the Communist Party would have been more sceptical of these ideas.

In this respect, much would have depended on the system of political representation. Here Mlynář’s ideas evolved over time, although in his public statements he adhered to the principle of maintaining the leading role of the Communist Party [note, Barnard 1991: 28, fn.12]. Unlike other members of his research team such as Petr Pithart [1968] and Ivan Bystřina7 who proposed greater political pluralism in terms of a multi-party system; Mlynář [1964, 1965: 76-81] advocated for pluralism within a reformed National Front where the KSC would play the role of final arbiter representing collective rather than sectional interests.8 Interest representation within this ‘internal’ system of pluralism would be

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6 For reasons of brevity, the ideas of Lakatoš [1966, 1968a] and also Petr Pithart [1968] will not be presented in detail here. As neither held any official KSC position in 1968, their ideas are summarised in Figure 1.2 as examples of ‘external’ reform thinking.

7 Ivan Bystřina’s contribution to this debate is taken from Skilling (1976: 358-360). More specifically an unpublished memorandum entitled ‘K otázám pluralitního politického systému socialismu’ written by Bystřina in the summer of 1968 for the Mlynář team is a key source of this particular stream of reform ideas [Skilling 1976: 360, fn. 99]. See also Bystrina [1968] and for a summary of his earlier political ideas see Skilling [1961a: 254; 1961b: 426-428].

8 The National Front was the official multi-party organ that formed the basis for government in socialist Czechoslovakia. This body had existed since the first post-war elections of 1946. After 1948, the National Front was generally viewed as a political fiction. In 1968, the National Front was composed of the KSC and 4 small political parties (e.g.
represented by a form of consociationalism with territorial and vocational representation operating within a multi-chambered parliament [Skilling 1976: 361].

Given the multifaceted nature of this system of representation it is not clear how public opinion would have reacted to such an initiative. Some members of the KSC were sceptical of the practicality of such a complex system of representation especially in light of other reform proposals such as federalisation [Peklik 1971: 233-234]. In this respect, those who commissioned the opinion polls undertaken during 1968 were very interested in discovering two things. First, did the Czechoslovak public favour a multi-party system? Second, if yes, did citizens prefer a plural or proportional electoral system?

5. Electoral reform

The specific question of electoral reform was examined by Vladimír Klokočka, a constitutional lawyer in Charles University and head of another research team. The results of his research into electoral reform were published as a book entitled ‘Elections in Pluralist Democracies’ (Volby v pluralitních democracích) in the autumn of 1968. In this work, there was a systematic exploration of the theory and practice of electoral representation in the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy. Having outlined the main features of electoral competition in each of these case studies with regard to electoral law, organisation, and the substantive basis for party competition; Klokočka [1968] outlined what he saw were the main problems in Western liberal democracies. Thereafter, he then proceeded to show how the Western capitalist experience could be used to inform reform of the socialist Czechoslovak electoral system.

A short explanatory note is required here to explain the main features of the post-war Czechoslovak electoral system. Such a task is complicated by the fact that there were a number of legislative reforms. In general, elections to Czechoslovakia’s most important assemblies, i.e. the National Assembly and Slovak National Council, were based on a single National Front candidate list. The state was divided into about two hundred constituencies where candidates were elected on the basis of a simple plurality vote in one round for a four year term of office. Candidate selection was restricted to members of organisations that were part of the National Front; and this task was undertaken at the constituency level. In most constituencies a single National Front candidate was placed on the ballot, although in the elections of 1964 there was competition in sixty eight constituencies between different National Front candidates. In effect, Czechoslovak voters had little or no electoral choice. Electoral participation was not compulsory, but the reality was that voters knew they were expected to turnout and support official candidates for fear of future official sanctions [Skilling 1976: 140-141; Kačerle and Hájek 2008].

In his conclusions on electoral reform, Klokočka [1968: 238-298] agreed with Mlynář [1964, 1980] and advocated for a multiparty system within a reformed National Front. Elections to a unicameral parliament would employ a proportional electoral system where voters would be presented with a list of candidates, and would express preferential choices on a secret ballot. Electors would be restricted to voting for parties within the National Front, but would have the freedom to support independent candidates who represented interests outside the official party system.

Like both Šik and Mlynář, a key starting point in the electoral reforms proposed by Klokočka [1968] was the threat to political stability posed by public dissatisfaction with how the Czechoslovak regime functioned. Moreover like Machonin et al. [1969], Klokočka was critically aware of the inter- and intraclass differences in political attitudes and values. In order to manage diverse interests within the electorate and maintain political unity within a communist regime; Klokočka argued that electoral reform should be a key element in the overall reform process. Significantly, both Klokočka and Mlynář agreed on the desirability of a multiparty system; but felt that the political conditions in 1968 were not favourable toward the introduction of an important institutional change.

Within the media during 1968 there was considerable debate over the merits of a multi-party system, and what form political opposition might take. In these debates Klokočka and Mlynář adopted a limited pluralist vision, while others such as Pavel Reiman (Director of the KSČ’s Institute of History / Ústav dějin komunistické strany Československa) wanted a system with two or more political parties. Some contributors to this debate talked of the necessity of having some form of “opposition” to the KSČ, but refrained from defining what form this opposition would take.

In contrast, others within the Communist Party such as René Rohan, a political theorist and leader of a working group established by Jiří Hendrych (ÚV ČSL, ČSS in the Czech lands and the Party of Freedom and Party of Slovak Revival from Slovakia), 15 social organisations such as trade unions, and 9 issue groups [Skilling 1976: 232; Williams 1997: 13].
KSČ) to make proposals regarding the reform of political institutions, adopted a more conservative position. Rohan [1966] rejected the idea of allowing opposition parties in principle, and stressed the leading role of the KSČ and the importance of the National Front. And finally there were some such as Robert Kalivoda [1968, 1970], a revisionist Marxist theorist, who proposed replacing parliamentary representation with a "direct democracy" based on a liberal media and a decentralised system similar to the Yugoslav Workers’ Councils model [note, Barnard 1972: 547; Kopeček 2002: 10]. In summary, there was little agreement within the Communist Party on changes associated with electoral reform. Such evidence suggests that public opinion was also likely to exhibit a plurality of views.

Notwithstanding the “mixed messages” emanating from the KSČ it seems reasonable to expect with regard to electoral reform proposals that those sections of public opinion with liberal pluralist political values would have been most in favour of a multi-party system. In addition, members and supporter of parties within the National Front (CSS and CSL) and various groups that emerged during 1968 such as KAN (Club of Non-Party Activists) and K231 (Club of Ex-political Prisoners) would also have welcomed such reforms. Conversely, staunch communist party members especially those at senior levels would have been suspicious of any loosening of the KSČ’s monopoly on political power and their own loss of position and influence.

Within this section there has been a necessarily brief overview of the main communist party inspired proposals for reform, where there has been a special focus on their public opinion aspect. It has been shown that there was coordination among the research teams in terms of (1) their common understanding of the causes of public dissatisfaction with the communist regime; (2) division of labour into specific though overlapping domains; (3) explicit recognition of the inter-connection between economic and political change; and (4) the acceptance that all reform must be undertaken under the auspices of the KSČ where the goal was to strengthen the foundations of the communist regime.

External Reform Proposals

Among the Czechoslovak intellectuals who were not working directly within the KSČ to set the reform agenda there was a group of ‘external’ reformers. Many of these ‘external’ reformers worked and debated with their ‘internal’ colleagues because they were also members of the Communist Party, and worked in research or university institutions that required official approval for their appointment. In short, the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reform proposals is more a matter of degree than kind.

However, it is important to keep in mind that from a public opinion perspective there would not have been a sharp distinction drawn between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reform ideas. This distinction is used in this study because it relates to an important qualitative difference: internal reform proposals tended to be concrete in nature while external proposals were more philosophical and principled in tone and content.

Perhaps the main distinguishing feature was that the external reform agenda was: (1) during the first few months of 1968 like much of public opinion not a direct part of the Prague Spring reform process being for the most part represented by segments of the official media; (2) not constrained by considerations regarding the internal politics of the KSČ between reformers and conservatives; (3) not limited by considerations imposed by possible Soviet intervention as occurred earlier in Poland (June 1956) and Hungary (October 1956); and (4) expressed themselves through philosophical theorising, promotion of political principles and civil liberties rather than the pragmatic and empirical approach used by the ‘internal’ reformers. Within this section, discussion of the external proposals for reform and their connection to Czechoslovak public opinion will be restricted to two domains: revisionist trends in Marxist philosophy, and calls for greater pluralism and democracy.

A summary of half a dozen of the ‘external’ reform ideas proposed during 1968 is presented in Figure 1.2. This figure demonstrates that the proposals coming from outside the Communist Party were varied, but shared a number of common features such as: (a) wanting substantial political change, (b) making proposals that were formulated on the basis of principles rather than policy details, and (c) adherence to a generally socialist orientation. Consequently, the summaries provided in Figure 1.2 represent an overview of the rich debate without making any pretense to giving a full exposition of the reforms proposed or their likely implications. The main message evident in Figure 1.2 is that the external reform agenda was characterised by heterogeneity. Consequently, it makes little sense to talk of a common non-communist reform platform in 1968.

1. Rejection of dogmatism and search for real socialism

One might reasonably argue that the ideas and writings of a small group of philosophers prior to the Prague Spring era are not likely to have had an important impact on public opinion. In a direct sense this assessment is true, as the major-
**Figure 1.2 Overview of the main ‘external’ proposals for political reforms during Prague Spring 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Main proposals</th>
<th>Proponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plural majority system</td>
<td>Democracy is predicated on choice. A two-party system would have a Communist Party representing socioeconomic cleavages and a Democratic Party standing for political representation. The overall goal was democratic socialism.</td>
<td>Creation of pluralistic political system with a liberal parliamentary democracy with two parties.</td>
<td>Václav Havel (Czech playwright); Pavol Števček (Slovak writer)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Czechoslovak society under communism was atomised and in order to reverse this process greater pluralism must be allowed.</td>
<td>Participation by non-communists in politics where the goal would be reform of the state.</td>
<td>Alexander Kliment (Czech novelist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-formation</td>
<td>Citizens’ rights were not protected under communism. The system of power was not only inherently corrupt but also incapable of solving problems.</td>
<td>Democratisation of the state with the help of the KSC; removal of corrupt officials; reform through community action; federalisation.</td>
<td>Ludvík Vaculík (Czech writer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>Representation of every social interest in the policy-making process. Political parties and mass organisation would be institutions of interest articulation.</td>
<td>Formation of independent organisations on the basis of common interests.</td>
<td>Michal Lakatoš (Slovak legal theorist, Institute of State and Law, ČSAV)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted liberal democracy</td>
<td>The mass media would transform the status quo into a real democracy that would be liberal in nature though not necessarily a competitive multiparty one.</td>
<td>Founding of independent political parties; autonomous judiciary; competitive elections and a free media.</td>
<td>Petr Pithart (Czech lawyer and political theorist)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist democracy</td>
<td>Marxist theory had been badly misinterpreted resulting in the dehumanization of man under communism where the individual was isolated under a collective lie.</td>
<td>Reform of communism through democratisation where truth and human freedom was to be the primary goal.</td>
<td>Karel Kosík (Existential Marxist theorist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist humanist theory which advocated for a communism without apparatuses devoted to workers interests and guided by intellectuals</td>
<td>Active participation of workers and students was necessary to create a true socialist democracy.</td>
<td>Ivan Švitáček (Humanist Marxist theorist)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Communist Party member in 1968. These contributions are included here as they did not hold influential positions in the ‘internal’ reform programme and expressed views that represent specific streams of reform. Also, these reformers are useful in this context in highlighting the full range of political ideas often loosely expressed (and often not attributable to specific authors) in the Czechoslovak media during 1968. A selection of key newspaper articles written by these theorists is available in Liehm (1988).

10 Both Svitáček and Kosík were Marxist philosophers who worked at the Institute of Philosophy, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, and were also members of the KSČ until they were expelled in 1964 and 1970 respectively for their outspoken views.

Orthodox political philosophers such as Jindřich Zeleny [1962, 1968] rejected the analyses presented in the writings of ‘revisionists’ such as Ivan Dubs ký and Karel Kosík as misinterpreting both the early writings of Marx and Hegel. In general, such misinterpretations were seen to have arisen because of: (1) an ‘anthropomorphization of Marxism’ where the focus was placed on the individual rather than class leading to the adoption of the existential and phenomenological ideas of Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Edmund Husserl; (2) the influence of the neo-Marxist ideas of Henri Lefebvre and György Lukács; and (3) incorporation of ideas from a wide range of idealist and bourgeois sources such as Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (First Czechoslovak President, 1920-1935).

Individualism: The most systematic work dealing with political reform from a philosophical perspective was Karel Kosík’s [1963] ‘Dialektika konkrétního’ (Dialectics of the Concrete).11 This work explored the relationship between the individual and society using a dialectical method. The key question addressed is: What does it mean to be an individual? According to Kosík individuality is defined by the freedom to live a creative life characterised by a critical outlook. Moreover, this individuality meant that public institutions should not intervene and attempt to influence what a person thought, or did. Moreover, individuals rather than classes as orthodox Marxism asserted were the agents and motive force of history. This individual rather than class based conception of the individual in society implied that a new conception of Czechoslovak socialism.

Kosík’s [1963] work was both a technical study of dialectics and simultaneously a critique of the communist regime. He rejected the orthodox ‘socialised’ view of the socialist citizen as being an unnecessarily narrow reductionist and mechanical interpretation of Marx’s ‘Das Kapital’ [1867, 1885, 1894] – the main cannon of orthodox communist ideology. In this respect, Kosík’s criticism of the Czechoslovak regime is distinct as it did not depend on the early humane works of Marx. Instead, Kosík critiqued the status quo from within its own theoretical framework. In practical political terms, Kosík was advocating for an (admittedly ill defined) non-Soviet conception of citizenship in a socialist state. However, he rejected the common belief in the liberating power of science and technology advocated by internal reformers such as Šik [1964, 1968, 1972], Richta [1966], Mlynář [1964] and Klokočka [1968].12

Democracy rather than democratisation: A much more confrontational stance was adopted by Ivan Svíták in a lecture given at Charles University entitled ‘Hlavou proti zdi’ (Head against the Wall) on March 20, and published in Student on April 10 1968. Here it was boldly argued that the Czechoslovak state was a totalitarian dictatorship, and the only way to end this monopoly of power by the Communist Party was to have open, free and fair elections with multi-party competition [Svítak 1971: 24-42]. In later speeches to KAN (the Club of Non-Party Activists) members, Svíták made more specific proposals by arguing that multi-party elections would ensure effective electoral competition. In terms of public opinion, Svíták [1971] echoed a point made by the historian Karel Kaplan that almost eight-in-ten of the Czechoslovak electorate (i.e. six million citizens) were not members of the Communist Party, and hence had effectively no real political representation [Skilling 1976: 527-529].

In this respect, Svíták was critical of the National Front and did not support the idea that the existing ‘satellite parties’ (i.e. ČSL and ČSS) could ever function as an effective ‘internal’ opposition [see also, Mandler 1968].13 The emergence of ‘new’ opposition parties would be based on the acceptance of the communist regime and giving Czechoslovak voters a real political choice. In addition, true multiparty competition would motivate the KSČ to reform itself in order to win free and fair elections. Like Klokočka [1968], he supported a candidate list ballot where non-party independents could also seek election [Skilling 1976: 358]. In short, Svíták [1971: 25] argued that the “democratisation” proposed by the KSČ’s internal research teams should not be confused with real democracy.

To summarise, philosophers such as Kosík [1963] and Svíták [1971] were expressing the prevailing mood within Czechoslovak public opinion that the communist regime did not respect the individuals’ rights. As a result, many citizens felt both dissatisfied and alienated. If the communist regime wished to survive

12 Vladimír Klokočka was like Petr Pithart one of the leading members of the Mlynář team [Barnard 1972: 547]. His ideas and work are treated separately in this study from those of Mlynář because of their theoretical differences, and because Klokočka [1968] was charged on a separate research project with the specific task of outlining detailed proposals for electoral reform [see, Barnard 1991].

13 The term ‘satellite party’ refers to political parties that existed legally under communism. In Czechoslovakia there were four satellite parties: See fn. 8 for details. Satellite parties had representation in parliament and for some periods were also in government. However, satellite parties were dominated by the KSČ and had little freedom to recruit new members or undertake partisan activities.

11 As the focus here is on the link between proposals for reform and public opinion the details of how Kosík combined Heidegger’s phenomenology with the early writings of Marx and his dialectical conception of individualised man in nature and history are not given. See, Piccone [1977] for details.
it would have to transform rather than reform itself, by first treating citizens as individuals rather than mechanically viewing them as representatives of a class [Satterwhite 1992: 122-124]. Significantly, attempts to successfully manage this philosophical criticism of the communist regime failed as the Presidium of the KSČ was compelled to issue another public critique of the revisionist Marxist ideas proposed in March 1965 [see, Kusin 1971: 51]. Czechoslovak philosophers focus on the humanist aspects of Marx and development of new theories of the individual led the Communist Party to establish research teams led by more pragmatic political theorists such Zdeněk Mlynář [1964], Vladimír Klokočka [1968], and Radovan Richta [1966] who pursued a more social scientific approach.

2. Pluralism and democracy

Writers and those working in the media are most strongly associated with the calls for greater pluralism during the Prague Spring era [Kusin 1971; Kaplan 1977]. Under communism writers and journalists were controlled by the Communist Party through the Union of Czechoslovak Writers and Union of Journalists respectively. Under the Leninist doctrine of the “leading role of the party” the KSČ exercised its right to use not only all writing, but also all culture for disseminating the party’s message of socialist realism. For writers there was tight editorial control of the two main journals, i.e. the Czech Literární noviny and Slovak Kultúrny život, for literary publication [Kaplan 1977].

However, by the early 1960s it became increasingly evident that Czechoslovak writers were resisting complete editorial control by the Communist Party through the Central Committee’s influential ideology department [Ideologické oddělení UV KSČ]. In the Spring of 1963, the separate congresses of Slovak and Czech writers saw defiant speeches on the communist regimes denial of literary freedom, and press censorship through an unpublished decree enacted in 1953. The KSČ leadership’s attempt to assert its monopoly as the only legitimate voice of public sentiment led to an effective deadlock between the government, writers and journalists from 1963 to March 1968 when censorship was abolished. The Fourth Congress of the Union of Writers in June 1967 witnessed not only criticism of the regimes censorship and restriction of artistic freedom, but went further as Ludvík Vaculík criticised the whole Czechoslovak communist system for being both corrupt and a failure [Skilling 1976: 69]. Consequently, by late 1967 on the eve of the Prague Spring the writers union and Literární noviny were described by senior communist party figures as forming a political opposition.

In the first three months of the Prague Spring writers and journalists conducted an intense debate on the most appropriate political reform model that would ensure democratic pluralism. Most writers and journalists did not make specific proposals for political reform, but tended instead to promote debate within public opinion by discussing various options. One playwright, Václav Václav Havel was more specific than most in proposing a two party system where the Communist Party would compete in elections with a future “Democratic Party” that would represent Czechoslovakia’s democratic and humanist traditions (i.e. Masarykism).

Havel [1968], like Svitáčk, did not believe that democratisation defined in terms of the emergence of public opinion exhibiting a pluralist competition of ideas combined with popular participation in civil society organisations was sufficient to ensure a socialist democracy in Czechoslovakia. Effective and permanent political reforms required a process of institution building and breaking the Communist Party’s complete control of political life [note, Mandler 1968]. Other writers such as Alexander Kliment [1968] seeking greater autonomy from official influence formed the ‘Circle of Independent Writers’ which was a common platform for legal rights, civil liberties, and freedom to participate in political life.

Kliment [1968] went further and made specific reform proposals. He advocated that the satellite parties, social organisations, and newly formed groups such as KAN and K231 should pledge themselves to a common platform. This ‘opposition agreement’ would then be presented at the Fourteenth Party Congress of the KSČ (scheduled at this point for 1970) as the basis for discussion. It was hoped that this document would represent Czechoslovak public opinion and become the basis for creating a form of internal opposition which was known as ‘oponentura’ [Skilling 1976: 527-528].

In summary, a key theme expressed by Czechoslovak writers from the early 1960s was the creation of a political system that would be both socialist and pluralist [Brown 1966; Jancar 1968; Paul 1974; Barnard and Vernon 1975; Barnard 1991]. Havel [1968] and Kliment’s [1968] political pluralism was in broad outlines similar to the centrist stream of ‘internalist’ proposals elaborated by Mlynář [1964], Lakatoš [1966, 1968a], and Klokočka [1968]. Other ‘internalist’ reformers such as Petr Pithart [1968] and Ivan Bystřina went further in supporting a multiparty system with an ‘external’ opposition.14 In this respect, one might ar-

14 See, Pithart [1980, 1998, 2009] for an overview of the evolution of this line of thinking during the Prague Spring era and afterwards during normalisation, the Velvet Revolution and transition process.
gue that Svitak’s [1971] ideas were radical in contemplating abolishing the incumbent communist regime.

However, differences in opinion between these various ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reformers may have been more a matter of strategy than principle. This is because most reformers, and most especially those working within the KSČ, recognised that the communist regimes in Czechoslovakia and in the rest of the Eastern bloc would only allow a limited re-distribution of power. This is because of fears that reform in one democratic centralist (communist) state would inevitably spread, and this this contagion process would inevitably lead to political instability and hence undermine the communist system of governance. Consequently, the internal political reform plans of Mlynář, Klokočka, and Lakatoš were simply the first step in a process of more extensive reforms proposed by Pithart, Bystřina, Havel, Kliment, and Sviták. Most of these reform proposals had limited audiences. It is therefore appropriate in the next section to explore reform proposals that were widely publicised in the media, and hence likely to have had an impact on Czechoslovak public opinion.

**Internal versus External Reform**

The theories and reform proposals outlined in the previous two sections were for the most part a discourse undertaken by the intellectual and political elite. This was especially true before the ascent of Alexander Dubček to the leadership of the KSČ on January 5 1968. The results of the Machonin teams’ survey of November-December 1967 demonstrate that public opinion in Czechoslovakia was fractured into many different interest groups united in a common attitude of dissatisfaction and frustration with life under communism. Much of this discontent had an economic basis. Consequently, it seems reasonable to think that the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reform proposals helped, through media reporting and debate, shape the climate of public opinion as it became more strident after March 1968.

Unfortunately, there are insufficient survey data to determine directly the extent to which the theories of reform summarised in the last two sections determined public opinion. In later chapters, an attempt will be made to relate opinion poll results that refer directly to specific proposals such as having a multiparty system of electoral competition. However, two documents were published during the main period of opinion polling (April to August 1968) that are more likely to have had an impact on public opinion because of their salience in the media.

These reform ‘manifestoes’ are important because they represent the most public face of the internal and external reform agendas.

**Official ‘internal’ reform agenda: The Action Programme**

The Czechoslovak Communist Party’s (KSČ) reform programme published on April 10 1968 is one of the best examples of the internal reform system of planning [ÚV KSČ 1968a]. For example, it was constructed using “working groups” with influential input from Mlynář, Richta, and Šik in sections devoted to the development of “a socialist democracy”, “science, culture and education” and “the national economy and standard of living” respectively [Mlynar 1980: 87-91]. The Action Programme was a public presentation of what was envisioned to be the first phase of the political reform process. As this document was designed to appeal to Czechoslovak public opinion the proposals were framed in the form of general principles. However, while the Action Programme was defined as a platform for unifying all political opinion; it was a product of the KSČ’s own internal thinking and not a survey of the opinions of other parties and reformist thinkers.

Nonetheless, the Action Programme did reflect public opinion in espousing the need for significant reform and the hope that this would indeed happen. Radoslav Selucky, a noted Czech reform economist, remarked in an article in Práce on April 11 that the Action Programme would have led public opinion had it been released in February, but that by mid-April it reflected: (1) what Czechoslovak public opinion expected; (2) the maximum limit of reform the current ÚV KSČ would allow; and (3) the minimum acceptable to KSČ party representatives scheduled to be elected at the Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9 1968 [note also, Selucky 1970: 96-98; Satterwhite 1992: 124-125].

From a public opinion polling perspective, the Action Programme is important because it stated that “public opinion polls must be systematically used in preparing important decisions, and the main results of the research should be made public” [ÚV KSČ 1968b: 23; Remington 1969: 104]. This reflected earlier statements by Alexander Dubček to the Central Committee (ÚV KSČ) on April 1 that public opinion polls demonstrated that Czechoslovak citizens wanted more representation both within the Communist Party; and within public institutions more generally [Gitelman 1977: 90].

15 Mlynář [1975, 1980: 98] argued that a key failure of the Dubček government was its inability to take the initiative by rolling out the political reform agenda more quickly in February rather than April 1968.
The Action Programme eschewed any claim to be a new departure, although it simultaneously claimed to be building “a new model of socialist society” that would be “profoundly democratic” based on “creative Marxist thinking.” The KSC would still direct Czechoslovak society, but would do so through setting an example and using persuasion rather than coercion. Public policy-making would be undertaken through the National Front, existing political parties, and social organisations would work together in a corporatist manner where the KSC would be the dominant partner. In short, there would not be new political parties and multi-party competition among independent parties and political groups.

Politically the key drafters of the Action Programme believed that advocating reform through reviving the essentially defunct National Front ignored political reality and popular sentiment. However, other senior KSC figures such as Lubomir Štrougal and Josef Smrkovsky felt that public opinion would not accept simply ignoring the question of the role of non-communist parties. Therefore, it was decided that a ‘corporatist’ type model implemented through the National Front was a workable short-term compromise [Mlynar 1980: 88-91]. The important question of electoral reform which would have provided public opinion with a concrete guide as to what the internal reformers had in mind was postponed. This is because the KSC hoped to deal with this and other questions initially at confidential conferences and later at the Fourteenth Party Congress scheduled for the final quarter of 1968.

The provisions of the Action Programme that dealt with civil liberties (i.e. freedom of movement, assembly, association, and expression) and property rights would have undoubtedly appealed to popular sentiment. All of these enhanced individual rights were to be enacted into a new Czechoslovak Constitution. It should also be noted that a new constitution was required in order to deal with the Slovak publics’ desire for greater equality within the proposed new federal structure. Overall, there was much in the Action Programme that was designed to elicit majority support within Czechoslovak public opinion.

**External reform agenda: Two Thousand Words**

Following the publication of the Action Programme in mid-April 1968 support for the reform programme both within the Communist Party and public opinion increased and became more strident in the media. This led to a polarisation of opinion within the KSC. Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party such as Alois Indra, Drahomir Kolder and Vasil Bil’ak; and Rude právo editor-in-chief, Oldřich Svestka began to argue in public that the reform process was in danger of critically undermining socialism [note, Ideologické oddělení ÚV KSČ 1969]. Public opinion would have become aware of this ‘conservative’ vs. ‘progressive’ conflict within the KSC in a series of articles published in journals such as Literární listy and Reporter.

In was in this environment of intense intra-party debate and active attempts to shape public opinion that Ludvík Vaculík published his ‘Two Thousand Words to Workers, Scientists, Farmers and Everyone’ on June 27 1968 simultaneously in a handful of national publications. This article had sixty signatories including some well known figures and its content was a blend of criticism of the KSC, and recognition of its attempt to implement the desires of public opinion. The central goal of the Two Thousand Words was to mobilise citizens, and most especially rank-and-file communist party members and lower level apparatchiks against threats to the political reform process.

This article reiterated Ivan Sviták’s earlier point that the Czechoslovak Communist Party’s democratisation proposals should be treated sceptically; and not accepted as a compromise for real democracy. Moreover, Vaculík in his manifesto argued that the KSC had in the past manipulated Czechoslovak public opinion where popular support for “socialism” equated in the public’s mind with the social welfare state, was used to justify popular acceptance of the entire communist party agenda [note, Rodnick 1970]. This deformation of public opinion was interpreted as demonstrating that it was the communist regime and its centralist bureaucracy that was responsible for all of Czechoslovakia’s economic problems, rather than some fault in its citizens. In essence, Sviták and Vaculík asserted that the KSC had ruled against the will and interests of Czechoslovak public opinion since February 1948.

The article had two immediate results. First, it caused a political crisis within the government and KSC where the polarisation of elite opinion forced the regime leadership to denounce the manifesto. Second, public opinion became even more polarised following the severity of the official denunciations [Skilling 1976: 277-278]. Vaculík’s ‘Two Thousand Words’ manifesto is a typical external reformist document in that (a) it was written by a single individual rather than a research team and did not represent the policies of an organised movement; (b) promoted in a rhetorical style bold rather than incremental change; and (c) ignored practical political constraints and paid little attention to any adverse consequences that might ensue from its launch on the national agenda at this specific juncture.

The impact of Vaculík’s article was also felt internationally as many of the Eastern bloc governments viewed the publication of such a document as evidence that the Dubček government had effectively lost control in Czechoslovakia.
1. Proposals for Reforming Czechoslovakia: The Prague Spring Movement of 1968

[Brown 2009: 374-375]. In this respect, the fact that the ‘Two Thousand Words’ article was printed and elicited widespread public support; and the Czechoslovak regime was impotent in setting the political agenda reinforced the view that external support for orthodox and loyal (conservative) elements may be needed.

Conclusion

A central theoretical theme of the Prague Spring reform movement was whether it was possible to reorganise Czechoslovak political institutions and still remain a recognisably communist state. The Soviet leadership having seen both the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ proposals and developments in Czechoslovak public opinion decided that the Prague Spring was not leading to a reform of socialism, but a transformation away from orthodox communist ideology and practice. With the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20-21 1968 it becomes a counterfactual question as to how the communist regime led by Dubček would have developed in the absence of military intervention.

The history of Marxist thought, as the opening quote suggests, demonstrates that all efforts to develop a Marxist theory that is compatible with the basic tenets of multiparty democracy have ended in failure. The Soviet model of a single party state is incompatible with any theory that supports pluralist public opinion and competitive multiparty competition. The internal reform theories proposed by Mlynář [1964] and more especially Klokočka [1968] represent significant attempts to construct a theory of socialist pluralism [Barnard 1991]. Whether socialist pluralism could have been implemented as an effective system of governance is debatable. However, the fact that Czechoslovak political theorists pursued this line of reasoning is important as it reveals some of the critical divisions and innovations evident among elites during the Prague Spring era.

Within this chapter an attempt has been made to make explicit links between the ‘internal reformist’ and ‘external transformist’ agendas associated with the Prague Spring era and public opinion. Where the theories and recommendations of internalists such as Mlynář espoused in public incremental change of the status quo; Vaculík and others externalists saw complete transformation of the state as being necessary.

However, one must be beware of dichotomising political thought during this era into pro- or anti-status quo streams because there was much overlap between internal and external theorists as Figures 1.1 and 1.2 indicate. In addition, it was never clear during 1968 what the various reformers ultimate aims were because there was a good deal of strategic position taking. Significantly, Mlynar [1980: 60] later argued that the differences between internal and external reformers were “more a matter of style than substance.” In this respect, one could argue that the activities of both the internal and external reformers complemented each other, although this was not a conscious plan during the Prague Spring era.

In the next chapter the focus will shift to exploring the opinion poll data in terms of the key themes identified here. The data presented in chapter two are aggregate level, and will give an insight into the attitudes of specific subgroups and the public as a whole. Although public opinion during 1968 was undoubtedly fluid in nature, the available opinion poll data only facilitates mapping out the contours of public attitudes rather than their dynamics. Notwithstanding, this limitation much remains to be learned about public opinion during short historical periods marked with the potential for great political change as was the case during the Prague Spring era.
2. Conceptions of Democracy, Public Opinion and Opinion Polling

To begin with we will oppose the view, sometimes voiced, that a democratic revival can be achieved without the communists, or even in opposition to them. This would be unjust and foolish too. The communists already have their organizations in place, and in these we must support the progressive wing. They have their experienced officials, and they still have in their hands, after all, the crucial levers and buttons. On the other hand they have presented an Action Program to the public. This program will begin to even out the most glaring inequalities, and no one else has a program in such specific detail.

Two Thousand Words, June 27 1968

One of the central themes of the last chapter was that all of the theories of reform were justified on the basis of promoting the will and true interests of the citizens of Czechoslovakia. In short, all of the political theories proposed espoused enhancing democracy. One might reasonably ask were all these different political theories and reform proposals talking about the same concept of democracy. Moreover, did the term “democracy” become so debased by contrary usage that public opinion would have become confused and lost interest in expressing a preference for one political vision?

The goal of this chapter is to explore this question using the surviving aggregated public opinion data. In order to undertake this task it is necessary to integrate the various conceptions of democracy inherent in the political theories discussed in the last chapter with ideas about public opinion and its measurement through opinion polling. A key first step in this theoretical synthesis depends on recognising that democracy is an “essentially contested concept.” This has important consequences for any study of public opinion because one must confront the possibility that the survey data do not represent citizens’ general political preferences because proposals for ‘democracy’ have no fixed meaning.

If this is true, one might reasonably argue that advocates of reform embarked on rhetorical and heresthetic (agenda setting) strategies to use public opinion poll results in order to promote the interests of a specific group [Riker 1986, 1996]. As a result, the extant polling data reveal little more than the success of specific interests in manipulating the narrative of public debates; and hence determined the media agenda by establishing the saliency of issues reported. In sum, public opinion poll results do not reveal citizens preferences but their exposure to salient media messages.
In order to address this difficult problem, this chapter will explore the different visions of democracy associated with the Prague Spring era in terms of their key principles. Thereafter, the argument presented in this chapter will highlight how different models of democracy varied on what constituted public opinion, and the legitimacy of opinion polling as a means of representing public preferences. Having established in an admittedly simplified manner the association between conception of democracy and the role of public opinion (via mass surveying), it should then be possible to hypothesise about the likely relationship between public preferences for reform and the various theories of reform proposed. Testing these hypotheses with opinion poll data on a number of key democratic issues will facilitate determining what were the Czechoslovak publics’ preferences regarding reform and type of democracy. By following this strategy there is avoidance of the unanswerable question of which of the political vision espoused during the Prague Spring era was truly ‘democratic.’

The central finding of this chapter is that there was no single public opinion toward political reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The apparently inconsistent attitudes where the public professed support for the status quo and substantial political change underscore citizens rational response to a complex and uncertain situation. The Czechoslovak public’s changing levels of trust in political leaders demonstrates that citizens were attentive to changing events and rewarded or punished national politicians on their perceived performance. This evidence suggests that some of the basic foundations for a more pluralist form of socialist democracy were present from the outset.

The argument presented in this chapter will be structured as follows. In the first section there is a theoretical discussion of the different visions of democracy prominent during the political debates present during the Prague Spring of 1968. Section two develops these theoretical ideas by linking them to conceptions of public opinion and its measurement through mass surveying. Section three presents the results of the data analysis in terms of the hypotheses outlined at the end of the second section. This is followed by some concluding remarks.

Different Visions of Democracy

The seven characteristics defining the essentially contested nature of the concept of democracy, outlined in the following quotation, may be reasonably seen as characterising the public debate concerning political reform during 1968 [Gallie 1956: 168, 171-180, 183-187, 194ff.]. Gallie’s [184-186] definition of why democracy is an essentially contested concept is worth quoting in full, so as to demonstrate the context in which Czechoslovak citizens expressed political attitudes in opinion polls during 1968.

(I) The concept of democracy which we are discussing is appraisive; indeed many would urge that during the last one hundred and fifty years it has steadily established itself as the appraisive political concept par excellence.

(II) and (III) The concept of democracy which we are discussing is internally complex in such a way that any democratic achievement (or programme) admits of a variety of descriptions in which its different aspects are graded in different orders of importance.

(IV) The concept of democracy which we are discussing is “open” in character. Politics being the art of the possible, democratic targets will be raised or lowered as circumstances alter, and democratic achievements are always judged in the light of such alterations.

(V) The concept of democracy which we are discussing is used both aggressively and defensively.

(VI) These uses claim the authority of an exemplar, i.e., of a long tradition (perhaps a number of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions) of demands, aspirations, revolts and reforms of a common anti-egalitarian character; and to see that the vagueness of this tradition in no way affects its influence as an exemplar.

(VII) Can we add, finally, that continuous competition for acknowledgement between rival uses of the popular concept of democracy seems likely to lead to an optimum development of the vague aims and confused achievements of the democratic tradition?

From a public opinion perspective, recognition of the essentially contested nature of the public debate in 1968 is fundamentally important for any inferences one might like to make from the extant survey data. Within the media debates of the Prague Spring era there was general agreement that democracy is a form of government by the people, but there was disagreement over what constitutes a “true” democratic state. One of the reasons for this debate over the concept of democracy derives from the contradictory principles associated with this concept. For example, is a democratic state defined by equality between citizens or the freedom of individuals to pursue their interests? Which of these two principles should be given priority if they conflict?1

1 This confrontation between the individual equality and freedom principles of democracy have been central features of the debates surrounding the influential works of Isaiah Berlin [1969] and John D. Rawls [1971]. Note also subsequent work deriving from Berlin’s and Rawls’ theories: Riker [1982] and Mackie [2003]; Nozick [1974], Cohen [2000], and Sandel [1998] respectively.

[78]

[79]
On the basis of these kinds of considerations, democratic states tend to be described in terms of particular adjectives such as “socialist” or “liberal”. If equality is ascribed to be a dominant principle in a democracy then states have often defined themselves as “socialist.” In contrast, if individual freedom or liberty is defined as a core principle then this system of governance explicitly defines itself as a “liberal” democracy. In both socialist and liberal democracies all citizens through elections select who is to be in government for a set period of time. Moreover, both variants of democracy emphasise the importance of periodic elections so that citizens may replace leaders on the basis of their performance in office.

Adherence to the principles of equality and freedom are sometimes evident in the type of electoral systems used to select political leaders where systems emphasising equality choose proportional rules while those that stress individual liberty gravitate toward majoritarian electoral laws. However, the differences between socialist and liberal visions of democracy are often more salient regarding public management of the economy [see, Bingham Powell 2000: 3-43]. Socialist democracies ensure equality through extensive government intervention into the economy with the provision of such things as universal access at point of provision to education, healthcare, and social welfare regardless of ability to pay for such services. In order to provide and fund such systems of equality the state is compelled to “intervene” in the economy. In contrast, liberal democratic states place a greater importance on leaving citizens free to pursue their own interests. As a result, the state avoids undertaking tasks that might be done by individuals or imposing burdens on citizens through taxation or regulations.

The distinction between ‘socialist’ and ‘liberal’ democracies may be taken one step further with regard to what might be called the primary unit of analysis. Within socialist democracies that were governed by communist regimes in the past, Marxist theory dictated that it was class that was the most important unit in making decisions. The central idea here was that all members of the same class were the same, and important differences existed across all classes. A central goal of a socialist democracy was to remove all class differences yielding a system of complete equality known as communism. In contrast, within liberal democratic states a type of methodological individualism prevailed where all decisions were viewed in terms of the citizen. In such states the principle of liberty is given its highest expression in the value that all citizens should be free to pursue opportunities within society without interference from the government, or other citizens.

Viewed from this admittedly limited and simplified perspective some key differences between socialist and liberal democracies arise. For citizens living within a socialist democracy one would expect to see political attitudes consonant with the value of equality such as support for policies that reduce differences in wealth and extended access to education, healthcare, and social services. In contrast, citizens living in a liberal democracy would support values that grant the individual the maximum opportunity to pursue whatever goals desired so long as they do not reduce the freedom of others (also known more technically as Pareto optimality).

Within democratic states citizens are free to choose whether public policymaking has a stronger liberal or egalitarian focus. However, within socialist democracies (or democratic centralist states) such as Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1989 the electorate was not free to change the focus of public policymaking through elections for example. The implication here, as Rodnick [1970] argues, is that the specific liberal democratic values associated with the First Republic (1918-1938), and President Masaryk in particular, remained latent among citizens living in a state founded on the Soviet model of democratic centralism [see, Masaryk 1927: 333-441; Capek 1995: 153ff.].

Therefore, the Czechoslovak case is unique in allowing scholars to study whether political attitudes under two very different visions of democracy (i.e. socialist democracy in 1968, and liberal democracy post-1989) are dissimilar. Such an analysis is important because it addresses the more general question of the link between political attitudes and regime type where it is often argued that attitudes supportive of democracy are likely to be weak within authoritarian regimes. An examination of this specific question is postponed until chapter seven.

### Public Opinion, Opinion polls and Democracy

When interpreting survey data on mass political attitudes it is critical to have some understanding of (1) the role that opinion polls play in linking masses and elites; and (2) the role that mass surveys play within political competition. Within the framework of this study it is important to stress from the outset that public opinion and opinion poll results have different statuses within different forms of democratic governance. However, as there have been different strands of theorising within both socialist and liberal democracies the conception of citizenship, public opinion, and opinion polling can exhibit overlapping similarities under both systems. It is necessary first to outline the main conceptual features of (a) public opinion, and (b) opinion polling in socialist and liberal democracies.
Public opinion and opinion polling in a Socialist Democracy

In theory within socialist democracies, that is communist regimes that adhered to an orthodox (Stalinist) modus operandi, public opinion did not exist. The communist party and government expressed the will of all citizens because in a classless state there could under orthodox interpretations of Marxist theory be only a unanimous opinion on all public issues. Adopting this 'monist' interpretation of public opinion meant that any acceptance of the pluralist assumption that the public had heterogeneous opinions was tantamount to asserting that the theory underpinning socialist democracy did not match with reality [Lakatoš 1968a: 92-104; Klímová 1969; Gitelman 1977; Welsh 1981; Kwiatkowski 1992; Henn 1998, 2001]. Consequently, the very idea of mass surveying had very important implications for both the theory and power structure within a communist regime. Anyone, advocating the merits of opinion polling could be accused of subscribing to a liberal democratic conception of the state. In this respect, two theoretical justifications could be used for using sample survey techniques. The first reason is that within the 'later' writings of Marx (e.g. Das Kapital, 1867, 1885, 1894) the transition period between a socialist and communist society was likely to be characterised by differentiated opinions that would converge over time, and mass surveying could facilitate this process by providing information on subgroup patterns and trends. Secondly, Marx's humane socialist writings such as 'The Paris Commune' (1871) emphasised the importance of individual participation in decision-making and the reconciliation of individual opinions for the collective good [Marx 1871, 1984; Page 1973: 55-57]. These two justifications regarding the study of public opinion using mass survey techniques were defended by reform communists on the basis that orthodox (Stalinist) policies of 'democratic centralism' were ineffective, and alienated citizens [Mlyňáč 1964; Klokočka 1968].

Public opinion and opinion polling in a Liberal Democracy

Within liberal democracies such as the United States there have been at least three influential conceptions of the role that opinion polls play within a system of indirect political representation. The first “populist” conception argues that citizens should have a direct impact on government and public policy-making where opinion polls would measure in an objective manner public preferences which would then inform government decisions [Gallup and Rae 1940; also note, Yankelovich 1991]. Significantly, some of the key figures in opinion poll-
sent in Figure 2.1 is that contrasting conceptions of public opinion, and the use of opinion poll data, tell us important things about the model of democracy envisioned by political theorists and reformers.

Figure 2.1 Typology of conception of public opinion, type of democracy and Prague Spring reform proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose for which polls are undertaken:</th>
<th>Conception of public opinion:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Monist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. COMPETITIVE ELITISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>IV. SOCIALIST PLURALISM***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. POPULISM (Direct democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IIIb. LIBERAL PLURALISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IVA. IDEOLÓGICO PLURALISM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The so-called ‘White Book’ was written by a group of Soviet journalists and published first in in Russian and translated soon after into Czech (Skupina sovětských Jurnalistů: 1968) and English (On events in Czechoslovakia, facts, documents, press reports, and eye witness accounts. Moscow: 1968).

** Vaculík’s ‘Two Thousand Words’ manifesto of June 27 1968 was published simultaneously in Literární listy, Práce, Zemědělské noviny and Mladá fronta. This text is reprinted in Hoppe [2004: 220], and an online version is available on a number of sites on the internet. An English language translation of the manifesto is given in Remington [1969: 196-202]. Reprinted versions of the articles by Kliment [1968] and Havel [1968] are available in Hoppe [2004: 220].

*** For details of this political theory see, Barnard and Vernon [1975], and Barnard [1972, 1991].

Note that a selection of key newspaper articles by these theorists is available in Liehm (1988). Public opinion is conceptualised here as a dimension that ranges from ‘monism’ where citizens’ attitudes are homogeneous to ‘pluralism’ where individual sentiments are characterised by heterogeneity. The second dimension represents the purpose of measuring public opinion using mass surveys, and these range from using opinion polls for purely ‘private’ strategic purposes to employing mass survey data as part of a ‘public’ information dissemination exercise where both citizens and elites have the same knowledge of public opinion. For the sake of simplicity, this typology dichotomises what are in reality dimensions characterised by degrees of pluralism and publicness.

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**Democratic Centralism:** The first cell of Figure 2.1 on the top left indicates that orthodox communist (Stalinist) regimes support a democratic centralist vision of socialism. Following Leninist theory where the communist party plays a leading and guiding role in society public opinion becomes by definition characterised by value consensus, or homogeneity. In this situation, mass surveys are denounced by orthodox Marxists as Western bourgeois “pseudo-science” [Skupina sovětských Jurnalistů 1968; Kwiatowski 1992: 358]. Hence opinion polls are (a) not undertaken, or (b) undertaken where the results are kept private. Both strategies were used in the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe [Gitelman 1977; Welsh 1981; Síklová 2004]. This view of public opinion and polling typified the positions adopted during the Stalinist orthodoxy associated with the rule of Antonín Novotný (1957-1968), and the Normalisation period (1969-1987) under Gustáv Husák. In short, orthodox communists equated public opinion with party ideology; and judged opinion polls to be dangerous and not appropriate for public consumption.

**Competitive Elitism:** Switching focus now to the second (top right) cell of Figure 2.1, we see here that public opinion is conceptualised as being composed of different and competing interests. These systematic differences in public opinion provide incentives for rival political elites to identify issues that will give them an advantage during inter-election periods through emphasis in the media and most importantly during election campaigns [note, Riker 1982]. Unsurprisingly, the logic of this competitive elitism perspective suggests that those who commission opinion polls have an incentive to keep mass survey results private in order to maximise the strategic advantage of having such information. Many of the research teams that were commissioned by the Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ) viewed survey research as a means of obtaining information for the purposes of planning a reform strategy. In this situation, the survey data were for exclusive use by selected senior KSČ members, and was not viewed as the basis for public debate. One might reasonably argue that the Mlynář research team’s national survey of political attitudes of May 2-14 1968 is an example of a competitive elitist view of public opinion, and the use of mass survey results. This is because there was the aspiration to shape the reform agenda. Private opinion poll results would inform this strategy, and thus facilitate out manoeuvring the less well informed conservatives and radical factions within Czechoslovak politics in 1968.2

2 In this study the reasons as to why antagonistic conservative and reformist elements existed within the KSČ (i.e. democratic centralism vs. competitive elitism and socialist pluralism) is not examined for reasons of brevity. One explanation proposed by Parkin
Liberal Pluralism and Populism: In the third (bottom left) cell of Figure 2.1 there are the Liberal Pluralist and Populist perspectives on democracy and public opinion. Here the measurement of citizens’ heterogeneous attitudes is undertaken for the purpose of contributing to public debate and the formulation of public policy. The Liberal Pluralist emphasises the role of different interest groups who compete openly to influence total public opinion and decision-makers. In contrast, the Populist perspective stresses the idea that public opinion has a key role to play during inter-election periods where opinion poll results give otherwise silent citizens a voice within policy debates.

Socialist Pluralism: Finally, the cell on the bottom right of Figure 2.1 denotes the Socialist Pluralism approach to public opinion. This perspective emphasises the Leninist principle of the “vanguard” or “leading role” to be played by the Communist Party. Here there is recognition of the fact that real-world socialist democracies such as Czechoslovakia were not classless societies, as orthodox communist theory advocated, but were in fact stratified [Machonin et al. 1969]. Moreover, social stratification was accompanied by a complex set of different interests where there was significant inter- and intra-strata differences in perceptions of political power [Brokl 1969]. From this perspective, there was what could be termed an “overlapping consensus” on the goals of the communist regime [note, Rawls 1987, 1993]. These goals were defined in terms of adherence to socialism with the long-term goal of attaining communism as defined by Marx. In the transition from socialism to communism it was accepted that sectional interests would have to be managed effectively; otherwise the communist regime would collapse [Sík 1964, 1968, 1972, 1990; Richta 1966; Mlynář 1964; Machonin 1969; Page 1973]. In this respect, we have already seen in chapter one that Czech and Slovak reform theorists such as Vladimír Klokočka [1968] and Michal Lakatoš [1966, 1969] promoted the idea of allowing the expression of preferences in (a) multiparty elections, and (b) published opinion polls. This venting of frustration would help ensure the success of Sík’s economic reform programme initiated in early 1967.

In short, the KSC would use surveys and elections results to understand the preferences of competing interests; and thereafter design national plans to manage pluralism, achieve the goals of socialism, and ensure the continued dominance of the Communist Party [note, Barnard and Vernon 1975; Barnard 1991].

Theory confronting data

Combining the proposals for reform outlined in chapter one and the typology summarised in Figure 2.1, it is possible to elaborate expectations linking conceptions of public opinion and attitudes toward electoral reform. The essential idea here is to connect elite led proposals for reform and their varying conceptions of political representation and public opinion with the results of opinion polls measuring Czechoslovak citizens’ preferences. In addition to exploring total public opinion, this analysis will also search for systematic differences within public opinion on the basis of likely “winners and losers.”

With proposals such as electoral reform one would expect varying preferences across members of the general public and members of the three state sanctioned political parties (i.e. the KSC, and the two main “satellite parties” CSL and ČSS) all of whom had privileged positions through membership of the National Front. In short, it seems reasonable to suppose that members of these parties would for understandable self-interested reasons only support political reforms that would maximise their potential electoral support. These theoretical expectations may be summarised as follows.

- H1 Democratic Centralism: Public support on the issue of electoral reform should be limited to preserving the status quo where the Communist Party would permanently dominate a moribund National Front. Conservative or risk averse members of the satellite parties (CSL and ČSS) would have adopted a ‘minimax’ strategy (minimising the maximum possible electoral loss) of supporting no electoral change thereby ensuring their privileged, albeit subordinate, position under the KSC.
- H2 Competitive Elitism: A plurality of public opinion would have supported the KSC’s Action Plan’s proposal for re-invigorating the National Front as part of the first phase of greater political reform. However, the leading role of the Communist Party would remain intact. Reformist members of the KSC would have preferred this proposal, and hence a party list voting system.
- H3 Liberal Pluralism / Populism: A plurality would have favoured abandonment of institutions of democratic centralism and a move toward either a plural electoral system with Single Member Districts [Havel 1968], or a more populist form of direct democratic representation espoused in Vacu-
Public Opinion toward Democracy and Elections

A necessary condition for the undertaking of opinion polling is that the public thinks there is some merit in this form of research. One might reasonably argue that within repressive communist regimes the general public might not (a) be fully aware of public opinion polls because of a lack of familiarity; and (b) appreciate the utility of survey research where the Communist Party was seen to be the final arbiter. Fortunately at the very outset of the Prague Spring era, ÚVVM enquired into these matters. Unsurprisingly, familiarity with public opinion research was limited to half the Czechoslovak adult population (56 per cent) with respondents living in the Czech lands exhibiting greater knowledge of polling than their Slovak counterparts (60 vs. 46 per cent). However, a large majority of those interviewed (84 per cent) thought opinion research was useful; and there were few differences between Czechs and Slovaks.4

3 This is a Rawlsian [1971: 152] interpretation of a maximin strategy.
4 The questions asked were: (a) “Before this interview started had you heard or read anything about public opinion research?” Response options: (1) Yes, (2) No. (b) “Do you think that it is useful or not to conduct such research? Response options: (1) Useful, (2) Not useful, and (3) Other answer. ÚVVM, VYZK 67-02, January 2-3 1968, N=995.
of strong support for a liberal pluralist, or possibly a populist system of direct democracy. This confirms the expectation outlined in H1. However, the public was also positively disposed to having a proportional representation (PR) electoral system based either on (a) candidates competing in ‘multi-member districts’; or (b) having a party list with preferential voting so that preferred candidates within a party could be supported.

**Figure 2.2 Public preferences toward different electoral systems, August 1968**

![Graph showing public preferences toward different electoral systems, August 1968](image)

### Source:

Note estimates are net percentages, or WAR statistics (see, Acronyms and Key Terms). This value was estimate as follows: Net score = (yes - no) * (1 – don’t know/100). This net estimate weights the difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses by the level of non-committed answers thereby reducing net differences where respondents exhibit low levels of opinionation.

**Single Member District Question:** In your electoral district one deputy is to be elected. For this one position there are a few candidates nominated by political parties or social organisations. The one who receives the largest number of votes is elected. Do you favour this system of election? Response options: (1) ‘yes’, (2) ‘no’, or (3) ‘don’t know’.

**Multi-Member District Question:** What is your response to one united list of candidates prepared for elections that includes candidates for all political parties and organisations, with the identification of their affiliation? You could elect a specified number of candidates from different political parties and organisations. Elected would be those who received the largest number of votes? Response options: (1) ‘yes’, (2) ‘no’, or (3) ‘don’t know’.

**Party List Question:** What is your response to the possibility of choosing only political parties without a preference for specific candidates? Response options: (1) ‘yes’, (2) ‘no’, or (3) ‘don’t know’.

**Party List with Preferential Voting Question:** What is your preference to the possibility of choosing political parties with a preference for specific candidates? Response options: (1) ‘yes’, (2) ‘no’, or (3) ‘don’t know’.

**National Front List of Candidates Question:** What is your response to a united list of candidates of the National Front? Response options: (1) ‘yes’, (2) ‘no’, or (3) ‘don’t know’.

In short, Czechoslovak public opinion favoured electoral reforms that gave them the most freedom in making electoral choices; and one not restricted to choosing among parties. Turning attention now to communist party members, one can see from Figure 2.2 that SMD was the most popular choice. This probably stemmed from the instrumental realisation that in a majoritarian electoral system, the KSČ as the largest party would win a disproportional number of seats. As a consequence, proportional electoral systems based on the two ‘party list’ options were least popular. The multi-member system would have favoured the KSČ’s largest party status in 1968, and was thus the second most popular choice for communist partisans.

The estimates presented on the right of Figure 2.2 demonstrate that ČSS and ČSL members both favoured a party list electoral system with the option of casting preferential votes, and these poll results are consonant with the logic outlined in H4. As a matter of interest, this is in general terms the electoral system currently employed in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Significantly, the least desired option was having a National Front list of candidates. Presumably, both ČSS and ČSL feared dominance of well-known KSČ candidates within such an electoral system.

Overall, the results presented in Figure 2.2 demonstrate that public opinion toward electoral reforms was oriented toward having an electoral system that promoted a liberal pluralist, or even a populist vision of democracy and public opinion. In this respect, the general public and KSČ favoured single or multi-member electoral districts for different instrumental reasons as indicated by H1 and H3. In contrast, ČSS and ČSL party members were most in favour of a socialist pluralist conception of democracy that most closely matched the ‘internal’ reformist agenda of Klokočka [1968] and Lakatoš [1966, 1968a].
A central feature of the competitive elite model of democracy supported by Mlynář [1964] and the socialist pluralism model of Klokočka [1968] was the concept of institutionalised opposition. In 1968, the main institution associated with such a vision of political competition was the National Front. Consequently, a critical test of the competitive elite vision of politics is the degree to which there was popular and partisan support for reforming rather than abolishing this moribund institution. The opinion poll results presented in Figure 2.3 reveal that the modal response for both the Czechoslovak public and most of the political parties was to stick with the status quo, i.e. support for the current National Front. The general pattern observed tends to confirm the expectations expressed in H2 where the public, at least with regard to the National Front issue, expressed a preference for a competitive elite or perhaps a neo-corporatist style of governance as indicated by the fact that 27 per cent of the public supported an “all inclusive National Front.” Significantly, no partisan group expressed this preference.

Looking in greater detail at the partisan patterns evident in Figure 2.3 the most salient feature is KSČ members’ strong support (47 per cent) for the status quo and significant non-partisan support for this option. Members of the satellite parties appear from the evidence presented in Figure 2.3 to have had decidedly different preferences to the rest of those interviewed. It seems that CSL and ČSS saw their own position as being more secure if membership of the National Front were limited to political parties. However, the socialists were prepared to support the inclusion of other organisations.

One might interpret the similar preferences expressed by general public opinion and KSČ partisans as arising from different considerations. For the general public in August 1968 there were aspirations for a more open and transparent political system as espoused by the two pluralist (liberal and social) political visions. In contrast, members of the Communist Party would have desired continued party dominance that could have been achieved in two ways: (a) maintaining the status quo with KSČ dominance over the ČSL and ČSS, or (b) opening up the National Front to such an extent that member organisations would remain weak, divided, and undisciplined where the KSČ would use a heresthetic (political manipulation) strategy to maintain its dominant position [Riker 1986].

It should be noted that Mlynar [1980: 88-89] was not personally in favour of reforming the National Front because of its unfavourable reputation.

Figure 2.3 Public preferences toward reforming the National Front, August 1968

Source: National Survey of Czechoslovakia undertaken for the Central Committee of the National Front, August 4-15, 1968, N=2,947, questions 12-16. Data reported in Piekarikiewicz [1972]. Note estimates are net percentages or WAR statistics. This value was estimate as follows: Net score = (yes – no) * (1 – don’t know/100). This net estimate weights the difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses by the level of non-committed answers thereby reducing net differences where respondents exhibit low levels of opinionation.

Do you think that the National Front in the ČSSR should continue in the same form as it is today? Response options: (1) Yes, (2) More yes than no, (3) More no than yes, (4) No, (5) Don’t know.

Should the National Front be the union of all existing political parties, voluntary organisations, and movements in the CSSR? Response options: (1) Yes, (2) No, (3) Don’t know.

Should the National Front be the union of only political parties? Response options: (1) Yes, (2) No, (3) Don’t know.

Should there be some political parties and voluntary organisations or movements outside the National Front? Response options: (1) Yes, (2) No, (3) Don’t know.
Institutional guarantees of democracy and perceived threats

Having looked at public and partisan support for two key institutions of political representation, it is sensible to briefly examine citizen perceptions of the institutional pillars of democracy. The survey questions used to explore these preferences were asked to a national sample immediately prior to the Warsaw Pact invasion – a fact that is discussed a little later. Respondents were asked to choose three institutions out of six that they considered guaranteed democracy in Czechoslovakia. The survey results presented in Figure 2.4 represents the weighted responses of three choices. First preferences were given the highest weighting and third preferences the lowest.

Figure 2.4 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions guaranteeing democracy</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subgroups</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>KSČ</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>Social Organisations</td>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>ČSL &amp; ČSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSČ members</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-KSČ</td>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSL members</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSS members</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Survey of Czechoslovakia undertaken for the Central Committee of the National Front, August 4-15, 1968, N=2,947, question 14. Reported in Piekalkiewicz [1972: 106]. Note estimates are mean scores. Exact question text is unknown, but may be inferred as being something such as “What are the greatest guarantees of socialist democracy? Make three choices in order of importance.” Weighted averages reported where the first choice was coded as 1.00, the second choice as .67 and the third choice as .33.

This data format is not ideal. However, it is only data available that facilitates subgroup analysis and is used here with the caveat that the results may stem in part from the data aggregation decision made by Piekalkiewicz [1972: 106]. Furthermore, one must also keep in mind that this survey data were commissioned by senior bureaucrats of the National Front who would have been motivated to demonstrate public support for an institution that many commentators regarded as moribund. In fact, many reformers thought the National Front was a primary candidate for dissolution in any meaningful process of institutional reform.

Within total public opinion it was institutions such as the KSČ and National Front that attracted most support. This is a pattern in agreement with the expectations outlined in H1 and H2. Popular support for key facets of the Liberal Pluralist, Populist, and Socialist Pluralist models (H3 and H4) such as having public opinion operate as a social institution and holding multiparty elections were given a lower weighting. This is shown in the bottom and lower left parts of Figure 2.4. Moreover, the pluralist belief in the importance of the organisational representation of interests was judged to be the least important guarantee of democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1968. One may posit two reasons for this result.
First, satellite parties and social organisations had been deliberately weakened by the communist regime and had appeared impotent for two decades. The resurgence of civic and political organisations during 1968 appears to have had insufficient time to influence longstanding judgements. Second, the perspective of respondents is likely to have been retrospective and hence support of democracy was viewed in terms of the status quo. One could argue that if the public had some experience with effective political parties and social organisations, public judgements may have been more prospective in orientation. As a result, the Czechoslovak public would have been more positive toward greater pluralism.

The evidence presented in Figure 2.3 also suggests that partisanship was an important determinant of attitudes toward democracy. Communist Party members expressed strong trust in the status quo, while members of the two satellite parties (ČSL and ČSS) were strong advocates of multiparty elections as a guarantee of democracy. Non-communist party members appear to have been aware of (a) their own institutional weakness; (b) the benefits of National Front membership; and (c) the potential of public opinion to guarantee a more pluralist system of democracy that would emerge where the Communist Party would no longer monopolise political power.

Perceptions of factors that had the potential to undermine the Czechoslovak polity betray widespread concern and worry about military intervention. Literally days after the conclusion of the surveying reported in Table 2.1 the dreaded Warsaw Pact invasion occurred. This table presents the differences between total public opinion and the attitudes of members of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (ČSS). Regrettably data for other party members are not available. For Czechoslovak citizens the threat of external intervention was considered to be a much greater danger than domestic political forces wanting to increase or minimise the pace or reform of the system, or even change the state.

It is important to stress here that prior to the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20-21 1968 no Soviet troops (or nuclear missiles) had been permanently stationed on Czechoslovak territory. For this reason, the Warsaw Pact invasion, and the subsequent permanent stationing of Soviet military forces in Czechoslovakia until 1991, had a profound impact on Czechoslovak citizens’ political attitudes. After August 21 1968 the Czechoslovak communist regime was popularly seen to be little more than a client administration of the Soviet Union where national independence ceased to exist.

### Table 2.1 Public perceptions of the greatest threat to the Czechoslovak polity on the eve of the Warsaw Pact invasion, August 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greatest danger:</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Conservatism</th>
<th>Reform</th>
<th>Subversives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First choice</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second choice</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third choice</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not selected</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSS members:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First choice</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second choice</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third choice</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not selected</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Weighted average where the first choice was coded as 1.00, the second choice as .67 and the third choice as .33. ** Most popular or modal response.

Note that the exact question text is unknown, but may be functionally represented as “What do you consider the most harmful aspect out of the following for the favourable development of Czechoslovakia? Select three possibilities in order of importance.” Response options: (1) Interference of foreign countries in internal affairs of ČSSR [Intervention], (2) Inability to solve economic difficulties [Economy], (3) Conflict between Czechs and Slovaks [Nationalism], (4) Opposition of the conservative political forces [Conservatism], (5) Excessive impatience of progressive political forces [Reform], (6) Activity of antisocialist forces [Subversives].

No separate survey data for the KSČ and ČSL are available, although the profile of total and KSČ samples are likely to have been similar [note, Skilling 1976: 543]. Estimates are percentages indicating preferences for a specific option as a proportion of the total possible. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 51-52] also reported weighted average responses on the basis of order of choice.
On the eve of the invasion, the main attitudinal difference between ČSS members and general public opinion related to different perceptions of the threat posed by the opposition of conservative political forces (ČSS mean=.46; Public mean=.30); and the lesser threat from the excessive impatience of reform minded progressive political forces (Public mean=.12; ČSS mean=.07); and the activities of anti-socialist forces (Public mean=.17; ČSS mean=.05).

The evidence presented in Table 2.1 is important because it reveals that it was those who supported a democratic centralist political vision who were most feared. For this reason, public support for H1 was circumscribed within Czechoslovak public opinion when the existence of the state was threatened. Here of course there was the well founded suspicion that conservative communists were capable of conspiring with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in maintaining the pre-1968 status quo through military force.

In sum, if one may talk of ‘negative’ preferences, or antipathy, in the ranking of public choices as shown in Table 2.1 would be in descending order: conservatives (H1), reformers (H2, H3), and subversives (H4). This pattern may be seen as reflecting public evaluations of the relative power of competing political visions to monopolise the public agenda. These perceptions were undoubtedly influenced by citizens’ sense of trust (or confidence) in specific political leaders, and identification with political parties.

Trust in politicians, voting intentions and party preferences

One of the few survey questions asked on more than one occasion during the Prague Spring era by ÚVVM was an item examining public trust or confidence in senior political figures. There are some methodological problems in examining this time series data; as the questions asked were not always exactly the same. Details of all the questions asked and methodological concerns are given in the appendix for this chapter. During the Prague Spring era these questions had a special strategic importance where ÚVVM did not always publish the results. Part of the sensitivity appears to have originated in the interpretation of the ‘trust/confidence’ items. Senior KSČ figures and members of the media interpreted these results as indicators of public popularity whose level and volatility reflected politicians’ competence in managing recent events.

The survey results presented in window (a) of Figure 2.5 underscores this ‘popularity’ interpretation. This is especially evident with the poll results for early September 1968 which were the first to be undertaken after the Warsaw Pact invasion. Here there is strong evidence for a “rally-round-the-flag” effect. This is a term used to refer to dramatic surges in public support for incumbent political leaders resulting from a major foreign policy event [Mueller 1972; Brody 1991]. These effects are most often associated in the public opinion literature with ‘external’ developments, i.e. military actions in other countries. The Czechoslovak case is special as most often there is no polling following ‘internal’ military invasions for obvious practical reasons.
trend in the survey data reveals that this surge in public support declined rather quickly in the following months. In order, to obtain a better sense of public trust or support for political leaders it is sensible to try to filter out this rally effect by ignoring the unique circumstances associated with the earlier autumn of 1968.

The trends evident in window (b) of Figure 2.5 reveal some important patterns. First, the trajectory of Ludvík Svoboda’s ratings exhibit the most dramatic increase stemming from his appointment as President on March 30 1968 by the KSČ on the basis of his reputation as a national hero from the Second World War; and his emergence in the public mind as a non-partisan representative of Czechoslovak collective interests. The strong support for Dubček throughout 1968 may be interpreted as a public preference for a “centrist” approach toward political reform. This would also seem to be true for the evolution in support for Oldřich Černík who became Czechoslovak Prime Minister from April 8 1968 to January 28 1970. Černík’s popularity derived from “his matter-of-factness and the cultivated way he appeared and spoke in public […] a stance […] that inspired trust in the public” [Mlynar 1980: 124].

The trust series for Josef Smrkovský (Chairman of the National Assembly, April 1968 to January 1969) whose role as “spokesman of the popular will” elicited a level of trust only exceeded by the non-authoritarian Dubček, and the elder statesman Svoboda. However, critical comments published in Rudé právo on June 18 following Smrkovský’s return from a parliamentary trip to Moscow and his negative reaction to Vaculík’s ‘Two Thousand Words’ appear to have resulted in an 18 point decline in his trust rating in the June-July ÚVVM poll [Skilling 1976: 286, 880-881]. This evidence reveals that public opinion was sensitive to comments reported in the media that did not match with expectations.

In short, Czechoslovak public was attentive and rewarded or punished leaders in the polls on the basis of how closely performance matched expectations. There were of course informational limits to this elite-mass linkage. Lack of public knowledge appears to explain the low and declining levels of support associated with Husák, Šik, and Císař as all three were senior (insider) figures during the Prague Spring era whose role and influence never attracted significant media reporting during the period. Thus, Gustáv Husák’s low and declining trust score should not be interpreted as public antipathy toward his pro-Soviet orientation; as this only became public knowledge after his ascent to power in May 1969 [note, Mlynar 1980: 221-227].

7 This effect is likely to be related to the social psychological impact of the permanent stationing of Soviet military forces in Czechoslovakia for the first time. Prior to August 20-21 1968 there had been no permanent Soviet military presence in Czechoslovakia, and this fact underpinned popular feelings of political independence.
Electoral reform, elections and party support

The central question of the type and form of general elections scheduled to be held in Czechoslovakia in late 1968, or the following year, were never finalised. The Fourteenth KSČ Party Congress held secretly at Vysočany (a large industrial zone in northeast Prague) the day after the Warsaw Pact invasion on Thursday August 22 effectively postponed the question of political reform. The draft report from this extraordinary party congress accepted that a new political system was required, but argued that adoption of a more plural system required additional institutional development in order to be effective. Consequently, central features of the institutional framework such as the dominant role of the KSC within the National Front framework were to remain intact until at least 1973 [Pelikan 1971: 195-228].

The Vysočany Congress envisaged “internal pluralism” where there would not be open party competition. Pluralism would be restricted to competition within the National Front – whose membership would be decided by the KSC. In short, the Communist Party would choose its political competitors. Following this logic the Fourteenth Congress favoured a single list of National Front candidates to be elected in multimember districts. Czechoslovak voters would elect perhaps one quarter of their representatives on the basis of a candidate list, while the majority of legislators would be elected on the basis of party (or National Front organisation) lists. The KSC openly accepted that both processes of election would be advantageous to the party [Pelikan 1971: 226-237].

It is important to stress two points here. First, these official reform proposals provide the most definitive answers to what electoral system reform was possible in late 1968. Second, the adoption of the Vysočany Congress reforms was contingent on the constellation of power within the Communist Party, the National Front, and among countervailing elites within Czechoslovak society. In short, the final form of the Prague Spring political reforms remained an open question to the end.

The survey evidence presented earlier in Figure 2.1 shows that the most favoured form of electoral system was Single Member Districts (SMD) followed by multimember districts. However, there was little public support for the Vysočany Congress’s preference for internal pluralism where voters would have selected most candidates from a National Front list. As noted earlier this pattern in the survey data indicates that the democratic visions of democratic centralism (H1) and competitive elitism (H2) were less popular than the liberal or socialist pluralist visions (H3 or H4). The vote intention and party support data shown in Table 2.2 demonstrate that even in the presence of a hypothetical ‘Democratic Party’ the KSC was still likely to have won the general election had it been held in the autumn of 1968 (note Mlynář 1987: 28-30).

Table 2.2 Vote intentions and party support in Czechoslovakia, 1968 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote intention and party support:</th>
<th>With current parties only</th>
<th>Including a new party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Communist Party (KSČ)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Socialist Party (ČSS)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People’s Party (ČSL)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new political party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cast a blank ballot</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know, no answer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Institute of Sociology Survey, Charles University, Prague, July 8-16 1968 [Gitelman 1977: 97]. This unusual sampling strategy may have been a methodological experiment where the same questions were asked using different survey modes; however, there is little documentary evidence for this supposition. See appendix for details of this survey.

It is necessary to highlight here that the vote intention questions are as the semantics convey: intentions to vote. Often the relationship between vote intentions and actual vote choice is far from perfect as voters change their mind, or decide not to participate in the election. In early August 1968, at least a quarter of the Czechoslovak electorate had no firm voting preferences. With such uncertainty it is easy to envisage vote preferences changing, especially if a real as opposed to hypothetical alternative party actively campaigned for votes. In short, the vote intention survey evidence does not provide clear evidence as to which democratic vision the Czechoslovak public favoured.

In this respect, it is easier to make inferences from the survey data by considering additional questions. The issue of maintaining the status quo through the institution of the National Front as favoured by the Vysočany Congress was rejected by a majority of public opinion as the estimates at the bottom of Table 2.3 shows.
Moreover, four-in-five of those interviewed favoured reform that provided for equality among all political parties in Czechoslovakia. Popular support for equality encompassed majority support within all subgroups. Examination of the sub-group data reveals that KSČ members were strongly divided about the proposed reforms. The strongest supporters of reform came from (a) the ‘ambitious’ 26-39 year old cohort who as will be seen in later chapters wanted greater influence; (b) the most highly educated; and (c) those not employed as manual workers. Expanding considerations toward the merits of having greater political choice, as promoted by the two pluralist political visions (H3 and H4), the survey evidence reveals that approximately a third of those interviewed in early August 1968 favoured greater pluralism. A majority, perhaps adopting a rational conservative position, expressed a preference for the status quo lacking concrete information on what kind of pluralist system was on offer. It should be noted that the Vysočany Congress’s strategy of prohibiting parties outside the National Front, and allowing the KSČ through its dominance of this institution to determine its political competitors did not attract majority public support.8

Overall the evidence presented in this section appears contradictory. On the one hand, the Czechoslovak public favoured greater political pluralism, believed that the existing satellite parties (CSS and ČSL) were not independent, and the National Front system of representation was restrictive. On the other hand, the public expressed support for maintaining many features of the status quo. How is it possible to reconcile public support for both the ‘closed’ democratic centralist and competitive elitist visions and the ‘open’ political pluralist conceptions of democracy?

There are two answers to this question. The first is informational. Many of the proposals for reform were hypothetical, and so many respondents are likely to have been reluctant to embrace reforms that had not been clearly worked out; and shown to be practical and to the collective benefit. Pragmatic conservatism suggested adherence to the status quo until realistic alternatives existed. The second and related answer relates to timing. With public perceptions of the threat of Warsaw Pact intervention combined with the danger posed by conservative elements within the KSČ leadership; it would have been strategically prudent in the autumn of 1968 to limit considerations of reform to the status quo, i.e. the internal pluralist model favoured by the competitive elite model of Mlynář [1964], or the socialist pluralism of Klokočka [1968].

8 National Survey of Czechoslovakia undertaken for the Central Committee of the National Front, August 4-15, 1968, N=2,947, questions 11 and 4 respectively. Note that the exact question text is unknown, but may be summarised as follows.

**Question 11:** Do you wish that there would be equality between all the political parties?

NA denotes that specific subgroup estimates are not available. Note that this specific poll was criticised in Rudé právo on May 24 1969: “According to the well-known rules of sociological imagination an attempt was made to prove that the views of some of our politicians and organs differ from the will of the people.” See, also Ulč [1971: 441], Piekalkiewicz [1972] and Skilling [1976: 534ff.].
2. Conceptions of Democracy, Public Opinion and Opinion Polling

Attitudes toward reform within the KSC

All of the survey evidence presented so far in this chapter reveals the importance of political attitudes within the KSC. Interestingly, for most of the Prague Spring era the rank and file and lower echelons of the Communist Party had little direct role in the reform process. However, this situation began to change with the holding of (extraordinary) district delegate party congresses on June 29-30 1968; and preparations for the Fourteenth Congress of national delegates scheduled for August 22 1968. The KSC leadership and most political commentators expected wide ranging reforms within the party combined with extensive changes of personnel at all levels within the organisation. However, it was not clear in the summer of 1968 what the attitudes of party membership were to (1) the reform process, (2) specific policies such as the Action Programme, and (3) decisions from the Plenum of the Central Committee held on May 27-29.

Consequently, the Institute of Political Science within the KSC organised two surveys of party members. The first survey of district delegates provides information on the attitudes of the rank-and-file and lower levels of the party hierarchy. The second survey explored the attitudes of more senior party members who as delegates to the national congress would have undertaken key tasks such as the election of the Central Committee. Both surveys asked a common set of questions facilitating comparison and addressed three general topics: (1) evaluation of recent Central Committee plenary decisions in late May, (2) evaluation of the challenges facing the KSC, and (3) perceived consequences of reforms for the KSC.

With regard to satisfaction with the decisions taken at ÚV KSC plenum meeting at the end of May 1968 there were important differences within the hierarchy of the party. The lower echelons of the organisation were less satisfied concern-
A similar pattern is evident in intra-party perceptions concerning the consequences of political reforms. The data presented in the top part of Figure 2.6 reveals an important hierarchy in opinions regarding perceived loss of power by the KSC, if reforms are implemented. This hierarchy derives from survey questions examining general and specific facets of losing power. Thus, there was most agreement that it would be “quite dangerous” if the KSC was to relinquish power in a general sense by for example facilitating greater equality in decision-making, and a pattern of sharing power in state and economic organs. Conversely, there was most disagreement that the KSC was ceding control of “state and economic organs.” Such a pattern suggests at the national (Czechoslovak) level that there was more sensitivity within the party to yielding power in principle to the concrete situations where power was lost (or shared) in practice.

Conclusion

This chapter has endeavoured to integrate the goals of opinion polling explored in the introduction and theories of political reform examined in the last chapter. This integration of political theory, mass survey methodology, and aggregate polling results has been organised in terms of a two-fold typology relating conceptions of democracy and public opinion. This perspective has the advantage of facilitating the formulation of hypotheses regarding the Prague Spring reform proposals that may be tested with the aggregated opinion poll data relating to institutional reform, vote intentions, and the structure of intra-party attitudes with-in the KSC.

The aggregate survey evidence presented in this chapter reveals that there was no single public opinion in Czechoslovakia toward the Prague Spring political reforms. As the nature and scope of the 1968 reform process was uncertain, those interviewed in national surveys during this era expressed what at first sight appear to be inconsistent attitudes and preferences. However, these different facets of Czechoslovak political attitudes reveal important information about the mass foundations of the reform process; and underscore the view that democracy was an “essentially contested concept” during this era. In such a situation of uncertainty, the public supported institutions strongly associated with the status quo such as the National Front as a reasonable and prudent basis for incremental reform.

However, such support for democratic centralist (H1) and competitive elitist (H2) visions of democracy should be considered primarily as first steps in the
reform process. In this respect, the liberal and socialist pluralist conceptions of democratic reform (H3 and H4) represent what was desired by the public in the medium to long term. The survey evidence reveals little public support during 1968 for radical or revolutionary political change such as the immediate adoption of direct democracy, or a return to capitalism. In general, Czechoslovak public opinion adopted a supportive but pragmatic “wait and see” stance that was in some respects similar to the position adopted by the most trusted political leaders, Alexander Dubček and Ludvík Svoboda.

Significantly, the strong link between citizens and Dubček’s style of leadership coincided with important hierarchical and national (or ethnic) divisions within the ruling KSČ party. Surveys of party members during the summer of 1968 demonstrate considerable unease and uncertainty about the reform process; and the consequences this would have for the positions of party members and the party more generally. It is not clear what would have been the outcome of revised party rules, and intra-party elections scheduled to occur in the autumn of 1968. All that can be said with certainty in this respect is that the Fourteenth (Vysočany) Communist Party Congress draft reform proposals favoured a cautious incremental approach.

Having explored the theories of reform and some key features of aggregated public opinion toward political change during 1968, it makes sense at this point to examine the survey evidence at the individual level. However, prior to mapping the political attitudes and preferences of individual citizens in early May 1968; it is necessary first to demonstrate the nature of public opinion in Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Prague Spring era. This task is important as it directly addresses explanations regarding the citizen origins of the Prague Spring reform process.

3. The Prague Spring Generation: Public Opinion on the Eve of Reform

One should understand this correctly: in 1967 Czechoslovakia was not on the verge of collapse, economically or otherwise. The reformers were not prompted into action by imminent doom, although in some fields relations had been near breaking point […] Reform theories, uncoordinated as they had to be in the absence of free interdisciplinary debate and action were formulated as an alternative national aim of a long term nature rather than as a plan for an immediate rescue operation.

Vladimír V. Kusin [1972: 2]

What was public opinion in Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Prague Spring era? Is there evidence of a groundswell of support for reform simply waiting for a movement to channel popular discontent with the status quo? According to views of expert commentators such as Kusin [1972], summarised in the opening quote above, the pre-1968 situation was complex. Consequently, there is a danger for commentators and scholars after an event to engage in post hoc rationalising. Moreover, the brief overview in the introductory chapter of the development of mass surveying highlighted communist opposition and distrust of opinion poll results. Consequently, there is very little evidence of the state of public opinion in Czechoslovakia prior to the Prague Spring era.

Fortunately, there is one source of survey evidence of the opinions, attitudes, and values of the young ‘Prague Spring’ generation who had for the most part grown up under communism. An international ten country study of public opinion toward international affairs and future developments was undertaken in Czechoslovakia in June 1967. This comparative survey project entitled ‘Images of the World in the Year 2000’ focussed on the age cohort (15 to 40 years old) who would become, it was thought, the decision-makers in the year 2000. Within this chapter the analyses presented will concentrate on the Czechoslovak wave of this cross-national survey project where an attempt will be made to present evidence relating to general political orientation on the eve of the Prague Spring era, by what one might call the ‘Prague Spring generation.’

1 The ‘Prague Spring generation’ term is intended to denote the cohort who was most likely to be winners or losers from the proposed reforms as members of this cohort were in the early or middle part of their careers. Political change in 1968 would have had most long term consequences for this group of ‘middle level elites.’
This chapter will demonstrate that public opinion in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1967 was both interested in public affairs and making changes in order to improve society. The survey data also show that there were little systematic differences between Czechs and Slovaks on almost all political issues. When compared to citizens in other communist, liberal democratic and authoritarian states, the evidence reveals that the younger generation within Czechoslovak public opinion were optimistic about the future, frustrated with the present, and strongly engaged in social affairs. These characteristics demonstrate that public support for reform of the system of governance in Czechoslovakia predates the Prague Spring era.

The evidence introduced in this chapter will be presented as follows. In the first section, various group based theoretical explanations of the origins of the Prague Spring reforms will be outlined. This is followed by a description of the survey data examined in this chapter and previous research on the Czechoslovak wave of the ‘Images of the World’ survey. Section three will present the results of the data analysis, and this will be followed by some discussion regarding the state of public opinion at the end of Antonín Novotný’s term of office (1957-1968) and his regime’s strong adherence to ‘bureaucratic socialism’ [Selucky 1970].

**Determinants of Political Pluralism in Czechoslovakia**

What are the origins of the Prague Spring reform movement? This question has been the source of a large literature written by participants in the events of 1968, and external observers who explored the question ex ante. In general, all accounts and analyses of the Prague Spring era propose explanations of why public discussions of extensive reform were suddenly possible in a state that had developed a reputation for being repressive of all deviations from socialist monism. In this chapter, the focus will be on political attitudes and evidence of differences in support for political pluralism among Czechoslovak citizens under forty years old in June 1967.

Most theories of the Prague Spring reform movement tend to be either: (1) elite based focussing on the impact of intellectuals and senior political figures, or (2) social group based explanations that emphasise the importance of institutions and context in shaping political values. In the latter case, variables such as occupation, nationality, and religion have often been used to explain differences in support for economic and political change in 1968. Ironically, under communism the existence of social stratification was important because in theory Czechoslovak society was in the process of convergence; and yet almost all theories for reform originating within the KSC adopted a social group (class) based analysis that often did not follow a Marxist analytical logic [e.g. Mlynár 1964].

As the elite or intellectual dimension to the Prague Spring era has been discussed earlier in chapters one and two; the focus here will be on four influential explanations that relate the events of 1968 directly to the citizens of Czechoslovakia. The theories briefly outlined in the following sub-sections are characterised by their group based explanations. Individual level social-psychological models of mass support for reform were not articulated due to the dominance of class based theories of society; and technical limitations in gathering mass survey data, and doing statistical analyses at the individual level.

1. **Static structural perspective**

Kusin [1972] in his examination of seven “non-established” groups evident within Czechoslovakia in 1968 argued that each of these sectional interests was primarily concerned with general systemic reform.2 During the Prague Spring the system of interest representation underwent a number of distinct processes of change that are likely to have had an impact on contemporary, and subsequent public opinion.

First, there was disintegration of the “monopoly structure” into smaller more specialist organisations. For example, during 1968 Czechoslovakia’s main trade union, the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH), began to splinter into smaller sub-industry specialist organisations and various enterprise and worker councils. The motivation for such institutional reform appears to have been a desire to escape encapsulation within democratic centralism, or to seek a voice that had been extinguished by centralisation.

Second, new groupings were formed with the purpose of aggregating and coordinating reform efforts. This was especially evident in the case of sectional interests such as the Union of Scientific Workers. Third, there was the creation of new (or renewed) groups that did not exist between 1948 and 1968. The most notable example of this phenomenon was Worker’s Councils, the Club of Non-Party People (KAN), the Club of ex-Political Prisoners (K231), and the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party. A defining feature of these interest groups was their desire to influence political decision-making. However in 1968, this channel of influence would either have been repressed or placed within the strictures

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2 The groups examined by Kusin [1972] were workers, farmers, intellectuals, students, national minorities, political groups, civil society groups, and the various churches.
of the National Front which was of course subservient to the Communist Party [note, Skilling 1976; Kaplan 2008; Hoppe 2009].

In summary, the static structural perspective posits a societal level explanation of the origins of popular support for reforms associated with the Prague Spring era. The overarching structures constructed under communism’s democratic centralism contained many competing interests who were seeking an opportunity in which to voice their grievances, and embark on independent action to attain their goals. Such a perspective is static in the sense that citizen support for change was inherent within the structure of Czechoslovak society pre-1968.

2. Dynamic structural perspective

In contrast to Kusin’s seven large social groups, Ivan Svitak [1971: 5] argued that there were just three main groups in Czechoslovak society in the late 1960s. First, there was the top one hundred thousand “power elite” composed of senior people in the KSC, the state, and the military. Second, there was the middle class made up of intellectuals, scientists, and engineers, etc. constituting about a third of the population. Lastly, there was the working class typically those employed in industrial and agricultural enterprises. This group constituted a majority of Czechoslovak society. Each of these three groups had different definitions of the origins and nature of the Prague Spring reform programme because of their dissimilar interests.

According to Svitak’s [1971] dynamic structural perspective, the power elite saw the Prague Spring as stemming from an economic crisis and hence required narrow economic reforms. Their goal was to initiate limited reform centred on creating an efficient managerial elite; so as to preserve the political status quo and their own incumbency. The middle class had a broader view of the crisis arguing that economic reforms depended on making political changes through the creation of a socialist democracy. Presumably some members of this group would have benefited from the creation of a more technocratic style of public policy-making. In contrast, a majority of Czechoslovak citizens as members of the working class expressed general support for greater pluralism and democracy. Such interests lacked both the instrumentalism and specificity of the elites and middle classes, and were characterised by aspirations focussed on the collective national interest.

These three interest groups (or social forces) adopted distinct political programmes. According to Svitak [1971] the political elites’ reform agenda was evident in the change in KSC leadership in January 1968; the middle class agenda was expressed in the Action Programme’s support for reform of society published on April 10; while Ludvík Vaculík’s ‘Two Thousand Words’ manifesto of June 27 reflected the wishes of the majority for the creation of a more open socialist democracy. A characteristic feature of this structural interpretation is its emphasis on the dynamics of change during 1968-1969; and its division of the Prague Spring era into five phases. Here both the dominance and goals of these three groups changed in systematic ways thereby explaining why the overall trajectory of political events during the Prague Spring era is complex.

From the perspective of understanding public opinion prior to the ascent of Dubček to power on January 5 1968; Svitak’s [1971] perspective is useful in constructing a picture of the propensities of different members of Czechoslovak society to support political pluralism in the June 1967. From this point of view, one would expect elites to support restricted reforms limited to economic issues; the middle class to want limited economic and political reforms; and the majority working class to be most supportive of reform in principle, but to be less opinionated or coherent regarding specifics.

3. Cross-cutting social cleavage explanation

An alternative explanation of popular support for the Prague Spring reform programme emphasises the importance of social change and stratification patterns in post-war Czechoslovakia. Krejci [1972: 2] argues that the empirical evidence points to a “homogenisation of Czechoslovak society” under the communist regime. This explanation proceeds to analyse this process of social convergence by focussing on two cleavages that exhibited most heterogeneity. One significant feature of this cleavage theory of differential political interests in Czechoslovakia is its assertion that the most important social differences were independent of communist party membership.

In fact, the social transformation achieved under communism had the unintended consequence of undermining the power and legitimacy of the regime. The first cleavage identified relates to changes in education and knowledge that became evident during the late 1960s with the emergence of conflicting interpretations of Czechoslovakia’s past, and frustration with public administration and
policy-making. The second cleavage was the persistence of ethnic differences between Czechs and Slovaks. Nationalism combined with different paths of development resulted in dissimilar public policy goals, where Slovaks felt that political elites (dominated by Czechs) did not pay sufficient attention to Slovak aspirations and goals.

According to Krejci [1972] the political tensions evident during the Prague Spring era had two main social sources. First, the knowledge cleavage became more salient due to the growing importance of technical skills with the adoption of even more advanced technology within the international economy. This trend created a sense of political “unease” among the well educated (and most particularly intellectuals) who began to want and demand more independence from the communist regimes’ stifling bureaucracy. Second, the nationality or ethnicity cleavage grew in importance as Slovak’s increasingly resented the Communist Party’s attempt to create a more unitary state through initiatives such as the Socialist Constitution of 1960 [note, Skilling 1962: 152-153, 156-159; Rothschild and Wingfield 2000: 167].

These two cleavages evolved from being latent to manifest during the late 1960s leading to a state crisis as the communist party found it increasingly difficult to manage differences among members of the elites with regard to politics and ethnicity. Timing was important in this respect because the simultaneous occurrence of both cleavages resulted in a complex struggle for power. Competing interests centred on the political and ethnic cleavages were evident with bitter intra-party rivalry within the KSC between those who supported or opposed Novotný’s leadership in late 1967; and among incumbent and countervailing elites thereafter. Importantly, this social cleavage theory of the origins of political elites thereafter. Importantly, this social cleavage explanation of support for Prague Spring reforms suggests a complex set of relationships which were tested primarily using aggregated economic and census statistics. The political cleavage was a product of who were the “winners and losers” under the communist regime. Here the link between socio-economic factors such as occupational position, income, level of economic wealth (e.g. house or land ownership), skills or knowledge, and political preferences was defined by the unique sectoral changes that occurred after 1948. For example, wage earners were “winners” while property owners and the salaried (who were not in the higher echelons of the KSC, or state institutions) were “losers.” The ethnic cleavage ostensibly split Czechs and Slovaks, where the later favoured greater autonomy under policies such as federalism and greater religious freedoms. However, as Slovak economic growth and development had been rapid under communism feelings of being an economic “winner” and political “loser” undoubtedly created significant cross-pressures among Slovak citizens.4

4. Stratification dominant model

The most extensive and influential study of Czechoslovak society prior to the Prague Spring era was a large scale stratification survey undertaken in the final two months of 1967. This model of the structure and attitudes of Czechoslovak citizens was built on the concept of social status, and was outlined in varying levels of detail and substantive focus in a number of publications before, during, and after the Prague Spring era [see, Machonin 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1992; Machonin et al. 1967, 1969].

Within this model differences in social status were seen to be important because this was the foundation of stratification within society. Social stratification in post world war two Czechoslovakia was seen to be complex and required a multidimensional approach. Consequently, stratification was seen to have five facets: (1) socio-occupational status based on the “complexity of work”, (2) lifestyle indicated by cultural interests and leisure activities, (3) level of education and qualifications, (4) standard of living, and (5) participation in the management of economic enterprises or organisations as an indicator of power.

It is important to highlight that the large survey undertaken by the State Statistical Office had a 71 per cent response rate; and was based on the responses of male heads of households (n=13,215), and their dependents (n=24,466).5 As this was a head of household study, the survey excluded all women, and young men who had no families or residences of their own and who would in many cases have been either apprentices or students. Consequently, this sample selection procedure is likely to have under-reported attitudes that would have questioned the status quo. Thus, it seems reasonable to suspect that the evidence provided by the stratification dominant model will be a more conservative explanation of political pluralism than the other theories discussed here.

4 Moreover, one might reasonably argue that having a Slovak (Alexander Dubček) at the pinnacle of power would have raised the expectations of Slovaks; and for this reason worried both Czech and Slovak incumbents fearing loss of position and influence under his new administration.

5 A smaller survey (N=1,431) examined issues related to social prestige, public perceptions of Czechoslovak society and respondents own position within this society.
Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

A central finding of Machonin et al.’s [1969] research is that Czechoslovak society on the eve of the Prague Spring era was stratified in a manner that was characteristic of the unique social transformation that had occurred under communism in the previous two decades. More specifically, there were tensions between three distinct facets of stratification in Czechoslovakia: (a) bureaucratic-equalitarian: allocation of positions on the basis of ideological reliability rather than ability, (b) technocratic: trends toward the creation and justification of a managerial elite on the basis of collective economic efficiency, and (c) socialist: initial dominance of the working class in the transition to a communist classless society. One may interpret this three-fold stratification as constituting the primary basis for political competition during the 1968 reform process within the stratification dominant model. It is obvious that this model is consonant with a number of the reform theories described earlier in the first chapter.

Stratification and political attitudes
At the danger of over-simplifying the complexity and detail of the results of the stratification dominant model’s large survey one may reasonably argue that systematic differences in support for greater political pluralism were associated with socio-occupational ranking, life-style, and level of education. Socio-occupational ranking was itself the product of selection processes that favoured specific personal attributes. Consequently, the key variables underpinning occupational ranking were gender, nationality/ethnicity, and age. Here women and Slovaks were disadvantaged, and individuals in the 36-45 year cohort had privileged access to top positions.

It is important to stress here that one must be careful in adopting a simple “winners vs. losers” interpretation of the stratification dominant model’s findings; where “losers” were most likely to support greater pluralism on the basis of self-interest. For example, the well educated members of the 36-45 year cohort were “winners” under the communist regime in the late 1960s. However, many members of this cohort also had ambitions to hold more senior positions and may have resented not being promoted more quickly. Therefore, the dominant stratification model suggests “the democratization process contained inter alia the elements of generational conflict” where members of the older cohorts with stronger ideological credentials feared being replaced by their frustrated better educated subordinates [note, Porekt 1971: 454, n.5].

Level of education, according to the dominant stratification model, also had important political implications. This is because much of the growth in creating greater equality in access to university (defined in terms of percentage of students with working class parents) stemmed from the selection of students on the basis of closeness to the Communist Party. Thus, one would expect that university graduates from working class backgrounds would have supported political pluralism only if it reinforced their own upward social mobility and that of their own children (i.e. social class propinquity). All others who had suffered discrimination in access to education on the basis of political criteria may be expected to have favoured greater pluralism, and the possibility of greater social mobility.

The impact of income and standard of living on political attitudes is less clear. Income differentials were relatively small (e.g. 77 per cent of households had monthly incomes of Kčs 1,250 to 2,500); and a large majority (89 per cent) of those interviewed in late 1967 felt that their standard of living was the same or better than that of the previous generation. On this basis, one would expect little association between income level and political preferences. However, when respondents were asked to compare current socio-occupational position and standard of living with the same positions in pre-war liberal democratic Czechoslovakia a plurality (42 per cent) felt that they would have been better off under capitalism. Thus it seems prudent to conclude that differences in economic expectations, rather than income level, or reported living standards, would have been a better predictor of political attitudes.

Stratification, perceptions of power, and democracy
The stratification dominant model did not deal directly with political questions, and directed its attention to an exploration of citizens’ perceptions of the general power structure within Czechoslovak society in late 1967. The power structure was conceptualised as having two key facets: authority and influence. Authority was defined as exercising power on the basis of appointment to a position presumably on the basis of communist party connections. In contrast, influence was the exercise of power while holding an office on the basis of achievements such as success in winning a competitive election. The stratification dominant model hypothesised that public access to power would be more restricted in case of authority where there was more scope for cronyism and the emergence of cliques.

Contrary to expectations the exclusivity of power was greater in the case of power structures characterised by influence rather than authority (69 vs. 52 per cent non-participation by the general public). This result produced different interpretations among the originators of the stratification dominant model. For Pavel Machonin [1969, 1992] this pattern was interpreted as evidence of the nondemocratic nature of the Czechoslovak socialist system. In contrast, Lubomír Brokl [1969] argued that this evidence could not be used to conclude that the power structures in pre-Prague Spring era Czechoslovakia were democratic, or not. This is because the survey methodology employed did not facilitate making
such general conclusions. Moreover, Brokl [1969: 258-259] argued that differences in access to power both within: (a) the Communist Party, and (b) outside it within state organisations and institutions, were determined by the same stratification factors evident within Czechoslovak society. Consequently, stratification of power and influence within the KSC and in society more generally stemmed from the same underlying social logic.

Moving away from considerations of who inhabited positions of power, the results regarding respondents’ perceptions of power revealed the highest levels of stratification. The modal response (40 per cent) regarding perceived division of power in Czechoslovak society was a simple dichotomy: elites versus masses. The official Stalinist three-fold division on the basis of workers, peasants, and working-intellectuals was accepted by just one-in-ten of those interviewed. The general impression here is that a majority of citizens felt excluded from public decision-making. Such a situation created the conditions for public frustration, and the basis of mass support for reform. Overall communist party membership was associated with a greater likelihood to holding positions of power and having a greater sense of political efficacy.

Comparison of models of mass support for Prague Spring reforms

In the last number of sub-sections, four explanations of why there was popular support for the wide-ranging reforms debated during the first eight months of 1968 have been presented. Despite their differences, all share one common feature – social groups are the primary unit of analysis. According to these explanations it was membership of groups, formal or otherwise, which determined their interests; and hence their motivation to support calls for change. The main details of each of the four social group based explanations have been summarised in Figure 3.1.

Each explanation focuses on different social groups and posited contrasting social mechanisms underpinning political reform, although most are based on a Marxist or pluralist logic of competing interests. In the final column on the right of Figure 3.1, there are brief descriptions of the observable implications of each of the four explanations of the determinants of reform in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s.

While it is the next logical step to test these competing explanations with appropriate data, there is an important limitation to any such analysis. The main problem is choice of dependent variable: what indicator would be a valid and reliable measure of public attitudes toward reform in the pre-Prague Spring era. For obvious practical reasons, no direct mass survey based measures exist as representative sampling on political issues only became available once the Prague Spring had commenced.6 Fortunately, the Images of the World in the Year 2000 survey fielded...
in Czechoslovakia during the final months of the (bureaucratic centralist) Novotný regime (1957-1968) does provide some opportunities. Consequently, the rest of this chapter will focus on mapping out potential 'dependent variables' where the goal is to see in comparative terms the potential for mass political mobilisation in Czechoslovakia a few months later during the spring and summer of 1968.

Thus the important task of testing the explanatory models summarised in Figure 3.1 must be set aside for future work. A necessary precursor to such model testing is the identification of indicators of public attitudes toward reform. Before embarking on this task it is important first to describe the unique survey dataset that will be used for this task.

**Methods and Data**

As the pre-Prague Spring survey examined in this chapter was fielded during June 1967, there are quite obviously no questionnaire items relating directly to political reforms – assuming such questions would have been allowed. Many of the items asked in this survey dealt with attitudes toward the future and foreign policy. However, there are two batteries of ten items each that were designed to explore: (1) general orientation or philosophy toward the future, and (2) respondents’ level of polarisation or dogmatic orientation. Within this chapter these twenty questions will be used to construct a general attitudinal profile of the young (15 to 40 years old) ‘Prague Spring generation.’ These three types of data will be analysed using aggregate statistical measures such as consensus or agreement estimators, which will be discussed a little later.

In order to address the important question of whether there was something special about the Czechoslovak ‘Prague Spring generation’ a strategy of making aggregated cross-national comparisons will be undertaken using a small number of key political items. The goal of this analysis is to determine if the Prague Spring generation had an attitudinal profile that helps to explain the origins of popular support for the 1968 reforms in Czechoslovakia. For this reason, it is necessary to outline key institutional features of the countries surveyed in the Images of the World project.

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7 Most of this data (except in the case of Germany, FRG) are available from the UK Data Archive, University of Essex. More details are available at the UK Data Archives’ website, and in Ornauer et al. [1976].
Figure 3.2 presents a classification of countries on the basis of level of technology, type of economy, political system, and military alignment. Inspection of this figure reveals that the institutional context under which respondents in this international surveying project lived varied considerably, where for example simple divisions based on residence in Eastern or Western Europe conceal important intra-regional differences. Within this chapter differences in political context denoted by communism, liberal democracy, and authoritarianism will be of most interest; and more especially differences within the communist bloc of countries on the basis for ‘orthodox’ (Czechoslovakia, Poland) versus a ‘reformist’ socialist governance system (Yugoslavia/Slovenia). It is appropriate at this juncture to make some more detailed remarks regarding the Czechoslovak survey data from June 1967.

The Images of the World ‘Prague Spring Generation’ Survey (1967)

The individual level survey data set that will be used in this chapter is the Czechoslovak wave of the ‘Images of the World in the Year 2000 Study’ which was fielded in June 1967. Face-to-face interviews were undertaken with over a thousand respondents (N=1,178) by a team of interviewers either from the State Statistical Office or the Institute of Public Opinion Research (UVVM), Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Respondents were selected using a quota sampling methodology on the basis of age, sex, size of place of residence, education, and occupation where interviewing was restricted to the target cohort of 15 to 40 year olds.

Unfortunately, there is little surviving documentation concerning how this survey was undertaken; and strategies used to minimise respondent selection bias where only opinionated respondents participated. In addition, during the period of interviewing there was the first Arab-Israeli (‘Six Days’) War in the second week of June 1967. As a key topic of this survey was peace and Czechoslovakia was the first country to follow the Soviet Union’s lead and sever diplomatic links with Israel, this tense international climate may have influenced how respondents answered questions [note, Page 1973: 9-10].

The international news in the first half of 1967 had many examples of conflict and violence. For example, in Europe there was a coup in Greece (April 21) establishing military rule; Spain attempted to take Gibraltar from Britain though an economic blockade; and there was growing tensions between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus where Turkey threatened an invasion. Further afield there was an escalation of the war in Vietnam and an increase in civil rights and anti-war demonstrations in the United States; there was continuing civil war in Nigeria (Biafra); and in China there was the Cultural Revolution, successful testing of a hydrogen bomb, and strong tensions between China and both the USSR and India. More positive news included a thaw (i.e. détente) in relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO where plans were well advanced for a draft Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (July); and in May 1967 the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT, precursor to the World Trade Organisation) had been successfully concluded. All of these events suggest a climate with the potential for considerable political debate among both elites and citizens cross nationally.

Methodologically, use of the Czechoslovak survey of June 1967 must address three concerns. First, potential respondents are likely to have known of official antipathy toward mass surveying as the KSČ claimed to represent all public opinion thereby making opinion polling unnecessary. Second, the Czechoslovak public had little experience with opinion polling methods and ethics such as confidentiality in 1967; as the last free political opinion polling was undertaken some twenty years earlier. Third, it is reasonable to suspect that there would have been a general unease toward expressing political opinions to strangers representing an official institution such as the State Statistical Office or the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

As there are no survey based measures of respondent cooperation, as is the case with the Mlyňář team survey of May 1968, or evidence from the Czechoslovak research team; one is compelled to take the survey evidence at face value.

8 As this study extended from 1966 to 1973 it is not clear from published sources who participated in this research; as there were considerable personnel and institutional changes associated with the normalisation period (1969-1987). Institutional affiliation reported in Ornauer [1976] reflects researchers and organisations as of March 1974, which in Czechoslovakia was the Institute of Sociology and Philosophy, Academy of Sciences. By this point UVVM had ceased to exist and many of its researchers had been dismissed.

9 Within Czechoslovakia, Israel became a symbol for liberalism and this was a prominent theme at the Fourth Congress of the Writers’ Union held on June 27-29 1967. Hambik [1971: 35-36] argues that the communist regime’s crude criticism of Israel created popular sympathy for the Jewish cause.

10 One may speculate that one reason the Czechoslovak authorities acquiesced to this international survey was the fact that it was implemented in the summer of 1967 in two other communist states: Poland and Yugoslavia (Slovenia), and could be justified as providing valuable information on the future development of a technocratic based society – a key concern of the Czechoslovak communist elite.
and be careful in making interpretations especially where the level of non-committal responses, i.e. don’t know, no answer, or refused is relatively high. In this respect, there is a high response rate (>95 per cent) for most items.

What is known is that the introduction read to each respondent emphasised four key points: (1) the questionnaire was primarily interested in feelings and thoughts about the future, and specifically the year 2000 where there was an eschewal of directly asking for evaluations of current conditions; (2) the study related to “young people” and not older decision-makers; (3) the focus of the research was comparative covering other European countries and the United States, which may have raised suspicions given the rhetoric surrounding the Cold War and the bipolar nature of international relations.11 In sum, these instructions suggest that respondents may not have perceived the ‘Images of the World in the Year 2000’ survey as an academic and hence uncontroversial piece of research.

A central and unique feature of this survey is its focus on “young people.” Within the context of exploring public opinion on the eve of the Prague Spring era there is a need to deal directly with the question of why this ‘young cohort’ survey is important for this purpose. This survey’s focus on the 15-40 year old cohort has two key advantages. First, on the eve of the Prague Spring era this demographic group constituted close to a third of the entire Czechoslovak population (i.e. 4.3 out of 14.3 million); and represented the most energetic section of society who were likely to determine the success or failure of the communist regime. Second, this large and strategically important cohort may be reasonably said to have experienced a unique process of political socialisation under three distinct regimes: the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia resulting from German occupation, and the authoritarian First Slovak Republic (1939-1945); the National Front government (1946-1948); and the communist regime (1948-1989). The majority of this ‘Prague Spring generation’ (3.9 million aged 20-39 years) were too young to have been socialised under the liberal democratic government of the First Republic (1918-1938), and for many of them their primary political socialisation occurred under the democratic centralist (communist) system of government [Kusin 1972: 124].

For these two reasons, the political orientation of the ‘Prague Spring generation’ represents a key sub-section of Czechoslovak public opinion, and an important set of ‘test subjects’ of all explanations of popular support for the 1968 reform programme; and by implication greater political pluralism. If evidence of the proposed patterns are not evident in this large “activist” cohort, then such explanations are likely to be of marginal importance in any understanding of the role played by public opinion in the emergence of the Prague Spring reform movement.

Prior to outlining the empirical results, it is necessary to make some comments regarding the presentation of aggregate statistics facilitating cross-national comparison. Ornauer et al. [1976] make extensive use of a summary measure called the Acceptance Ratio (AR) which is a net difference score between positive and negative responses among those respondents who expressed definite opinions. This is undoubtedly a useful summary statistic for making comparisons, but its main disadvantage is that it ignores respondents who did not have strong definite opinions. Consequently, in this chapter use will be made of additional summary statistics. A brief overview of the aggregate data statistics presented in this chapter is given in (a) the Key Terms and Acronyms section at the start of this monograph and (b) in the appendix for this chapter, so as to keep the discussion here within reasonable limits.

One final point with regard to the comparative analyses is also in order. The survey data from India is not included in the data reported because this study was based on elite and regional (Utter Pradesh, Northern India) rather than citizen based national research. The data for Yugoslavia comes solely from Slovenia – one of the most developed regions in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Some of the data from Poland comes from a pilot survey, as specific items were not asked in the larger national questionnaire. The data from Czechoslovakia is presented separately for both the Czech lands and Slovakia because of scholarly assertions regarding their different political cultures [Krejci 1972: 5-11, 27-38; Kusin 1972: 143-161; Skilling 1976: 451-492; Golan 1971: 189-209; Golan 1973: 186-199; Dean 1973; Steiner 1973; Leff 1988; Kirshbaum 2005: 231-250; Heimann 2009].

Lastly, survey estimates from Japan should be treated with caution because of differences of timing, methodology, and survey response effects. Consequently, some of the variation observed between countries may be methodological rather than substantive in origin [see, Galtung 1976: 46-47; Ornauer et al. 1976: 589-619]. As the focus of this chapter is on Czechoslovakia, these methodological concerns are not of critical importance.

**Empirical Results and Discussion**

One of the central topics of the Images of the World study was public expectations about the future at the start of the twenty-first century. A review of these...
helped determine the emergence and path of the reform process evident in 1968. A similar assumption is adopted in this chapter where it is proposed that people believe and hope about the future affects that very future [Wiberg 2003: 102]. However, it must be stressed that the Images of the World survey was not designed for exact predictions, but was constructed on the assumption that “what people believe and hope about the future affects that very future” [Wiberg 2003: 102].

Optimism-pessimism towards the past, present and future

A defining feature of the Prague Spring era was the optimism and hope that underpinned popular support for the proposed reform programme. One might reasonably postulate that a strong sense of optimism was a central characteristic of the Prague Spring generation. The Images of the World survey employed Hadley Cantril’s [1965] ‘optimism-pessimism’ scale. The summary statistics for orientation (i.e. AR, WAR, and median) for Czechoslovakia shown in the first column of Table 3.1 reveal that Czechoslovak respondents were more optimistic about the future than either the present, or the past. In fact, the distant future represented by the year 2000 was given almost the maximum optimism score.

Also, the evidence presented in Table 3.1 reveals that Czechs and Slovaks were more sanguine about the present and the past than their counterparts living in other communist states. Examining the second and third columns of Table 3.1 reveals that Slovaks were more optimistic than Czechs in their perceptions of the past, the present, and near future (1972). However, both were equally optimistic concerning the distant future (2000). Extending our consideration to all countries reported in Table 3.1 one observes that states with economies that were characterised by high technology and free market systems (see Figure 3.2 for a classification of countries), and who are by implication wealthier were generally most pessimistic about the future.

12 A systematic investigation of the success of political experts in predicting future events found that a simple statistical model outperformed experts [Tetlock 2005]. The idea that the general public has the ability to make correct decisions was first proposed in a systematic manner by French mathematician Condorcet [1785]; and has been used to justify the validity of studying aggregate public opinion trends [Page and Shapiro 2003].
Optimism is not only linked to expectations, as • Power and optimism model: Galtung [1976: 74-80] in his examination of economic expectations model: Galtung [1976: 74-80] in his examination of all the cross-national AR patterns evident in Table 3.1 proposed a ‘developmental fatigue’ explanation where citizens living in richer states tend to be more pessimistic than residents in poorer economies because their expectations were lower. Attaining a high level of development is associated with ceiling effects regarding future expectations, and hence optimism. In contrast, less well endowed citizens are more optimistic as they can readily see what is possible in their future by observing their richer neighbours.

• Culture model: Inglehart [1990: 30-33; 212-247] argued that culture, based on distinct historical experiences, is important in explaining national differences in cynicism and optimism. One of the main elements of historical experience is economic development. Here greater economic security is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction. However, other factors such as political history and culture are also important. Inglehart [1990: 242-244] concluded that happiness, and related values such as optimism, have a strong cultural component. What specific facets of national culture determine happiness or optimism is not explored by Inglehart [1990].

• Power and optimism model: Optimism is not only linked to expectations, as Galtung [1976] argues, but also eagerness to act and turn dreams into reality. Motivation to act to change circumstances depends on personal resources such as having a high social position, being active in social and political af-
of what was substantively important about being interested in the future in the late 1960s.

Sicinski [1976: 126-128] in his exploration of the substantive meaning of the future to respondents in the Images of the World survey showed that Czechs and Slovaks interest in the future was not based on escapism either to a “glorious past” (e.g. the First Republic) or some undefined idealised future (e.g. attainment of ‘true’ communism). In this respect, the Czechs and Slovaks were similar to citizens living in both communist and liberal democratic states in being strongly rooted in the present. What appears to have made public opinion in Czechoslovakia and other communist states different was its support for setting collective goals through state planning. Belief in the power of scientific planning to deliver results appears to have given Czechs and Slovaks a relatively strong sense of the possibility of controlling the future through the application of scientific principles. Significantly, this notion lay at the heart of the ‘internal’ reform proposals promoted during 1968.

Table 3.2 Public opinion regarding technocratic solutions for attaining economic and security goals, 1967-1970 Agreement Ratios (AR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Communist states</th>
<th>Liberal democratic states</th>
<th>Ath#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ČSSR</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely economic reality</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideal</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely security reality</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security ideal</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Perceptions of likely societal change

Further evidence of Czechoslovak belief in the merits of a scientific approach to development is evident in Table 3.2. Please note a more detailed analysis of this data is provided in the appendix to this chapter. The Acceptance Ratio (AR) values show that Czechs and Slovaks had the strongest belief in both the possibility and desirability of economic planning among all the countries surveyed. However, if account is taken of level of opinionation as is the case with the WAR coefficient the strength of this particular belief falls considerably because on average a third of respondents gave no definite answer to this question. Nonetheless, the AR, WAR, and PA statistics for Czechs and Slovaks indicate a uniquely positive profile for the potential of economic planning.

However, this optimism did not extend to international security as was the case in West Germany (FRG). In comparative terms, the patterns evident in Table 3.2 suggest that belief in the potential of the scientific approach to economic planning was strongest in socialist economies, and weakest in market economies. This broad difference undoubtedly reflects both ideological orientation, and evaluations of the ability of science to successfully model complex social systems. For Czechs and Slovaks one might interpret this optimism as evidence of popular support for the technocratic approach championed by Šik [1964, 1968] and Richta [1966].

Significantly, Czechoslovakia’s ability to engineer international relations toward conflict avoidance elicited pessimism given the logic of the Cold War in Europe. Since the scope for change in the international arena was strongly constrained, it appears that Czechs and Slovaks believed societal change was most likely to occur within the domestic arena. It is to this topic that our attention now turns.

Having survey data on Czechs and Slovaks perceptions of likely societal change immediately prior to the Prague Spring reforms provides invaluable information regarding the potential for mobilising popular support for reform during 1968. Fortunately, within the Images of the World survey there are items inquiring about general and specific perceptions of likely change in society. In this section, the focus will be on six questions dealing with three broad themes: (a) general welfare as indicated by ‘happiness’, (b) equality of opportunity for women and the young, and (c) social equality as reflected in less unemployment and stratification leading to greater social convergence.
high proportions giving “don’t know” responses.14 Many issues there was little public consensus. This lack of consensus most likely closer examination of the Perceptual Agreement (PA) estimates reveals that for greater consonance in attitudes on the basis of a common socialist ideology. A social convergence, and social stratification. One might have reasonably expected divisions among the communist states with regard to happiness, unemployment, so-

divided, thus no clear popular response can be reported.

The modal response for Poland was both ‘more’ and ‘less’ indicating that public opinion was equally divided, thus no clear popular response can be reported.

Note country codes and statistical estimates are broadly the same as in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

* The modal response for Poland was both ‘more’ and ‘less’ indicating that public opinion was equally divided, thus no clear popular response can be reported.

Surprisingly, the evidence shown in Table 3.3 reveals important differences among the communist states with regard to happiness, unemployment, social convergence, and social stratification. One might have reasonably expected greater consonance in attitudes on the basis of a common socialist ideology. A closer examination of the Perceptual Agreement (PA) estimates reveals that for many issues there was little public consensus. This lack of consensus most likely reflects both genuine disagreement and uncertainty, as indicated by the relatively high proportions giving “don’t know” responses.14

**Table 3.3 Comparison of public evaluations of future social development, Perceptual Agreement (PA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Communist states</th>
<th>Liberal democratic states</th>
<th>Ath#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSR</td>
<td>ČR</td>
<td>SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. More happiness</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. More unemployment</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. More social convergence</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c. More social stratification</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a. More gender equality</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b. More opportunities for young</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Q.13: What do you think will be the situation in your country by the year 2000? Do you think that … (a) People will have more or less happy than they have today? (m) There will be more unemployment or less unemployment than there is today? (n) People will be more similar or less similar to each other than they are today? (0) There will be more difference or less difference between people high up and people low down in society than there is today? Response options: (1) More, (2) About as now, (3) Less, (0) Don’t know.

Q.14: What do you think will be the situation in your country by the year 2000? Do you think that … (a) It will be more common or less common with women in leading positions than it is today? (b) It will be more common or less common with young people in leading positions than it is today? Response options: (1) More, (2) About as now, (3) Less, (0) Don’t know.

Note estimates are Perceptual Agreement (PA) statistics. See appendix for a more detailed table.

* The modal response for Poland was both ‘more’ and ‘less’ indicating that public opinion was equally divided, thus no clear popular response can be reported.

Comparison of the attitudinal profile of Czech and Slovak respondents across all six items down the first two columns on the left of Table 3.3 indicates considerable similarity. This appears to be especially the case with regard to predictions of happiness, social convergence, reduced social inequality, and improved opportunities for the younger generation. Some differences surface when examining the consensus within public opinion (PA) statistics for unemployment where Czechs were more unified in their expectations than Slovaks.

Overall, Czech and Slovak respondents in June 1967 appear to have had the most positive perceptions of future societal development of all the ten countries examined in the Images of the World study. This evidence suggests that from a comparative perspective Czechs and Slovaks were most similar in being positively predisposed toward thinking that society could be made better. This raises the question: Did Czech and Slovak respondents in June 1967 feel that they had the power to influence public policy-making and make their daily lives better?

**Sense of political efficacy, influence and interest**

Examination of citizen interest in public affairs and their own influence on politics will be examined from three perspectives: (a) the individual, (b) the group level defined in terms of age cohort (15 to 40 years old), and (c) from a cross-country standpoint. Turning first to the individual level and the attitudes of Czechs and Slovaks, the data presented in Table 3.4 reveals low levels of political efficacy, perceived influence, and divisions over whether the citizen should be interested in personal or public affairs.

At the individual level Czechs and Slovaks are dissimilar to respondents living in liberal democratic states who generally felt more empowered. Only Yugoslavia (or more correctly Slovenia) among the communist states exhibited a positive sense of political efficacy. In contrast, respondents from Poland expressed the lowest sense of being able to shape their own personal future.

The aggregate statistics shown in the centre of Table 3.4 indicate that generational differences were a common feature across all the countries surveyed. Here most respondents felt the younger generation would (i) make more progress in domestic affairs than the older generation; (ii) had a more realistic view of the world; and (iii) the young in the late 1960s had too little influence on public affairs. With regard to perceptions of the role played by Czechoslovakia in international affairs, the coefficients shown in the bottom of Table 3.4 indicate that Czechs felt that their country had more influence on international affairs than their Slovak compatriots (WAR_{CR}=.41, WAR_{SK}=.22).

14 Please note a more detailed version of Table 3.3 is provided in the appendix to this chapter.
Table 3.4 Sense of political efficacy and scope of political interest at the individual, group and national levels, (Agreement Ratios, AR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Communist states</th>
<th>Liberal democratic states</th>
<th>Ath#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of efficacy</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of influence</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of personal interest</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. GENERATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National progress</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More realistic</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of influence</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. COUNTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country influence</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of national interest</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


INDIVIDUAL: Q37: Do you expect your own future to be determined predominantly by what you yourself make of it or by external events and circumstances over which you have little control? Response options: (1) Predominantly by what you do yourself, (2) Predominantly by external circumstances, (0) Don’t know. Q38a: Do you think that you personally have too little, adequate, or too much influence on the public affairs of your country? Response options: (1) Too little, (2) Adequate, (3) Too much, (0) Don’t know. Q40: What do you think is the best thing for you personally to do? Response options: (1) To be concerned with all matters of general interest, (2) To be concerned only with matters of interest to you personally, (3) Or to adjust only to what happens around you? (4) Don’t know.

GENERATION: Q35: Do you think that your younger generation will promote domestic progress and development more, about the same or less than the older generation? Response options: (1) More, (2) About the same, (3) The will be worse than the older generation of today, (0) Don’t know. Q36: Who do you think has the most realistic view of the world today: the younger generation or the older generation? Response options: (1) Younger generation, (2) Older generation, (0) Don’t know. Q38b: Do you think that the younger generation have too little, adequate or too much influence on the public affairs of your country? Response options: (1) Too little, (2) Adequate, (3) Too much, (0) Don’t know.

COUNTRY: Q39: Do you think that your country has too little, adequate or too much influence on international affairs? Response options: (1) Too little, (2) Adequate, (3) Too much, (0) Don’t know. Q41: What do you think is the best thing for your country to do? Response options: (1) To be concerned with matters of interest to all countries, (2) To be concerned only with matters of direct interest to your country, (3) Or to adjust only to what happens in the world?, (4) Don’t know.

Note country codes and statistical estimates are the same as in Tables 3.1-3.3.

3. The Prague Spring Generation: Public Opinion on the Eve of Reform

On the question of whether Czechoslovakia should focus on matters of direct interest rather than general issues in international affairs, Czech respondents supported a general orientation while Slovaks favoured focussing on direct issues. However, there was little consensus within Czech and Slovak public opinion on these matters as the Perceptual Agreement statistics reveal important divisions (PAInstrument=-.45 and PAInstrument=-.46).

In comparative terms, young Czechs and Slovaks in June 1967 were characterised by feelings that they had little personal control or influence over public affairs. The question of pursuing personal or public interests divided Czechoslovak opinion. The young cohorts in all countries appear to have felt frustrated in watching an older less competent generation dominate decision-making in the public sphere. Within the international arena Czechs and Slovaks like their counterparts in other communist states were divided over the merits of pursuing national or general interests, in the midst of the Cold War.

Social and political activism

In the last sub-section the Images of the World survey data indicated that citizens in communist states such as Czechoslovakia did not exhibit strong sentiments regarding control of public affairs. Here we will extend this analysis by exploring the extent to which respondents were involved in social and political affairs, and hence likely to be mobilised into action through organisational channels. The summary measures presented in window (a) of Figure 3.3 illustrate that Czechs and Slovaks were some of the most politically active respondents interviewed within the Images of the World study. One salient feature of Czechoslovak society was that it was one of the most secular countries in Europe by the late 1960s, so it is not surprising to observe low levels of active participation in institutionalised religious activities; or the fact that such activity was much higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. This pattern fits with the results of other surveys on religion discussed earlier in the introductory chapter [note, Kadlecová 1964, 1967; Prusák 1970].

Turning our attention to general organisational activism, the pattern evident in window (b) reveals that young citizens living in communist regimes were generally more active than their counterparts in liberal democratic and authoritarian polities. However, it is important here to warn against equating organisational membership based on free choice in liberal democratic countries and the various forms of pressure applied in many communist states to encourage social activism. Notwithstanding this important caveat, the fact that young Czechs and Slo-
vaks were involved in comparatively large numbers in political and social organisations provided an important reservoir for mobilisation.

**Figure 3.3 Profile of social and political activism, 1967-1970 (per cent)**

(a) Membership of political or religious organisations

(b) Total organisation membership

The bottom part of Figure 3.3 shown in window (c) reveals the relative use made of different channels of social and political activity, and demonstrates a unique profile for Czechs and Slovaks. The left side of window (c) shows that in Czechoslovakia activism was concentrated within organisations. Expression of opinions within the media was much less frequent, although it appears to have been greater than in most other countries surveyed. Significantly, citizens living under General Franco’s authoritarian regime in Spain (1939-1975) exhibited some of the lowest levels of social and political activism. Admittedly this social and political activism data does not give a qualitative sense of what participation meant to individual citizens, so some care is required in making comparisons.

However, if one limits consideration to Czechoslovakia the survey evidence presented in Figure 3.3 suggests that the younger generation were involved and active in social and political organisations to a significant degree. Whether such membership and activism stemmed from coercive, instrumental, or voluntary reasons is impossible to tell from the data. However, the fact that many young Czechs and Slovaks were part of larger social networks suggests, at the very least, the potential for political mobilisation during the Prague Spring era existed...
in the summer of 1967. Having explored the propensity to participate in social and political life, it is now fitting to investigate the values that Czech and Slovak respondents brought to the public sphere.

**Attitudinal orientation of Czechs and Slovaks in 1967**

Within the Images of the World survey two batteries of attitudinal items were included in order to test: (1) individuals’ open or closed mindedness (dogmatism), and (2) respondents’ general orientation toward the future. This battery of twenty items is important within this chapter because these questions could potentially be used as a measure of general orientation toward reform in Czechoslovakia (i.e. a dependent variable); and thus provides a basis for testing the four explanations of political reform (or greater political pluralism) outlined earlier. Within many of the social group based explanations of the origins of the Prague Spring reforms, a strong emphasis is placed on the differing interests of Czechs and Slovaks. If such explanations are plausible one would expect varying interests to be reflected in dissimilar attitudinal orientations.

The profile of these groups of respondents across all items on the ‘dogmatism’ and ‘general orientation toward the future’ scales is presented in Table 3.5. The Acceptance Ratio (AR) estimates indicate, as in previous tables, the degree to which the respondents accepted the statement presented to them; and the Perceptual Agreement (PA) statistics reveals the degree to which there was consensus on the answer given. On the dogmatism scale both the AR and PA statistics are generally similar for both Czechs and Slovaks.

For the general orientation toward the future items there is again much similarity between the Czech and Slovak responses. The last two items dealing with uncertainty about the future and the need for “fundamental change” show a common response profile, but different levels of consensus where Slovaks were in less agreement to both questions. This attitudinal evidence suggests that Czechs and Slovaks were rather similar to one another.

Additional analysis (not reported) of these items using a multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique on the Czech and Slovak samples separately confirms the conclusion taken from Table 3.5 that nationality was not a key source of political division in Czechoslovakia in 1967. This is not to suggest that nationality was unimportant, the survey data presented suggests that the importance of national divisions was most probably restricted to specific issues such as federalisation. Unfortunately, the Images of the World survey does not have any questions that would facilitate examination of this important political issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudinal orientation questions:</th>
<th>Acceptance Ratio</th>
<th>Perceptual Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>Slovaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLARISATION / DOGMATISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31a: in the history of mankind there have probably been just a few really great thinkers</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31b: it is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or a cause that life become meaningful</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31c: of all the different philosophies in the world there is probably only one which is correct</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31d: a person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty non-descript sort of person</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31e: to compromise with our opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31f: the worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31g: a group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its members cannot exist for long</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31h: in this complicated world the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on trusted leaders or experts</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31i: it is often desirable to reserve judgement until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31j: the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as ones own</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL OUTLOOK TOWARD FUTURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31k: the most important thing is not worldly success, but what happens in the afterlife</td>
<td>-.84</td>
<td>-.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31l: the most important thing is not one’s own success, but the success of ones children</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q31m: the present is all too often full of unhappiness, it is only the future that counts</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The Prague Spring Generation: Public Opinion on the Eve of Reform

The survey data presented in this chapter has outlined some key facets of public opinion in Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Prague Spring era. More specifically, this chapter has adopted a comparative approach to discover answers to two questions: (a) How similar were Czech and Slovak attitudes on a range of political issues? (b) Were the attitudes evident in Czechoslovakia in June 1967 different from those observed in other states and systems of governance? Firstly, the aggregated survey data presented in this chapter suggests that the younger generation of Czechs and Slovaks had similar attitudes, values, and orientations toward the future. Secondly, cross-nationally Czechoslovak public opinion exhibited particular characteristics such as firm optimism about the future, frustration with the present, and a comparatively strong engagement in social affairs.

Both results taken together indicate that there was latent popular support for reform among the younger generation in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1967 prior to the ascent of the reform oriented Dubček government in January 1968. This interpretation of the June 1967 survey data is consonant with views expressed by some Czech intellectuals [see, Havel 1989: 109, 1991: 151; Pithart 1990: 34; Bartošek 1998: 17; Kaplan 2002: 404]. However, others such as Ekiert [1996: 138-144] have asserted that the public mood in early 1968 was marked by apathy and little interest in public affairs.

On balance it seems sensible to conclude that the relatively high level of participation by young Czechs and Slovaks in social and political organisations suggests an institutional framework and social network was conducive to political mobilisation. Undoubtedly, this survey based evidence of the public mood in Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Prague Spring era is at best circumstantial. However, in defence of the approach adopted in this chapter the survey data presented represents the most systematic source of information available for this period; and undoubtedly merits more detailed study.

Having explored in this chapter opinions that were a pre-cursor to the Prague Spring era, our attention in the next chapter will switch to political attitudes in the middle of the period of reform during early May 1968. Moreover, the survey data examined will address more directly the political issues associated with the ‘internal’ Prague Spring reform programme because the survey examined was designed with the purpose of drafting preliminary recommendations for implementing changes to the political system in late 1968.

### Conclusion

The survey data presented in this chapter has outlined some key facets of public opinion in Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Prague Spring era. More specifically, this chapter has adopted a comparative approach to discover answers to two questions: (a) How similar were Czech and Slovak attitudes on a range of political issues? (b) Were the attitudes evident in Czechoslovakia in June 1967 different from those observed in other states and systems of governance? Firstly, the aggregated survey data presented in this chapter suggests that the younger generation of Czechs and Slovaks had similar attitudes, values, and orientations toward the future. Secondly, cross-nationally Czechoslovak public opinion exhibited particular characteristics such as firm optimism about the future, frustration with the present, and a comparatively strong engagement in social affairs.

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The first two chapters were concerned with the main political theories underpinning the Prague Spring reforms of 1968, and the aggregate polling evidence regarding public support for proposed political reforms. The last chapter explored the nature of public opinion immediately prior to the Prague Spring era. In this chapter, our attention will switch toward constructing a map of Czechoslovak citizens’ general political attitudes in the midst of all the debates that are now seen to characterise the events of 1968. The goal here is to find out what was the general orientation of citizens during the Prague Spring era; and do the patterns observed in the survey data from 1968 fit with some of the political theories outlined in chapter one. However, this is just a first step; as a key objective of this study is to place Czechoslovak political attitudes within a more general examination of the stability of political attitudes across both space and time. This task will be examined more directly in chapter seven.

Within this chapter the structure of political attitudes among citizens in the Czech lands and Slovakia (space component) will be examined to see if there were important differences. Much ink has been spilt arguing that the factors that eventually led to the “Velvet Divorce” of 1993 when the Czechoslovak federal state voluntarily dissolved itself, were evident in the Prague Spring era [note, Wolchik 1994; Musil 1995; Krejci and Machonin 1996; Sigurd Hilde 1999]. This study will not directly address this thorny issue, but will restrict itself to the narrower question of ascertaining if the survey data supports the thesis that Czech and Slovak citizens saw the political world differently in 1968.

The time aspect of this chapter is restricted to the Czech lands (or Czech Republic) where an examination will be made of political attitudes on May 2-14 1968 and May 12-19 2008. This exercise is only possible through the replication of many of the Mlynář team survey questions of 1968 some four decades later with the purpose of exploring (a) the stability of political attitudes across
the generations, and (b) the link between political regime type and citizen’s political preferences. This analysis not only provides valuable evidence regarding the mass foundations of the Prague Spring reform, but also facilitates examining to what extent Czech citizens had to “learn” democracy in the 1990s. As noted already, this is a topic that will be addressed more directly later in chapter seven.

It is critically important to stress from the outset that the evidence presented in the following pages is based on making inferences from the survey responses of national samples at two time points four decades apart. Such a task is fraught with methodological and theoretical difficulties. Methodological concerns cover a wide range of issues such as (a) the nature of the polling environment in the first half of May 1968, did respondents answer survey questions without reservations? (b) the validity and reliability of asking the same set of political questions to citizens who lived in different political regimes four decades apart; and (c) the difficulty of interpreting both the questions asked and the responses given.

This last concern is linked to the question of what theoretical foundations can be employed in a study of survey response patterns across two (hypothesised) political cultures and political regimes (socialist and liberal democracy). Earlier chapters have provided the foundations regarding political theory, and more will be said on this topic in the next section. Equally important is the theory of survey response to be used to make inferences. As the opening quote to this chapter highlights – all data analysis is bought with theoretical assumptions. As will be shown a little later, adopting this perspective has important consequences.

The empirical evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that underlying political attitudes in the Czech Republic exhibited considerable stability between 1968 and 2008. This finding suggests that there is continuity in political values across the generations. This fact has two important implications. First, Czechs general political attitudes are not completely determined by current political institutions and the performance of current office holders. Second, Czech’s general political orientation has a long history perhaps stemming back to the First Republic (1918–1938) and beyond. Another key finding stemming from the analyses presented in this chapter is that the political preferences evident among Czechs and Slovaks during the Prague Spring were essentially the same suggesting that the ‘national’ question was not a key cleavage within public opinion.

The evidence presented in this chapter will be divided into five parts. In the first section the political theory used to interpret the survey data will be described. The following section will make some remarks regarding the data analysed and the statistical methodology used to make inferences. Sections three and four will present the results of comparing Czech and Slovak political values and preferences respectively. In the concluding section, an attempt will be made to integrate the empirical findings within the theoretical framework described in the first two sections.

**Political Theory Confronting Survey Data**

The central assumption of this monograph is that it is a sensible idea to link the theories of political reform proposed before and during the Prague Spring era with mass survey data. One central reason for making this assumption is that some of the key political theorists such as Doc. PhDr. Zdeněk Mlynář CSc. were either directly involved in supervising mass survey research; or shaped public debate in the media, and hence indirectly influenced the type (and timing) of survey questions asked by ÚVVM – a theme briefly alluded to in the introductory chapter. It is not clear if the Mlynář team had the intention in the summer and autumn of 1968 to confront political theory with the aspirations and preferences expressed by citizens in the political attitudes survey of May 2-14 1968. Speculation on this point is less important than the fact that the extant polling evidence does facilitate such a task.

In order to keep the discussion within manageable limits this chapter will concentrate its attention on the political theories proposed Zdeněk Mlynář [1964] and Vladimir Klokočka [1968] because of their role as ‘official theorists’ within the Prague Spring reform programme. Some remarks have been made regarding these two theorists earlier in chapter one. The goal here is to expand this initial discussion to present in a little greater detail these two theorists conceptions of citizen politics in a reformed socialist Czechoslovakia.

**The Mlynář model of citizen politics**

The Mlynář team survey of early May 1968 was designed to measure key features of political attitudes toward a more liberal democratic system. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, Mlynář [1964] stressed the strategic importance of having an institutional framework whose twin foundations were political pluralism and a market economy. These two institutions were necessary for the construction of a socialist rather than liberal individual form of citizenship, which Mlynář saw as the pre-conditions for the future establishment of communism. Moreover, the necessity of employing advanced industrial and technological
techniques in creating the conditions conducive to the creation of communism necessitated having political freedoms, a market economy, and economic management based on competence rather than loyalty to a Soviet inspired democratic centralist ideology.1

Mlynář’s political theory outlined in ‘State and Man: Reflections on Political Management under Socialism’ (Stát a člověk: Úvahy o politickém řízení za socialismu, 1964) is based on a social group analysis of a modern socialist or capitalist society. In the second part of this book entitled ‘Democracy and citizen control’, Mlynář argued when discussing the relationship between democracy and the economy that effective governance was dependent on reconciling (a) the need for technocratic management of the economy; and (b) the desire to increase citizen participation in decision-making [Mlynář 1964: 113-142]. With regard to the question of what would be the most effective form of democratic citizenship in the modern state; direct democracy was rejected on pragmatic grounds as being too idealist, and arguments that the emergence of scientific management would destroy citizenship was seen to be too pessimistic [Mlynář 1964: 112, 57, 163].

According to Mlynář the central weakness of contemporary citizenship was public indifference and passivity toward public policy-making. The central reason for citizen disengagement from politics in the mid-twentieth century was the perception that it was economic and political elites who controlled economic development. This resulted in a low sense of political efficacy and the feeling that many political processes such as elections were empty rituals. Just as capitalist states were monopolised by powerful economic interests, communist states were being increasingly controlled by bureaucratic elites [Mlynář 1964: 127-128, 130, 163-168].

This clash between managerial elitism and mass based democratic representation could be resolved more easily under communism by making economic organisations more democratic as was the case in Yugoslavia in the early 1960s [Lapenna 1964: 42-51, 95-108; Mlynář 1964: 141-147]. Within Czechoslovakia the main problem identified was the bureaucratisation of public administration along Soviet lines. As the Communist Party (KSC) had been at the heart of this bureaucratisation process, Mlynář [1964: 64-67, 181] advocated transforming the role played by the party from being the representative of proletarian class interests toward becoming an advocate of the collective societal good.

1 Similar debates regarding the necessity of economic and political reforms occurred in the Soviet Union during the late 1950s and 1960s. For an overview of these debates see Lewin [1975: 127-248], Brown [2004: 19-40] and Nove [2004: 41-50].

In essence, Mlynář [1964, 1965] saw political reforms as having two key features: (1) greater intra-party democracy within the KSC, and (2) pluralisation of the Czechoslovak system where greater opportunities for representation and influence would be created. The Mlynář model of citizen politics did not envisage multiparty competition, or an open institutional challenge to the KSC either through an ‘internal’ opposition as proposed by Pithart [1968] and Bystrý; or true multiparty competition as advocated by Svitak [1971], Havel [1968], Mandler [1968], and Kliment [1968].

Given Mlynář’s [1964] concerns with gauging citizen’s level of engagement with politics and the principles of political representation and their willingness to participate in public life; it is not surprising to find that the two central questions addressed in the Mlynář team survey of May 1968 was (1) attitudes toward core democratic principles, and (2) level of political activity [see, Brokl et al. 1999: 9-14; Bečvář 1999]. Figure 4.1 shows that these two research questions were examined in terms of a number of key themes. Mlynář’s [1964] theory of the relationship between state and man was Marxist in that his theoretical analysis was based on social groups rather than the individual citizen.

### Figure 4.1 Mlynář model of citizen politics and the Czechoslovak political attitudes survey of May 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Key concepts</th>
<th>Indicators of citizens’ attitudes and behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political orientation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Belief in a system of politics founded on competing interest groups rather than centralised decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Support free speech, a free media, and right of assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>Hold a centralised or diffuse conception of power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>Support respect for minority opinions and rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Belief in equality of opportunity rather than position in society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current activities</td>
<td>Level and type of current participation in all types of organisations or associations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future activities</td>
<td>Willing to be a candidate in all types of elections, adoption of a critical orientation, interested in politics and current affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of passivity</td>
<td>Not willing to be active in politics, tend to accept the status quo, have no interest in political affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Attitudes of Citizens towards Politics Survey, Czechoslovakia, May 2-14 1968, Brokl et al. [1999].

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[149]
However, the empirical operationalisation of “political man” in Czechoslovakia appears to have been influenced by the social-psychological approach within contemporary sociology and political science in the late 1960s. It seems likely that this aspect of the research stemmed from the interests of other more junior members of the study group who wanted to utilise the specific concepts of political efficacy and level of political participation pioneered by scholars such as Almond and Verba [1963] in their study of political culture.

The original Mlynář research team never empirically tested the basic model of democratic citizenship summarised in Figure 4.1. However, two members of the original research group, doc. PhDr. Lubomír Brokl and Ing. Josef Bečvář, did analyse the data three decades later, which for current researchers represents an important direct link with the original theoretical work underpinning the May 1968 survey’s construction. The Brokl et al. research report (1999) assessed the democratic orientation of Czechoslovak citizens in terms of (a) adherence to basic democratic principles, (b) support for measures to implement democracy, (c) exhibition of non-democratic attitudes, and (d) support for minority rights. Significantly, the analyses reported focussed either on total public opinion or specific social groups; and did not elaborate any individual level models or explanations of Czechoslovak political attitudes during the Prague Spring era [note also, Bečvář 1990, 1999; Brokl 2002].

As noted earlier in Chapter 2, Zdeněk Mlynář was not the only one to draft a theory of political reform for official use during the Prague Spring era. An altogether different theory of reform based more squarely on a cross-national study of elections, and formal systems of political representation, was proposed by Vladimír Klokočka [1968]. This model of electoral politics represents something of elections, and formal systems of political representation, was proposed by Vladimir Klokočka [1968]. This model of electoral politics represents something more liberal than that proposed by Mlynář [1964] and Michal Lakatoš [1966, 1968a]; but less radical than the proposal made by ex-communists such as Ivan Sviták [1971] and Emanuel Mandler [1968], and non-communists such as Václav Havel [1968] and Alexander Kliment [1968].

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2 This literature appears to have included Lipset [1959], Almond and Verba [1963], Bendix and Lipset [1954], Jahoda and Warren [1966], Krech et al. [1962], Lane and Sears [1964] and Talmon [1955].

3 There were plans to implement Almond and Verba’s political culture survey in Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the normalisation process scuppered this project. However, a replication of the original political culture survey was fielded by CVVM in 2009 as part of an international project.

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Klokočka’s model of citizenship and electoral participation

In a previous chapter it was argued that one of the defining features of the political reforms proposed during the Prague Spring era was a socialist model of pluralism and citizenship. However, it is important to stress that this vision of political pluralism presented in the official reforms proposed by Mlynář [1964] and Klokočka [1968] was different to the versions of pluralism developed earlier in England and the United States [Barnard 1991: 1].

English and American liberal conceptions of political pluralism deriving respectively from the seminal works of (a) Harold J. Laski [1917], G.D.H. Cole [1920]; (b) the enlightenment liberal political philosophical treatises of John Locke and John Paine; and (c) and the Federalist Papers [1787-1788] written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Each of these three broad streams of political theorising emphasised the central role of citizenship in providing the only effective counterbalance to authoritarianism. In contrast, influential socialist thinkers such as Karl Marx focussed on individuals’ alienation from themselves stemming from the operation of a capitalist economic system. This alienation was conceptualised in group or class terms where this phenomenon was concentrated among workers. Consequently (at the risk of simplification) liberals defined effective citizenship in terms of individual freedom where citizenship was seen to be fundamentally political in nature. In contrast, socialists viewed citizenship in terms of equality and saw it as being primarily economic in character. This resulted in a clash of values, as noted earlier in chapter two, over the relative importance of ensuring individual freedom or creating equality in society.

The experience of communism within Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1968 revealed that the orthodox Marxist prediction of the “withering away of the state” was false. Political power had not become increasingly devolved toward the citizen: it had in contrast to socialist theory become more centralised in the hands of the KSČ, who held a monopoly on all decision-making [see, Kabele and Hájek: 2008]. A central problem for the Czechoslovak communist regime was that positive memories of citizenship rights under the liberal democratic First Republic forced a re-think of citizenship under socialism. During the early 1960s a number of political theorists began to develop what Barnard [1991: 2] called “socialist or civic pluralism.”

It was highlighted earlier in chapter one that the communist regime’s assumption that society and the state were one and the same was rejected by Czechoslovak pluralists such as Vladimír Klokočka [1968]. Consequently, there was an abandonment of the idea that there were no competing interests in a socialist soci-
ety. Research by Machonin et al. [1969] and others demonstrated empirically that Czechoslovakia had not become a classless non-stratified society after two decades of socialism. The rejection by orthodox communists of differences in society undermined civic order over the long-term. This is because there was no channel through which civil conflict and competition between different interests could be managed by the state. In order for such a management of interest competition to operate, it was necessary to allow individuals and groups the scope to articulate their interests. In short, a pluralist rather than monist conception of citizenship was required. The two main official proposals for reforming citizenship in Czechoslovakia were made by Mlynář [1964] and Klokočka [1968].

In order to effectively manage the tension between irreducible social heterogeneity and the requirement for state unity, Klokočka [1968] argued in his proposals for electoral reform of the necessity of having rule governed behaviour. The idea that socialist states were defined by class based politics was seen to be a dangerous illusion that Marx had warned against in ‘On the Jewish Question’ (1844). Two decades of socialism in Czechoslovakia predicated on democratic centralism had failed to suppress different interests in society and appeared to confirm Marx’s concerns. Klokočka [1968: 255ff.] proposed using the metaphor of a “game” to demonstrate how individuals acted mattered as much as what they did within political life. The creation and adherence to the “rules of the game” had the positive benefits of (a) making political and social life more predictable, and hence stable; and (b) providing a framework for managing the inevitable social conflicts in society where the state could play an agenda setting role determining what were the most important values underpinning social consensus.

Adhering to the pluralist view that Czechoslovak society and the state were not the same implied that citizens needed legal rights protecting them from the agents of the state such as the security services (e.g. StB and VB). This perspective was controversial because it rejected the provision expressed in the Czechoslovak Socialist Constitution of 1960 that there were no longer different class interests in Czechoslovakia. Rejection of this idea implied denial of the orthodox view that the state was a (working) class based “dictatorship” where state and society were juxtaposed. In short, a pluralist socialist conception of citizenship required a fundamental re-thinking of both legal and political rights.

In political terms, the key issues centred on the party and electoral systems. Klokočka [1968: 208-285] advocated for a multi-party system within the framework of the National Front where there would be no open opposition to socialism. While both Mlynář [1964] and Klokočka [1968] favoured a multiparty system with ‘internal”, or institutionalised opposition they stated in an article in


Literární listy (March 21, 1968) that they did not think that conditions within Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring era favoured such an extensive system of political reforms. Notwithstanding such reservations, Klokočka’s [1968] proposals for electoral reform did represent a major deviation from the status quo. Klokočka’s pluralist socialist model envisaged a unicameral parliament where members would be elected on the basis of multiparty competition. General elections would be based on a secret ballot using candidate lists and preferential voting. Legislative competition would occur mainly within the chambers’ system of committees. Klokočka [1968: 298] argued that citizen participation in elections tended to be either a plebiscite where there was acclamation of the incumbent regime, or a competition between two or more different policy platforms. The central difference between these two voting systems was that the latter allowed choice, whereas the former did not. Klokočka [1968: 27, 213, 239, 248] went even further and implicitly argued that in the absence of real electoral choice, as was the case in Czechoslovakia post 1948, the communist regime exhibited a key characteristic of “all modern autocracies.”

It should be noted that the publication of Klokočka’s [1968] book length presentation of his proposals for electoral and political reform coincided with the Warsaw Pact invasion. Consequently, his ideas were never subject to serious debate; and it is unclear if Klokočka’s conclusions would have ever been used as a blueprint for reform of the political system. However, the ideas expressed are important as they represent one of the few comprehensive cases ever made to liberalise a democratic centralist state from within. Such a policy was not seriously contemplated again until Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) based reform programme of the mid-to-late 1980s [Gorbachev and Mlynář 2002: 65; Brown 2007: 97, 110, 161; Wydra 2007: 195]. Having briefly outlined the Mlynář [1964] and Klokočka [1968] models of citizen politics, it is now an appropriate moment to make some remarks regarding the unique survey data that will analysed within this chapter. Thereafter, there will be a presentation of the empirical results.

Data and Results

This research is based on a national survey undertaken in Czechoslovakia in early May 1968 by the state polling agency (UVVM). The purpose of this research was to examine the “attitudes of citizens towards politics” and the preparation and analysis of this data was undertaken by the ‘Development of Democracy and Political System Group’ based at the Institute of State and Law, Czechoslovak
Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

Academy of Sciences (ČSAV). This research group formed in 1966 was directed by Zdeněk Mlynář, and was generally referred to as the “Mlynář team.” One of the key objectives of the Mlynář team was to ascertain the political beliefs and values of Czechoslovak citizens for the purpose of formulating proposals for reform of the political system.4

It seems reasonable to assume that this research agenda was envisaged as forming the foundation for managing social and political change during the 1970s. This assessment is supported by the fact that Zdeněk Mlynář, Party Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) directed this research programme. The process of reform was expected to last until about 1978 [Mlynar 1980: 84]. Following the replacement of the Dubček reformist government; Mlynář was expelled from the KSC in 1970, and was subsequently a prominent member of the Czechoslovak dissident movement – being a founding member of Charter 77 [note, Mlynar 1980; Gorbachev and Mlynář 2002; Simon 1997].

The original national quota probability sample contained 3,600 interviews with representative samples from both the Czech lands and Slovakia. Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20-21 1968, and the subsequent period of normalisation (1969-1987) analysis of the Mlynář team’s political attitudes survey ceased. This is because the post-1968 KSC elite ordered the data be destroyed. However, a third of the original completed questionnaires were saved and stored secretly by one of the original team members at their residence for the next two decades. In 1998, the responses from the surviving 1,194 questionnaires were converted into an electronic format by CVVM facilitating statistical analysis.

Respondents were interviewed face-to-face by five hundred ÚVVM interviewers from May 2-14 1968. This coincided with a period of change where Dubček promised on the basis of the Action Programme of April 10 a “new model of democracy”, which was given exuberant public support in Prague during the May Day celebrations. However, on May 3 Dubček suddenly disappeared to

4 Some preliminary results of this research programme were presented at a conference in Smolence (Smolenický zámok), Slovakia, on March 8-8 1968. This meeting marked an important shift in the thinking of Zdeněk Mlynář and Petr Pithart. Prior to March 1968, KSC reformers had focussed on the theme of democratisation, and more specifically liberalisation. However, three conference presentations made by two Slovak lawyers, Jiří Grospic and Zdeněk Jelínský and historian Samo Falt’an made a compelling argument about the fundamental link between liberalisation and federalisation; and hence democratisation within Slovakia [see, Žatuliak 1996: 29-31]. Thereafter, Mlynář accepted that democratic reforms in Czechoslovakia had to include the creation of new federal structures granting Slovakia greater independence. Evidence of this change in thinking is evident in the Action Programme of April 1968 where political liberalisation and federalisation were linked for the first time in an official KSC policy document.

Moscow for two days of bilateral meetings with Brezhnev to explain why Czechoslovak democratisation was not incompatible with socialism. On May 9 news of Warsaw Pact troops moving toward the Czechoslovak border emerged, although the Czech news agency (ČTK) reported these were normal manoeuvres, which in any event did not start until June [Bracke 2007: 145-146].

Given the nature of the Czechoslovak communist state between 1948 and 1968, and the dramatic events of April and early May; the validity and reliability of any survey research undertaken during this era is an important consideration. Within the ÚVVM survey attempts were made to measure if respondents felt pressured to provide “politically correct” answers that were at variance with their true preferences. Such survey validity measurements were undertaken using standard projection items (i.e. would other respondents feel anxious and would these other respondents answer truthfully), and interviewer’s subjective evaluations of the respondent’s disposition toward the survey interview. Preliminary research work (not reported because of space constraints) indicates that the survey response data do provide a reasonably authentic picture of Czechoslovak public opinion in May 1968.

Brokol model of political orientation in 1968

As noted earlier the work of Brokol et al. [1999] represents the closest approximation to what a Mlynář team survey based report might have looked like. In 1967 Mlynář had thought that his teams’ reform proposals would have been presented to the leadership at the next KSC party congress scheduled at that point for 1970 [Mlynar 1980: 78-79]. The analyses presented by Brokol et al. [1999] sought to identify at the level of social groups who were “democrats” and “non-democrats” using about thirty political attitude questions many of which had a Likert scale response format. The key social groups explored were nationality (Czech vs. Slovak), level of education, age, and communist party membership. In general, the results revealed that attitudes toward democracy tended to exhibit both intra- and inter-group differences where a majority had what were defined to be values supportive of parliamentary democracy.

A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used by Brokol et al. [1999] to map out the democratic orientation of Czechoslovak citizens in May 1968. Twelve of the original thirty items were used for this task. See the chapter appendix for details. A four factor solution using varimax rotation explaining 47% of the total variance was presented as the final rotated PCA model. The four factors reported were: (1) “Basic democratic principles” – a factor that explained
14% of the total variance and had strongest loadings on four items; (2) “Means of implementing democratic principles” explained 13% of the variance, and had strongest loadings on four items; (3) “Undemocratic democrats” explained 10% of total variance and had a strong loading on a single item; and (4) “Rights of minorities” explained 9% of the variance and again stemmed from a strong loading on a single variable [see, Brokl et al. 1999: 35-52].

The main social cleavage found in a detailed group based analysis of these four factors arose with the rights of minorities (factor 4) where Czechs were judged to have a more democratic orientation than Slovaks. More generally, Czechs and Slovaks were seen to have slightly different conceptions of democracy, where the former had a more ‘rights based’ perspective while the latter had a more ‘rule based’ viewpoint. In the following two sections, a similar mapping of political attitudes will be undertaken with the same May 2-14 1968 survey where a larger set of variables will be used and a replication survey implemented on a national sample (N=1,066) in the Czech Republic on May 12-19 2008 by CVVM. Here the objective is to compare political values and preferences in 1968 and 2008. A more detailed item by item analysis is given later in chapter seven.

Political Values in 1968 and 2008

The battery of thirty questions asked in the Mlynář team survey (1968) was designed to explore the “democratic” attitudes of the electorate. There were specific items that measured concepts such as pluralism, tolerance of minorities, political participation, sense of political efficacy; and more specific issues such as support for multiparty democracy, and the status quo. In short, these questions were designed to provide information on specific issues and also general political orientation. In this chapter, the focus will be on exploring what this data tells us about general political values in 1968 and in 2008 through a replication survey. One of the most frequently used methods of examining political values using a set of variables is to employ Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).

At its simplest EFA is a statistical method for identifying a set of latent constructs such as political values measured by a set of survey questions. The goal here is to provide the simplest representation of the association between the political beliefs of respondents measured using a set of twenty Likert scales. Consequently, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is not used as the objective is not to summarise the responses of the twenty items into a smaller set of variables.

Whereas PCA is a variance oriented technique, Factor Analysis is concerned solely with correlations between variables. Factor Analysis assumes that the observed correlations are caused by some underlying pattern in the data resulting from the presence of a number of predetermined factors. Strictly speaking one should know in advance, on the basis of some theory, how many factors there ought to be. It is considered that the contribution of any variable can be split into a common component, i.e. that part which contributes to the factors, and a unique component (or ‘noise’). The sum of the common components is called the communality. The methodology of EFA is very similar to PCA except that the variability to be partitioned between the factors is that held in common by the survey items analysed. The unique variability of survey questions is excluded from the analysis. In this context, EFA makes most sense since the purpose of this chapter is to identify common underlying (or latent) political values – unique variance is not of intrinsic interest here. One practical consequence of using EFA rather than PCA is that the factor loadings extracted have lower values, or strength, because only the common variance is considered with EFA [Fabrigar et al. 1999].

Exploratory Factor Analysis across space and time

It is important here to make explicit two assumptions before presenting the results of the EFA. First, the Czech lands and Slovakia are considered to be separate political cultures. Much of the literature on politics in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring era, and beyond, emphasised the differences between the Czech and Slovak components of the federal state. Therefore, it makes sense to explore empirically if this is indeed the case. Second, all twenty questions asked in both 1968 and 2008 will be employed in the analyses. The inclusion (or exclusion) of specific questions in EFA often has important consequences on the interpretation of the underlying (factors) values reported. However, the goal here is not to produce the “best” model of political orientation for the Czech lands (in 1968 and 2008) and Slovakia (1968); but to compare (a) the constellation of

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5 Unlike the analyses reported later in this study, the Brokl et al. [1999: 35-36] data analyses are based on a subset (12) of all the variables available (30). The items analysed related specifically to democratic orientation. This selection of variables is important as it has implications on the statistical models estimated and reported.

6 A maximum likelihood method for estimating the number of factors facilitates more extensive inferences regarding level of significance and estimation of confidence intervals for the factor loadings extracted. However, this estimation procedure is unsuitable in this situation due to the presence of “Heywood cases” due to the data not being multivariate normal.
Czech and Slovak political attitudes in 1968; and (b) Czech political attitudes across time.7

An important consideration in the estimation of an EFA model is selection of the most “appropriate” number of factors. Using the Kaiser criterion (eigenvalues >1) and scree plots leads to inconclusive results. The key problem here is the lack of strong correlations among the variables. A parallel analysis was undertaken and was inconclusive, but using a PCA rather than EFA model suggested that no more than four factors should be used.8 Preliminary analyses across all three datasets indicated this was a reasonable decision for making comparison.

The EFA results presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.3 reveal a four factor solution yields interpretable results for the Czech lands in 1968 and 2008, and Slovakia in 1968. The three survey questions enquiring about a respondents’ willingness to participate in local, regional, or national elections as a candidate form a separate dimension in all models estimated. The fourth factor in all models is relatively weak (eigenvalue <1), but makes substantive sense in each model and justifies inclusion. Comparison of the political orientations for the Czech lands and Slovakia for 1968 shows a broadly similar picture. The two strongest factors in Tables 1 and 2 refer to ‘political participation’ (as a candidate) and ‘pluralism’, and explain similar proportions of the total variance (.40). The dissimilarity in ordering of factors 1 and 2 for the Czech lands and Slovakia in 1968 is not very important as the differences in explained variance between the top two factors are relatively small. In this respect, the top two factors in the Czech lands and Slovakia should be seen as having equal importance.

Table 4.1 Political orientation in the Czech Lands, 1968 (N=411)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>Factor1</th>
<th>Factor2</th>
<th>Factor3</th>
<th>Factor4</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>KMO</th>
<th>SMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support a multiparty democracy (q23_d)</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.574</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow expression of non-socialist opinions (q15_d)</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.127</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with plural interest representation (q12_m)</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>.787</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to defend civil rights through strikes (q16_d)</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support expression of group ideas and interests (q28_s)</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.760</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support minority rights (q9_m)</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.889</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support private sphere (q26_m)</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.808</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No censorship (q4_m)</td>
<td>-.129</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>.736</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics no right to influence all life (q14_s)</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.194</td>
<td>.752</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional election candidate (q6_s)</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.898</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National election candidate (q7_m)</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>-.075</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local election candidate (q5_s)</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to independent candidacy (q3_m)</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.689</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sense of external efficacy or knowledge (q25_d)</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sense of internal efficacy (q21_s)</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-.055</td>
<td>.690</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to action against opponents of democracy (q17_d)</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.956</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics concerns me personally (q18_s)</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active expression of opinion in public (q27_m)</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>-.142</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free expression for all (q22_d)</td>
<td>-.291</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.784</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance explained (eigenvalues)</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1-F2=.03; F1-F3=-.15; F1-F4=.11; F2-F3=-.25; F2-F4=.19; F3-F4=.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note EFA model with a Quartimin Oblique Rotation (same as Direct Oblimin, delta=0). Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) reported. Unipolar items removed from analysis by factor loadings. Kaiser’s Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMSA) and Anti-image correlation between variables and factors were calculated for all factors. KMO values range from 0 (no variance explained by the factor) to 1 (all variance explained by the factor). 7 The correlations between twenty items examined are generally speaking rather low (≤.3) indicating that smaller subsets of items should be used, or a different statistical modelling strategy. This has important methodological and theoretical implications that are discussed later. 8 Parallel Factor Analysis is a more systematic method of deciding how many factors to report from a PCA/EFA than either the Kaiser Criterion or Scree plots. Here a simulation approach is used. Typically one hundred random datasets similar to the one being analyzed are generated to determine how many factors may be extracted from such random data. Knowing how many artificial factors are likely to exist in a comparable random dataset sets a limit on the number of non-random factors that should be reported from an EFA/PCA analysis (Fabrigar et al. 1999: 277-279).
### Table 4.2 Political orientation in Slovakia, 1968 (N=322)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey questions</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>KMO</th>
<th>SMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional election candidate (q6_s)</td>
<td>.847</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National election candidate (q7_m)</td>
<td>.780</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.407</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local election candidate (q5_s)</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.539</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free expression for all (q22_d)</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>-.197</td>
<td>-.158</td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support political pluralism (q19_d)</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.626</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.113</td>
<td>.590</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support a multiparty democracy (q23_d)</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.630</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow expression of non-socialist opinions (q15_d)</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>.459</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to defend civil rights through strikes (q16_d)</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with plural interest representation (q12_m)</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.364</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.839</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support expression of group ideas and interests (q28_s)</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.399</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support minority rights (q9_m)</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.229</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.934</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No censorship (q4_m)</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>-.357</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sense of internal efficacy (q21_s)</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td>-.041</td>
<td>.637</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sense of external efficacy or knowledge (q25_d)</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.577</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.668</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to action against opponents of democracy (q17_d)</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics concerns me personally (q18_s)</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>-.094</td>
<td>-.167</td>
<td>.406</td>
<td>.755</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics no right to influence all life (q14_s)</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>-.314</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>-.297</td>
<td>.761</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active expression of opinion in public (q27_m)</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>-.322</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>.743</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to independent candidacy (q3_m)</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.865</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support private sphere (q26_m)</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>-.287</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.765</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of total variance explained</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation between four factors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1-F2=-.01; F1-F3=-.04; F1-F4=-.01; F2-F3=+.07; F2-F4=-.01; F3-F4=+.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: EFA model with a Quartimin Oblique Rotation (same as Direct Oblimin, delta=0). Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) reported. Uniqueness estimates indicate the amount of variance across all factors not explained by a variable. KMO indicates the sampling adequacy of the variable for EFA. Values > .7 suggests the variable distributions are suitable for EFA. SMC is the correlation of a variable with all other variables in the analysis except itself, and is a measure of the inter-correlation of all the variables analysed. In this analysis, the extracted factors have been interpreted as follows: Factor 1: Political participation; Factor 2: Pluralism; Factor 3: Political efficacy; Factor 4: Support liberal democracy.

### Table 4.3 Political orientation in the Czech Republic, 2008 (N=664)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey questions</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>KMO</th>
<th>SMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional election candidate (q6_s)</td>
<td>.938</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National election candidate (q7_m)</td>
<td>.839</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local election candidate (q5_s)</td>
<td>.820</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.336</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with plural interest representation (q12_m)</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.483</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.755</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support expression of group ideas and interests (q28_s)</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.432</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.756</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support a multiparty democracy (q23_d)</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>.783</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to independent candidacy (q3_m)</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>-.119</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.868</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support minority rights (q9_m)</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.875</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to defend civil rights through strikes (q16_d)</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>-.173</td>
<td>.864</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support private sphere (q26_m)</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.841</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support political pluralism (q19_d)</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>.732</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active expression of opinion in public (q27_m)</td>
<td>-.165</td>
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<td>.424</td>
<td>-.173</td>
<td>.699</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sense of internal efficacy or knowledge (q25_d)</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.395</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.779</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sense of internal efficacy (q21_s)</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics concerns me personally (q18_s)</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics no right to influence all life (q14_s)</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.539</td>
<td>.719</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to action against opponents of democracy (q17_d)</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>-.170</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politics no right to influence all life (q14_s)</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.539</td>
<td>.719</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of total variance explained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation between four factors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1-F2=-.01; F1-F3=-.04; F1-F4=-.01; F2-F3=+.07; F2-F4=-.01; F3-F4=+.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: EFA model with a Quartimin Oblique Rotation (same as Direct Oblimin, delta=0). Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) reported. Uniqueness estimates indicate the amount of variance across all factors not explained by a variable. KMO indicates the sampling adequacy of the variable for EFA. Values > .7 suggests the variable distributions are suitable for EFA. SMC is the correlation of a variable with all other variables in the analysis except itself, and is a measure of the inter-correlation of all the variables analysed. In this analysis, the extracted factors have been interpreted as follows: Factor 1: Political participation; Factor 2: Pluralism; Factor 3: Political efficacy; Factor 4: Support liberal democracy. Survey questions denoted with ‘_s’, ‘_m’ and ‘_d’ refer to items that were mildly different or different in the replication survey of May 2008.
The cross-time EFA analyses for Czech citizens in 1968 and 2008 are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. These two tables reveal a number of differences in the loading of particular survey items, and the necessity of employing dissimilar factor labels. These dissimilarities appear to reflect the political regimes prevailing during the Prague Spring era (socialist democracy); and four decades later in 2008 (liberal democracy). This makes sense, and it would be surprising if institutional context were not reflected in the response patterns observed.

Looking more closely at the two strongest factors, one observes that in 1968 (Table 4.1) the first two factors are close to being equally important in terms of the proportion of explained variance (F1=.47, F2=.40); while in 2008 there is a much larger difference (F1=.51, F2=.30) as shown in Table 4.3. One might interpret this change as indicative of different political priorities. In 1968, the key priority was firstly to establish a more competitive system of representation; and then worry about who would occupy these new political positions. Forty years later, with a functioning liberal democracy the focus quite understandably shifted to candidate selection concerns.

This commonality in political orientation among Czech citizens under communism and liberal democracy, though with (understandably) different emphases, is also evident in the correlation between the factors extracted. The bottom parts of Tables 4.1 and 4.3 reveal a negative association between ‘political participation’ and ‘political efficacy’ for both 1968 and 2008 (i.e. 1968: F1-F2=-.25 and 2008: F2-F3=-.38 respectively). This negative relationship is reasonable as willingness to be a candidate in any kind of election depends on possessing confidence, and a sense of being able to understand politics and shape public policy. The fact that the negative association is approximately 50 per cent greater in 2008 than it was in 1968 is suggestive of differences in hopes and aspirations that characterised the Prague Spring era; and the mundane realities of living in a fully functioning liberal democratic state in May 2008.

However, one must be careful here not to “over-interpret” the data as such dissimilarities may stem from methodological differences across the surveys undertaken in 1968 and 2008. In this respect, one of the key inconsistencies between the two surveys reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 is the question wording. This discrepancy arises because: (a) some of the items asked in 1968 were context specific referring in some cases to communist era institutions and would have made no sense in 2008, and (b) the terminology employed in some questions in 1968 would have been considered archaic by Czech respondents in 2008 thereby risking misinterpretation, or non-response.

For these two reasons, one third of the replication questions had to be significantly reformulated in order to reliably measure the concept underlying the original questions; another third had to be mildly re-worded in order to remove old fashioned phraseology; and the remaining third were repeated verbatim. An informal ad-ocular analysis of question wording effects in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 does not reveal strong effects indicative of methodological problems. Nonetheless, more specific tests of the socio-demographic response profile for potential question wording effects should be undertaken in future work.

Overall, the EFA evidence presented in this section shows that the general political orientation of Czechs and Slovaks during the Prague Spring era was similar notwithstanding variation in emphasis. Comparing the structure of political values between 1968 and 2008 among Czech citizens reveals a general pattern of stability; where differences appear to reflect the institutional framework of living under communism or a liberal democracy. In sum, despite variation one might expect from: (a) the presence of dissimilar political values, and (b) methodological effects arising from replicating survey questions at two time points four decades apart; the overall structure of general political orientation appears to be stable across both space and time. A more detailed analysis of each of the twenty replication items is presented later in chapter seven where there is an investigation of opinion change using cohort analysis.

In this section, the attitudinal survey evidence has been conceptualised as ‘similarity data’ where it is the correlation among responses which has facilitated creating a map of the public’s values. An alternative, theory of the survey data is that the survey responses reflected respondents’ preferences rather than their values. This difference is important because it reflects different conceptualisations of the survey response data, and the relationship between the variables.

Political Preferences in 1968 and 2008

In this section, there will be an exploration of Czech and Slovak respondents’ preferences for various features of democratic governance. This analysis uses exactly the same data employed for the EFA reported in the last section. Here responses to the twenty Likert scale items are seen to provide information about respondents’ single peaked preferences. Therefore, it is assumed that all respondents view and interpret the political survey questions similarly, but they differ in their preferences. In order to map citizens’ attitudes toward democracy it is very useful to be able to locate both the survey questions and the respondent.
ents in the same hypothesised policy space. Multidimensional unfolding (MDU) analysis facilitates this task. MDU analysis of political preferences

Multidimensional unfolding explores if an individuals’ policy preferences can be effectively represented geometrically in terms of more general values or orientations such as economic left-right, or social liberal-conservative. Technically, unfolding involves the construction of “joint psychological spaces” where both individual respondents and the political attitude scales are represented as points in a joint space where individuals are assumed to select the response option (e.g. strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree) that is closest to their ideal point. Consequently, the goal here is to investigate if it is possible to identify general political values that can help explain the preferential logic used by individual respondents in answering the twenty political attitude scales implemented in the Mlynář team survey of May 1968 and the replication survey fielded in May 2008.

One of the main problems with MDU is that the estimation procedure often yields “degenerate solutions” where there is a good statistical fit to the data, but the resulting patterns are not interpretable. Often this results in two dimensional maps where all the respondents are located at the centre point of a circle formed by the political attitude scales. In non-degenerate solutions the ideal points representing the attitude scales and respondents will be intermixed. The results presented in this chapter undoubtedly suffer from some degeneracy, but not to the extent that the results do not make substantive sense.

For this reason, the MDU models reported are used primarily for exploratory purposes. The unfolding model estimates may be used for creating a typology of different respondent types, which may subsequently be subject to a cross-validating analysis. It should be noted that Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) is a more robust technique, but the disadvantage here is that it does provide estimates of the preferences of individual respondents. However, the patterns estimated for the political survey questions reported in this chapter using either MDU or MDS models tend to be very similar; providing some additional confidence in the unfolding estimates reported.

9 In order to keep the discussions within the bounds of a single chapter the technical details of unfolding modelling are not discussed. For details see Coombs [1964]; Borg and Groenen [1997]; De Leeuw [2005]; and for a specific electoral choice application, see Hinich [2005].

10 The models presented in Figure 4.2 employed a technique developed by Busing, Groenen and Heiser [2005] to deal with the degeneracy problem. An alternative, and perhaps better approach in future work, would be to implement an estimation strategy proposed by van Deun, Heiser and Delbeke [2007].

(a) Czech Republic 2008 (N=1,045)

Note that these item points were derived from a Multi-Dimensional Unfolding (MDU) model of the responses to the eleven Likert scale questions. These figures are joint plots of the common space of the survey items (black filled circles) and respondents (light hollow circles). Dimension 1 appears to refer to individual social liberal - conservatism, while dimension 2 seems to reflect economic liberal-conservatism. Details of all survey questions used to construct this figure are given in the appendix for this chapter.

Window (a) of Figure 4.2 reports the results of an MDU model of the May 1968 survey items for Czech respondents. The two dimensions may be interpreted as: (1) ‘sense of political efficacy’ (low to high), and (2) ‘form of socialism’ (monism to pluralism). An examination of the patterning of the twenty survey items reveals that the political attitude scales cluster into three sets. The bottom cluster in window (a) has many of the same variables as the first factor in Table 4.1. This cluster is interpreted here as denoting a preference for socialist monism and is associated with a high sense of political efficacy. In contrast, the cluster on the top right suggests a preference for pluralism and again a strong sense of efficacy. The final cluster on the top left is characterised by support for pluralism combined with a low sense of political efficacy. More details of the interpretation of the two-fold typology constructed from window (a) are given in the appendix to this chapter.

(b) Slovakia 1968 (N=591)

(c) Czechoslovakia 1968 (N=1,194)
The evidence presented in window (b) of Figure 4.2 for Slovakia in 1968 reveals that the pattern of preferences is similar to that obtained for Czech respondents. It is important to highlight at this point that it is the relative positions in Figure 4.2 that are used for interpretation, and not the absolute coordinates. The pattern evident in window (a) is roughly speaking the same as window (b) rotated clockwise by about 45 degrees. This finding is important because it indicates that the political preferences of Czechs and Slovaks during the Prague Spring era were essentially the same, with the important caveat that this similarity may have a methodological source relating to how the multidimensional unfolding estimation proceeded. One of the key reasons for the degeneracy problem may have a methodological source relating to how the multidimensional unfolding estimation proceeded. This difference analysis indicates that this model suffers much more from the degeneracy problem than that evident in the separate Czech and Slovak models. This difference analysis indicates that the political preferences of Czechs and Slovaks during the Prague Spring era were essentially the same, with the important caveat that this similarity may have a methodological source relating to how the multidimensional unfolding estimation proceeded. This difference analysis indicates that this model suffers much more from the degeneracy problem than that evident in the separate Czech and Slovak models. This difference analysis indicates that the political preferences of Czechs and Slovaks during the Prague Spring era were essentially the same, with the important caveat that this similarity may have a methodological source relating to how the multidimensional unfolding estimation proceeded. This difference analysis indicates that this model suffers much more from the degeneracy problem than that evident in the separate Czech and Slovak models.

The evidence presented in window (c) of Figure 4.2 underscores this caveat, as it demonstrates the results of treating Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a single political unit. The total Czechoslovak pattern is very different to that observed for both Czechs and Slovaks separately. Here overall Czechoslovak preferences appear to be best represented by a single dimension that refers in general terms to support or opposition to political pluralism. In short, this preference structure suggests that Czechoslovak public opinion in 1968 was divided between (1) those that supported reform (greater pluralism), (2) those that were passive or apathetic, and (3) those that preferred the status quo (socialist monism). This picture of public opinion suggests that the salience of reform messages in the media in 1968 does not necessarily mean that the “silent mass” shared their pluralist preferences.

However, the pronounced circular pattern for respondents evident in this MDU analysis indicates that this model suffers much more from the degeneracy problem than that evident in the separate Czech and Slovak models. This difference may have a methodological source relating to how the multidimensional unfolding estimation proceeded. One of the key reasons for the degeneracy problem with any MDU model estimation is missing data: and more specifically highly structured missing data [van Deun et al. 2007: 105]. The larger Czechoslovak dataset has a greater absolute number of missing cases (with listwise deletion), and this fact has a determining effect at an earlier stage in the iterative process of model estimation yielding the degenerate solution observed. If this is the case, it has the important implication that the decision of dividing the Czechoslovak dataset into two parts was a serendipitous one; and indicates an important methodological concern that must be addressed when undertaking this type of analysis.

Finally, the unfolding analysis for the Czech Republic in 2008 reveals a model solution that has a degeneracy problem where the twenty political attitude scales are divided into three clusters. The top centre cluster seems to denote preferences for pluralism, the centre cluster to aspects of political efficacy, and the bottom right cluster refers to willingness to be a candidate in elections. Comparison of windows (a) and (c) suggests that the differences in the structure of preferences observed reflect the different institutional environments present in 1968 and 2008. During the Prague Spring era preferences were ordered on the basis of pluralism and sense of political efficacy. These were of course important themes in the reform agenda of 1968. Four decades later the preferential pattern observed relates to three distinct features: (a) political participation as a candidate, (b) orientation to the collective principles of liberal democracy, and (c) individual features of political representation such as efficacy and the autonomy of the private sphere.

**Conclusion**

Using a unique political attitudes survey dataset from the Prague Spring era the analyses presented in this chapter have endeavoured to map the political values and preferences of (a) Czech and Slovak citizens in May 1968, and (b) Czech citizens in 1968 and 2008. An Exploratory Factor Analysis reveals that Czechs and Slovaks had broadly similar political values during the Prague Spring era. Of course this conclusion is dependent on the questions selected by the Mlynar team, and the exclusion of items dealing directly with contentious issues such as the “National Question”, and proposals for federalisation. This question selection bias undoubtedly influences the results reported in favour of consensus. This consideration represents an important limitation to any conclusion that may be drawn from an analysis of the May 1968 survey dataset.

The cross-time exploratory factor analysis of political values in the Czech Republic over four decades reveals some differences, but overall the patterns observed suggest stability in the constellation of political values across the generations; and the two different regime types under which surveying was undertaken.

11 There is some historiographical debate as to the nature of the linkage between greater liberalisation of the Czechoslovak political system and greater independence for Slovakia with federalisation. Kusin [1972: 143-149] explicitly, and Skilling [1976: 451-489, 858-877] implicitly, treated these two issues as separately within their work. In contrast, more recent scholarship has emphasised their interconnectedness [Kuyk 1987: 472; Brown 2008].
Such results beg the question, what is the origin of these persistent political values. One answer proposed by Rodnick [1970] and others is that Czechoslovak political attitudes during the Prague Spring era had their origin in the First Republic. One implication from the research presented in this chapter is that the political values evident in May 1968 have been in turn transmitted to the current generation of Czech citizens. Whether the political values evident in 1968 have their origins in the First Republic is impossible to say with certainty. This is because there is no surviving individual level survey data from the 1946 to 1948 period to test such a thesis.

The unfolding analyses presented in this chapter indicate that the preferences of Czechs and Slovaks in May 1968 were broadly similar reflecting: (1) a willingness to get involved in politics, and (2) support for either a centralised or pluralist form of socialist democracy. These results fit neatly with the competing reform theories outlined in chapter one and the aggregate poll data patterns discussed in chapter two. Exploration of the political preferences among Czech citizens in 1968 and 2008 reveals unsurprisingly that differences in context are reflected in the response patterns observed. However, it must be noted that there are some problems with these dimensional analyses due to degeneracy; underscoring the point that further work is required.

In the last two chapters there has been an examination of public opinion prior to and during the Prague Spring era. In the next two chapters, our focus will shift to elite opinion as this has been a key element in almost all of the literature examining the events occurring in Czechoslovakia during 1968. Fortunately, having access to another unique survey dataset we are in a position to examine both the structure of the Czechoslovak elites and their preferences and values. This analysis is important because it sheds light on the important question of whether the Prague Spring reforms were associated with significant levels of intra-elite competition and conflict.

5. The Structure of Czechoslovak Elites at the End of the Prague Spring Era

One of the big mistakes people make is to judge real political influence only, or chiefly by formal position […] High ranking official positions, therefore do not always bring power and influence […] The struggle for power and influence in the decision-making process, therefore, involves a jockeying for position in the lower, apparently less important sections of the apparatus […] genuine influence depended on how many people loyal to them or in their personal debt they had in various lower level departments. And there too, are various informal and, to the uninitiated eye, invisible groups and cliques united by a shared outlook […] Some groups and cliques inside the power apparatus gradually became tools of the reform Communists, whereas others were instruments of conservative forces trying to slow down and frustrate the reformist policies […] the power that we were trying to influence at the same time influenced us and our reformist concepts. For power to serve our needs, we in turn had to serve it.

Zdenek Mlynar [1980: 53-57].

In the previous chapters the focus of attention has been on outlining the competing theories of political reform, and the attitudes of the Czechoslovak public toward such proposals. Much of the previous literature on the Prague Spring era has made relatively little use of survey data, where inferences about reform policies and public preferences are elicited from biographies, oral testimony, official documentary evidence, or contemporary descriptions of mass demonstrations garnered from the media. The goal of this study is to contribute to previous work by emphasising the distinctive insights to be gained from systematically evaluating what participants in the events of 1968 expressed in personal anonymous structured interviews.

Until now this monograph has provided no direct evidence of the structure, preferences, attitudes, beliefs, and values of Czechoslovak leaders except what might be inferred from their writings and public pronouncements. In this chapter an attempt will be made to redress this weakness. Within the following pages there will be a direct examination of who were the Czechoslovak elites at the end of the Prague Spring era (i.e. the first half of 1969), and what was the interrelationship among elite members. In the next chapter, our attention will switch

1 In the original Czech version this series of quotes is taken from Mlynář [1978/1990: 63-67].
to an exploration of the preferences and values of this elite segment of Czechoslovak society. The data for these analyses come from a unique elite survey undertaken at a key time point: immediately prior to the repressions associated with the normalisation process.

The Czechoslovak wave of ‘The International Study of Opinion Makers’ forms part of a set of studies undertaken between 1968 and 1975 in Yugoslavia, Norway, Australia, and the United States [Barton, Denitch and Kadushin 1973; Higley, Field and Grøsholt 1976; Higley et al. 1979; Moore 1979]. In these four countries a series of books and articles endeavoured to demonstrate how a comparative research methodology could advance the study of national elites. Curiously, there were rather few comparative publications from this project. This outcome appears to have arisen from the fact that the survey sampling and questionnaires implemented were often different [see, Higley and Moore 1981; Barton et al. 1982].

In addition, the group of scholars who participated in ‘The International Study of Opinion Makers’ followed different theoretical perspectives when thinking about elites; and analysing an opinion makers dataset. For example, in the Yugoslav study there was a significant Marxist sociological orientation evident in explorations of the class origins of communist regime members and the expression of socialist values [Barton, Denitch and Kadushin 1973]. In contrast, in the Australian study there was considerable work undertaken in formulating a new theory of elites that could be tested within the methodology of ‘The International Study of Opinion Makers’ [Field and Higley 1980; Higley et al. 1979]. Other scholars, mainly from the United States, focussed on methodological issues. These researchers also studied substantive topics such as the impact of formal and informal influences on elite opinions, and explanations of what determines leadership attitudes from within the perspective associated with the ‘Columbia School’ in political science [Denitch 1972; Kadushin and Abrams 1973; Barton 1973].

In this chapter it will be shown that the basis for cohesion among Czechoslovak elites during the Prague Spring era stemmed partly from structural factors. The Communist Party’s deliberate policy of selecting the leaders of Czechoslovakia’s socialist society from the working class appears to have been successful. This is because few of the elites interviewed had origins in the ruling class of the First Republic. Closer examination of the socio-demographic profile of the Prague Spring elite reveals that membership of this group was strongly associated with privileged access to scarce resources such as university education. Significantly, the survey data shows how communist elites were consolidating their privileged position through marriage and education. This fact is important because it points to stratification within Czechoslovak society, despite the KSC’s avowed policy of increasing equality.

Within this chapter and the next, use will be made of the theoretical ideas proposed by John Higley in a series of publications where he developed specific hypotheses that may be examined using the Czechoslovak wave of ‘The International Study of Opinion Makers.’ This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, there is a presentation of the elite theories that might be applied to Czechoslovakia under communism; and thereafter there is a brief discussion of how these theoretical considerations relate to the empirical evidence explored in this chapter. Section two provides an overview of the unique dataset used in this chapter. This is followed by a profile of the Czechoslovak decision-making elite of early 1969, and their participation within communication networks associated with opinion-making. Section four presents the results of a social network analyses mapping out the interactions within this elite group; and this is followed in the final section by some concluding remarks.

Elites, Power, Influence and Social Circles

The study of elites involves accepting that small groups do determine how states operate. This assumption is explicitly rejected by many scholars who argue that it is society rather than the state that has ultimate power where collective expressions of mass discontent have the potential to bring about change; as happened with the protests associated with the Prague Spring (1968) and Velvet Revolution (1989). Acceptance or rejection of elite theory is often determined by whether one has a monist (centralised) or pluralist (decentralised) conception of power within a state.

Classical elite theories associated with Pareto [1935], Mosca [1939], and Michels [1911] are most often interpreted as adhering to the monist view where power is seen to be concentrated in the hands of an elite few who are said to be well integrated as a group. In contrast, most democratic and Marxist theories reject this reduction of politics to elites and argue that it is more fundamental social and economic forces that determine the distribution of political power [Burton 1984: 47]. These theoretical differences centre on the degree to which the structure of power and influence at the national level is characterised by unity, or diversity [Moore 1979: 673].

Many of the elite models put forward in the social sciences differ on this point. The ruling class and power elite models argue that the available evidence from the United States and Western Europe reveal a considerable degree of elite inte-
The plural elite model contends that there is little evidence of the integration of elites who come from different sectors because these ‘isolated’ leaders confine their activities to specific policy domains [Dahl 1961, 1967; McConnell 1966].

These two debates over (a) the existence and importance of elites; and (b) the monist or pluralist nature of elite power hinge on the evidence presented. The fact that it is not possible to say that elites determine the structure and stability of state regimes, and how power is distributed within states stems from the use of different methodologies. As many of the classic elite studies quoted were undertaken during the 1950s and 1960s there was by 1969 no single source of empirical evidence that would have facilitated testing the relative explanatory power of the most influential elite models. This is because almost all influential elite studies had developed their own unique set of definitions of core concepts such as ‘elite’, ‘power’, and ‘influence’.

In order to surmount these problems, scholars associated with ‘The International Study of Opinion Makers’ argued that the historical evidence demonstrated that regime stability depended on (a) elites exhibiting shared values, cooperation, and trust; and (b) extensive and inclusive interaction among elites [Higley and Moore 1981]. This basic assumption held by many influential sociologists and political scientists such as Aron [1950: 129], Dahrendorf [1967: 229-231], Lijphart [1968], McRae [1974], and Putnam [1976] suggested that the study of elites is an important topic; and should not be treated as epiphenomenal. Furthermore, demonstrating the structure and values of elites was an empirical question that should be undertaken using an explicit standardised methodology that could be used to replicate and compare findings.

Developing a comparative research methodology

In addressing this theoretical and methodological problem Kadushin [1968: 686] insightfully noted that power is a “disposition concept” meaning that power is almost always defined in terms of its effects rather than what it is (i.e. its ontology). This is because power is only observable when it is exercised. Of course there are a myriad of ways of observing and measuring power. As a result, researchers often defined power and the elites who possess it in different ways. Unsurprisingly, studies of the same system often yielded contrasting conclusions. For example, Mills [1956] found that there were strong links between members of the national elite in the United States; while Dahl [1961] concluded from his work that such links were either weak or non-existent.

Building on the insight that power and influence is exercised by small groups of individuals, or elites, one strategy for making elite research more methodologically rigorous is to define elite groups in a manner than is replicable. Here Kadushin [1968] proposed using snowball sampling with open sociometric items where elites are defined as those who exercised power regardless of their formal positions. If power and influence resided among elites who inhabited the same (or intersecting) social circles then it should be possible, having first identified the elite population, to systematically sample this group using mass survey techniques. This was the basis for the Czechoslovak wave of the International Study of Opinion Makers initiated during the late Prague Spring era.

Within this chapter the focus will be on describing the methodology for determining: (a) elite group membership using a survey technique, (b) the structure of elite membership in terms of social background, and (c) the nature of interaction among members of the elite. This exercise forms the first part of an analysis of the degree to which the Czechoslovak elite were integrated in 1969. The second part of this analysis, determining the level of value consensus will be undertaken in the next chapter. The evidence from both chapters will provide a valuable insight into the stability of the Czechoslovak communist regime at the end of the Prague Spring era.

Elite Survey Data and Methodology

The International Study of Opinion Makers coordinated in part by Paul F. Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University attempted to redress the limitations in previous research on national elites by undertaking comparative analyses of both the structure, and opinions of elites cross-nationally in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The goal of this ambitious research programme was to implement a common research methodology where there would be a mapping of the network of contacts among legislators, mass organisation leaders, key figures in the economy and media, and intellectuals [Denitch 1972; Barton, Denitch and Kadushin 1973].

2 The importance of social circles and group affiliation developed by Georg Simmel [1908/1950] was one of the inspirations for using social networks as a means of studying elites, power and influence by Kadushin [1974] and others.

3 It was proposed to undertake studies in Canada and the United States in North America; Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland in Eastern Europe; Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in Western Europe; and Tunisia in North Africa. Yugoslavia became the pilot study for this comparative research agenda.
Fortunately during the final months of the Prague Spring era before the repressive aspects of the normalisation process had begun in earnest, the Czechoslovak wave of the opinion maker’s study was implemented. This work, undertaken by a research team in UVVM, resulted in a total of 193 interviews with legislators from the Federal Assembly (n=51); senior media figures working in print, radio, and television (n=75); and intellectuals composed of scientists, artists, and writers (n=89). Interviews lasted on average ninety minutes, and established not only the background and social network of respondents, but also respondents’ views of contemporary political affairs.

Survey methodology

Within the International Study of Opinion Makers the elite population was divided into six groups: senior politicians, higher echelon bureaucrats, decision-makers within the committee system of the Communist Party and associated organisations, economic planners and enterprise directors, those working in the mass media, and intellectuals (i.e. artists, scientists, writers, etc.). Due to the deteriorating surveying climate, only half the elite groups specified in the theory underpinning the opinion makers’ project were selected for interviewing [Illner 1970; Barton 1973: 220-228]. Thus interviews in Czechoslovakia were undertaken with political representatives, those working in the mass media, and intellectuals.

In this respect, sampling was undertaken in three steps. First, institutional sectors were defined along with positions within specific organisations. Second, the hierarchy of positions within the sector organisations to be sampled were identified. Third, a random sample of positions from each sector was selected for interviewing. A total of 1,080 respondents were identified from the three sectors. These became the population from which a systematic random sample was drawn where it was envisaged that there would be about 70 interviews in each sector (N=222). It should be noted that there was no overlapping membership across sectors.

Consequently, the plan was to interview about one-in-five of the total elite population in the political, mass media, and intellectual sectors. Difficulties in

4 The Federal Assembly came into existence with an amendment to the Constitution enacted in October 1968. This was part of the federalisation policy. At the time of interviewing the Federal Assembly was a new institution whose members were elected for a transition period from the enlarged Czech and Slovak National Councils. The first election to the Federal Assembly (composed of the House of the People and House of Nations) was held in late November 1971.

organising interviews led to a 14 per cent loss of sampled respondents (n=31). Many of these ‘lost’ respondents were replaced with alternates that were not always selected randomly. Moreover, in the post-surveying stage twenty two interviews were removed from the final dataset for reasons that are not clear. This resulted in a total sample size of 193 respondents. In summary, 10 per cent of the political elites were interviewed (n=43), in addition to 30 per cent of the mass media opinion leaders (n=75), and 19 per cent of the intellectuals (n=75).

It is important to stress that this elite survey was not a representative sample, although a systematic effort was made to randomly select those interviewed [Illner 1970: 9]. Details of the selection procedures used are given the appendix to this chapter.

Questionnaire design and interviewing

The questionnaire had eighty seven questions divided into four categories.5 While many items replicated those asked in Yugoslavia, some questions were not based on the basis of evidence from pre-testing [Illner 1970: 19]. The elite interview questionnaire was structured as follows. First, the survey gathered information about the socio-demographic background of each respondent and their family along with information about their organisational participation, communist party membership, and level of involvement in World War Two. Second, the attitudes, values, and role definitions of respondents were measured. Attitudes toward foreign countries and workers’ councils were assessed along with a battery of eleven Likert scale items exploring socio-economic and political preferences. Perceptions of the role of the mass media, communist party, and various institutional sectors were also examined. The goal here was to construct scales of (a) egalitarianism, (b) conservatism, (c) centralism, and (d) criticism. Third, respondents’ exposure to information carried in the domestic and foreign media was evaluated with a number of items. Fourth, measurements were made of the respondents’ self reported participation in the policy-making process through writing proposals or reports, and making comments in the media.

Interviewing was undertaken by a team of twenty five people composed of a mix of researchers and graduate students from the social sciences. Interviewing

5 In comparison to the “master” questionnaire implemented in Yugoslavia where there were 113 items, the Czechoslovak survey adopted half the items exactly (n=55), and a further 18 per cent were partially adopted. Of the 87 Czechoslovak questions, 47 are directly comparable with the Yugoslav sample, 28 were modified, and 9 questions were unique [Illner 1970: 18].
began in January 1969 and ended in early July. The timing of interviews across sectors was not evenly distributed. Most of the mass media elites were interviewed in during the first two months of 1969, while the intellectuals’ interviews took place mainly during March, April and May. Interviews with politicians (i.e. members of the Federal Assembly) took place mainly in June due to the rapidly changing situation where the process of purging the party had begun in earnest. Thus, the political sample is likely to be the most problematic in terms of data validity and reliability [Illner 1970: 15].

Analysis and Results

The goal of this section is to answer three key questions. First, who were the key decision makers and opinion leaders in Czechoslovakia in 1969; and were there differences across the three sectors interviewed? Second, what were the potential channels of opinion formation and leadership among the elite respondents interviewed in the final stages of the Prague Spring era? Third, what were the socioeconomic attitudes and preferences of this elite group; and were there important differences among the opinion leaders examined?

Before presenting some answers to these questions it is important to stress once again that the estimates associated with the political representatives need to be treated with some caution. This is because membership of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly in 1969 was largely honorary, and many assembly members did not work as full-time “politicians” in the commonly understood meaning of this term. For one thing they attended parliament for a few days per year, and had little direct influence on legislation. The real influence of this group was often informal and stemmed from their non-political professional work [Illner 1970: 23].

Who were members of the Czechoslovak elite in 1969?

In the Yugoslav elite study of 1968 the respondent’s sector was found to be the “most important single variable for predicting opinions and behaviour” [Barton 1973: 229]. Thus, knowing the profile of the members of each sector is an important first step in any analysis of opinion-making elites. The evidence presented in Table 5.1 shows that in terms of gender the elite group studied was primarily male. Less than one-in-five of those interviewed were women. There were some differences across the three sectors where women were more strongly represented in the political and media spheres than in the intellectual one. This suggests

5. The Structure of Czechoslovak Elites at the End of the Prague Spring Era

Table 5.1 Socio-demographic profile of the Czechoslovak elite in 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>91</td>
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<td>160</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age cohort</td>
<td>&lt;=32 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33-38 yrs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39-41 yrs</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42-47 yrs</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48-57 yrs</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;=58 yrs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Employee with a university education</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functionary</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media employee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worker any type</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational position</td>
<td>Absolute leader, e.g. enterprise director</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leader, e.g. deputy director</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functionary with leadership duties</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent professional, e.g. engineer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive worker, e.g. teacher</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct producer, e.g. worker</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free profession, e.g. artist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year joined</td>
<td>1931-1944</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949-1967</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that women had less access to graduate and postgraduate education in Czechoslovakia; and hence a lower likelihood of being an opinion leader in any sector other than the political. Age appears to have also been important, as most of the elite group (58 per cent) were middle aged, i.e. in their early forties to late fifties. Age is an important variable because it provides information on the type of political socialisation experienced by Czechoslovakia’s communist elite. This age profile indicates that most of the important opinion makers were socialised during the later stages of the First Republic, or under the German Protectorate of World War Two. Consequently, this age cohorts’ perceptions of communism are likely to be different to those who grew up knowing only the post-1948 socialist system of governance.

In general, most studies of elites suggest that level of education may be regarded as one of the primary resources necessary for entrance into opinion-making circles. However, it should be noted that the KSC was more ‘Leninist’ in comparison to other communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe where party loyalty was valued more highly than skills. In fact, the Czechoslovak Communist Party retained a reputation for being anti-intellectual in its recruitment of party members [Jancar 1971; Ulč 1974, 1978].

Almost two-in-three (63 per cent) of those interviewed had a university degree. This evidence indicates that elite membership depended on having access

---

Table 5.1 continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never joined the KSČ/KSS</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the elites are divided into three sub-groups where ‘1’ refers to members of Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, ‘2’ respondents employed in the mass media, and ‘3’ denotes intellectuals (i.e. artists, writers and scientists). ‘%’ indicates the overall profile of the sample in percent while ‘N’ reports the number of cases. The estimates reported in columns 1, 2 and 3 for each category sum to one hundred percent, except in cases where responses such as “unknown” are not reported. The table should be interpreted as follows: 77% of the politicians sample was males and 23% were female, while in the total elite sample 83% of those interviewed were men and 17% were women.

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5. The Structure of Czechoslovak Elites at the End of the Prague Spring Era

to personal resources such as education. The data presented in Table 5.1 reveal that the political sector had the broadest range of educational attainment, indicating that this group was the most open. However, given the “part-time” nature of being a Federal Assembly representative such openness may have been more apparent than real with regard to being an opinion leader.

As one might expect, the occupational profile of those interviewed is indicative of having an elite status and this underscores the validity and reliability of the survey data examined. Comparison of the total percentages in the penultimate column of Table 5.1 with the three sectoral estimates reveals quite a high level of occupational (and educational) differentiation between the three elite sub-groups. Turning our attention now to occupational position (i.e. position within the workplace hierarchy) one finds unsurprisingly that non-leaders are weakly represented in the opinion makers’ sample.

One surprising feature of the bottom of Table 5.1 is that the four-in-ten members of the Federal Assembly interviewed were not members of the Communist Party. This non-membership figure is higher than that estimated for the mass media and intellectuals, where about one-in-four were not communist party members. There are two possible reasons for this unexpected finding. First, there is a ‘selection bias’ effect where the politicians interviewed were less likely to be communist party members than might otherwise be expected. Second, the respondents had been party members but at the time of interview (mainly between May 5 and early July 1969) they had either voluntarily resigned or had been expelled from the party. Although the response option of “former party member” was offered to respondents almost none chose this option, and so it is not certain how members of the National Assembly interpreted and answered this item.

More generally, most of the respondents in the elite survey (91 per cent) who were members of the Communist Party joined after World War Two. Almost a third of members (31 per cent) joined once the communist regime had already taken power, i.e. became members in 1949, or some time later. Overall one could interpret these data as evidence of political pluralism where the Czechoslovak elite were evenly divided into three groups: (1) the 50 per cent who were long-term committed party members, i.e. joined the KSČ or KSS prior to 1948; (2) the
The typical member of the Czechoslovak elite in 1969 was male, middle aged, with a university education who worked in Prague as leader of the organisation in which he was employed; and was likely to be a (committed) member of the communist party. Although the composition of the normalisation elite led by Gustáv Husák was never subject to a similar analysis; research on the social composition of the KSČ in 1984 reveals a broadly similar picture of (more senior) party members. This evidence suggests that elite recruitment mechanisms in communist Czechoslovakia remained largely consistent. It seems that periodic membership vetting (prověrky), and changes in recruitment policy, had little real impact in the face of a largely constant pool of potential members [Sin Kwok 1996: 68].

In the next sub-section, our focus will move toward building a profile of the channels of communication used by elite members from different sectors for both receiving and transmitting information in their roles as potential policy makers and opinion-making elites.

Social origins of elites and reproduction of social positions

One of the central findings in the literature describing the ascent of the communist power elite in Czechoslovakia after 1948 was the Communist Party’s promotion of citizens from working class backgrounds; and discrimination against members of the former elite classes in the First Republic. One means of validating the quality of the data in the Czechoslovak Opinion Maker’s Survey is to check if this pattern is evident. In other words, the expectation is that there should be either a negative, or null, relationship between the occupations of the respondents and their father and paternal grandfather. A significant negative relationship would indicate discrimination against former elites while a non-significant (or null) relationship suggests no connection with the past – a form of tabula rasa effect.

It is the null (or tabula rasa) pattern that is observed in a series of cross-tabulations of seven category occupations across three generations, i.e. Chi-square father-respondent = 7.56, df(16), p=.961; Chi-square grandfather-respondent = 18.29, df(16), p=.307. This analysis is limited because of the relatively small sample size (N=193) where some cells in the cross-tabulations estimated have few (<5) cases, thus undermining the robustness of any statistical test. Moreover, more powerful statistical procedures such as log-linear modelling should be applied to these data in future work.

An examination of inter-sectoral elite differences in social mobility makes more demands on the data, and reduces confidence in the results. However, exploratory analysis reveals that in none of the three elite sectors is there a significant social mobility relationship. It would seem that the Czechoslovak communist regime was successful in breaking any elite linkage between the First Republic and the communist regime. A similar result is obtained if a cross-tabulation is undertaken between respondents’ (grand) fathers’ occupation; and the respondents’ membership of any of the three elite sectors i.e. Chi-square father-respondent = 9.30, df(8), p=.340; Chi-square grandfather-respondent = 13.82, df(8), p=.087.

Fortunately, it also possible with Czechoslovak Opinion Makers’ Survey to briefly explore if the elite respondents interviewed in 1969 were well integrated into the opinion-making elites’ social network through family ties? A similar cross-tabulation analysis reveals that the answer is yes. There is a significant positive relationship between the occupation of the respondent and their spouses (Chi-square spouse-respondent = 201.08, df(20), p≤.001; Gamma = +.39, p=.001) indicating a process of marital homogamy based on level of education. This is likely to have had important consequences for class endogamy where access to resources and status would have been restricted to favoured groups within socialist Czechoslovak society. Support for such a view is evident from the fact that the relationship between the occupation of the respondent and that of their first born child is also positive and significant, i.e. Chi-square first child-respondent = 180.43, df(20), p≤.001; Gamma = +.40, p=.001.

In summary, members of the Czechoslovak elite interviewed at the end of the Prague Spring era had experienced a similar form of social mobility to that witnessed in Yugoslavia at the same time point [see, Popovic 1973: 131ff.). If political socialisation had occurred during the post-1948 era in the movement to build a socialist state then one would expect that this group would have expressed primary loyalty to the communist regime. Moreover, these elites had a stake in the Czechoslovak socialist state; as their primary family ties to spouses and children were mediated by the opportunities offered by the communist regime. For this reason, one might expect to see few intra-elite attitudinal differences due to their common interests.

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8 If the non-economically active category is removed from analysis of the first born children (n=112) to take account of the fact that many of these were still in full-time education the strength of this relationship increases considerably, i.e. Gamma = +.60, p=.022
Elites’ perceived role and influence in society

One central feature of all groups is their own perceived role in society. Within the elite dataset there are two groups of items that explore this issue. In the first group each respondent was asked to select from a list of five to seven options what were the three most important functions undertaken by their elite grouping. Here the first most important function is examined in order to get a sense of what the elite respondents saw as their primary role in Czechoslovak society given the experience of the Prague Spring era and its immediate aftermath. The second set of questions asked all respondents the perceived roles of two key institutions: the mass media and the Communist Party. Thereafter, there will be a brief examination of which groups Czechoslovak elites saw as having (a) most control over public opinion, and (b) influence over citizens.

How did Czechoslovak elites’ perceive their role in society?

For members of the Federal Assembly there was little consensus on their main function or role (PA=.20) as respondents did not give strong support to performing any single task.9 The most popular responses were “to defend the interests of society as a whole” (37 per cent) or “to inform constituents about the most important problems” (30 per cent) suggesting parliamentarians saw themselves as “trustees” rather than “delegates” selected “to defend the needs and interests of constituents” (14 per cent). Such an orientation suggests a “top-down” view of political representation which perhaps reflects the Leninist State and Revolution (1917) doctrine of the communist party’s leading role in society [Lenin 1939: 252]. With regard to two of the key goals of the Prague Spring a minority of one-in-nine saw striving “for the realisation of socialist humanism” as a key role, and even less (7 per cent) supported the idea of formulating “new ideals and goals in-nine saw striving “for the realisation of socialist humanism” as a key role, and even less (7 per cent) supported the idea of formulating “new ideals and goals for society.”

Intellectuals were similar in not having a strong unitary sense of their role in Czechoslovak society (PA=.17). The pattern in responses suggest that the artists, writers, and scientists interviewed envisaged three facets to their social function: (a) creativity – make works of quality [30 per cent]; (b) communication – dis-

9 The Perceptual Agreement statistic (PA) decomposes empirical (survey question response) distributions into “modal”, “uniform” or “semi-uniform” ideal types where an average measure of agreement is calculated from these constituent parts weighted by the proportion of cases they represent. The agreement measure has a value of −1 where there is strong disagreement (perfect bimodality), 0 indicates a uniform distribution where there are equal levels of support to all points on the scale while +1 indicates strong agreement (perfect unimodal distribution). For details see, the appendix for chapter 3 and van der Eijk [2001].

seminate social ideals and values in an understandable manner to citizens, and promote intellectual interests [40 per cent]; and (c) criticism – to evaluate problems in society and formulate new ideas and goals [28 per cent]. Here it is interesting to observe that it was intellectuals rather than political representatives who were, by their own admission, the mainspring of reform and change.

The only section of the elites interviewed with a strong sense of their function or role in society was the mass media (PA=.87). Here almost nine-in-ten (89 per cent) agreed that their main function was “to give true and relevant information.” This role conception suggested an objective and technocratic outlook where very few respondents adhered to an investigative, or reformist point of view (4 and 3 per cent respectively). This response pattern is surprising given the strong role played by the mass media during 1968 in reporting past crimes against citizens by state officials and its dissemination of reform proposals [Kaplan 1977: 110-133; Končelík and Trampotá 2006; Končelík 2008]. However, with the changing political situation perhaps it is hardly surprising to observe greater levels of prudence in the responses given in light of increased official criticism of the media’s role in the Prague Spring reform movement on the eve of normalisation [Williams 1997: 207; Skilling 1976: 821; Kaplan 1977: 152-158; Simecka 1984: 50-56].

Turning our attention now to the two key institutions examined by all three elite groups one finds a strong consensus (79-89 per cent) that the main function of the mass media is “to give true and relevant information” to the public. Significantly, there was much less consensus concerning the primary role of the Communist Party. For legislators, the plurality view was “to explain the ideas and policies of the party to society” (43 per cent); in contrast for those working in the mass media and intellectuals it was “to formulate new ideals and goals for all of society” (45 and 39 per cent respectively). Curiously, the idea that the Communist Party should “express and protect the interests of the working class” was a role perception held by less than one-in-ten (7 per cent) of all those interviewed.

Who had most influence on public opinion and citizens?

Having briefly explored what Czechoslovak elites in 1969 saw as their respective roles in society it seems natural to ask: Who did elite’s themselves think had most influence over public opinion and citizens? Fortunately, the opinion makers’ survey asked two items that facilitate answering this question. It should be noted that measuring influence over “public opinion” and influence over “citizens” may appear at first sight to be exploring the same thing. A cross tabulation of answers to both questions reveals that the responses to the two items are indeed correlated (Lamda (λ) = .25, p≤.001), but not strongly enough to reasonably assume both indicators measured the same perception.
The theory at the basis of the International Study of Opinion Makers Project, as noted earlier, was that power and influence among national elites resided in the structure of their social circles. One key advantage of this approach is that the

5. The Structure of Czechoslovak Elites at the End of the Prague Spring Era

Looking first at elite influence over public opinion, the evidence presented on the left side of Table 5.2 shows that a bare majority of Federal Assembly respondents (51 per cent) and a plurality from the mass media (40 per cent) thought that senior political figures exercised most influence; with top media people coming next. The pattern was reversed for the intellectuals who felt that journalists and media commentators (38 per cent) were more important than politicians (30 per cent). This suggests that public opinion was primarily shaped by leaders in the political and media spheres with intellectuals playing a weaker role. It is interesting to note that members of the Federal Assembly were in effect not considered to be part of the elite, thereby undermining their inclusion in the opinion makers’ survey [IIliner 1970: 23].

In addition, economic decision-makers, communist party officials, and trade union leaders were judged to have negligible impact in shaping public opinion. This is presumably because much of their work rarely came to public notice. The estimates for influence over citizens demonstrate a broadly similar pattern where legislator and mass media respondents assigned senior politicians most influence; while intellectuals gave themselves equal sway with those in parliament. Perhaps the most salient feature of the estimates on the right of Table 5.2 is that the legislators’ level of consensus dipped considerably regarding perceptions of their ability to influence public opinion and citizens respectively (Diff. PA = -.17; .44 minus .27). This change is associated with more control being attributed to intellectuals in the case of influencing citizens (24 per cent) rather than public opinion (9 per cent). In general, nine-in-ten respondents agreed that three institutions effectively monopolised influence in Czechoslovak society in 1969: senior government figures, the mass media, and intellectuals.

Overall, the evidence presented in this sub-section reveals that apart from the mass media, there was little consensus on the primary role of each elite group examined, or the Communist Party for that matter. The implication here is that there were important differences both between and within each elite sector examined. For this reason, one would expect to observe variation in the attitudes expressed by respondents on a variety of issues. On the question of who influences mass society, no section of the elite was seen to completely dominate all others. There appears to have been a multiplicity of influences based on each elite subgroups distinct and interconnected roles in Czechoslovak society. This raises the important question of the degree to which different sectors within the Czechoslovak elites were both the source and target of influence.

Structure of interaction and influence among elites

The Perceptual Agreement (PA) statistic indicates the extent to which there is consensus on who has most influence over public opinion and citizens in percent while intellectuals gave themselves equal sway with those in parliament.

Table 5.2  Elite perceptions of who had influence over public opinion and citizens in Czechoslovakia, 1969 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite groups in society</th>
<th>Influence over public opinion*</th>
<th>Influence over citizens*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors of enterprises</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectuals (scientists and artists)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top politicians and representatives of state</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionaries of the Communist Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the Federal Assembly</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominent journalists, commentators, editors</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top trade union officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominent economists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Chi-square for influence over public opinion = 19.56, df(12), p=.076
* Chi-square for influence over citizens = 13.34, df(14), p=.500

Note that the elites are divided into three sub-groups where ‘1’ refers to members of Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, ‘2’ respondents employed in the mass media, and ‘3’ denoted intellectuals (i.e. artists, writers and scientists). ‘%’ indicates the overall profile of the sample in percent while ‘N1’ reports the number of cases for the influence over public opinion item and ‘N2’ the influence over citizens one. The ‘total’ columns indicate the response profile of all elite respondents. All percentages are column estimates and sum to one hundred and indicate the pattern of responses for each elite sub-group and the entire sample. The Perceptual Agreement (PA) statistic indicates the extent to which there is consensus on who has most influence (see Acronyms and Key Terms and appendix to chapter three for more details). The table should be interpreted as follows. Among legislators in the Federal Assembly 51% stated that “top politicians and scientists” had most influence over public opinion while 30% of intellectuals had the same perception.

Looking first at elite influence over public opinion, the evidence presented on the left side of Table 5.2 shows that a bare majority of Federal Assembly respondents (51 per cent) and a plurality from the mass media (40 per cent) thought that senior politicians most influenced. In general, nine-in-ten respondents agreed that three institutions effectively monopolised influence in Czechoslovak society in 1969: senior government figures, the mass media, and intellectuals.
survey research methodology employed facilitates inclusion of individuals who are important opinion makers, but whose official position would not have indicated this fact. Within social circles the power to influence and shape opinion is seen to operate through two channels: (a) individuals who are the source of opinions for others, and (b) individuals who are the targets of others opinions.

In the Czechoslovak study of opinion makers four sociometric questions were asked to all respondents in the sample. Details of these sociometric items are given in the appendix to this chapter. The sources and channels of interaction, or discussion, were divided into those that dealt with ‘specific issues’ related to the respondents’ position, and those that related to ‘general’ social and political concerns. This leads to a four-fold classification where sources of influence are given by: Special Influence in own field of work (SI); General Influence on social and political problems (GI); Special Discussion Partner in own field of work (SDP); and General Discussion Partner for social and political problems (GDP).

The data presented in Figure 5.3 shows the extent of interaction reported by respondents. It should be noted here that the Czechoslovak elite survey restricted interviewing to three (politicians, mass media, and intellectuals) of the six domains outlined in the International Study of Opinion Makers Questionnaire and implemented in Yugoslavia in 1968. However, the nominations made by the three Czechoslovak elite sectors were coded within the larger six category elite schema. One of the striking features of the estimates given in Table 5.3 is the extent to which interactions were outside the respondent’s social circle where the impact of those no longer living was perceived quite strongly in the minds of those interviewed.

Curiously, this effect also extends to the targets of influence, although to a lesser degree. Notwithstanding, the importance of ‘significant others’ who had been older than the respondent and had died during the career of the interviewee; one could argue that such nominations were strategic in an uncertain political situation such as that prevailing in 1969. Naming deceased discussion partners might have been seen as minimising the possibility of recriminations for the responses given.

Examining first sources of influence, the majority or plurality response referred to deceased persons while members of the respondents “private circle” played a minor role especially with regard to general social and political problems. Otherwise, respondents own elite sector was an important reported source of influence for legislators and intellectuals; while those in the mass media indicated that intellectuals were a key reference source, particularly for general social and political issues. Such evidence supports the view put forward in many

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominations</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Legislators</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Administrators</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Functionaries</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Journalists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Intellectuals</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) Deceased</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>(O) Private circle</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) Foreigners</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) Others</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>194</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
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<td>34</td>
<td>85</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCES OF INFLUENCE:</th>
<th>Special Influence in own field of work (SI)</th>
<th>General Influence on social and political problems (GI)</th>
</tr>
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<td>Nominations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Legislators</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Administrators</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Functionaries</td>
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<td>4. Economists</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>5. Journalists</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>6. Intellectuals</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) Deceased</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) Private circle</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) Foreigners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) Others</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total choices</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the elites are divided into three sub-groups where ‘1’ refers to members of Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, ‘5’ respondents employed in the mass media, and ‘6’ denoted intellectuals i.e. artists, writers and scientists. ‘(O)’ indicates interactions outside the total elite network under consideration. Estimates are column percentages and sum to one hundred. The table should be interpreted as follows. 12% of legislators listed functionaries as sources of influence in their own special field of work and 15% of legislators stated that functionaries were also a source of influence on general social and politi-
In general, members of the Federal Assembly seem to have had the broadest range of sources of social influence. Unfortunately, it is difficult to interpret what this means as it could be evidence of (a) recruitment from a broad spectrum of occupations and hence many different types of contact, (b) their relative low status within the Czechoslovak elite yielding broader interaction strategies, or (c) a special feature of being a politician where harnessing the “strength of weak ties” was an essential occupational skill.11

Turning our attention now to the targets of influence, we observe once again politicians’ broad range of connections for both specific and general issues. In contrast, members of the mass media and intellectual spheres tended to have discussion partners from within their own professional sectors. The fact that legislators discussed specific and general issues with functionaries is an indication of how information percolated among the middle echelons of the Communist Party. An important difference between interactions reported for the sources and targets of discussions is that in the latter private circles played a more important role. One explanation of this difference is that respondents attempted to act as “opinion leaders” when talking to their family and close friends.

In sum, the evidence presented in Table 5.3 reveals that the structure of the Czechoslovak elite in 1969 was marked by three characteristics. First, interaction within a person’s own field of work was a key conduit through which power and influence is likely to have been channelled indicating the importance of ‘sectoral’ socialisation processes. This phenomenon was a central finding in the study of Yugoslav elites in 1968, where sector location was the “most important single variable for predicting opinions and behaviour” [Barton 1973: 229]. Second, there was a significant level of outside influence coming from deceased ‘significant others’ with regard to sources of ideas; and from ‘private circles’ in the transmission of opinions. Third, elite sectors not interviewed in the Czechoslovak study, i.e. administrators, functionaries, and economists do not appear from the survey data to have been key sources or targets of discussion beyond the legislative sphere.

Future research should explore this sociometric data with a view to using social network concepts such as “centrality” to expand our knowledge of which groups and individuals had greatest power and influence; and what explanatory variables help explain differences in such influence. In the next sub-section, there will be an extension of this analysis of patterns of influence among the political, media, and intellectual elite sectors. This will be undertaken through exploring the structure of intra-elite interactions using a sociometric methodology.

**Sociometric analysis**

One of the central goals of The International Study of Opinion Makers project was to analyse elite links using social network statistical methods. Social network (or sociometric) analysis facilitates representation of the structural features of the inter-relationship between social actors (individuals, groups, organisations, etc.) in a graphical manner. Such maps of social networks are generally used to provide information concerning the strength of relationships represented as spatial distances: a procedure which greatly aids interpretation of sociometric data. In addition, it is also possible to estimate which actors play a central role in a social network through their unique links to other members of the elite [Petrusek 1968; Degenne and Forsé 1999; Scott 2000].

Figure 5.1 is a sociometric representation of all the interactions reported by those interviewed in the Czechoslovak elite survey on the basis of sector. This analysis provides a map of the entire social network, and is an aggregation of the data reported in Figure 5.3. The most salient feature of this figure is the high level of intra-sector interactions reported by those from the political, mass media, and intellectual sectors. Of course, these were the only groups interviewed so it is not possible to see if the other seven elite sectors represented in this figure exhibited the same pattern. There was a much higher level of intra-sector interaction among the intellectuals (n=371) than among either journalists (n=223), or legislators (n=92).

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11 The importance of weak links within a social network was demonstrated in a seminal article by Granovetter [1973] who argued that such forms of interaction acted as bridges between different sub-groups, and thus facilitated the dissemination of information and increased integration of larger social networks.
In contrast, those working in the mass media are motivated in their news gathering capacity to have contacts beyond journalism. The relatively low level of interaction among members of the Federal Assembly reflects: (a) most legislators had other careers, (b) the parliament met for a short time each year, and (c) members of parliament had little influence over legislation and appear to have discussed such matters with communist party functionaries. Another important pattern evident in Figure 5.1 is the high level of reported interactions with those defined to be outside the elite. Here the importance of the deceased is noteworthy; and may refer to influential others from the past who may have promoted the career of the respondent.

Of course, the number of links within elite networks is only one indicator of how members of the Czechoslovak leadership in 1969 sought, or gave advice and information to their colleagues. The evidence presented in Figure 5.1 suggests that the Czechoslovak elite were not strongly integrated, but were rather fragmented where most communication was intra-sectoral. Perhaps this reflected fears about purges that were to come with the normalisation process. In addition to the number of links, the type of links between social actors is also crucial. One measure of the importance of a social tie is its 'proportional strength.' This characteristic represents the investment social actors place in a relationship and the costs of maintaining it.

The proportional strength of a link is estimated by dividing the value of a link (here this value is simply the number of mentions) by the total sum of mentions for all ties to a specific elite sector. Using the proportional strength measure, it is possible to estimate the degree to which relationships in a social network are well integrated where all actors are fully and equally well connected to each other. Level of integration into a network is important because the absence of links creates strategic opportunities for an actor to manipulate (through brokering) the flow of communications between others. This absence of links between specific members of a network is called a "structural hole." Structural holes within a network imply 'constraints' on an actor where withdrawal from relationships creates an opportunity for manipulation by others. Thus a low constraint indicates the presence of many structural holes and an actors' unimportance or strategic weakness in a network; while high constraint indicates equality of communications and an actors' level of integration, and also the high costs of withdrawal [Degenne and Forsé 1999: 117-127; Scott 2000: 82-99; de Nooy, Mrvar and Bategelj 2005: 138-150].

The results of an estimation of the (dyadic) constraint of all links in the Czechoslovak elite network are shown in Figure 5.2. Here the strength of the constraints are represented visually where elite sectors with high constraints are
In contrast, those associated with making critical assessments of society such as the mass media and intellectuals have higher constraints. Significantly, journalists (.26) were more constrained in their relationships than intellectuals (.16) suggesting that the mass media depended more on intellectuals for articles and broadcasts; whereas the latter had other outlets for their work.\footnote{Albright [1976: 117] highlights that the relationship between intellectuals (writers) and journalists in the pre-1968 period was antagonistic because the former used literary journals to express criticism, and did not derive their income from such publications. In contrast, journalists were salaried to state controlled institutions and were often compelled to do the KSČ’s bidding and criticise intellectuals.}

Estimation of aggregate constraint for the Czechoslovak elite sample of 1969 reveals similar values for those in the mass media (.64), and intellectuals (.62); and a lower value for politicians (.50). This implies that legislators were less integrated into the elite network, and had more freedom than their mass media colleagues and intellectuals to withdraw from existing ties and possibly exploit structural holes for their own strategic advantage. The group with the highest constraint was foreigners (.71) because their link with the Czechoslovak elite stemmed primarily from interaction with intellectuals (.58).

In sum, this necessarily brief sociometric analysis of the Czechoslovak elite data reveals a leadership network that was not strongly integrated where most interaction occurred within specific sectors. In addition, the respondents interviewed appear to have had important links with those not formally classified as being within the opinion-making elite. In part this stems from the influence of past elite members who were deceased in 1969. Legislative members of the elite survey had a distinct profile due to their relatively low level of interaction with the mass media and intellectual spheres; and their stronger reliance on administrators, economists, and functionaries.

**Opinion formation and policy formulation**

In the last two sub-sections there was an examination of the structure and channels of interaction among Czechoslovak elites in 1969 where an attempt was made to identify both the sources and targets of discussions. Here we will extend this analysis one step further by mapping out: (a) the sources of influences on elites, (b) the channels of elite influence on public opinion through the media, and (c) elites influence on the policy-making process. It should be stressed that the survey data presented only indicates the potential channels of causality, as there are no direct measures of each of these processes.
The top part of Table 5.4 presents the eight main sources of information noted by elites, and this represents most (87 per cent) of all mentions recorded. According to the elite survey evidence politicians, mass media, and intellectuals did not use all the sources of information available in the same manner. Legislators were characterised by a relatively strong dependency on “non-public” sources of information, i.e. ‘internal bulletins and circulars’, ‘draft material from administrators’; and lower use of information coming from the mass media and professional publications.

In contrast, those working in the mass media were unsurprisingly heavy consumers of “public” information carried in daily and weekly publications, political magazines, and press conferences. Intellectuals were similar in accessing information related to their work, such as having discussions with colleagues, reading a professional literature, and attending meetings and conferences.

In general terms, these information source profiles would seem to reflect the power of a respondents’ own sector to determine its members’ goals. Moreover, one could argue that differential information exposure represents an important basis for the intra-sectoral socialisation of elites. Furthermore, politicians’ lower levels of news consumption from the socialist and foreign press is indicative of a more insular and domestic orientation than that evident among their mass media and intellectual colleagues.

In the middle section of Figure 5.4 there is an exploration of the channels through which Czechoslovak elites had an influence on media content, and the news agenda. This influence is divided into ‘active’ and ‘passive’ processes. In the former, it was the media who set the agenda and utilised a member of the elite to make a specific point. With the latter, it was a member of the elite who attempted to set the media agenda by making pronouncements in the public arena. The data reveal that regardless of whether the influence process was passive or active, it was intellectuals who were most prominently mentioned in the media; and who in turn made greatest efforts to shape the media agenda. Legislators from the Federal Assembly were least active with regard to both processes.

In the bottom part of Figure 5.4 there is an examination of two channels of input into the policy-making process. The first method relates to the writing of policy proposals and the role the respondent played in such a process, here there is a qualitative distinction between those who: (a) initiated a proposal, (b) participated in the drafting and submission of a policy proposal initiated by a third party, or (c) both initiated and helped write a policy proposal. The second method refers to membership of advisory or consultative bodies involved in the formulation of public policy.

The Structure of Czechoslovak Elites at the End of the Prague Spring Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>Source of</td>
<td>Daily / weekly papers and magazines</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td></td>
<td>information</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>Professional meetings and conferences</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>Draft material from administrators</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>Radio</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>168</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>133</td>
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<td>Radio</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Yes, active contribution on television</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lecture</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>POLICY MAKING INFLUENCE</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Proposals</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, not an advisor or consultant</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the elites are divided into three sub-groups where ‘1’ refers to members of Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, ‘2’ respondents employed in the mass media, and ‘3’ denoted intellectuals (i.e. artists, writers and scientists). ‘%’ indicates the overall profile of the sample in percent while ‘N’ reports the number of cases. For each elite sector the data are row percentages and sum to one hundred. The total ‘%’ indicates the percentage of the total sample who gave a specific response. The table should be interpreted as follows. 102 respondents stated they were mentioned (passively) in the media, and this represented 53% of the total sample. Of these 102 respondents 29% were legislators, 30% worked in the mass media and 40% were intellectuals.
5. The Structure of Czechoslovak Elites at the End of the Prague Spring Era

The survey responses at the bottom of Figure 5.4 reveal that politicians (44%) played an important role in initiating proposals, while members of the media (33%) and intellectuals (46%) tended to be involved in the follow up process of drafting a proposal. The role of policy consultant was dominated by the intellectuals. Overall the policy formulation process indicates a division of labour where politicians took the lead in initiating proposals; and it was intellectuals and members of the media who gave these proposals substance. Given politicians relatively low consumption of published news and links with the media; it seems likely that legislators derived inspiration for legislation primarily from within the state bureaucracy, and secondarily from the media.

Conclusion

A key theme of the Prague Spring era was that a relatively small group of about two hundred thousand people monopolised economic and political power over a national population of approximately fourteen million [Krejci 1972: 110-111]. To take one example, Michal Lakatoš [1966, 1968b, 1968c, 1969], an influential Slovak intellectual, made numerous references to a “power elite” and a “bureaucratic power apparatus” where Czechoslovakia was divided into two classes: a minority with power and a majority who were powerless. This was a widespread perception in society. Three-in-four (75 per cent) of those interviewed in the Machonin team’s social stratification survey of late 1967 agreed that social differences most definitely existed within officially classless Czechoslovakia.

Quite obviously not all party members or functionaries had the power to shape national policy-making. The key problem here is finding a valid definition of who is a member of the elite, and what constitutes power and influence. Attempts to place the study of opinion-making elites on firmer foundations lie at the heart of the Czechoslovak elite survey examined in this chapter. Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring era provides a valuable case study of the nature of elite power. This is because a number of strands within elite theory argue that societies differentiated on the basis of wealth and resources provide the basis for defined elites to exist. Czechoslovakia under communism became one of the most egalitarian states in the world with regard to indicators such as income equality, but was very stratified with regard to political power [Večerník 1992; Machonin 1969: 15].

The deliberate policy of removing elite elements from Czechoslovakia’s First Republic indicates that the national opinion-making elite of 1969 should have been marked by consensus in terms of background. The evidence presented in this chapter reveals that Czechoslovak elite members in 1969 did not come from privileged ‘bourgeois’ backgrounds. In fact, membership of the elite was defined in terms of access to scarce resources such as a university education, and having such advantages transmitted to the next generation. In a similar manner to Yugoslavia, membership of a specific elite sector was very important as most interaction was intra-sectoral. However, given the limited scope of the Czechoslovak opinion makers’ survey to three sectors and the changing political situation during interviewing; one must be careful in making definite conclusions.

This chapter has explored the structure of the national elite in Czechoslovakia at the end of the Prague Spring era where the focus has been on who the opinion makers were, and how much did they interact within one another. In the next chapter, this analysis will be extended to examine two additional questions. First, what were the Czechoslovak elites’ attitudes and preferences regarding general public policy questions? Second, were the Prague Spring opinion makers integrated in terms of exhibiting a consensus on general policy preferences and value orientations?
6. The Preferences and Values of Czechoslovak Elites

It seems for the moment that sociology does not yet possess tools that would help to explain why members of the same [elite] class or group arranged themselves on the opposite side of a dividing line, according to a cluster of psychological motivations: to joyfully go with the majority of the people or against it; to trust democracy or dictatorship […]

Peter Hruby [1980: 150]

The argument that elite integration fosters political stability and effectiveness is very prevalent and persuasive.


In the last chapter there was an examination of who were members of the Czechoslovak elite at the end of the Prague Spring era. The evidence suggesting a socio-demographic (or proletarian) basis for elite cohesion was not compelling. Here the goal is to extend this elite profile by using the attitudinal questions asked in the Czechoslovak Opinion Makers Survey of 1969 to: (1) map out the preferences and values of the Czechoslovak elite, and (2) test some explanatory models of elite preferences and values. These exercises are important for two interrelated reasons. First, this work facilitates examination of the content of the messages and ideas that travelled through the structures constituting the Czechoslovak national elite just as the normalisation process was being initiated. Second, the survey based evidence of elite preferences and values allows one to explore the degree to which the Czechoslovak national elite was characterised by consensus; and thus provides a measure of the stability of the Prague Spring regime.

Knowing whether this relatively small group of opinion makers were defined by a common set values and policy goals allows us to make important inferences about the nature of the Czechoslovak regime during the Prague Spring era, and provide some sense of the political changes that were coming with the normalisation process. Within this chapter use will be made of a specific theory linking elite type and regime form, where it is postulated that stable regimes are characterised by a national elite that exhibits consensus in contrast to politically unstable regimes that have a “disunited” governing class. Consequently, having the ability to measure the extent to which an elite group is marked by consensus (or
disunity) provides one with a valuable insight into the nature of a regime within which the members of the national elite operate.

In addition, the unique timing of the Czechoslovak wave of the national opinion makers survey, where the membership of governing class were being systematically replaced on ideological grounds, provides a unique opportunity to explore the dynamics of this change. The timing of a respondents' interview is potentially an important explanatory variable explaining differences in preferences and values because of the changing composition of the Czechoslovak elite. Alternatively, if this factor has no significant influence it suggests that the survey data gathered in the opinion makers’ survey is both valid and reliable.

The survey evidence presented in this chapter will show that the Prague Spring elites were “ideologically united”, but did differ on the basis of being more conservative or liberal in orientation. Differences in orientation cannot be explained in terms of elite sector demonstrating that ‘reformers’ or ‘liberals’ were not concentrated among legislators, those working in the media, or intellectuals. This finding undermines the view that the Czechoslovak elite in 1968 were divided into easily identifiable factions. The reality was more complex. This implies that the Prague Spring ruling class were not likely to have fractured into warring camps over reform had the Warsaw Pact invasion not occurred.

The argument presented in this chapter will be structured as follows. In section one there is a theoretical discussion of the general relationship between elite type and form of regime. Section two presents evidence from the Czechoslovak elite survey of 1969 concerning socio-economic and political preferences, and how these data may be used to construct a typology of policy preference outlooks. The following section explores in a similar manner the most important elites and the preceding one. In the conclusion, there are some remarks regarding what elite consensus in Czechoslovakia in 1969 tells us about the political situation at the end of the Prague Spring era.

Elite Consensus and Regime Stability

In the last chapter, the goals of The International Study of Opinion Makers were discussed in terms of influential elite theories and models. The elite surveying methodology implemented in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia appears to have been used (subject to revision) in the United States, Australia, Norway, and the Federal Republic of Germany [Kadushin 1974; Moore 1979; Higley et al. 1979; Higley et al. 1976; Hoffman-Lange 1985, 1989]. This surveying methodology and its application to the study of elite integration were critically evaluated by Higley et al. [1991] in their comparative analysis of the elite basis for stable democracies.

In order to keep the theoretical considerations within reasonable bounds, the focus in this chapter will be on John Higley’s neo-elite theory which combines features of the classic plural, power, and ruling class elite models to create an elite integration perspective. One of the key advantages of Higley’s integrated elite theory is that it was deliberately designed to be tested using data from the opinion makers research programme [see, Higley et al. 1976; Higley et al. 1979; Field and Higley 1980; Higley and Moore 1981; Higley and Burton 2006].

According to Field and Higley [1980] there are four types of elites: (1) disunified elites, (2) consensually unified, (3) imperfectly unified, and (4) ideologically unified. An elite group that is unified is defined in terms of three characteristics. First, all members are well integrated together through formal and informal channels. Second, national leaders belong to one or more elite sectors, none of which dominate the state. Third, power and influence are exercised through frequent interaction among a small group of individuals from all major elite sectors.

The second and fourth of Field and Higley’s [1980] elite types are of most interest here, as they denote the national leaderships in stable democratic and communist states respectively. These two elite types are similar in that both were associated with stable political regimes, but differ on the basis that consensually integrated elites elicit higher levels of legitimacy from citizens than their ideologically integrated counterparts because the Soviet Union imposed such elites on states such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.

The data from The International Study of Opinion Makers were used to explore consensually integrated elites in the United States and Australia. No similar work was undertaken for the ideologically integrated national leaders of Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. With regard to the American and Australian elite surveys undertaken in 1971-2 and 1975 respectively, Higley and Moore [1981: 595] concluded that their empirical findings did “not consistently or entirely contra-

1 In should be noted that within this comparative elite surveying programme the terms “opinion-making elite” or “political elite”, were defined as persons “who by virtue of their institutional positions have a high potential to influence national policymaking” [Moore 1979: 674 fn. 2; a similar definition is presented in Higley and Burton 1989: 18].

2 However, the electoral success of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) in the last free elections in 1946 before the communist coup two years later suggests that the communists did have legitimacy among the Czechoslovak electorate, although it is difficult to ascertain if this lasted to the Prague Spring era and beyond.
dict any of the familiar models of elite integration. A more accurate description is provided by the consensually integrated model we have advanced.”

**Ideological elite consensus and reform**

If the elite theory of Field and Higley [1980] was equally applicable to communist states in the late 1960s; one should observe a similar pattern of elite integration among the ideologically unified leaders of communist Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as that observed in the United States and Australia. This is because the elites in all four countries were according to this theory integrated, although for different reasons. The analyses presented in Barton, Denitch, and Kadushin [1973] for Yugoslavia reveal that the attitudes and values expressed by elite respondents were most strongly determined by sector membership. Thus the integrating features of similar family backgrounds and membership of the Communist Party appear to have been limited by the ‘pluralising’ effects of institutional socialisation. The evidence presented in the last chapter reveals a similar pluralist pattern in Czechoslovakia.

In one sense this similar result is surprising. This is because the political situations in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were very different during the periods of elite interviewing. Politics in Yugoslavia was marked by stability in 1968, while the regime in Czechoslovakia in 1969 was in the process of initiating repressive normalisation reforms following the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20-21 1968. Ironically, both the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak elites who were interviewed in 1968 and 1969 respectively lost their positions by 1972 following extensive party purges stemming from the growth of ideological disunity.

This raises the question of how does one interpret the Czechoslovak elite data if one accepts Field and Higley’s [1980] classification of Czechoslovakia as being ruled by an ideologically unified elite. Should one expect to see high levels of elite integration as most members of the national leadership were loyal members of the Communist Party, or because the Czechoslovak elite in 1969 were integrated on the basis of a consensus regarding the necessity of reform? Alternatively, is it more reasonable to think that the Czechoslovak elite would have been divided on the basis of hard-line and reformist factions where the balance of power was shifting to orthodoxy during 1969?

It should be noted that Field and Higley’s [1980] consensus-disunity model was later extended by Higley and Burton [1989] to deal with democratic transitions and breakdowns. Ironically, the Higley and Burton [1989: 19] article published on the eve of the collapse of communist regimes across Central and East-

ern Europe deliberately ignored the question of political change in regimes led by ideologically unified elites. However, the logic of their model facilitates constructing an explanation of the post-communist transition to democracy from the perspective of elites. According to Higley and Burton [1989, 2006: 55-106] a successful transition to democracy requires an “elite settlement” where members of the old and new regimes negotiate a compromise which is accepted by all, leading to consensus and a stable democratic regime. This is essentially what happened in Czechoslovakia between November 1989 and June 1990 [Suk 2003].

Alternatively, a stable democratic regime with elite consensus is achieved in a two-step process. First, some of the rival elite factions agree to participate in elections and collaborate in coalitions in order to gain office. Second, rival factions that initially rejected the electoral politics option recognise that non-participation in elections condemns them to a permanently isolated position, and eventual loss of all power. Consequently a process of compromise takes place, where elite consensus ensues leading to a stable democracy. One might argue that the ‘unreformed’ Czech Communist Party (KSČM) is currently following this path.

We can now turn the clock backwards, and use the same elite consensus model to outline the logic of how a successful transition in 1968 toward a stable political regime based on consensus might have evolved. The evidence suggests that Dubček hoped to create an “elite settlement” through intra-party democratic procedures where non-reformist members of the elite were given the option of compromise, and accepting “socialism with a human face,” or be replaced. This ‘elite settlement’ began in January 1968 and would have accelerated with the various KSČ congresses scheduled for August and September.

The Warsaw Pact invasion on August 20-21 1968 ended this “elite settlement” process. Thus, the Czechoslovak elites interviewed in the first half of 1969 could be interpreted as being “disunited” on the basis of three criteria: (a) support for a return to the pre-Prague Spring orthodoxy, (b) support for the reform programme, and (c) maintenance of the status quo by current office holders protecting their personal position by whatever means necessary. Notwithstanding, these important divisions there is still reason to think that an (“ideologically unified”) elite consensus was likely. This is because neither the policy outcomes of the Prague Spring reforms nor the implications of the coming normalisation process were fully evident in early 1969. Consequently, the elite value consensus present in 1968 was likely to be still intact; and should have shaped the elite preferences and values examined in this chapter.
Structure of Czechoslovak Elite Preferences

Within the Czechoslovak Opinion Makers Survey (1969) there is a battery of eleven Likert scale items (four point scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree) exploring socio-economic and political attitudes. Often such survey questions are used to measure respondents’ attitudes to specific (policy) issues; and as a means of exploring the underlying ideological structure of the attitudes measured. Demonstrating the presence of a latent or underlying ideological orientation among the respondents means assuming that the responses to the battery of survey questions are correlated.

An examination of the substantive content of the questions asked to Czech elites in early 1969 reveals a number of common themes (a) materialism; (b) equality; (c) individual freedom; (d) inter-personal trust; and (e) control in terms of economic planning, and law and order. In order to detect ‘acquiescence response bias’ or giving the same answer to all items in order to complete the interview quickly; the survey questions were phrased both positively and negatively where the conscientious interviewee would have had to give different responses in order to be consistent.

An examination of the summary statistics for each of the items (shown in the appendix for this chapter) reveals that there are systematic differences in the mean responses across items for all respondents and also across each of the three elite sectors. Within this chapter a central concern is estimation of the degree to which Czechoslovak elites exhibit consensus in their political preferences, attitudes and values. Here use will be made of a Perceptual Agreement (PA) statistic developed by van der Eijk [2001] and used previously in chapters three, four and five. See Acronyms and Key Terms section and the appendix of chapter three for details.

The evidence presented in Table 6.1 reveals that there was little consensus over the necessity of taking “strong measures against improper behaviour by young people” (PA=.20), but there was strong agreement that “more rapid economic development” did not require “significant limitations on personal freedom” (PA=.76). The legislators interviewed were in strong agreement that “long term economic development should be the most important goal of every country” (PA=.81) in contrast to members of the mass media (PA=.47), or intellectuals (PA=.46).

These summary statistics suggest that there are important differences in the mean responses to the opinion question across the three elite groups. A more systematic analysis (ANOVA) demonstrates that there were significant (1) intra-group differences [for all items except q.19, q.24 and q.26; p≤.05]; and (2) inter-group differences for seven of the eleven items. For example, there was a significant difference between the preferences of politicians and both the media and intellectuals (who had the same opinion) toward the need for greater central authority in order to ensure more rapid economic growth (Mean difference=.57, p≤.009).
Mapping Czechoslovak elites preferences

Given the saliency of the socio-economic and political issues addressed in the elite survey items, it seems sensible to think that all respondents interpreted the questions asked in the same manner. However, respondents would have differed on the basis of their personal preferences, or ideal points. Therefore, it is reasonable to conceptualise the eleven Likert scale items as preference choice data where interpersonal differences indicated that each respondent chose answers closest to their ideal point. In this situation, the most appropriate form of statistical examination is called “unfolding analysis” [Coombs 1964; Hinich 2005].

As noted earlier in chapter four, in an unfolding analysis both respondents and survey questions are represented in a common space. This is because the Likert scales are conceptualised as individual preferences where the data are seen to be single peaked and therefore best represented by a quadratic function. The results of a Multi-Dimensional Unfolding (MDU) analysis are presented in Figure 6.1 in a two dimensional space.

It is immediately obvious that the eleven Likert scale items are clustered into four groups, i.e. materialism, control, equality, and freedom-trust. The two dimensional space appears to relate to the economic and social domains with differences on each dimension reflecting an ‘egocentric’ or ‘sociotropic’ orientation (see footnote 4). The exact wording of all items and their associated coding are given in the appendix to this chapter. The positive and negative signs denote whether the item was phrased positively or negatively with regard to the general concept being measured.

The hollow circles in Figure 6.1 are the positions of each of the 193 respondents in this two dimensional (social-economic) space. On the basis of the most extreme items on opposite ends of both dimensions, an interpretation of what this space represents may be formulated. The left (negative) side of the first dimension refers to materialism in society, progress requires the ideas of the young, and social trust; while the right (positive) side is marked by increased control over the economy, more equality in incomes, and restricting the improper behaviour of the young. In general terms, this pattern suggests a ‘Social dimension’ composed of liberal individualist versus social control or conservative preferences. The second dimension ranges from the top (positive) acceptance of social stratification and the need to limit personal freedom for economic progress to the bottom (negative) where there are preferences for higher living standards, acceptance of widespread materialism, and long term economic development. This pattern suggests an ‘Economic dimension’ with conservative and liberal poles.

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3 Initially an exploratory principal components analysis was undertaken to see if the Likert scales could be used to map out some underlying values that might help explain the responses observed. This analysis proved unsatisfactory as the correlations across all items is low (r≤.3 in most cases).
One might reasonably dispute this interpretation of the constellation of survey items presented in Figure 6.1. There is admittedly an inherent difficulty in using terms such as ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ within a communist system. However, lacking more appropriate terminology these terms are used here to denote relative preferences when compared to the status quo. This is a general problem with many of the analyses presented in the following pages. In order to demonstrate the reasoning underpinning the interpretations presented, the coding schemes allocating items to dimensions and classification schemes developed in the following sections are defined in the appendix. This should clarify for the reader the labelling of latent dimensions presented in this chapter.

Accepting that Figure 6.1 may be validly interpreted in terms of Social and Economic dimensions with both of these dimensions having ego-centric vs. sociotropic poles; it is possible to create a simple two-fold typology thereby classifying all the respondents in Figure 6.1 (illustrated as hollow circles) into four categories. The top left quadrant of Figure 6.1 indicates “Social Liberal” preferences because there is support for freedom of expression (q.23) and general interpersonal trust (q.24), combined with an acknowledgement of economic inequality. The top right is labelled “Conservative” because there is an adherence to policy positions supportive of the communist regime’s status quo, i.e. deferment to the states’ or KSC’s wishes (q.21 and q.22) and support for equality – a core belief within socialism (q.26 and q.18).

Turning now to the bottom right quadrant named “Economic Liberal” this term refers to acceptance of the benefits of greater economic materialism (q.25 and q.27) likely to ensue from greater liberalisation of the Czechoslovak economy under reforms proposed by Ota Šik [1964, 1968, 1990], combined with support for social control (q.20). Finally, the bottom left quadrant is difficult to interpret because it contains a single item (q.17) espousing popular support for materialism. However, on the basis of the logic of the other preferences it makes sense to think that if the opposite of Social Liberal is Economic Liberal, then the converse of conservatism will be “Liberalism.” Moreover, such a liberal outlook is not incompatible with popular support for materialism.

4 The terms ‘ego-centric’ and ‘sociotropic’ come from the economic voting literature within political science, and are a convenient summary means of denoting outlooks that are individualist or collective respectively.
A pertinent question to consider at this point is: What is the association between these preference profiles and the three elite sectors interviewed? The first cross-tabulation in Table 6.2 reveals that the plurality preference among Czechoslovak politicians in 1969 was economic liberal; for the mass media it was social liberal; and for intellectuals it was liberalism.

The cross-tabulation statistics presented beneath this table indicate that there are significant differences across elite sectors and preference categories. Given the evidence presented in the last chapter these differences make sense. However, it is important to stress that Table 6.2 shows considerable intra-sector differences suggesting that it would be unwise to over-emphasise inter-sectoral attitudinal variance. Having summarised the preferences of all elite respondents across eleven issue scales into four distinct ideological categories; it is now time to explore in a similar manner the value structure of the Czechoslovak elites as a means of getting a sense of their general ideological orientation.

## Structure of Czechoslovak Elite Values

Within the cognitive psychology approach in political science, information about an individuals’ values system is considered to be important. This is because beliefs and values are seen to be the attitudinal basis determining observed or reported behaviour. Moreover, having a battery of survey measures on different values facilitates creating perceptual maps of the general ideological orientation of the respondents interviewed. Within the Czechoslovak Opinion Makers Survey the values of respondents were measured using a simple counting procedure. Respondents were asked from a list of eight pre-codes to pick three response options. The resulting elite survey dataset has three mention or count variables, i.e. first most important value chosen, second, and third. Details of the most important value items are given in the appendix to this chapter.

With such count data one has the option of analysing the first (and presumably) most important value, or taking all values chosen and constructing an aggregated count measure. In order to obtain a more comprehensive portrait of the values of Czechoslovak elites the second strategy was chosen. Examination of a cross-tabulation of most important values by elite sector reveals that members of the mass media and intellectuals were much more inclined to “work for the economic development of society”, advocate for “honesty and truthfulness in public life”, and to “seek new answers to problems and not accept the status quo” than their colleagues in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly. Also, intellectuals were the strongest adherents of striving “against social and economic inequality”; but...
were most unlike members of the mass media in wishing to “avoid conflict and maintain good interpersonal relations” (44 vs. 24 per cent respectively).

Exploration of the degree to which the Czechoslovak elite of 1969 could be considered “consensually unified” on the basis of their values is shown in Table 3. It should be noted that the most important value responses may only be represented as count data. This is because respondents simply indicated whether they believed a specific value was important, or not. Such data provides less information than the Likert scale (preference) data examined in the last section. The estimates on the extreme left of Figure 6.3 show the response profile for all the elites interviewed; and reveals that rejection of passive acceptance of the status quo was the most popular (modal) first choice response (42 per cent), with high standards in public office being the modal response for choices two and three (29 and 23 per cent respectively).

The most important values in life variables facilitate generating rank order data where often researchers treat the first mention as being the most important choice, and therefore the main variable of interest. The results presented in Table 6.3 indicate that the modal responses for all first choices examined appear to be rather different to the second and third choices selected. However, statistical comparison of the rankings across all three choices (Friedman test) and pairwise comparisons of rank orderings for all permutations of choices (1 vs. 2; 1 vs. 3; 2 vs. 3) using a series of Wilcoxon signed rank tests indicates no significant inter-choice differences.

The Friedman test statistic for the political and mass media elite sub-groups suggests significant differences in the distributions across the three choices indicating some attitudinal disunity within these two elite sectors. Overall, statistical analysis of the most important value rank data suggests that the Czechoslovak elite of 1969 is best characterised as exhibiting consensus whose strength it is impossible to estimate given the rank order nature of the data. In the next sub-section, this analysis will be extended to explore the idea that the responses to the most important value questions may be explained by an underlying set of general values.

**Mapping Czechoslovak elites’ values**

As the survey responses to the most important value question indicate a respondent’s three most favoured preferences (out of eight possibilities), this information may be defined as “dominance” or “ordered” data [Coombs 1964: 18-20]. Consequently, one of the most appropriate means of exploring a perceptual map of political values is to represent the responses observed using a Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis (see Acronyms and Key Terms for a brief explanation). The results of such an analysis are shown in Figure 6.2. The most salient feature of the scaling estimates for the battery of eight most important values is their dispersion across all four quadrants of the two dimensional map. Looking first at dimension 1, this seems to refer to ‘Decision-making style’ ranging from “conflict” on the extreme left where state priorities override local needs when there is inevitably conflict between the ‘centre and periphery’ (MIV_state) to support for “consensus” where citizens are assisted in participating in community decisions (MIV_comm).

The second dimension may be reasonably interpreted as reflecting ‘Policy Goals’ where at the top of Figure 6.2 there is support for the economic development of society or the more general idea of “development” (MIV_econ). At the opposite end of this dimension, located at the bottom of this figure, is a belief in overcoming social and economic inequalities (MIV_ineq) or advocating for greater “equality.” Here equality also appears to be associated with having a problem-solving approach to life (MIV_ans), and a belief in decisions being taken as close to the citizen as possible (MIV_coll).

In short, the MDS results shown in Figure 6.2 suggest that the value structure of Czechoslovak elites in 1969 had two central components: (1) Policy goals reflecting either a development or equality orientation, and (2) Decision-making style denoting support for a conflict or consensus approach to policy-making. One could argue that the first component is essentially an economic left-right dimension, while the second one denotes level of support for centralised planning. Assuming that the interpretations of these value dimensions are correct; the MDS results allow one to create a fourfold classification based on each of the quadrants in Figure 6.2. Given that there are only eight indicators for four categories developing a valid classification system is difficult. It is however a valid

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5 Coombs [1964: 3-28] in his seminal work argued, as the opening quote to chapter four shows, that the same data may be conceptualised in different ways. Coombs suggested that data maybe classified as (a) dominance/order, or (b) similarity/proximity. The former type, of central interest here, relates to data that denote agreement among respondents about the ordering of stimuli. For example, what is the level of agreement among respondents that party ‘x’ is to the right of all other political parties examined. Here the three choices represent the dominant or ordered preferences from the set of eight stimuli offered in the survey question to all respondents. On the basis of the choices made it is possible with MDS to construct a (low dimensional) perceptual map of the reasons (or values) underpinning these choices.
The Preferences and Values of Czechoslovak Elites

Figure 6.2 A two dimensional map of the value orientations of the Czechoslovak elite in 1969

Note that these item points were derived from a multidimensional (proxscal) scaling model using the proxscal routine. The data are the responses to three close ended questions asking respondents were asked to select three choices from a list of eight options. Thus the data represents “mentions” or counts for each of these pre-coded values. Dimension 1 is interpreted as “decision-making style” ranging from “conflict” (-) to “consensus” (+). Dimension 2 is seen to denote ‘policy goals’ and indicates a “development” or “promote equality” orientation.

Legend:
- MIV_econ: work for economic development of society
- MIV_ipr: avoid conflict and maintain good interpersonal relations
- MIV_coll: sacrifice self for collective interests
- MIV_state: priority of state over local needs
- MIV_truth: honesty and truthfulness in public life
- MIV_comm: assist citizen participation in community decisions
- MIV_ineq: strive against social and economic inequality
- MIV_ans: seek new answers to problems and not accept status quo

6. The Preferences and Values of Czechoslovak Elites

exercise. This is because the results of this procedure may be cross-validated in a subsequent step of the data analysis.

The top left quadrant of Figure 6.2 contains items that emphasise the necessity of all citizens working toward the goal of collective economic development (MIV_econ) where the state would set priorities, thus indicating adherence to the value of Centralism. Here support for national development would mean adopting a ‘competitive’ stance in overcoming, rather than persuading, any localised opposition. In the top right quadrant, the value of development through consensus is emphasised through support for promoting good interpersonal relations (MIV_ipr), demanding high standards from those holding public office (MIV_truth), and facilitating citizen input into public policy-making at the local level (MIV_comm). Such values are consonant with the basic tenets of Corporatism.

Social Democracy would seem to be an appropriate label for the third bottom left quadrant of Figure 6.2, where the emphasis is on promoting collective interests (MIV_coll) and socio-economic equality (MIV_ineq). The last quadrant is less easy to interpret. This is because it contains only a single item – demanding a critical stance toward problem solving and not passively accepting the status quo (MIV_ans). Given the prevalence of such a value orientation in the Czechoslovak media during the Prague Spring era, it makes sense to call this value Reformism.

Adopting a similar strategy to that followed in the last section it is possible to classify all the respondents used to construct the survey question pattern shown in Figure 6.2 as supporting values associated with Centralism, Corporatism, Social Democracy, or Reformism. The key advantage of employing such a classification procedure is that it facilitates exploring the elite survey data in a substantive manner; and it also provides an opportunity to evaluate the face validity (and reliability) of the interpretations proposed for the structure of the attitudinal data.

The second cross-tabulation at the centre of Table 6.2 shows that the most popular single response for all elite sectors regarding value orientation was Corporatism: where 44 per cent of those interviewed are given this classification. This finding is important as it suggests that there was some value consensus among Czechoslovak elites at the end of the Prague Spring era. As with the elite sector and preference cross-tabulations discussed earlier, there are still significant differences. This is indicated by the chi-square and nominal association (Phi, Cramer’s V) statistics. The value orientation profile for the legislators interviewed is interesting because it suggests that this group was unique in its level of adherence to social democratic and reformist values, and its rejection of centralism.

One might question the validity of this profile on the basis of the sampling problems noted in the last chapter with regard to members of the Federal As-
Association between Elite Preferences and Values

In the last two sub-sections there has been a systematic exploration of the preferences and values of the Czechoslovak elite, where there has been an attempt to represent this information using two dimensional maps. This task has been imperfect as the attribution of some survey items to dimensions has not always been clear cut. In part this problem stems from the limited number of items available, the particular nature of the items themselves, and the uncertain political environment under which respondents completed interviews.

In light of these constraints, it is prudent to undertake a cross-validation of the two classifications constructed in the last two sections. In this respect, one may take advantage of the fact that it is logical to think that there should be a relationship between the preferences and values of the Czechoslovak elite. The expectation here is that elites’ preferences and values should have some association; but this relationship should not be especially strong as this would indicate that the classifications derived for both preferences and values are indicators of the same (single) latent construct.

Cross-validation of the preference and value classifications

As the classifications are simple indicators of general orientations the data are nominal level; and it is therefore appropriate to use Phi, Cramer’s V, and the Contingency coefficient to obtain an estimate of association between the preference and values classifications. As expected, there is a significant association between preference and values classifications (Phi = .34, p=.007; Cramer’s V = .20, p=.007; Contingency coefficient = .33, p=.007), but this relationship is not very strong. The implication here is that elite preferences and values are related, but they are distinct as they are cognitively different. This is because preferences refer to specific policy options whereas values indicate general views as to ideal states of the world.

In order to cross-validate the preference outlook and value orientations of the elite sample, it is necessary to formulate some expectations as to the correspondence between both typologies. This is not an easy task because such links tend to be viewed as being specific to national political cultures; and with communist elites there is the additional issue of interpreting preferences and values within a ‘universalist’ socialist ideology. In short, the cross-validation process can only be tentative in nature because it is very difficult to formulate a priori expectations within the constraints imposed by the elite survey dataset.

It is important to stress the need to view the value orientations and political preferences from within the framework of the ‘reform communism’ movement evident during the Prague Spring era. The basic logic of our expectations may be summarised as follows.

- The Centralism value orientation is likely to be most strongly associated with social liberal preferences because under communism state planning was not envisaged as encompassing personal moral questions unless it was considered politically subversive.
- Corporatism as a value orientation should be most closely associated with liberal preferences because belief in collective decision-making depends on consideration of the widest possible range of ideas to be effective.
- Having a Reformist orientation is most probably linked to an economic liberal outlook because as was described in chapter one a central feature of the Prague Spring reform agenda was the liberalisation of the Czechoslovak economy so as to create a socialist market.
- Lastly, a Conservative orientation (within communism) will be associated with a social democratic outlook as this represents the orthodox position of most communists who emphasised strong state intervention into the economy so as to ensure greater social equality rather than wealth creation.

All of these expectations are summarised at the bottom of Figure 6.3. In order to evaluate the association of the value orientation and political preference (2 x 2) classifications a Correspondence Analysis was undertaken. This technique is useful in this situation because it facilitates mapping the two (categorical) four-fold classification scales in the same low dimensional space where proximity in this map indicates a higher level of association between value orientation and preference outlook.
The correspondence analysis results presented in Figure 6.3 suggests that the cross-validation exercise was reasonably successful. The proximity between the hypothesised value orientations and political preferences, i.e. centralism and social liberal, corporatism and liberal, and reformism and economic liberal outlook all exhibit the expected patterns of spatial closeness. The conservative orientation is closest to a social democratic outlook as predicted, but the distance is much greater than that observed for all other value-preference pairings suggesting there is a lower association for this pair. Overall, the evidence presented in Figure 6.3 provides a reasonably convincing cross-validation of the preference and value classifications developed earlier in this chapter.

It is tempting to make an interpretation of the two dimensional space created by the correspondence analysis shown in Figure 6.3. However, this task is fraught with difficulty because there is little theoretical basis for speculating on what latent factors might underlie both value orientations and preferences. One could tentatively speculate from the theory of attitudes that it is beliefs that underpin values and preferences. On this basis, one might say that the first dimension represents beliefs toward ‘reform’ or ‘accepting the status quo’ (conservatism); while the second dimension appears to refer to a belief in ‘equality’ or ‘freedom’ (social democracy vs. liberalism). One striking feature of Figure 6.3 is that a ‘reformist-liberal’ profile is missing. This suggests that none of the elites interviewed favoured what could be termed the ‘effective abandonment’ of communism. Given the tentative nature of this evidence such an interpretation must be seen as speculative because it is based on a considerable number of assumptions using a relatively small dataset.

Within the preceding paragraphs the analysis and interpretation of the attitudinal structure of Czechoslovak elites’ preferences and values has undoubtedly stretched the limits of prudent inference making. In defence of this admittedly exploratory analysis, the goal of this chapter has been to determine if it is possible to construct perceptual maps of Czechoslovak elites that facilitate greater understanding of the Prague Spring reform movement. The results presented seem reasonable given the constraints imposed by the data. In the penultimate section of this chapter, an attempt will now be made to provide an explanation of elite preferences and values in terms of the Czechoslovak leadership profile presented in the last chapter.

6 Within cognitive psychology there are a number of theories of attitudes, and often the terms ‘belief’, ‘attitude’ and ‘value’ are not used standard ways. Nonetheless, there is a general acceptance of a hierarchy of cognitions, regardless of how they are labelled, where some are seen to be more fundamental than others in shaping thoughts and behaviour. Here the term ‘belief’ is used to denote an attitudinal disposition that is more fundamental than either ‘preferences’ or ‘values’.
Explanations of Elite Preferences

In this chapter there has been an examination of what the elite survey evidence tells us about the preferences and values of national opinion makers in Czechoslovakia at the end of the Prague Spring era. Through a series of analyses it has been possible to construct two classification systems that facilitate examining in a more substantive manner differences in outlook among national leaders in the first half of 1969. In the last chapter, the focus was on building a profile of who were the Prague Spring elite, and the type of interaction among sectors within this elite group. In addition, there was an exploration of who elites perceived as having most influence over public opinion. All of these analyses revealed systematic inter- and intra-sectoral differences among the opinion makers interviewed.

In this section, the goal is to pull together some of the analyses elaborated within this chapter and the previous one in order to address the important question: How is it possible to explain the expressed preferences of the Czechoslovak elite in the first half of 1969? The dependent variable examined is preferences derived from the classification procedure outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Therefore, the dependent variable has four values: social liberal, conservative, economic liberal, and liberal. As the dependent variable is composed of four categories that do not constitute an ordered scale, the most appropriate form of regression analysis is Multinomial Logit (MNL).

Within the MNL models estimated conservative preferences will be taken as the base category from which all the models will be compared. This makes substantive sense as all three other preference categories denote some form of liberalism. These three dependent variables will be examined using six different explanatory models – many of which were introduced in the last chapter (see Tables 5.1 and 5.4). These explanatory models are (1) position in society, (2) sources of influence on elite, (3) channels of influence on the public, (4) policy-making influence, (5) value orientation, and (6) methodological effects.

The final methodological effects model refers to the uncertain political situation in 1969 which may have influenced how respondents chose to answer the survey questions. Here two indicators are tested. First, time of interview captures the fact that the effects of the purges associated with the normalisation process began in the later phases of interviewing, i.e. after April 17 1969 [note, Williams 1997: 226-236]. Second, interviewers recorded if a respondent exhibited a generally negative tone toward the interview; and this serves as an indicator of fear or resentment toward the questions asked. These two indicators are included to control for the progressive deterioration in the surveying environment.

Elite consensus and explaining preference outlook

In the theory section of this chapter it was noted that within The International Study of Opinion Makers a central research question was determining if national elites were integrated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Elite integration was defined in terms of high levels of interaction and a general consensus over matters such as public policy priorities. The general preferences model to be tested facilitates exploring elite consensus in Czechoslovakia because if these national opinion makers were really integrated one should expect most, if not all, of the six models proposed to have little explanatory power where few of the variables will have statistically significant effects.

This is because the attitudes and behaviour of elites should follow the same pattern if they shared a common socialisation experience. Elite integration based on socialisation in post-war Czechoslovakia could have resulted from membership of the Communist Party; adherence to its modus operandi, and basic ideological tenets. Therefore, one may hypothesise that if the Czechoslovak elite were indeed integrated explanatory models 1 to 4 (listed above) should exhibit little predictive power in explaining general political preferences. Elite consensus does not of course imply that there are no differences in values and preferences. What is implied is that such differences are distributed in a non-systematic throughout the entire elite network, and are not strongly associated with specific sectors.

Therefore, it is expected that value orientation will show significant effects in the overall MNL model, and will be the most important sub-model in terms of explanatory power. Moreover, the evidence presented in Figure 6.3 facilitates making three specific predictions. First, holding a centralist value orientation will be significantly positively associated with having social liberal preferences. Second, adhering to corporatist values will be significantly and positively linked with liberal preferences. Third, a reformist value will be significantly and positively related to having an economic liberal preference profile.

MNL model results

The regression model results presented in Table 6.4 show that the ‘position in society’ and ‘sources of information’ explanations do not help to explain Czechoslovak elites’ preferences. This fits with expectations. However, contrary to expectations variables associated with influencing public opinion and policy-making do help to explain preference outlook. The results in the centre of Table
Table 6.4 MNL models explaining Czechoslovak elite preference outlooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>Social liberal</th>
<th>Economic liberal</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B  Sig.  Δp</td>
<td>B  Sig.  Δp</td>
<td>B  Sig.  Δp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position in society</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector I: politicians</td>
<td>1.82 .148 .19</td>
<td>.83 .455 .03</td>
<td>.94 .362 .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector VI: intellectuals</td>
<td>1.32 .158 .11</td>
<td>.18 .829 .12</td>
<td>1.17 .120 .12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers and magazines</td>
<td>-.36 .558 -.03</td>
<td>.12 .831 .07</td>
<td>-.46 .370 -.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal bulletins and circulars</td>
<td>.28 .639 .02</td>
<td>.43 .449 .05</td>
<td>&lt;.01 .994 -.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft material from administrators</td>
<td>-.07 .282 -.13</td>
<td>.16 .827 .08</td>
<td>.12 .859 .07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read foreign press</td>
<td>.89 .372 .15</td>
<td>-.65 .298 -.12</td>
<td>-.36 .560 -.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Channels of influence on public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>.69 .430 -.08</td>
<td>1.58 .044 .10</td>
<td>1.69 .009 .16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>1.64 .031 .21</td>
<td>-.04 .944 -.13</td>
<td>.25 .679 -.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>-.12 .658 -.01</td>
<td>1.32 .832 .05</td>
<td>-.17 .764 -.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy making influence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiated reports or proposals</td>
<td>-.261 .042 -.18</td>
<td>-.72 .387 -.02</td>
<td>-.45 .569 .10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in writing proposals</td>
<td>1.56 .078 .17</td>
<td>1.27 .135 .09</td>
<td>.30 .730 -.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a consultative organ</td>
<td>.25 .708 .01</td>
<td>.31 .633 .04</td>
<td>.43 .492 .07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value orientation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralism</td>
<td>3.51 .010 .32</td>
<td>2.08 .102 .05</td>
<td>2.70 .033 .11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatism</td>
<td>-.39 .676 .07</td>
<td>.55 .492 .04</td>
<td>1.76 .025 .32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformism</td>
<td>1.30 .169 .09</td>
<td>.92 .258 &lt;.01</td>
<td>1.37 .096 .14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodological effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of interview (early to late)</td>
<td>-.105 .008 -.26</td>
<td>-.64 .091 &lt;.01</td>
<td>-.63 .074 &lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative attitude to interview</td>
<td>.05 .936 .02</td>
<td>-.31 .594 -.07</td>
<td>.04 .951 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.105 .522 .01</td>
<td>.995 .005</td>
<td>-.49 .495 .02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Goodness of fit statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>McFadden's R²</th>
<th>% Correctly classified</th>
<th>Lambda (λ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position in society</td>
<td>528.70</td>
<td>558.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of information</td>
<td>530.51</td>
<td>579.45</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of influence on public</td>
<td>525.77</td>
<td>564.92</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy making influence</td>
<td>575.41</td>
<td>536.26</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value orientation</td>
<td>530.23</td>
<td>569.38</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological effects</td>
<td>531.48</td>
<td>560.79</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined model</td>
<td>533.02</td>
<td>708.93</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Czechoslovak Elite Survey, January-July 1969. Note all models were estimated with 193 cases.

6.4 reveal that being active in the media is associated with having a liberal rather than conservative (the base category for all analyses) preferences. This makes some sense as most of the literature on the Prague Spring emphasises the generally liberal tone and content of media discourse during 1968. The implication here is that those with ‘conservative’ preferences must have used more private channels in communicating their views when initiating policy proposals (see below).

Activities associated with endeavouring to shape public policy exhibit a unique influence – they are associated with social liberal preferences. In addition, initiating proposals is connected with having conservative preferences whereas participation in the drafting of proposals helps explain having a social liberal outlook. These relationships are unexpected, and suggest that members of the Czechoslovak elite with different preference outlooks attempted to set the public policy-making agenda using different strategies. The more conservative elements appear to have favoured initiating proposals, while social liberals tended to collaborate on pre-existing policy documents.

Two of the three specific predictions with regard to value orientation and preference outlook are confirmed. Having a centralist value orientation increases the probability of expressing social liberal preferences by almost a third (p=.4,32), while the relationship between corporatism and liberal preferences is equally strong (p=.3,2). Centralist values are also positively but less strongly associated with (a social and economic) liberal preference profile. Contrary to expectations holding reformist values is not a significant predictor of liberal economic preferences, but does help to explain more general liberal views (b=1.37, p=.096, prob=.14). Moreover, the goodness of fit statistics at the bottom of Table 6.4 demonstrates that the value orientations sub-model does not have the greatest explanatory power.
Lastly, the changing political situation appears to have shaped respondents’ willingness to express generally liberal (as opposed to conservative) preferences. This negative effect was most strongly felt among those with a social liberal profile where willingness to express such a preference outlook declined by more than a quarter (p = -.26) between January and July 1969. Although this methodological effect is statistically significant for the other two liberal preference categories, the changes in probabilities are below one per cent (p ≤ 0.01). Interestingly, interviewers’ subjective assessments of respondents’ attitude to the questionnaire do not exhibit significant effects suggesting that those who disliked being interviewed were careful to hide their concerns to the interviewer, or refused to be interviewed.

It is important to provide some quantitative measure of this changing political situation. One simple indicator of the change was communist party membership. During the period of interviewing for the elite survey in 1969 the KSČ lost through expulsions almost ninety seven thousand members, where total membership fell from 1.67 to 1.53 million. The process of expelling party members increased rapidly in the three years between late 1968 and 1970, i.e. growing from 22,046 to 96,283 to 326,817. This represents a membership loss of 28 per cent in three years. Of the 473,731 members who were screened (prověrka) because of their pro-reformist views, almost a third of these also lost their jobs. This effect alone had an impact on approximately six hundred thousand people through family links, and represented 4 per cent of the entire Czechoslovak population [Hruzy 1980: 146-147].

This figure is likely to be a conservative estimate for elites. This is because the more active members of the KSČ fell under greater suspicion. According to Mlynář [1975: 163] half of the most politically active party members were purged; and this number was estimated to be 70 to 80 per cent of those who had been involved in the theoretical work of drafting reform plans during 1968. Although, the most extreme effects of these purges occurred after the period of elite interviewing; it seems reasonable to suspect that Czechoslovak elites had some appreciation of what was coming.

7 More recent historical scholarship using archival material only available since the 1990s suggests that the extent of the KSČ party purge in 1969 and 1970 may not have been as great as once thought [Williams 1997: 226-236; 2006: 106-108].

**Conclusion**

The opening quotes to this chapter highlighted important methodological and theoretical points that have been a central feature of the work presented in the previous pages. Scholars associated with The International Study of Opinion Makers research programme (1967-) developed and tested both the methodological and theoretical instruments for undertaking comparative research on elites in Yugoslavia, Norway, Australia, the United States, and West Germany (FRG). The analyses outlined in this chapter contribute to this literature, and also provide a unique insight into the structure and attitudes of the Prague Spring elite.

Within this chapter and the previous one, the concept of elite integration has been explored with the Czechoslovak Opinion Makers Survey (1969). The evidence presented in the last chapter revealed a mixed picture. Czechoslovak elites tended to have similar backgrounds stemming from the selective recruitment criteria used by the Communist Party in the preceding two decades, i.e. 1948-1968. Moreover, these communist elite members appeared to be anxious to consolidate their positions through inter-marriage and transmitting the benefits of elite status to their children. However, the structure of interaction patterns indicated a strong sectoral bias.

Responses to the sociometric questions may have been biased by the uncertain political situation, so it seems prudent not to over-interpret these mixed results. In any case, the second facet of elite integration relates to consensus over things such as general policy preferences and value orientations. The evidence presented in this chapter reveals that there is sufficient attitudinal consensus in the Czechoslovak elite data to construct in an inductive manner general typologies regarding elite policy preferences and value orientations. The two perceptual maps of Czechoslovak elite attitudes presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 were cross-validated, and used in the penultimate section to indirectly test for evidence of elite integration.

The results of the regression model analysis demonstrate that differences in Czechoslovak elite preferences were primarily due to dissimilarities in value orientations. Other factors such as position in society, where elites obtained information, or the strategies used to shape the public agenda do not help to explain why the elite respondents were classified as conservative, or some form of liberal in the general political preference typology. This implies that attitudinal or perceptual differences were largely intra-rather than inter-sectoral in nature.

Mlynář’s [1978] insider account of the KSČ and the Prague Spring reforms, and Skilling’s [1976] seminal analysis of the “interrupted revolution” both argue that attributions of ‘reformer’ or ‘conservative’ labels to specific groups or even
individuals over-simplified a complex reality [note also, Pithart 1980]. A similar pattern was also evident among Soviet elites during the same era [Skilling 1971: 395; Churchward 1973: 135]. In sum, it would seem that the mechanisms underpinning the stability of regimes based on Higley’s concept of “ideologically united elites” had a strong social-psychological and dynamic basis that does not fit with a pluralist interest group interpretation.

According to Higley’s neo-elite theory and its extension to deal with political transition processes, elites marked by consensus are indicative of a stable political regime. If this theory is correct, then the evidence presented in this chapter, and the previous one, suggests that the Prague Spring elite was not likely to have fractured into orthodox communist and reformist factions. However, Jancar [1971: 128] in her analysis of the “demonopolisation of power” in 1968 highlighted the strong potential for elite disunity because “absolute monopoly rule becomes endangered at that point when the traditional hierarchical party equilibrium breaks down, and the new in the process of formation becomes susceptible of stabilisation at a level analogous to a pluralistic (democratic) consensus.”

What is known with greater certainty is the destabilising effect that the Warsaw Pact invasion and subsequent imposition of purges associated with the normalisation process had on Czechoslovakia’s political development in the two decades preceding the Velvet Revolution of late 1989 [note, Simecka 1984; Pehe 1988; Svec 1988; Narayanswamy 1988; Bracke 2003]. In the next chapter there will be an examination of the legacy of the Prague Spring era in terms of the persistence of political attitudes between 1968 and 2008. Here the focus will shift away from elites and back toward citizens once more, where there will be an extension of the analyses presented in chapter five. A more general discussion of the legacy of the Prague Spring period will be given in the concluding chapter.

7. Popular Support for Democratic Values across the Generations in the Czech Republic

The best laws and the best conceived democratic mechanisms will not in themselves guarantee legality or freedom or human rights [...] if they are not underpinned by certain human and social values. [...] Without commonly shared and widely entrenched moral values and obligations, neither law, nor democratic government, nor even the market economy will function properly.

Václav Havel [1993: 18-19]

Within the study of the post-communist transition process it is often assumed that citizens across Central and Eastern Europe had to “learn” democracy and capitalism during the 1990s. Citizens who had grown up under communist regimes had to learn many new political lessons such as (1) the institutions associated with competitive multiparty elections; (2) the central tenets of liberal democracy related to rights dealing with matters like the tolerance of minority opinions and political activities often associated with free speech; and (3) the duties of citizenship, such as willingness to participate in elections as a candidate, or protest against authorities who attempt to undermine civil rights [Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006; Kopecký 2007].

This argument that the citizens of post-communist states such as the Czech Republic were a tabula rasa with regard to liberal democracy assumes that citizens’ political knowledge was solely determined by the experience of a communist regime. There are two reasons to question the strength of such an interpretation. Firstly, communism within Czechoslovakia did not strictly speaking create a one party state. Between 1948 and 1989 there were also other (satellite) parties such as the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (CSS) and the Czechoslovak Peoples Party (CSL) who were allowed very limited freedom to attract members; and participate in the National Front, parliament, and government. Secondly, the First Republic Czechoslovakia had a multiparty system that was one of the most stable in Central and Eastern Europe during the inter-war era [Broklová 1996; Brokli and Mansfeldová 1996; Boguszak and Gabal 1996; Bradley 2000 in contrast note, Heimann 2009: 48-86].

Moreover, the Prague Spring reform movement of 1968 demonstrates that there was popular support for key features of liberal democracy such as freedom of information, free expression of ideas, and having a multiparty system. This does not mean that there was not popular support for socialism. In fact, the survey evidence from the Prague Spring period suggests that there was popular sup-
The argument presented in this chapter is structured as follows. In the first section there is a brief overview of why we might expect political opinions to be open or resistant to change. Section two examines the relationship between age, attitudes toward key political events, and general political values. Here there is a transformation in the ‘public’ where younger age groups start with different opinions than either their parents or grandparents. In this sense, the older generations die without ever changing their opinions and younger generations replace them having embraced different values from the outset.2

Previous research on the relationship between age and social and political attitudes has tended to adopt one of two explanations. The “increasing persistence” model argues that attitudes are imprinted in late adolescence and early adulthood (i.e. the “impressionable years”) and become crystallised for life [Glenn 1974; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Baker 2000].3 Successive cohorts develop contrasting attitudes because they grow up in different socio-political environments, e.g. becoming an adult under communism (democratic centralism) is different to being raised under liberal democracy. In contrast, the “perpetual susceptibility” model argues that there is no relationship between age and attitude change [Visser and Krosnick 1998]. This perspective is important within this chapter as it suggests that while older cohorts have more stable attitudes than the young; this does not imply that the young are more susceptible to changing their opinions than the old [Czaja and Sharit 1998]. In short, there should be no system-

1 An inventory of many of the survey questions asked in 1968 provides a more detailed picture of citizens’ political attitudes during the Prague Spring era. This poll data is available at the website for this study. See the appendix for details.

2 This type of investigation known as Cohort Analysis can be very technical in nature because of a variety of methodological issues that arise when trying to explain opinion change in cross-sectional survey data. Here the analysis presented will be kept as straightforward as possible. For an introduction to cohort analysis see Glenn [1977], Converse [1976], Abramson [1983], and Firebaugh [1992, 1997].

3 The exact age at which political attitudes become imprinted is generally noted to be “late adolescence” that is sometimes defined as 21 to 24 years old [Vollebergh et al. 2001: 1195-1197]. Recent cross-national research that includes the Czech Republic concludes “that 14 year olds have already incorporated fundamental attitudes associated with citizenship” [Hooghe and Wilkenfeld 2008: 168].
Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

atic differences in attitudes toward key facets of democracy between citizens regardless of age.

Such openness to political change represents one way of explaining the post-communist transition process. However, one might propose that the process of opinion change should vary systematically depending on attitude domain. Earlier in chapter four, an exploratory factor analysis of all the survey questions asked in both 1968 and 2008 suggested that there were four latent value dimensions. Three of these underlying values: political participation, sense of political efficacy, and support for pluralism, featured in both datasets four decades apart. At the level of latent values, the survey evidence suggests a considerable level of attitudinal stability.

If we switch our attention to the changes in each of the twenty attitude questions it seems plausible to think of three distinct trend patterns: (a) attitudes that exhibit persistence, (b) attitudes that have undergone significant change, and (c) an intermediate category that shows relatively small amounts of variation over time. In this respect, one could argue that some attitudes associated with pluralism are likely to have changed between 1968 and 2008 because of experience with a liberal multiparty democratic regime since 1990. In contrast, attitudes toward participation; and more specifically putting oneself forward for local, regional, or national elections relate to personal features of the citizen such as their sense of duty to do public service. Lastly, citizens’ sense of political efficacy may depend on factors that change slowly over time, and thus represent an intermediate category.

In order to explore the nature and degree of attitude change between 1968 and 2008 it is necessary first to map out differences in opinion across time. More specifically in the next section there will be an exploration of the evidence that different birth cohorts of Czech citizens have systematically contrasting opinions toward: (a) key political events, and (b) core liberal democratic values.

Age, Attitudes and Values

In our first exploration of political attitudes across the generations, the focus will be on how different cohorts in May 2008 perceived the key events of 1968 and 1989. Age in this case is a key indicator of direct experience of these events, and is likely to be an important determinant of attitudes toward the historical events of 1968 and 1989. The events surrounding the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Velvet Revolution of late 1989 are similar in that both involved proposals for changing the political system and economy. Nonetheless, both historical periods

7. Popular Support for Democratic Values across the Generations in the Czech Republic

are different in terms of their timing, context, outcome and meaning. The central question addressed here is how citizens forty years after the Prague Spring and nineteen years after the Velvet Revolution perceive these key historical events? This question is important because the memory of these events played an important role, as Wydra [2007] argues, in the emergence of democracy.

Cohort perceptions of Prague Spring and the Velvet Revolution

In order to facilitate making comparison between the events of 1968 and 1989, public attitudes to both periods of contemporary Czechoslovak history were assessed in terms of three criteria: (a) purpose – did these events propose reform of the prevailing system or revolutionary change? (b) leadership – were these events directed by elites or by ordinary citizens acting together? (c) objectives – did these events espouse political or economic change? Using these three criteria plus an additional direct comparison of citizens’ evaluation of the link between what happened in 1968 and 1989 provides a basis for mapping how contemporary Czech citizens see two key turning points in their recent history.

A preliminary examination of the Czech public’s perception of the Prague Spring movement and the Velvet Revolution reveals that contemporary public opinion is split into three groups that lie at the left, centre, and right of all seven scales investigated. This evidence is important as it implies that there is not a strong consensus on what the events of 1968 and 1989 mean; rather there are distinct facets of opinion. Estimation of a Perceptual Agreement (PA) measure for all scales supports this finding where a score of -1 indicates complete disagreement, zero indicates that equal numbers of respondents chose each point on the scale, and +1 denotes complete consensus within public opinion.4

This analysis indicates that there are moderate levels of consensus ranging from a low value (PA=.15) for the question of whether the Velvet Revolution was led by an elite group of dissidents rather than being seen as a mass movement to a high value of (PA=.48) on the question of the strength of the link between the Prague Spring era and the Velvet Revolution. The fact that the agreement statistics do not have strong positive (or negative) values suggests that different groups within Czech society hold different perceptions of the nature and consequences of the political developments associated with 1968 and 1989.

4. Explanations of the Perceptual Agreement statistic (PA) have been given earlier in the Acronyms and Key Terms and in the appendix of chapter three. For details see, van der Eijk [2001].
7. Popular Support for Democratic Values across the Generations in the Czech Republic

The evidence presented in Figure 7.1 demonstrates that in general there are few differences between the three cohorts identified. A more detailed inspection indicates the presence of three noteworthy patterns. First, the older generations are more likely to think that the Prague Spring and Velvet Revolution had a stronger economic aspect than the younger cohorts. Second, the (youngest) post-communist generation is more likely to think than those present at the events of 1989 that the Velvet Revolution was driven by citizens rather than elites. Thirdly, those who were young adults in 1989 have a stronger belief that the Prague Spring was revolutionary rather than reformist. These differences are interesting but should be treated with caution. This is because the standard error on the estimates presented in Figure 7.1 suggests that the variation observed is not likely to be statistically significant ($p<.05$). In the next sub-section, attention will switch to the more general question of whether attitudes toward democracy have changed in the four decades following the Prague Spring of 1968.

**Stability of democratic values across time**

In the last subsection there was an examination of two key political events among different age cohorts at the same time point. This analysis revealed that political experience and socialisation had little impact on the attitudes expressed. In order to examine more systematically political attitudes across time this sub-section will compare political attitudes measured at two time points, 1968 and 2008. The purpose of this comparison is to see if total public opinion measured is best characterised as exhibiting stability or change. This comparative analysis facilitates addressing an important question: Have Czech citizens become more or less democratic in their opinions between 1968 and 2008?

The data presented in Figure 7.2 summarises total opinion change on all twenty survey questions asked in both 1968 and 2008. The survey questions have been coded to indicate opinions supportive of liberal democracy. Positive values indicate a growth in such opinions between 1968 and 2008. The most obvious feature evident in Figure 7.2 is that the strength of democratic attitudes increased for six indicators, decreased for twelve others, and for two items there was effectively no change. Overall, this evidence reveals that Czech citizens in May 2008 were generally speaking no more democratic than those interviewed in the middle of the Prague Spring in May 1968.

5 It should be noted that differences of opinion between 1968 and 2008 of less than 4 per cent are not likely to be statistically significant due to sampling error. Therefore, the amount of non-significant opinion change increases to seven items.
However, such an interpretation needs to take account of some important methodological considerations that go to the heart of attempting to evaluate opinion change over time, where the political context changed considerably. Different political contexts have direct effects in the determining which survey questions can be asked to respondents in an opinion poll. For example, the researchers in 1968 explored citizens’ tolerance of opinions that opposed the status quo through allowing “the public expression of opinions that are not socialist” (q.15). Quite obviously repeating such a survey question in 2008 is not sensible, and so the decision was made to examine support for the expression of “opinions in public that go against the current system of democratic governance” (q.9).

While both items ask about respondents orientation toward the political status quo – the status quo in 1968 which might be characterised as a democratic centralist regime and 2008 typified as a liberal multiparty democracy are very different. One might argue that greater public backing for the status quo in 2008 combined with less tolerance for anti-system views is an indication of support for the democratic state against authoritarian tendencies. However, a core feature of liberal democratic theory is majority tolerance of minority opinions, even if such minority opinions are considered objectionable by the majority.

This is the logic underpinning the comparisons reported in Figure 7.2. Of course one might reasonably argue that the questions asked in 1968 and 2008 are qualitatively different making strict comparison an invalid exercise. The strategy adopted here is a compromise one, which operates on the working assumption that the evaluation of popular support for democratic principles can be undertaken regardless of whether citizens actually live in a liberal democratic state. However, the responses to the questions asked will be treated with caution as it is not possible to establish the degree to which the items used suffer from question bias and measurement error [Schuman and Presser 1981; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000: 178-179].

Moreover, it is likely that the answers given to the questionnaires implemented in 1968 and 2008 elicited in many cases responses best conceptualised as “top-of-the-head” that stem from a “distribution of considerations” rather than ‘true’ fixed opinions [Zaller and Feldman 1992; Zaller 1992]. Therefore, the differing contexts prevailing on May 2-14 1968 and May 12-19 2008 may have systematically affected the considerations respondents used to answer the questions asked. In short, the differing political contexts effectively resulted in framing effects that shaped what those interviewed thought about when answering the survey questions; in contrast to priming them about what to think [Kinders and Sander 1990]. This may help explain why we observe the pattern of net differences in opinion recorded between 1968 and 2008 shown in Figure 7.2.

Sources: ÚVVM May 2-14 1968, questions 3-7, 9, 12, 14-18, 20-23, 25-28 (N=795); CVVM May 12-19 2008, questions 1-20 (N=1,013). See the appendix of chapter four for details. Please note that the classification of items into rights, expression and duty is used here as a means of charting public opinion change in a general sense.
It is probably no coincidence that the items that exhibit the greatest decline in popular support between 1968 and 2008, i.e. support for political pluralism with regard to the status quo (q.13), and believing that protesting for civil rights (q.10) were the product of functionally (rather than strictly) equivalent questions. However, there is no evidence that difference in exact question wording had systematic effects; as items that are “different” are not always associated with large changes in opinion in either a positive or negative direction.

An interesting pattern in the differences in public opinion between 1968 and 2008 relates to Czechs perceptions of “political efficacy”, that is the extent to which citizens “feel that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, i.e. it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties” [Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954: 187]. It seems from the evidence shown in Figure 7.2 that Czech citizens’ sense that they have the personal capacity to exert political influence, i.e. internal efficacy, grew between 1968 and 2008 (+3.8 points). In contrast, popular belief that political authorities are responsive to individuals efforts to exert influence, i.e. external efficacy, declined (-5.4 points) during the same period.6

Changes in sense of political efficacy over time reflecting variation in political or institutional context are not uncommon, and were particularly evident in the United States during the 1960s. This underscores a point made earlier that political events have important substantive consequences, and this fact warns us to be careful when interpreting survey results [Converse 1972: 328-329]. The implication here is that Czechs felt more equipped in 2008 to be effective citizens, but felt less able to influence public policy than was the case during one of the most optimistic phases of the Prague Spring period (May 2-14 1968), some four decades earlier. One might argue that the high optimism evident in May 1968 is an unrealistic standard for comparison with the mundane realities of a functioning liberal multiparty democracy.

In any case, such differences in overall public opinion are likely to mask dissimilarities among citizens. It is to this facet of public opinion change that we now turn our attention, where our focus in this chapter is on the relative importance of age, period, and cohort effects.

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6 It is important to note that the concepts of internal and external political efficacy were developed from the work of Lane [1959: 149], Campbell et al. [1960], Balch [1974: 24], Craig [1979], and Marsh [1977]. This refinement of the political efficacy concept was probably not familiar to the researchers in the Mlynář research team in 1968, as they were only widely accepted within political science during the 1970s.
analysis undertaken. Therefore, trends that exhibit change of less than 10 percent should be interpreted with caution as they may be due to sampling error.

It is also important to keep in mind that the socialisation and period effects explanations of public opinion change are based on an important assumption. It is supposed that the process of ageing, or life-cycle effects, does not have a significant impact on the opinion change observed. For example, one would not expect ceteris paribus citizens to have strongly pro-communist views on politics when they are young to become intensely anti-communist as they age. In contrast, one might expect a person who is ‘independent’ in terms of social norms in their youth to become more conservative as they age.

Life-cycle effects are special in the sense that they relate to opinion changes at the individual level that are rarely a source of observed opinion change at the societal level. This is because the effects are most often offset by changes due to generational replacement. In the next sub-section, we will examine whether life-cycle effects are likely to be a significant source of opinion change.

Life-cycle Effects as a Source of Opinion Change

The existence of life-cycle effects is predicated on observing two patterns in the data. First, there should be significant and persistent differences between cohorts who are at different stages in the life cycle. For example, aging leads to increasing conservatism and a general hardening of attitudes [Peterson 1999: 213]. Second, while age may be correlated with opinions toward liberal democracy issues such as protection of minorities, the opinions within each age group must move in a direction that brings them closer to the pattern observed in older cohorts [Mayer 1992: 178-84].

Thus, if differences in opinions toward minority rights are due to aging then all cohorts should increasingly state that the majority should override minority preferences as they grow older. When we look at the relationship between age and many political attitudes we observe from Table 7.1 that this only occurs for some questions within the two surveys examined. This evidence demonstrates that there is no consistent relationship indicative of an aging effect.

For example, if an examination is made of attitudes toward standing as a candidate in local, regional and national elections we observe a distinct age effect for these three variables in 1968, but no such effect is evident in 2008. In general, the evidence presented reveals no persistent dissimilarities between birth cohorts in the two surveys examined. This means that for the most part opinions through the life cycle tend to remain largely constant suggesting that a focus on...
7. Popular Support for Democratic Values across the Generations in the Czech Republic

(a) Increase in liberal democratic attitudes

(b) Change in willingness to stand as a candidate in an election

(c) Decrease in liberal democratic attitudes

(d) Mixed pattern of change in liberal democratic attitudes

Source: ÚVVM May 2-14 1968, questions 3-7, 9, 12, 14-18, 20-23, 25-28 (N=795); CVVM May 12-19 2008, questions 1-20 (N=1,013). See the appendix of this chapter for details. All scales used in this data are four point Likert agree-disagree items. In all cases the two agree/disagree responses estimates are reported in these figures. Only respondents aged 18 years or more are included in this analysis. The ‘younger’ and ‘older’ cohorts refer to those respondents who were adults in both 1968 and 2008. The ‘younger cohort’ denotes individuals who were 18 to 24 years old in 1968 (n=56) and thus 58 to 64 years in 2008 (n=139). For the ‘older cohort’ these respondents were 25 to 29 years old in 1968 (n=84) and are 65 to 69 years in 2008 (n=88).
generational and intracohort sources of opinion change is a reasonable assumption. Fortunately, it is possible to take our analysis one step further and examine the impact of life cycle effects on that battery of items asked in 1968 and 2008. Here, we must focus on those respondents who were adults during this period.

**Political attitudes across the life-cycle**

Because of restrictions in the two datasets used in this chapter, it is only possible to examine the two youngest cohorts of 1968 again in 2008 (i.e. for two time points) for obvious demographic reasons. Nonetheless, within such limitations the ‘younger’ and ‘older’ cohorts represent a critical division between those younger citizens who would have reached adulthood in 1968 and would therefore have been most likely to have been influenced by the Prague Spring reform movement. In contrast, the older citizens would have been socialised in an earlier period. The ‘younger cohort’ denotes individuals who were 18 to 24 years old in 1968 (n=56); and thus 58 to 64 years in 2008 (n=139). For the older cohort these respondents were 25 to 29 years old in 1968 (n=84), and are 65 to 69 years in 2008 (n=88).

Figure 7.3, presents a comparison of the survey estimates for these two cohorts along with all other respondents (who came of age or died) between 1968 and 2008. Examination of these survey results reveal that the data may be divided into four broad categories: (a) increase in liberal democratic attitudes, (b) decrease in willingness to stand as a candidate in elections, (c) increase in liberal democratic attitudes, and (d) a mixed pattern of change.

The data presented in Figure 7.3 demonstrates that increase in liberal democratic attitudes was evident with regard to internal political efficacy and support for the right of citizens to stand in elections without the endorsement of a political party. The largest increase is evident for the independent candidacy measure on the right of window (a) of Figure 7.3. Here the greatest change in opinion occurred for those who were young adults and were in their “impressionable years” in 1968; suggesting that the events surrounding the Prague Spring had an important sociising effect — a finding consonant with previous results in this field of attitude research in the United States [Sears 1975; Visser and Krosvic 1998]. The data relating to citizens willingness to stand as a political candidate in the three main types of elections shown in window (b) of Figure 7.3 reveals small changes for national and regional government, and a more pronounced change for local elections. This is a curious finding and most likely reflects some of the characteristic features of this level of governance.

These contests are unique in that independent candidates do well (i.e. they gained about half of all seats in the 2002 elections) in smaller urban settlements such as villages and towns, while the largest right wing Civic Democrat Party (ODS) tends to dominate in large urban areas such as Prague where they gained 40 per cent of all seats in 2002. In short, interpreting the reasons for changing attitudes toward being a candidate for local government is complicated by the interaction of two key factors — age and political context effects.

First, respondents who were aged 18 to 29 years old in 1968 and 58 to 69 years old in 2008 are likely to have different levels of enthusiasm for political activism by virtue of their age. Second, the District National Committee system of local government under communism lacked autonomy because local councils operated with in a system of governance where there was the parallel authority of the Communist Party [Vajdová 2003: 152-3; Smith 2009]. This situation changed considerably in the 1990s with the post-communist transition process. Specifically, the powers of local government increased in terms of raising and spending money; and the number of local government municipalities increased from 4,104 in 1989 to 14,702 in 2002 in a process partly determined by local referendums [Lacina and Vajdová 2000: 259-261].

Window (c) of Figure 7.3 presents all those survey questions that are characterised by a decline in liberal democratic attitudes. In general, the set of seven attitudes shown here refer to various facets associated with citizen action. For this reason, a life-cycle effect makes sense as it shows that individuals around retirement age are less inclined toward undertaking activities such as protesting for civil rights, protecting minorities, and ensuring tolerance of what are considered (extreme) minority views than was the case when these same people were in their twenties. This general disengagement from political activity among the older age cohorts is a well known phenomenon linked to changing levels of participation across the life cycle [Verba and Nie 1972; Jennings 1979; Strate et al. 1989].

The patterns presented in window (d) of Figure 7.3 are less uniform in illustrating mixed patterns of attitudinal change across both cohorts and issues. Questions that relate to the rights of the individual such as freedom of expression, integrity of the private sphere, and the principle that politics should not influence all aspects of social life attracted greater public support in 2008. However, the pattern for the two cohorts which it is possible to examine at these two time
points exhibits a more mixed pattern. Many of these changes are within sampling error suggesting there is considerable stability in opinion across the life cycle.

Having established, within the limits of the survey data available, that life cycle effects are not an important source of opinion change our attention will now turn toward investigating the extent to which attitudinal change can be explained in terms of population turnover, or a real transformation in the Czech public’s political opinions.

Generational Replacement and Intracohort Sources of Opinion Change

It was argued earlier that two important mechanisms of public opinion change are: (a) Generational replacement – where evolving attitudes are based on the changing age composition of the public, and (b) Intracohort change – observed opinion change where people of all ages have changed their mind. In order to demonstrate these two distinct sources of opinion change a detailed example will be used to illustrate the logic of how it is possible to make estimates of these different sources of change.

As noted earlier in 1968 and 2008, ÚVVM and CVVM (i.e. Czech state polling agencies) using a series of Likert scale items to explore public attitudes toward issues often associated with public support for a democratic form of governance. Within these five point scales the two points denoting supporting for liberal democracy were recorded as estimates of a pro-democracy orientation. For example, in 1968 46 per cent of the Czech public thought that it was not necessary to have a political party’s endorsement in order to stand for election. Forty years later this belief had increased to 58 per cent.

The data shown at the bottom of Table 7.2 reveals that this increase in popular support of independent candidacies in elections resulted from the operation of two mechanisms of change. The first of these mechanisms is evident in the fact that both of the birth cohorts present in the surveys of 1968 and 2008 registered an increase (on the level recorded in 1968) in support for independent candidacies. If we assume that both the ÚVVM and CVVM surveys had representative samples, this evidence suggests that the Czech public underwent a process of in-
toward politics between 1968 and 2008. These results raise the question: Which of these two processes had the greater impact on public attitudes toward politics? In order to find an answer to this question, estimates of the effects of generational replacement will be made by exploring what public opinion would have looked like if there had been no population change. This counterfactual is achieved by holding the composition of the Czech population constant, but allowing opinions within cohorts to change.

Therefore, one needs to eliminate the effect of opinion change from total change observed in order to see the impact of generational replacement. The basic logic may be represented as follows. Opinion change due to generational replacement equals Actual opinion change plus change due to generational replacement minus Actual opinion change only. Please note that real opinion change is also known as ‘intracohort change’. In this situation all change relates to opinions measured at two time points.

Table 7.2 demonstrates how this procedure is implemented using census and survey data. In the first column of this table the population distribution in 1968 as derived from the Census of that year is given. In the second column there is the percentage in each cohort who stated in 1968 that having independent candidates in elections was desirable. In the third column the cohort distribution in 1968 was multiplied by the percentage cohort attitude toward independent political candidates in 2008, and was then summed across all cohorts.

This sum (58.14 per cent) is our estimate of what public opinion toward independent candidates would have been in 2008 had there been no change in the composition of the Czech population since 1968. If one subtracts this figure from the actual total opinion recorded by CVVM in 2008 (i.e. 57.79 – 58.14 = -0.35 points) we can calculate the impact of generational replacement. The details of these estimations are shown in Table 7.2. Looking at the calculations beneath this table we see that there was a 12 percentage point increase (i.e. the estimate labelled ‘C’) in support for having independent candidates in elections between 1968 and 2008, and was then summed across all cohorts.

This sum (58.14 per cent) is our estimate of what public opinion toward independent candidates would have been in 2008 had there been no change in the composition of the Czech population since 1968. If one subtracts this figure from the actual total opinion recorded by CVVM in 2008 (i.e. 57.79 – 58.14 = -0.35 points) we can calculate the impact of generational replacement. The details of these estimations are shown in Table 7.2. Looking at the calculations beneath this table we see that there was a 12 percentage point increase (i.e. the estimate labelled ‘C’) in support for having independent candidates in elections between 1968 and 2008. From these simple calculations, we know that 0.35 points (3 per cent) is due to generational replacement and 11.34 points (97 per cent) may be attributed to the Czech public ‘changing its mind’, i.e. intracohort change.

In summary, most of the change in opinion regarding standing in an election without the endorsement of a political party recorded in the survey data for 1968 and 2008 was due to period effects. It would appear that the Velvet Revolution and subsequent post-communist transition process led the Czech public to adopt a more liberal stance on standing in elections. This implies that the imprint of socialisation processes with regard to political issues such as the conditions for par-
in support for state censorship provisions comes from the emergence of younger cohorts with a less liberal view of freedom of expression for extreme groups within the Czech Republic. In addition, this process of change is also associated with a greater sense of internal political efficacy among citizens that they understand public policy-making (+3.83 points).

However, it is important to keep in mind that those issues associated with generational replacement have total absolute opinion changes of ±4 percentage points, and thus do not refer to large amounts of total attitude change. In summary, it seems prudent to conclude that the most important source of opinion change in political attitudes linked to liberal democracy between 1968 and 2008 came from the Czech public changing its mind, rather than the Czech public itself changing during this four decade period.

### Conclusion

In the foregoing pages there has been an exploration of the stability of political attitudes among Czech citizens using a unique set of mass surveys undertaken in 1968 and 2008. The central goal of this chapter has been to examine how differences in political experience, as indicated by age, help explain the sources of stability or change in public attitudes towards key facets of democratic systems, i.e. pluralism, participation, and a sense of efficacy. One of the key architects of the post-communist Czech state, Václav Havel, emphasised (as the opening quote reveals) the fundamental importance of shared social values as the foundations for a successful state. This has been the assumption that has informed the analysis of political attitudes among Czech citizens over a four decade period presented in this chapter.

Given the dramatic changes that occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 1989, and during the transition process since 1990; it is reasonable to suppose public opinion may also have changed in systematic ways. Consequently, at the start of this chapter two key questions were posed. First, did popular support for democratic values remain stable or change in the four decades following the Prague Spring of 1968? Second, what has been the source of stability or change in political attitudes during this period?

With regard to the first question, the evidence presented reveals a mixed pattern of change in attitudes toward liberal democracy between 1968 and 2008. More specifically one may identify three key patterns evident in figure 7.2. First, popular support for the ‘duty’ or costs aspects of democracy declined. Second, adherence to ‘rights’ or benefits associated with liberal democracy increased.
The political problem of mankind is to combine three things: economic efficiency, social justice, and individual liberty. The first needs criticism, precaution, and technical knowledge; the second, an unselfish and enthusiastic spirit, which loves the ordinary man; the third, tolerance, breadth, appreciation of the excellencies of variety and independence, which prefers, above everything, to give unhindered opportunity to the exceptional and the aspiring. The second ingredient is the best possession of the great party of the proletariat. But the first and third require the qualities of a party which, by its traditions and ancient sympathies, has been the home of economic individualism and social liberty.

John Maynard Keynes [1931: 311]

The central goal of this study has been to investigate how mass and elite survey data from the Prague Spring era contributes to our understanding of the events of 1968, and their aftermath. While much of the literature on the Prague Spring era discusses the importance of “people power” there has been relatively little systematic analysis of what Czechoslovak citizens thought of the reform process; and how they evaluated the choices on offer. Most analyses of the Prague Spring era, and its long-term legacy, focus on how membership of the Czechoslovak elites began to change during 1968; and underwent a large purge during the following normalisation period (1969-1987). In this study, an attempt has been made to integrate the insights of the previous (largely elite based) literature with an analysis of survey data from this period, which has to date not been used for this purpose.

Conclusion

The central goal of this study has been to investigate how mass and elite survey data from the Prague Spring era contributes to our understanding of the events of 1968, and their aftermath. While much of the literature on the Prague Spring era discusses the importance of “people power” there has been relatively little systematic analysis of what Czechoslovak citizens thought of the reform process; and how they evaluated the choices on offer. Most analyses of the Prague Spring era, and its long-term legacy, focus on how membership of the Czechoslovak elites began to change during 1968; and underwent a large purge during the following normalisation period (1969-1987). In this study, an attempt has been made to integrate the insights of the previous (largely elite based) literature with an analysis of survey data from this period, which has to date not been used for this purpose.

Consequently, the early chapters of this study outlined the relationship between opinion polling and political climate in Czechoslovakia, and some of the key political theories associated with the Prague Spring era. Thereafter, using (1) aggregate and individual level data; (2) surveys undertaken before, during, and the end of the reform era; plus (3) looking at political attitudes from the citizen and elite perspectives – this monograph has been able to create a unique survey based map of citizens’ and elites’ attitudes in 1968-’69. In order to understand the meaning of these survey-based maps of respondents’ political values and preferences, a research strategy of integrating theory with empirical analysis has been employed where possible.

This concluding chapter will have four sections. First, the legacy of the Prague Spring era for Czech citizens is discussed with reference to a trend series of poll
questions exploring public attitudes toward key historical events. Second, key streams in the historiography of post-war Czechoslovakia are discussed in light of the substantive conclusions derived from the survey analyses presented in this study. Finally, there are some general remarks about the implications of the empirical results presented and suggestions for future research.

Legacy of the Prague Spring Era for Citizens

Mlynář's (1975, 1980) evaluation of the main features and strategic weaknesses of the Czechoslovak reform programme of 1968 represents an elite level ‘insiders’ retrospective perspective prior to the fall of communism. From a public opinion point of view this assessment represents only one facet of the Prague Spring legacy. The perceptions of citizens over a longer time frame are also important in considering the historical importance of the Prague Spring era. This is especially true as the events and direct participants of the events of 1968 are increasingly accessible to younger generations only indirectly through the written and oral testimonials.

One perspective on Czech attitudes toward 1968 is that the Prague Spring is seen by public opinion to be a period of both idealism and shame. Such ambivalence, uncertainty, or equivocation has resulted in contemporary Czech public opinion expressing little overt interest in the events of 1968 [Pithart 1999: 85-86; Alvarez and Brehm 2002: 52-64; Wydra 2007: 219-243]. One survey based method employed in the Czech Republic and Slovakia over the last half century has been to ask the public which periods of Czechoslovak history they consider the most “glorious”, “important” or “greatest” facilitates exploring an ambivalence, uncertainty, or equivocation interpretation of public opinion.

Such evidence has been used by some scholars as one means of exploring the sociology of memory in the Czech Republic [Šubrt 1995, 2009]. Interpretation of public opinion toward the past requires considerable caution. Influential theories of survey response such as the Belief Sampling Model suggest that the answers given by respondents to relatively abstract questions such as the relative importance of historical periods may reflect “top-of-the-head” responses that are likely to exhibit considerable variation across repeated measures [Zaller 1992; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000; Alvarez and Brehm 2002].

The important periods in history trend series (1946-2007) presented in Table 8.1 reveals that popular evaluations of the past do exhibit considerable changes from one survey to the next. Why this should be the case is not entirely clear. For example, how can one explain the decline in importance of the Second World War as perceived by the public?
War era in surveys between 2005 and 2007 where there is a fall from 49 to 15 per cent? Moreover, Table 8.1 also illustrates that the passage of time increases the number of historical events leading to response patterns that do not always exhibit a clear logic.

In this respect, the survey data for the historical importance of the Prague Spring era exhibits only intermittent importance in the surveys reported for the 1969 to 2007 period. In the absence of more detailed research one may simply say that priming effects arising from media coverage of the events of 1968 may be responsible for this intermittent pattern. Moreover, question format is also a concern where mentions of the Prague Spring increase when the time horizon is restricted to the twentieth century as the final two columns of Table 8.1 illustrate.

Notwithstanding the methodological concerns arising from use of the survey estimates presented in Table 8.1; the general picture to emerge is that the Prague Spring era has a rather low impact on Czech public opinion. Over the complete span of Czech history the events of 1968 rank joint seventh out of all historical periods examined with a mean score of 3 per cent. Significantly, with this type of question the Velvet Revolution also does not appear to have a much greater importance. The high rankings given to Charles IV (1346-1378) and the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) reveal the different considerations that Czech respondents use when answering history questions in mass survey interviews. Here the content of current school history textbooks and lessons is undoubtedly important in shaping attitudes toward the past.

Significantly, when Czech respondents are asked to restrict their considerations to the twentieth century the Prague Spring era has been judged by respondents in 2005 and 2007 to be less important than the Velvet Revolution and the First Republic. One might posit a variety of reasons as to why the Prague Spring of 1968 is not a very salient feature in contemporary Czech citizens’ perceptions of important historical periods. One reason for this popular attitude is that the Prague Spring resulted (unintentionally) in the permanent stationing of Soviet military bases in Czechoslovakia from 1968 to 1991. Thus the events of 1968 are associated in the public’s mind with the themes of defeat and occupation.

However, in the absence of more concrete evidence it is best to concentrate on known relationships. The survey evidence presented in Table 8.2 reveals that a majority (58 per cent) within Czech public opinion in May 2008 did not see the Velvet Revolution as being a direct consequence of the Prague Spring of 1968.

<table>
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<th>Explanatory variable</th>
<th>Subgroups</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Velvet Revolution</td>
<td>22 64 15 358</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prague Spring</td>
<td>27 63 10 328</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20 59 21 412</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher Secondary</td>
<td>26 60 14 303</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third level or more</td>
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<td>Subjective standard</td>
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<td>High</td>
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<td>Vote in Chamber elections</td>
<td>Would not vote</td>
<td>20 50 30 456</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would vote</td>
<td>23 64 13 610</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote intention</td>
<td>Civic Democrats (R)</td>
<td>23 68 9 186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Democrats (L)</td>
<td>24 61 15 265</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communists (L)</td>
<td>28 57 15 112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the reasons for discussing public opinion toward history is to highlight the importance of how history is interpreted. Of course most citizens are and are replaced by more sceptical or indifferent younger cohorts. as the older generations who attribute more importance to 1968 eventually die out, regard to the Velvet Revolution. Such a perception is likely to increase over time not live through 1968 may see the Prague Spring as an isolated event, at least with 2007: 237; Lyons and Bernardová 2010]. Majority opinion among those who did vote intention. This evidence implies that there is most likely no single legacy of the Prague Spring era among contemporary Czech citizens [Pehe 1988; Wydra 2008], the retired, those with low levels of political knowledge, and Czech Communist Party (KSČM) voters are the only sections of Czech public opinion to express above average support for the view that the events of 1968 led directly to communist Party (KSČM) voters are the only sections of Czech public opinion to express above average support for the view that the events of 1968 led directly to

Level of party attachment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroups</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats (R)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party (R)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very close</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly close</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathiser</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to no party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Trust in political institutions
| Very low              | 19  | 59 | 22 | 207|
| Low                   | 22  | 55 | 23 | 393|
| High                  | 25  | 60 | 16 | 287|
| Very High             | 22  | 60 | 17 | 179|
| Current political situation
| Not satisfied         | 22  | 58 | 20 | 924|
| Satisfied             | 20  | 59 | 21 | 142|
| TOTAL (N)             | 235 | 619| 212| 1,066 |

Source: CVVM May 12-19 2008, question 30. This item is an 11 point (0-10) scale and includes all respondents aged 15 years or more. See appendix for details. Rows sum to one hundred percent subject to rounding error. Responses denoting ‘Yes’ (0-6), ‘No’ (7-10) and ‘Don’t know’ (don’t know and no answer) refer to a re-coding of the 11 point scale in question 30. The ‘Prague Spring Generation’ refers to respondents who were 15 years or older in 1968 and similarly for the ‘Velvet Revolution Generation’ in 1989. The ‘Post Communist Generation’ refers to all those born after 1974 and only came to early adulthood (i.e. 15 years) after 1990.

In contrast, the older ‘Prague Spring generation’ (i.e. aged 55 years or more in 2008), the retired, those with low levels of political knowledge, and Czech Communist Party (KSČM) voters are the only sections of Czech public opinion to express above average support for the view that the events of 1968 led directly to those of 1989. In short, Table 8.2 demonstrates that there is a systematic socio-demographic (or structural) patterning to perceptions of the past; and these differences are based on level of interest and knowledge of politics, current position in society, and political orientation as indicated by right wing self placement, partisanship, and vote intention. This evidence implies that there is most likely no single legacy of the Prague Spring era among contemporary Czech citizens [Pehe 1988; Wydra 2007: 237; Lyons and Bernardová 2010]. Majority opinion among those who did not live through 1968 may see the Prague Spring as an isolated event, at least with regard to the Velvet Revolution. Such a perception is likely to increase over time as the older generations who attribute more importance to 1968 eventually die out, and are replaced by more sceptical or indifferent younger cohorts.

One of the reasons for discussing public opinion toward history is to highlight the importance of how history is interpreted. Of course most citizens are not professional historians, but derive their views on Czech history from what is presented in textbooks and in the media. Here the role of historians and their differing approaches toward interpreting the past, as evident in the study of historiography, are vitally important in making any evaluation of the mass and elite survey evidence presented in this monograph. Consequently, in the next section there will be a brief overview of the key streams in Czech historiography and more specifically contemporary interpretations of the Prague Spring era.

**Czech Historiography and the Survey Evidence**

Within this study there has been thus far no systematic attempt to outline the competing historical interpretations of Czechoslovak politics between 1948 and 1970. This is because the focus of this work has been on exploring the mass and elite survey “primary source” evidence. Moreover, the theoretical discussions of the Prague Spring era presented in chapter one and elsewhere have concentrated on contemporary proposals for political reform. Of course in order to answer the central question of this study regarding how the polling evidence influences current understanding of the Prague Spring era; it is essential at this point to discuss some of the main features of contemporary scholarly interpretations of post-war Czechoslovak history. In this respect, one may identify three broad streams in recent Czech historical research on communism. These perspectives may be summarized using the terms ‘dichotomisation’, ‘periodisation’, and ‘evolution.’

1. **Dichotomization**

   Interpretations of the past have been an important feature of the post-communist transition process because evaluations of the experience of communism formed part of the legitimisation of the new state [Cuhra and Kopeček 2004; Mayer 2009]. One description of the Communist Era (1948–1989) in Czechoslovakia viewed it as an “interim period” where Soviet dominance deformed historical development. This interim period perspective on modern Czechoslovak history views communism as a completely negative phase of subjugation where both citizens and elites lacked autonomy. One important political implication of such a simplified historical perspective is that it avoids all potential “blame games” regarding the 1948–1989 period as historical events were determined by external factors. However, this approach implies ignoring all the social changes that occurred under communism as an aberration. Here historical work adopts an institutional or elitist focus through a concentration on the themes of security, resistance, re-

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Table 8.2 continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variable</th>
<th>Subgroups</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of party attachment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current political situation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (N)</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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[258]
pression, and manipulation by institutions of state. Society under communism is viewed as a passive target of state policy, and is not treated as a subject worthy of study in itself. Consequently, detailed historical analyses of the events of 1948, 1968, Charter 77, and 1989 concentrate on communist elites and dissident counter-elites where society is portrayed as a background to key events.

The unintended consequence of popularising specialist works on topics such as the StB or VB reinforce a dichotomised view of modern Czechoslovak history within the public. This is not to suggest that any serious Czech historian adheres to such a simplified view of history, but is meant to highlight the manner in which their works have been interpreted by those wishing to legitimise the current Czech state by distorting it from its predecessor. From this perspective, public opinion during the Prague Spring era is problematic because any evidence that undermines the simple dichotomisation of the recent past (i.e. pre- and post-1990) is judged to be either subversive, or methodologically flawed where mass surveying was impossible under a repressive communist regime and any results supportive of communism should be rejected as propaganda.

2. Periodization

An alternative perspective which steers clear of this dichotomisation of post-war Czechoslovak history has been strongly influenced by the Prague Spring of 1968 for two interrelated reasons. First, it was such a unique event in Czechoslovak history and the subsequent evolution of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and consequently cannot be simply ignored. Second, many of the most influential historians writing in the post-communist period had direct personal experience of the events of 1968, and its aftermath. As a result, this generation of historians have tended to interpret the Prague Spring period and twentieth century Czechoslovak history more generally as being composed of discontinuities marked by distinct periods. This perspective is evident in such definitive works as Benčík et al. [1991] where the dynamics of contemporary Czechoslovak history are conceptualised in terms of different political phases, with much less emphasis on any underlying continuity stemming from factors such as general social change. In 2008, celebration of Osmičky (the eights) is an interesting example of the power of the periodization perspective within public opinion regarding the historical events associated with 1918, 1938, 1948 and 1968.

3. Evolution

An alternative perspective adopting a more social history orientation rejects the dichotomisation of the past into: (1) negative periods characterised by subservience first to Germany (1938-1945) and then to the Soviet Union (1948-1989), and (2) positive periods such as the independence represented by the First Republic (1918-1938) and the post-communist period [note, Wydra 2007: 243]. In contrast, it views Czechoslovak society as evolving under different political institutions where successive governments regardless of their ideology have had to respond to “pressure from below” (tlak zdola). The evolutionary perspective discounts the periodization approach for it’s over emphasis on discontinuities in Czechoslovak history where the focus has been on the circulation or replacement of elites. This evolutionary view of history gives voice to those who perceived certain advantages to life under the communist regime, and to the possibility that there have been common values underpinning all political regimes since 1918.

Historiography of the Prague Spring Era

The specialised historiography exploring the origins, nature and consequences of the events of 1968 tend to fit into one or more of the three broad perspectives just described. Recent scholarship has tended to adhere to the evolution of society perspective when examining the Prague Spring era in light of ‘new’ primary source material made available from various archives since the 1990s. Special attention will be paid to this emerging literature, as it will be contrasted with an older body of work which attempted to answer the question: Was the Prague Spring a process of reform or revolution?

Exploring the Prague Spring historiography in this manner facilitates making an evaluation of how empirical analyses of mass and elite attitudes presented in this monograph increases understanding of the specific events of 1968, and also the development of Czech society in the late twentieth century. The overview of previous work on the nature of the Prague Spring presented in Figure 8.1 reveal the broad scholarly division between those adhering to a ‘reform’, ‘revolutionary’ or ‘evolutionary’ interpretation of Czechoslovak politics between 1967 and 1970.

Within the older literature mainly published in the 1970s on the Prague Spring, most authors tended to use the terms ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’ in specific ways. This occurred because there were (and are) no definitive criteria for distinguishing between these two outcomes under all circumstances. In this respect, Skillling [1976: 828-829, 834] focussed on contemporary theories of revolution as a basis for arguing that the Prague Spring involved something more than reforms. In contrast, Williams [1997: 3] employed insights from a theoretical framework developed for the analysis of “great reform” by explaining the events of 1968 in terms of the reformers values and preferences whose expression was constrained by strategic considerations.
Figure 8.1 Overview of three main explanations of Czechoslovak politics and society during the Prague Spring era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Definition of Prague Spring</th>
<th>Maintenance of socialist system</th>
<th>Type of explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>REFORM EXPLANATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown (1969)</td>
<td>Reform movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Elite and structural explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusin (1971)</td>
<td>Reform movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Intellectual perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan (1971)</td>
<td>Reform movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Social group explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page (1971)</td>
<td>Reform through the technocratic transformation of society</td>
<td>Yes, but system would be transformed</td>
<td>Intellectual, internal party perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusin (1972)</td>
<td>Reform movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Social group explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krajci (1972)</td>
<td>Reform movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Social group explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan (1973)</td>
<td>Process of fundamental change</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Social group explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mlynář (1975, 1978)</td>
<td>Reform movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Primarily elite where public opinion acted as a constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnard (1972, 1981)</td>
<td>Reform, “opening up communism”</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Competition between conservative, moderate and progressive factions within the KSČ and societal interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams (1997, 2006)</td>
<td>Reform, liberalisation of a Leninist regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Elite and structural explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heimann (2009)</td>
<td>Reform, preservation of the regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Elite explanation focussing on key political actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REVOLUTION EXPLANATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusy (1968)</td>
<td>Institutional revolution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Elite and structural explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobč (1969)</td>
<td>Intellectual revolution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svitak (1971)</td>
<td>Revolution, Democracy vs. democratisation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Social group explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilling (1976)</td>
<td>Interrupted revolution</td>
<td>Yes initially, but may have evolved beyond socialism</td>
<td>Elite and social group based explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pikholia (2006)</td>
<td>Revolution as UV KSČ had lost control of events</td>
<td>Counter-revolution</td>
<td>Political elite explanation from the Soviet leadership’s perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bracke (2007)</td>
<td>Competition over the meaning of socialism and detente</td>
<td>Counter-revolution as defined by USSR</td>
<td>Inter-communist party competition and Cold War international relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>** EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaplan (2008)</td>
<td>Social and political change whose origins are traced to 1968</td>
<td>Society and socialist system were co-evolving</td>
<td>Social group explanation in terms of pressure from below “tlak zdola”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoppé (2009)</td>
<td>Attempt by KSČ faction to use reform and public opinion for strategic purposes</td>
<td>From KSČ perspective yes, from societal perspective no</td>
<td>Three different political movements are used as case studies of “tlak zdola” in action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note this classification of scholarly works on the Prague Spring is necessarily broad, and ignores the overlap in the explanations evident across many of these and other works. Also, this restricted literature selection attempts to provide an overview of the types of interpretations proposed for political developments in Czechoslovakia between 1967 and 1970 with no claim to comprehensiveness.

The question of how to accurately define competing political interests evident during 1968 is also problematic. Defining groups, factions, or interests with the term “opposition” is difficult in Czechoslovakia and within communism more generally, in the late 1960s. This is because this term had a multiplicity of meanings [Schapiro 1972; Kusin 1973a]. Defining opposition inevitably involved making a subjective judgement as to the legitimacy of the communist regime; where ‘opposition’ could refer to those who sought greater liberalisation and pluralism, or it might indicate those who opposed any reforms. Using the term in a specific way is often indicative of adherence to a particular perspective where for example ‘opponents’ were “democrats” in the pre-1968 phase, but switched to being conservative orthodox communists in the January to August 1968 period.

Beyond these thorny terminological issues, historical explanations of the origins and dynamics of politics in Czechoslovakia in 1968 tend to adhere to one of six main theories of societal development in post-war Czechoslovakia. These sometimes implicit explanations of the Prague Spring, summarised in the following six points, are not always employed exclusively in a single work.

- Generational replacement as a source of social change [Krejci 1972; Kusin 1972; Galia 1973]
- Incompatibility of institutions and political culture [Kusin 1971; Svitak 1971; Skilling 1976]
- Irreversibility of liberalising and pluralistic trends [Krejci 1972; Skilling 1976]
- Continuity versus discontinuity in political development [Brown 1966; Paul 1974; Jancar 1971; Skilling 1966, 1976]
- Evolution of society on the basis of bottom up pressures toward greater diversity [Kaplan 1993, 2008; Prečan 1993; Bartošek 1998; Hoppé 2009]
- Complex set of factors based on heterogeneous motives and strategic interests [Williams 1997; Heimann 2009]

The first four of these explanations of the development of modern Czechoslovak history propose a deterministic process of change, be it reform or revolution. The essential argument is that the events of 1968 were in some sense inevitable, and presumably a similar case would be made for the Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation in 1993. These four ‘deterministic’ explanations do note the importance of institutions, choices, and chance events; but contend that historical developments had an inherent logic. Here public opinion is likely to be viewed in terms of underlying political values, whose main power is to shape political preferences and hence behaviour.
The final two explanations also adhere to an inherent logic or endogenous account; except that in these two models it is the process of decision-making rather than outcomes that is the centre of study. The evolutionary approach tends toward a social group or societal version of events, while the “complex set of factors” approach focuses on elites. According to the complex factors model, the emergence of the Prague Spring era and its disappearance with normalisation were the result of key actors values, preferences, and strategic decision-making. Therefore, public opinion within this explanation has a more strategic quality where preferences reflect not only political values; but also constraints imposed by institutions and political actors.

The central point to be highlighted here is that interpretation of opinion polls and elite surveys undertaken during the Prague Spring era is strongly influenced by the general explanation adopted. This concern is vitally important because it determines how the mass and elite survey evidence may change our understanding of the events of 1968. In the following three sub-sections, there will be a brief overview of three influential views of the Prague Spring that employ different explanatory approaches that take account of public opinion, but are not strongly dependent on this source of historical evidence.

**Public opinion and the interrupted revolution explanation**

One of the most detailed accounts of Czechoslovak politics in 1968 attempted to answer the question: Did the Prague Spring represent a process of reform, revolution, or counterrevolution? Conceptualising the Prague Spring era in this manner stems from the view that Czechoslovak communism was essentially dualistic in nature. On the one hand, Czechoslovak democratic centralism was progressive (or reformist) in orientation favouring an independent democratic path of development. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) also exhibited authoritarian tendencies and subservience to the Soviet Union. The history of the Czechoslovak regime alternated between “reformism” and “authoritarianism” where the politics of 1967 to 1970 represents the most salient example of this dualism. Furthermore, the societal underpinnings of these twin features rested on the fact that the Soviet model of communist government was viewed as an “alien system” by most Czechoslovak citizens.2

This resulted in a second dualism within Czechoslovak society where citizens became either apathetic or critical. Here there was an important process of social differentiation. Disinterest in politics was prevalent among a majority of citizens, and expressions of criticism were made by a minority of intellectuals. Crucially the political repressions of the 1950s and the reluctance of the KSČ leadership to embark on a process of de-Stalinisation had a polarising effect on the dualisms evident in both the political and social spheres. Moreover, the perceived immorality of the political trials of the 1950s only acted to intensify existing socio-political divisions.

The removal of Antonín Novotný in early 1968 represented the eclipsing of the authoritarian faction within the KSČ by a more reform oriented leadership under Alexander Dubček. However, Skilling [1976: 826] notes that the progressive element within Czechoslovak communism did not have a single vision of reform. This created a power vacuum. Rival plans for change competed not only for endorsement by the Communist Party leadership, but also for support from public opinion (občanská veřejnost).

Skilling argues that at this stage the socio-political momentum was such that the official reform plan announced by the KSČ in its Action Programme was “outdated by the time of its publication.” By the summer of 1968 Czechoslovak politics was characterised by a competitive mix of interests varying a great deal in their proposals for reform. Public opinion exhibited a similar complexity according to Skilling [1976: 830] where there were important differences between the level of opinionation and preferences present in the Czech lands and Slovakia, and between urban and rural areas.

Skilling [1976: 834] concluded that the Czechoslovak “revolution” was essentially unique. The initial impetus for reform coming from factions within the KSČ and intellectuals was effectively overtaken by public opinion by August 1968. Skilling hypothesised that the momentum of change created by a process of cumulative and reinforcing reform would have led to a “metamorphosis of the entire system” had the Warsaw Pact invasion not occurred. Ironically, the invasion galvanised public support for change although Czechoslovak citizens were impotent to effect reform during the normalisation period.

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1 Skilling [1976: 850] termed this perspective the “dialectic of Czechoslovak history” where triumphs were inevitably followed by disasters occurring at ever shorter intervals between 1918 and 1968. This oscillating interpretation of contemporary Czechoslovak history has been opposed by some scholars who argue that a continuity perspective is equally, if not more, appropriate when studying topics such as the Prague Spring [see, Paul 1974].

2 This incompatibility between Stalinism and Czechoslovak political culture argument made by Kusin [1971: 121] and Skilling [1976: 825] was questioned by Barnard [1972: 546] and others. In contrast, Schwartz [1968: 894] stressed the incompatibility between a coercive Stalinist political system and effective public policy-making in Czechoslovakia.
The survey evidence presented in this monograph does not provide direct support for Skilling’s [1976] “interrupted revolution” explanation because there are insufficient data to capture the dynamics he described. The polling data are consonant with Skilling’s contention that there was latent support for reform, but there is little survey evidence from the pre-invasion period that Czechoslovak public opinion was likely to support far reaching economic and political change. In fact, the survey analyses presented in this study suggest considerable stability and cohesion among both citizens and elites. In short, the mass and elite survey data, notwithstanding its limitations, points toward a reformist rather than revolutionary explanation of the Prague Spring era.

Such a conclusion is agnostic about how public and elite opinion may have evolved in the absence of military intervention. Skilling’s [1976: 82] conclusion that the political values evident in 1968 would not disappear with normalisation is supported by the 1968-2008 replication analyses reported in chapters four and seven.

Public opinion and the liberalization explanation

In contrast to Skilling’s [1976] interrupted revolution explanation of the history of the Prague Spring, Williams [1997] has argued for a reformist model using archive material only available to scholars after the fall of communism. Williams [1997: 3] opens his study by stating that “the reforms of 1968, in intention and execution, amounted only to a liberalisation of a Leninist regime.” Thereafter, using a political liberalisation model of “great political reform” developed by Oksenberg and Dickson [1991]; Williams examines Czechoslovak politics [1967-1970] from the point of view of key political actors. More specifically, he attempts to explain the Prague Spring era from the perspective of elites “cognitive and normative frameworks and contingent strategic choices.”

Significantly, Williams [1997] argues that one of the origins of the KSČ’s policy of liberalization was public opinion, or more specifically the need for information on citizens’ preferences in order to make public policy-making more efficient. The change in orientation toward use of mass surveying techniques was based on the view that a more efficient high technology economy required reliable information. The key point here was that economic success would ensure political stability. The political benefits of ‘democratising the economy’ were seen to require substantial changes to the legal and political rights of citizens. These were some of the key normative and cognitive features of Williams’ [1997] explanation of how the liberalization reform process proceeded between 1967 and 1970.

The other key feature of Williams’ liberalization model is the constraint on the choices open to the communist regime during 1968 and 1969. Williams [1997: 10-12] asserts the liberalization programme was a “strategic choice” deliberately chosen by a faction within the ruling regime. This choice assumed (incorrectly) that the Soviet Union would not decisively oppose liberalization in Czechoslovakia. Domestically, the constraints on liberalization were seen to be (1) Masaryk’s complex political philosophy which essentially espoused an elite model of democracy, and so was not completely incompatible with KSČ reform ideas; (2) the political legacy of the First Republic which may be characterised as a corporatist and collective form of governance not hugely dissimilar from proposals to reform the National Front; and (3) the communist regime’s political vision, while consonant with some elements of Masaryk’s thought and general features of the First Republic, was nonetheless grounded on a different theoretical basis, i.e. the creation of a Marxist-Leninist inspired socialist democracy.

Williams [1997] agreed with Skilling [1976] that one of the primary constraints on KSČ policy-making during 1968 was that it did not have a single model of reform. According to Williams [1997: 17, 26], key policy documents such as the Action Programme were so full of conflicting principles and promises, that it is questionable if the Prague Spring reform programme could be reasonably considered democratic in nature. In one ironic sense, Williams’ [1997: 28] explanation matches with Skilling’s [1976] where the former concludes that the unintended consequences of the Prague Spring reform programme might have been much more ‘revolutionary’ than the Communist Party intended.

The survey evidence outlined in this monograph touches on a number of key points in Williams’ [1997] liberalization model. One central theme is the models assertion that rank-and-file communist party members and non-partisan members of the public were best characterised by apathy and passivity in early 1968. Williams contends that the main reason why public opinion was in such a moribund state resulted from the fact that Czechoslovak society was marked by a high level of power or status inequality, notwithstanding that most citizens had roughly the same level of income regardless of occupation. The survey evidence presented in chapter three of this study suggests that there was indeed a sense of frustration with the status quo, but this does not necessarily imply the high level of passivity suggested by Williams [1997: 14].

Strategic choice is the central feature of the liberalization explanation, and the mass and elite survey evidence presented in chapters two and six reveal the importance of this factor during the 1967 to 1969 period. The mass and elite polling
data suggest that Czechoslovakia’s leaders and citizens shared similar political values; but both strata realised that preferences had to take account of strategic constraints. Thus much of the rhetoric carried in the media during 1968 may have misrepresented the underlying political consensus favouring incremental reform in Czechoslovakia on the eve of invasion.

Public opinion and the evolution of society interpretation

The ‘new’ evidence emanating from the archives opened up following the fall of communism has changed scholarly interpretations of the Prague Spring. Williams [2006: 113] argues that the once secret material demonstrates that the classifications such as “conservative” or “progressive” used in works written in the 1970s and 1980s confuse more than enlighten. This is because the currently available archive evidence demonstrates a much more complex reality among both political leaders and public opinion. From this more fluid perspective where fixed political positions were the exception rather than the rule, it is much easier to understand how specific political figures and Czechoslovak society more generally adapted to the Prague Spring reforms and the following normalisation process.

Williams [2006] contends that greater understanding of the long-term evolution of Czechoslovak society will provide a more insightful portrayal of how the transformation from industrial to consumer society shaped the policies of the Novotný (1957-1968), Dubček (1968-1969), Husák (1969-1987) and Jakeš (1987-1989) communist governments. This evolution of society perspective has been evident in recent Czech historiography on the Prague Spring era. Building on the insights of Selucký [1970: 79-87], Pithart [1980: 34], Strmiska [1983: 96, 1989: 253ff.], and Havel [1989: 109] who have all argued that the events of 1968 were fundamentally driven by latent pressures within Czechoslovak society; historians such as Karel Kaplan [2002: 404] have concluded that it was social change that was the primary motivator for economic and political reforms. This emphasis on the societal aspects of the Prague Spring era has some important consequences because it draws attention away from the failure of the reform programme.

3 The use of a structural or evolution of society approach within Czechoslovak historiography pre-dates the post-communist era [Felcman and Musilova 1986]. It has been a key theme in the work of influential historian Karel Kaplan [1987, 1968, 1983] in his various studies of post-war Czechoslovak history.

[268]

Conclusion

Viewing 1968 as a “happy-unhappy year” (št’astný-neštastný rok) highlights the distinct socio-political facets of the process of reform and normalisation where the emergence of a more independent society in the 1960s resulted in two rather different political responses from the communist regime – reform and repression [note, Šimečka 1988]. These latent social forces which strove toward a common goal are most often described within contemporary Czech historiography using the concept of civil society (or social movement) which is often operationalised as something close to public opinion, that is, society minus the state [Pithart 1996: 201; see also, Brokl 2002].

Within this civil society stream of the historiography of the Prague Spring period most works accept that there was a civil society in 1968, although citizenship had been curtailed by the Novotný regime to the confines of the family. This raises the question of when did civil society in communist Czechoslovakia emerge? One answer proposed by Karel Bartošek [1998: 17] is that it is possible to speak of a civil society in Czechoslovakia from 1963. Most other Czech historians tend to remain agnostic on this point due to the lack of definitive documentary evidence.

Notwithstanding debates over the genesis of civil society the evolution of society interpretation of the Prague Spring era highlight two key observable facts: the effective abolishment of media censorship on March 4 1968, and mass peaceful opposition to the Warsaw Pact invasion in late 1968 and 1969. More generally, this historical perspective is founded on three ‘pillars’ of particular interest to research on public opinion: (1) diversity within Czechoslovak political attitudes and values, (2) the importance of public opinion as a political force, and (3) the freezing of public opinion with normalisation. Each of these pillars will be examined in the following sub-sections in terms of the survey evidence outlined in the preceeding chapters.

Diversity within public opinion

From a public opinion perspective, one of the most important features of the evolution of society interpretation of the events of 1968 is its emphasis on “the mosaic of various interests” [Sviták 1984: 62]. In short, civil society and by implication public opinion was defined by its diversity where there were no social groups with distinctive reform projects. The polling evidence provided by Piekalkiewicz [1972], Bečvář [1990] and others is frequently used to demonstrate this central point. Most often this stream of historical research focuses on the institutional evidence such as membership and level of activeness of various social, political, and interest groups in the National Front [Pecka, Belda and Hoppe 1998: 9, 22; Hoppe 2009].

[269]
Within this field of historical scholarship there is much research on the existing satellite parties, i.e. the Socialists (ČSS) and Christian Democrats (ČSL), and the (re)emergence of additional parties such as the Social Democrats (forcibly merged with the KSČ in May 1948), and totally new parties such as KAN and K231. In addition, extensive changes within the lower echelons of the KSČ during the summer of 1968 (70 per cent of party cadres were replaced) is seen to be an important source of social and political change. These features of civil society are examined for the purposes of elucidating the social logic of who favoured political change, and why.

Public opinion as a political force (tlak zdola)
The diversity in public opinion may be viewed as the horizontal component of the evolution of society explanation of the Prague Spring era. In contrast, the vertical component represented by the interaction between the communist elites and citizens has been described in terms of "pressure from below" (tlak zdola). This vertical component is important because between 1948 and the abolishment of media censorship in March 1968 the communist leadership and general citizenry were seen to inhabit parallel social worlds where there was little vertical two-way communication [Klimová 1969; Mlynář 1983: 54-55; Hejzlar 1988: 148]. The emergence of pressure from below (or public opinion) is primarily described within the evolution of society perspective in terms of the content of the Czechoslovak media after March 1968; and more specifically articles written by Alexander Kliment and Václav Havel in Literární listy, and Ivan Sviták and Emanuel Mandler in Student published over the following three months. Unfortunately, relatively little use has been made of extant public opinion poll data to profile in a more 'direct' way the pressure from below, as articulated by the public itself in mass survey interviews.

Public reaction to the Warsaw Pact invasion is a central feature of the evolution of society explanation of the Prague Spring. This is because the political vacuum that accompanied the invasion had the unintended effect of providing an opportunity for civil society (or public opinion) to express itself in the following weeks and months. Moreover, the invasion initiated a 'rally-round-the-flag-effect' (discussed earlier in chapter two) where public support for the Prague Spring reforms and leaders became consolidated and strengthened. This cementing of both the horizontal and vertical components of civil society is seen to be evident in surviving records relating to public activities such as (a) the large volumes of petitions circulated and supported by the public in the autumn of 1968 and early 1969; and (b) the rapid growth in Workers’ Councils within state run enterprises [Prečan 1993: 17; Kaplan 2002: 78].

Freezing of public opinion
Equally important for the evolution of society explanation is the long term reaction by Czechoslovak public opinion to the rolling back of the reform programme and the initiation of the normalisation process. Here the puzzle has been to explain the rapid contraction of active public opinion and the widespread prevalence of public apathy toward politics until 1989. Various commentators have used social-psychological arguments where the frustration of intense hopes combined with the perceived betrayal by KSČ leaders of the reform agenda resulted in deep disappointment and apathy [Rejchrt 1988: 44]. Others such as Šimečka [1988: 174] suggested that the rapid contraction in civic activism was a learned behaviour stemming from the lessons of previous repressions.

The new archive evidence regarding the coercive measures used to suppress public opinion reveals that purges of communist party members was more restrained than previous research suggested. About four percent of party members in terms of January 1968 figures were expelled from the KSČ, this represents about a half a percent of the entire Czechoslovak population [Williams 2006: 108].4 The fact that the Husák administration (1969-1987) was restrained in its use of coercion has important implications for the evolution of society explanation of the Prague Spring era. The implication is that the freezing of expressions of public opinion may be seen as a deliberate strategy employed by Czechoslovak citizens to effectively manage their relations with the state.

The polling evidence from the normalisation period reveals that beneath the image of a public interested in consumerism, entertainment, travel, and spending time in country homes (i.e. chalupa or chata, which ranged from elegant villas to simple huts); the Czechoslovak public retained its interest in politics and public affairs. A series of KVVM and ÚVVM poll reports do provide evidence for an anomic and asocial behaviour, but it also reveals that a majority (80 percent) of the public were by 1982 exposed to media from the West.

4 The content of these articles and Sviták's Two Thousand Words manifesto were discussed earlier in chapter two.

5 Archive research in the early 1990s revealed that strong public support for leaders such as Dubček, Černík, and Svoboda was misplaced as these politicians private views were very different to their public reputations [Pauer 1993: 187-204].

6 Less than six and a half thousand were placed on a blacklist between 1972 and 1989 which meant they were constantly monitored to ensure that they did not re-enter public life. Most of this group were senior figures during the Prague Spring period, and only a small minority (n=130) were workers.
The polls reveal that during the normalisation period about two-thirds of Czechoslovak citizens were interested in politics. The freezing of public opinion through abstention from public life did not mean that Czechoslovak citizens were indifferent and apathetic concerning politics [Williams 2006: 112]. This survey evidence suggests that the evolution of Czechoslovak society, whose dynamics emerged so openly during the Prague Spring era, continued its development during the normalisation period leading eventually to mass demonstrations and the Velvet Revolution.

Concluding Remarks

This study has undoubtedly raised as many questions as it has attempted to answer. Some of these questions stem from the methodological features and limitations of the datasets examined, and the necessarily limited number of analyses presented. In this respect, it is obvious that much more can be learned by undertaking more detailed individual level analyses of the data presented in chapters three to six. In this respect, this study has refrained because of space constraints from outlining individual level models that could be used to explore popular support for the proposals for reform outlined in chapter one. Elaborating and estimating such models represents an important avenue for future research. In defence of the specific data and theory driven approach adopted in this monograph, it is prudent (due to the paucity of previous work analysing Czechoslovak survey data from 1968) to start by mapping out the key patterns in political attitudes evident among citizens and the elite.

With regard to the first main question outlined in the ‘road map’ section of the introductory chapter, the survey analyses presented in this study demonstrate that the surviving mass and elite data from the 1967 to 1969 period do provide a unique and valuable contribution to scholarly understanding of the Prague Spring era. The historiographical debates outlined in the last section reveal that a survey evidence based approach has the potential to broaden the evolution of society perspective on the events of 1968, and accounts of contemporary Czech history more generally by giving citizens (via opinion poll results) a more central role than has been the case to date. Turning now to the second main question examined in this study, the cross-time analyses reveal that the evolution of Czech society since 1968 is marked by considerable stability. Thus, the prevailing view that Czech society has experienced extensive social and political change since 1989 is not the full story. The cross-time survey evidence is consonant with the view that changes in Czech society are not determined solely by the prevailing system of governance, but have an endogenous component encapsulated in the ‘tlak zdola’ concept. Adopting a bottom-up (‘pressure from below’) perspective is likely to yield a more nuanced account of the post-communist transition process. This represents an important line of future research.

Some final comments should be made regarding Mlynář’s [1975, 1978] account of the Prague Spring period and the surviving survey evidence. While much of his analysis of the failure of Prague Spring reforms is based on the motivations and actions of key elite actors, and specific institutions such as the media; his general conclusion is that Czechoslovak public opinion favoured reform rather than revolution. This position contrasts with the ‘interrupted revolution’ thesis proposed by Skilling [1976]; the more nuanced view of apathy and opposition evident in Williams [1997: 253] ‘strategic reform’ based explanation; and the ‘pressure from below’ accounts evident in Kaplan [2008] and Hoppe [2009]. Fortunately, the Mlynář team’s survey of May 1968 and the replication study completed in 2008 provide a unique basis for comparing these rival interpretations of the events of 1968 and placing them in their proper historical context.

One important lesson arising from the survey evidence presented in this study is that broad generalisations concerning public opinion in 1968 obscure as much as they enlighten. This is because the survey results generated during the 1967 to 1969 period reveal distinct facets of citizens thinking that appear at first glance to be contradictory. For example, the material presented in chapter two shows that Czechoslovak public opinion on the eve of the Warsaw Pact invasion expressed support for the status quo, and specific institutions such as the KSČ and National Front; but also wanted substantial reforms that would have undermined the power of these bodies.

Such apparent inconsistency reflected a conservative rationalist perspective where Czechoslovak public opinion felt that radical reforms undertaken in haste were likely to lead to unintended consequences. Ironically, the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20-21 1968 demonstrated the wisdom of such a position given the realpolitik nature of being a small geopolitically important state in central Europe. It is important to stress that the military invasion by five fraternal socialist states had a profound and permanent impact on Czechoslovak public opinion. This is because the pre-Prague Spring independence enjoyed by Czechoslovakia ended with the permanent stationing of Soviet military forces from 1968 until 1991. The pragmatic incremental approach toward political reform championed by Mlynář [1964, 1975, 1978] matched the strategy favoured by public opinion; although the preferences favoured by Czechoslovak citizens were generally more liberal than those favoured by Mlynář [1964] in his competitive elite model.
Indubitably the political solutions proposed during the Prague Spring era to Keynes “political problem of mankind”, quoted at the start of this chapter, constitute a unique and important example of citizens and elites grappling with fundamental issues. It is hoped that the survey evidence presented in the foregoing chapters facilitates two things: (a) promotes increased scholarly interest in the role played by citizens in the emergence of the Prague Spring reform movement, and (b) contributes in some small measure to a broader understanding of the events of 1968 and 1989 where citizens voices are given a more central role in explaining both the stability and change evident within contemporary Czech society.

References

Please note that authors are referenced on the basis of language of publication. This means that some authors will have references based on both the Czech and English forms of their name. This is because both versions have appeared in the sources used in this study, e.g. Šik and Sik. In other cases such as Jaroslav Krejčí and Jiří Pelikán, the English version of their names are used (i.e. Krejci and Pelikan) because the references quoted in this monograph only refer to the works these authors have published in English. With Zdeněk Mlynář his book ‘Nightfrost in Prague’ (1980) which was translated into English is referenced as Zdenek Mlynar, except in situations where more than one Mlynář work is being quoted in the text. This is because most of this author’s works were published in Czech. A similar strategy has been adopted with Ivan Sviták. In short, the rule for referencing is to use the exact information adopted in each article or book quoted because this allows the interested reader to locate these sources as they are referenced in bibliographic databases.


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Appendices

Website for this Research Study

Please note that more detailed information on the survey data discussed in this study may be consulted by going to the link at the following website address:

http://sites.google.com/site/pragespring1968surveyresearch

http://praguespring1968.pbworks.com/

The additional material available on the website includes: (1) questionnaires for all the surveys analysed in this study, (2) aggregate survey results for many of the UVVM opinion polls undertaken during 1968, (3) many technical details regarding the mode of interviewing, date of fieldwork, etc. Much of this material was gleaned from Piekalkiewicz [1972], and has been supplemented with additional information from a variety of sources. Further work needs to be done in obtaining: (a) the original survey reports (if they still exist), and (b) the exact question wording and ordering of the questionnaires.

Timeline of Czechoslovakia’s Political History

Note that the legal and political definition of the governments and regimes in Czechoslovakia during the twentieth century is complicated by a succession of political and constitutional changes. The following provides a succinct overview of the main developments in the Czechoslovak state before and after the Prague Spring era. This information summarised in the following table sets some of the arguments discussed in the text within the appropriate political context.
Chronology of Events in Czechoslovakia, 1967-1969

### 1967

**27-29.6.1967**

The Fourth Czechoslovak Writers Congress formulates harsh critique against the official cultural politics, particularly censorship. Ludvík Vaculík’s critical speech leads to his expulsion from the KSČ. Unfavourable comments toward government policies were also made by Pavel Kohout, Alexander Kliment, Václav Havel and Milan Kundera.

**19.9.1967**

The Culture Ministry takes control over Literarní noviny (journal of the Czech writers union). Circulation of about 400,000 copies falls sharply. The authors resume control over the journal in March 1968 and change its name to Literární listy. The Culture Ministry also took control of Kulturný život (journal of the Slovak writers union).

**18.10.1967 - 24.10.1967**

Meeting of the Presidium (ruling committee or Politburo) of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ). Preparations are made for the Central Committee (ÚV KSČ) meeting scheduled for late November.

**30.10.1967 - 1.11.1967**

Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ). Includes discussions regarding the Party’s role in the political system. Criticism of accumulation of power – an indirect critique of Antonín Novotný.

**31.10.1967**

Violent clashes between police and students at Charles University in Prague. Struggle between supporters of reform and conservatives during the session of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ).

**1.11.1967 - 10.11.1967**

KSČ First Secretary Antonín Novotný is present in Moscow during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution. This stay is prolonged for several days – officially due to “sickness.”


Soviet leader Brezhnev goes to Prague to mediate between the struggling factions in the KSČ. He avoids giving direct support to Novotný by making the famous statement “Eto vashe bylo” (it is your own business).


Meetings in the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ). There is a crisis in leadership in the Party. The UV KSČ’s opposition faction exerts pressure on Novotný.

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**Regime** | **Notes**
---|---
First Republic | Between independence in 1918 and the enactment of the Constitution in 1920, the state was known as Republic of Czechoslovakia (or RČS). Thereafter, the Czechoslovak state was known officially as the Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR). This post-independence system of government lasted from October 28 1918 to September 30 1938.

Second Czecho-Slovak Republic | In the months following the German annexation of the Sudetenland, the ČSR was broken up into Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and the autonomous regions of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (October 1 1938 to March 14 1939).

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia | The annexation of the Sudetenland was extended to all of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This led to the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia declared independence. This system of governance lasted from March 15 1939 to May 9 1945.

Post-war ‘National Front’ government | In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the Beneš government returned from exile. A general election in May 1946 saw the KSČ become the largest party in the Czechoslovak parliament. A National Front government formed from the main parties established to oversee reconstruction until the next elections scheduled for mid-1948.

Communist regime | Czechoslovakia was ruled as a ‘socialist democracy’ following the Soviet model from February 25 1948 to December 23 1989

Post-communist era | Following the Velvet Revolution (November 1989) and the first multi-party elections (June 1990) there was the Federal Democratic Republic (1990-1992) and the Velvet Divorce (June – December 1992) led to the creation of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic on January 1 1993.

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Note some scholars classify the political history of Czechoslovakia between October 1918 and February 1948 as being composed of three republics, i.e. 1918-1938, 1938-1939 and 1946-1948 (Heimann 2009). However, this is not a standard convention used by Czech historians. The classification used here follows the most widely used system of periodisation.

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Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

1968

1.1.1968 Novotný concedes to the reformist faction of the ÚV KSČ intellectuals and the Slovaks, but this compromise comes too late.

2.1.1968 A meeting of the KSČ Presidium discusses political developments. The Presidium is divided evenly between supporters of Novotný and Dubček and is unable to resolve the political deadlock and so decisions are devolved to the Central Committee.

5.1.1968 There is a meeting of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ). This meeting is a continuation of earlier meetings held between December 19 – 20 1967. Alexander Dubček is elected First Secretary of the KSČ, and Antonín Novotný is forced to resign. The result is a triumph for the Slovaks and the reform supporters. The meeting is a prelude to the period of liberalization in Czechoslovakia called the Prague Spring.

7.1.1968 Rumours circulate that economist Oldřich Černík might become the next Prime Minister.

9.1.1968 Indirect critique of Novotný appears in the Czechoslovak Press, which asserts that there should not be a concentration of political power in a single person.

10.1.1968 New liberal ideas appear in the Czechoslovak media. The KSČ’s national daily Rudé právo suggests calling off the class struggle.

15.1.1968 Dubček appoints a commission to prepare proposals for an Action Program for the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ).

18.1.1968 Political developments in Czechoslovakia are for the first time on the agenda of the Soviet Politburo. From now on, the new leadership in Czechoslovakia is closely monitored by the Soviets.

20.1.1968 Dubček travels to Hungary to meet with Hungarian Communist Party leader János Kádár. Dubček signals no change in Czechoslovak Foreign Policy.

24.1.1968 The Fifth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers Union works out a compromise between moderate authors sensitive to the new Communist Party leadership and more critical members who desire regime change.

25.1.1968 Decision to make public all information about the meetings at the highest levels of the Party.

29.01.1968 - 30.01.1968 Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia agree on a bilateral agreement concerning economic and social reforms in Czechoslovakia. Proposals circulate in Czechoslovakia to permit import of western newspapers.

4.2.1968 Dubček and János Kádár meet in Hungary.

7.2.1968 Dubček meets with Gomułka, the leader of the Polish Communist Party.

13.2.1968 Rudé právo warns the Ministry of Culture against censorship.

16.2.1968 President Novotný visits several factories in the Prague area and criticises the new KSČ leadership.

21.2.1968 Brezhnev, leader of the Soviet Communist Party, participates in the opening ceremony celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the communist takeover in February 1948.

23.2.1968 President Novotný in a speech in Prague admits some political errors were made in the past, but defends the record of the communist state during the previous twenty years. The East German Party leader, Walter Ulbricht, harshly criticises the economic reform plans during his visit. Dubček supports rehabilitation of political prisoners. The Peoples’ Militia (Lidové milice) which was part of the KSČ stage a big parade in Prague during the celebration.

25.2.1968 General Jan Sejna defects to the United States. He is under investigation for fraud and embezzlement, together with the son of President Novotný.

28.2.1968 Journalists demand the abolishment of press censorship.

1.3.1968 The Presidium of the KSČ lifts the censorship that was introduced in 1966. Some Czechoslovak authors calls for free elections.

5.3.1968 Jiří Hendrych a close ally of Antonín Novotný is dismissed from the ÚV KSČ. Josef Špaček is named new chief ideologist of the Central Committee. Czechoslovak newspapers give extensive coverage to the Šejna scandal.

603.1968 - 07.03.1968 Warsaw Pact meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia is not on the agenda.

8.3.1968 The Chief of Staff of the Czechoslovak Army demands President Novotný’s resignation.

10.3.1968 The youth newspaper Směná in Bratislava publishes an open letter to Antonín Novotný urging him to resign as president. Students lay down a wreath on Jan Masaryk’s grave on the twentieth anniversary of his death. Mass meetings in Prague and other places in Czechoslovakia in support of Dubček.

12.3.1968 Czechoslovakia’s leading literary weekly, Literární listy, publishes a comment on the latest trial of Soviet writers, while a Prague based newspaper called Svobodné slovo reports on tensions between students and the communist authorities in Poland.

13.3.1968 Josef Smrkovský is elected Chairman of the Czech Parliament. The ÚV KSČ holds discussions about the Action Program. This document promises fundamental reforms: rehabilitation of political prisoners, freedom of press, freedom to congregate and freedom of religion.
Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

14.3.1968 Meeting of the Presidium of the ÚV KSČ. The Action Program is passed unanimously. Rehabilitation of political prisoners and lifting of the censorship are among the important issues on the agenda. The President of the National Parliament resigns.

15.3.1968 The Slovak Parliament demands a new constitution for a socialist federation. The Minister of Interior Josef Kudrna is dismissed. Czechoslovak journalists are expelled from Poland.

16.3.1968 Students demonstrate in Prague.

16.03.1968 - 17.03.1968 Local KSČ conferences pass resolutions demanding the resignation of President Novotný. Full accounts of these resolutions are printed in Rudé právo.

21.3.1968 The Presidium of the ÚV KSČ asks Antonín Novotný to resign as President.

22.3.1968 Memorial ceremonies at the twentieth anniversary of Jan Masaryk’s death. Ludvík Svoboda, a Czechoslovak war hero from World War Two, is selected to replace Antonín Novotný as President. Students arrange a “teach-in” in Prague.

23.3.1968 Press censorship is effectively abolished. Meeting of “the Five” (Soviet Union, GDR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria) and Czechoslovakia in Dresden, East Germany. Dubček is openly criticized by the Soviets, Polish, and the East Germans. The situation in Czechoslovakia is characterized as a “counterrevolution.”

26.3.1968 There are strikes in Czechoslovakia for the first time since 1948. The circulation of newspapers in Prague has doubled several times since January.

28.03.1968 - 05.04.1968 Meeting of the UV KSČ where there is an endorsement of the decisions adopted by the Presidium on March 14. Six new ‘reformist’ members are appointed to the Presidium while supporters of Novotný are removed.

30.3.1968 Ludvík Svoboda is formally elected President of the ČSSR.

31.3.1968 Three thousand victims of earlier political purges meet in Prague to demand justice.

1.4.1968 Dubček confines his intentions of making the ČSSR more democratic without giving up the KSČs leading and controlling role in society.

2.4.1968 Demands of public investigation into Jan Masaryk’s death in 1948. The Attorney General announces that the death of Masaryk will be investigated together with forty-eight others that were killed during the February 1948 communist takeover.

3.4.1968 Minister of Defense, General Bohumír Lomský, announces his resignation during a meeting in the UV KSČ. Lomský was considered one of Novotný’s closest allies.

4.4.1968 The UV KSČ appoints Oldřich Černík as the new Prime Minister.

5.4.1968 The UV KSČ decides to rehabilitate victims of the purge and the court processes of 1950–’54. The Central Committee also reverses the exclusion verdicts of authors from 1967.

6.4.1968 The government of Josef Lenart resigns and Černík is asked by president Svoboda to form a new government. Several union leaders are replaced, among them the leader of the national journalist union.

8.4.1968 Černík’s new government takes office. Young intellectuals concerned about democratic and economic reforms hold key positions in the new government.

10.4.1968 The Action Program is endorsed by the UV KSČ despite criticism that the program is not far-reaching enough.

15.04.1968 - 30.04.1968 Regional KSČ party conferences pass resolutions demanding a special congress to elect new members to the UV KSČ. A special party congress is scheduled for early September 1968.

15.4.1968 Citizens who experienced punitive measures for political reasons at the hands of the KSČ begin to report their stories in the media. There are accusations in Rudé právo that the Soviet secret police were involved in the Czechoslovak political purges of 1952.

16.4.1968 Meeting of the Presidium of the KSČ. On the agenda is a Soviet invitation to a meeting in Moscow in May. An article published in Rudé právo implies for the first time that Soviet agents played a role in Jan Masaryk’s death.

17.4.1968 The coalition within the UV KSČ that supported the removal of Novotný start to compete for increased control and influence.

21.4.1968 Czechoslovak economists warn that economic reforms are being implemented too slowly.

23.4.1968 The Bulgarian Party leadership travels to Prague to renew a bilateral alliance between Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

24.4.1968 Prime minister Černík presents the government’s program to the Parliament. He paints a grim picture of the nation’s economic situation.

28.4.1968 Political clubs and groups are established nationwide. Meetings are held at lecture halls at Charles University in Prague. The students protest against KSČ inspired anti-Americanism.

30.4.1968 Victims of the Stalinist era repressions are honoured in Prague.

30.4.1968 The Soviet Union offers Czechoslovakia economic aid equivalent to 400 million US dollars.

1.5.1968 Standing ovations and declarations of support to Dubček and Svoboda during the First of May demonstration in Prague. For the first time since 1948, participation in the demonstration is voluntary.
### Appendices

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<td><strong>13.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>Poland’s communist leaders criticize developments in Czechoslovakia. They claim that the counter-revolutionary development constitutes an unacceptable threat to the whole communist world. Prague Radio accuses three Eastern Bloc newspapers of spreading misleading news about the Czechoslovak reform process. Dubček meets with the Hungarian party leader János Kádár.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>14.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>Prime Minister Černík announces extensive political and economic reforms during a press conference. Černík welcomes foreign investment in Czechoslovak industry. Soviet newspaper issues sharp attacks against Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, the first Czechoslovak president, claiming that he was behind a plot to kill Lenin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>Czechoslovak newspapers react angrily against the Masaryk accusations in Soviet media. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister gives positive assessments of the Czechoslovak reform policy and supports development leading away from Soviet orthodoxy. The Warsaw Pact announces military manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia in June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin visits Prague to hold discussions with Czechoslovak leaders. Czechoslovakia continues work on the creation of a federal state. The process is expected to be completed within ten months. President Tito of Yugoslavia declares his support of the liberalisation process in Czechoslovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>The KSČ Presidium warns against all attempts to re-establish alternative parties, and criticise the Czechoslovak media for its unfavourable reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>23.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>The KSČ takes the first steps towards a rehabilitation of 40,000 individuals who served time in prison or in special camps following the political purges of the 1950s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>The KSČ announces that it will no longer directly supervise foreign policy, but leave this to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry and the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>26.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>The KSČ takes the first steps towards a rehabilitation of 40,000 individuals who served time in prison or in special camps following the political purges of the 1950s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>29.5.1968</strong></td>
<td>The Warsaw Pact announces military manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia in June. Three Catholic bishops expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1948 are allowed to re-enter the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.06.1968 - 15.06.1968</strong></td>
<td>Delegates scheduled to participate in a forthcoming KSČ party congress are elected during the first two weeks of June. This party congress is important as it will appoint (new) members to the UV KSČ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.6.1968</td>
<td>Dubček accuses Novotný of not providing a full account of his role during the purges in the early 1950s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.1968</td>
<td>Soviet tanks enter Moravia to take part in Warsaw Pact manoeuvres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6.1968</td>
<td>Senior Czechoslovak officials meet in Moscow to discuss bilateral economic agreements between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.6.1968</td>
<td>Dubček leads a Czechoslovak delegation to Hungary. János Kádár gives the impression that he understands the aims of the Czechoslovak liberalisation. Both Dubček and Kadar emphasize their common solidarity with the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.6.1968</td>
<td>Harsh attacks against the leadership of KSČ are published in Pravda, especially against party secretary Čestmír Císař and the Czechoslovak media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6.1968</td>
<td>The Warsaw Pact starts its military manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.6.1968</td>
<td>The political reform process continues. New legislation is enacted to rehabilitate victims of political trials and pay them compensation. The authorities warn against extensive liberalization. They eschew “bourgeois pluralism” and insist on maintaining the leadership role of the KSČ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.6.1968</td>
<td>Parliament passes a new law formally ending censorship in the media and literature. Rudé právo publishes poll results showing that ninety percent of its non-communist readers support a multiparty system. Ludvík Vaculík’s “The Two Thousand Words” is published. This manifesto contends that the democratisation process is in danger. A number of artists, scientists, and well known athletes sign the manifesto. Among those who sign are the Olympic champions: Emil Zátopek, Jiří Raška, and Věra Čáslavská.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7.1968</td>
<td>An article entitled “The One Thousand Words” written by Josef Smrkovský counters claims suggesting that the democratisation process has come to an end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7.1968</td>
<td>The Presidium of the KSČ discusses an invitation to take part in a Warsaw Pact meeting in Warsaw on July 15. They decide not to participate unless Romania and Yugoslavia also take part.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.07.1968</td>
<td>The Warsaw Pact meeting condemns Czechoslovak revisionism and warns that the development is a common issue for all members. The Warsaw Pact countries formulate a letter containing a series of demands to the Czechoslovak authorities. Military intervention is seen to increasingly likely. In secret meetings, the East German (Ulbricht) and Polish (Gomułka) leaders pressure the Soviets for an invasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.07.1968</td>
<td>The Presidium of the KSČ discusses the “Warsaw letter.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.7.1968</td>
<td>Dubček confirms his intentions to continue the reform process in Czechoslovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.7.1968</td>
<td>The UV KSČ discusses making a reply to the “Warsaw letter.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.07.1968</td>
<td>Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders meet at Čierná nad Tisou in Southeastern Slovakia for bilateral discussions. An agreement is concluded and a Warsaw Pact meeting is scheduled to be held in Bratislava.</td>
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<td>29.07.1968</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8.1968</td>
<td>Negotiations with Brezhnev end. Dubček makes statements on national television about the negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8.1968</td>
<td>In Prague, there is a public demonstration to express support for Dubček.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1968</td>
<td>There is a Warsaw Pact meeting in Bratislava. This meeting concludes that Czechoslovakia is not free to choose its own path to socialism. The “Brezhnev doctrine” on the shared duty to defend Socialism is formulated. A letter from senior KSČ opponents to Dubček’s reform policy is delivered to the Soviets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8.1968</td>
<td>Kádár claims at a Central Committee meeting of the Hungarian Communist Party that the Bratislava meeting was a turning point. It is claimed that a political solution has been found. Dubček urges the Czechoslovak press to exercise greater prudence in making editorial decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8.1968</td>
<td>The Soviet Politburo meets and expresses scepticism regarding the agreements concluded at Čierná nad Tisou and Bratislava. Military preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.8.1968</td>
<td>President Tito of Yugoslavia makes an official state visit to Prague and declares his support for Dubček.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.8.1968</td>
<td>Moscow declares that military exercises will be held in East Germany, Poland and the Ukraine. Forces from the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany will participate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.8.1968</td>
<td>Dubček meets the East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht at the famous Czech spa at Karlovy Vary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.08.1968</td>
<td>Final decisions are made in the Soviet Politburo. The harsh attacks on Czechoslovakia in the Soviet Press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.8.1968</td>
<td>Meeting of the UV KSČ. On the agenda is the federation question. Brezhnev declares in a phone call with Dubček that he is not satisfied with the Czechoslovak fulfilment of their obligations in the “Bratislava agreement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.08.1968</td>
<td>President Ceaucescu of Romania makes a state visit. Bilateral agreements are signed. President Ceausescu declares his support for Dubček and his policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.8.1968</td>
<td>Dubček meets the Hungarian Communist leader János Kádár in Slovakia. No signals are given about what is going to happen next.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.8.1968</td>
<td>Minister of Interior, Josef Pavel establishes the administrative framework for rehabilitating victims of the Stalinist purge.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.8.1968 - 21.8.1968</td>
<td>The Warsaw Pact invades Czechoslovakia. Dubček and all senior KSČ figures are detained. The Soviets fail to establish a new government, but enact secret Moscow agreements that put an end to the liberalization. The invasion force is composed by about 300 – 600,000 soldiers from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Germany Democratic Republic, and Bulgaria. During the invasion about ninety-two civilians are killed, and more than 300 are injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.8.1968</td>
<td>The Soviet news agency TASS claims that the invasion stems from an invitation to help stop counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. The UV KSČ states that the invasion was conducted without the knowledge of the Czechoslovak government. Dubček decides to summon the Fourteenth Party Congress to a secret meeting at Vysočany in Northeast Prague. The UV KSČ building is surrounded at 4:00 am. Soviet troops clash with civilians outside the building and one civilian is killed. Soviet soldiers arrest Dubček and members of the UV KSČ at 9:00 am. Dubček is flown to a secret KGB facility in the Carpathian mountains (Ukraine) where Smrkovský and Černík are also interned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.8.1968</td>
<td>Both the Czechoslovak Parliament and the special Vysočany Party Congress condemn the occupation as an illegal act. The special KSČ/KSS Congress meets at a secret location (Vysočany) in an industrial area in Prague. A Peoples’ Militia guards the meeting. Very few Slovak delegates are able to attend the meeting at such short notice. The Congress appoints a new UV KSČ with only reform supporters and a Presidium is elected. Literární listy calls for international support. A curfew is declared in Prague.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.8.1968 - 30.8.1968</td>
<td>There are widespread demonstrations against the Soviet invasion. Various forms of protest actions including posters, passive resistance, and removing road signs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.8.1968 - 26.8.1968</td>
<td>President Svoboda flies to Moscow. Dubček is also brought to Moscow to join the other Czechoslovak leaders for “negotiation” with Soviet leaders. Dubček is allowed to return to Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leaders demand that all the resolutions of the special Vysočany Congress are declared invalid. The Czechoslovak leaders reject the demands. The Soviets also demand that the Prague invasion be removed from the agenda of the UN Security Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.8.1968</td>
<td>Emil Zátopek, a famous Olympic champion, gives a speech on one of the secret free television channels in Czechoslovakia. There is a general strike in Prague. A Soviet armoured train with equipment to locate radio transmitters “gets lost” in Czechoslovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.8.1968</td>
<td>The negotiations come to an end, and the Czechoslovak leaders are allowed to return to Prague. They are forced to sign a secret protocol before leaving Moscow. In Prague there are street demonstrations. The leaders of the main Czechoslovak trade union movement (ROH) calls for a general strike. Prague citizens take part in demonstrations against the invasion. Some civilians are shot by Soviet soldiers. The Czechoslovak media still functions in spite of the occupation forces. Humour and contempt are efficient weapons against the occupation forces in the streets of Prague. In spite of strict Soviet measures to stop broadcasting, an underground media system continues to operate. Vasil Bil'ak, a senior KSS figure, demands an independent Slovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.8.1968</td>
<td>Dubček makes a television broadcast and informs the Czechoslovak people about the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.8.1968</td>
<td>Dubček meets the new Central Committee elected by the Vysočany Party Congress. The Central Committee has been meeting constantly since August 22. Dubček informs the new ÚV KSČ about obligations forced upon them by the Soviets in Moscow. President Svoboda appeals for discipline and trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.8.1968</td>
<td>Some leaders in Bratislava complain about the Czech majority dominance at the Vysočany Party Congress. Gustáv Husák encourages Dubček not to endorse the newly elected ÚV KSČ. Few Slovak delegates were present at the Vysočany Congress. The Czechoslovak parliament unanimously condemns the Soviet invasion and demands that Warsaw Pact troops be withdrawn. The KSS demands that the Vysočany Party Congress be declared invalid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.8.1968</td>
<td>The free broadcasts are silenced. Czech and Slovak leaders agree to summon a new party congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.8.1968</td>
<td>Meeting of the UV KSČ. Dubček reports on the results of the negotiation in Moscow. Dubček informs the Central Committee about the nature of the negotiations. Leadership replacements demanded by Soviets are made. Underground broadcasts are reduced to local transmitters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9.1968</td>
<td>Censorship is re-imposed on the media. Czechslovaks line up outside the West German and Austrian embassies to obtain visas to leave the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.1968</td>
<td>The UV KSČ meets to make new appointments. Dubček’s allies hold the line despite mounting Soviet pressure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.9.1968</td>
<td>A Czechoslovak delegation headed by Černík meets Soviet leaders in Moscow.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.11.1968</td>
<td>Meeting of the UV KSČ. Supporters of the Prague Spring reforms are excluded from the meeting. Students strike for three days in support of national freedom. The student strike spreads from Prague to other universities around the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.11.1968</td>
<td>There is a student demonstration and a meeting of Czechoslovak journalists in Prague. Members of the UV KSČ blame the media for the political crisis. Workers support student demonstrations in Prague.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.1968</td>
<td>Students in Prague arrange “sit-ins” and prolong their strike. The KSČ leadership urge these students to stop protesting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12.1968</td>
<td>There is a popular protest against Zpravý a propagandist newspaper circulated by the Soviets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.12.1968</td>
<td>Dubček is called to a meeting with Brezhnev in Kiev. He meets with Svoboda, Černík, Štrougal and Husák. Proposals are put forward concerning purges at the district and local levels within the KSČ. Husák positions himself with the goal of replacing Dubček, who is becoming increasingly isolated. There is mounting pressure against the Czechoslovak mass media to stop open criticism of the invasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.12.1968</td>
<td>Plenum meeting of the ÚV KSČ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.12.1968</td>
<td>Dubček warns against the dangers of public unrest.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.1.1969</td>
<td>Jan Palach sets himself on fire in central Prague and dies two days later. In the three months two other students (Jan Zajíc on Feb. 25, and Evžen Plocek on April 4) also set themselves on fire in protest against the Warsaw Pact occupation, the abandonment of democratic reforms by Czechoslovak politicians, and public apathy. Palach had demands (1) Abolition of censorship, and (2) removal of the Soviet propagandist Zpravý bulletin. During this period Palach also proposed that students should occupy the Czechoslovak Radio building in Prague and call a general strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1.1969</td>
<td>Meeting of the UV KSČ. Proposals to alter the declaration from August 21, 1968 that condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion are rejected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.1.1969</td>
<td>There are mass demonstrations at Jan Palach’s funeral, where there is public support for the Action Program and opposition to the Warsaw Pact occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.3.1969</td>
<td>The Czechoslovak ice hockey team defeats the Soviet team (7-2) at the World Championships in Stockholm, Sweden.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following biographical notes reveal some common characteristics held by the Prague Spring reformers: political socialisation after the fall of the First Republic and experience of occupation during the Second World War, university education at Charles University in Prague and/or in the Soviet Union, simultaneous careers within the KSČ and ČSA V, and lack of success in establishing an influential political role (if alive) during the immediate post-communist period. Such similarities provide valuable insight into the unique nature of the reform proposals associated with the Prague Spring era.

Alexander Dubček (1921 – 1992)

Although born in Slovakia, he grew up in Kyrgyzstan in the Soviet Union (1924-1938) and later returned to Czechoslovakia. He became a member of the KSS in 1939. During the Second World War, Dubček joined the resistance against the Germans, and was wounded in the Slovak National Uprising (1944). His career within the Communist Party progressed steadily after the war and during the 1950s; as is evident from his membership of the National Assembly (1951-1955), and his attendance at a political school for communist elites in Moscow (1953-1958). Thereafter, his political career was mainly on the national stage. He became a Secretary in the ÚV KSČ (1960-1962), and also a member of the Presidium between 1963 and 1968. He was leader of the KSS from 1963 following a successful power struggle against the pro-Novotný faction. Following a similar factional competition in the KSČ in late 1967, Dubček became leader (First Secretary) of the KSČ. Under his leadership, policies of economic and political reform were drafted during the following months. This is evident in such documents as the Action Programme (April 10 1968). With the informal abolishment of censorship, the process of political liberalisation moved beyond the confines of internal KSČ debate, and this was especially evident in the media. Domestic political developments in Czechoslovakia alarmed the Soviet Union, and despite Dubček’s reassurances the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20-21 1968. The Dubček government was compelled to accept Soviet demands for rolling back reforms. Dubček was forced to resign from office in April 1969, and later from all public life. He remained out of the public eye until 1988. During the Velvet Revolution of late 1989, he supported popular demands for the removal of the KSČ regime. Dubček hoped for a more ‘humane socialism.’ Political events moved beyond this conception of reform, and Dubček’s position as Chairman of the Federal Assembly did not see him play a central role in the immediate post-communist transition process. He died unexpectedly from injuries sus-
tained in a road accident in late 1992. An autobiography entitled Hope Dies Last was published posthumously in English in 1993.

**Vladimír Klokočka (1929 – 2009)**

This Czech lawyer and politician was educated at the Faculty of Law, Charles University, Prague. He later lectured at this institution. During the Prague Spring era he was a member of the Czech National Council (lower chamber), and as a Dean at the Law Faculty at Masaryk University, Brno he was responsible for drafting electoral reform legislation. These electoral reforms were informed by his comparative study of electoral systems published as Volby v pluralitních demokraciích (Elections in Pluralist Democracies) in late 1968. Following the Warsaw Pact invasion, Klokočka lost all of his political and academic positions. Thereafter, he worked in an insurance company until he signed Charter 77 when he was dismissed. Klokočka subsequently went into exile in West Germany. Here he worked as an academic at the University of Munich. With the fall of communism in late 1989, he returned to Czechoslovakia and worked in the Czech Constitutional Court (1993-2003). Here he played a key role in legal disputes concerning political parties and electoral law until his retirement. Thereafter, Klokočka continued to write academic articles and books on topics such as the Constitution of the European Union (Ústavy států Evropské unie, 2005).

**Karel Kosík (1926 – 2003)**

As a youth activist in the KSČ, he opposed the German occupation of Czechoslovakia during the Second World War. In 1944 he was arrested by the Gestapo, and later sent to the Terezín concentration camp. After the war, he studied philosophy and sociology at Charles University and in the Soviet Union. He became one of the leading Humanist Marxist thinkers in Czechoslovakia and internationally following publication of Dialektika konkretinho (Dialectics of the Concrete) in 1963. During the 1960s, he was involved in many political debates while being a member of the Institute of Philosophy, ČSA V and the Faculty of Philosophy, Charles University. In addition, he was a senior member of the Czechoslovak Union of Writers. He emerged as one of the leading intellectuals of the Prague Spring period. After the Warsaw Pact invasion, he was expelled from the KSČ and lost all of his academic positions. He was imprisoned in 1972 for political reasons; and was banned from public life until the fall of the communist regime in 1989. Kosík returned to academia and writing during the 1990s, and openly criticised the Czech government’s liberal economic policies.

**Zdeněk Mlynář (1930 – 1997)**

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Mlynář joined the KSČ at the age of sixteen. He studied law at Lomonosov Moscow State University from 1950 to 1955. The experience of living at the heart of communism and becoming more aware of how communist regimes actually operated appears to have spurred his early belief in the need for reforming the Soviet model of socialism. While in Moscow he became friends with a fellow law student, named Mikhail Gorbachev. After a brief stint in the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Prague, where Mlynář attracted the ire of a senior KSČ figure for failing to follow illegal instructions. Thereafter, he decided to join the Institute for the Study of the State and Law, ČSAV. Here he completed a doctoral thesis on Machiavelli’s political ideas. Thereafter, he embarked on a political career where he published articles on the theory of communism in influential KSČ publications such as Rudé právo. Between 1966 and 1968, Mlynář led an inter-disciplinary research team whose task was to draft proposals for political reform by 1970. Some of the ideas underpinning this research were already evident in Mlynář’s Stát a člověk (State and Man) published in 1964. Here he argued that Czechoslovakia had to strengthen the rule of law, especially with regard to individual rights, and needed to develop a more comprehensive model of socialist citizenship.

In the spring of 1967, Mlynář presented some of his pluralist reform ideas at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. These ideas received a cool official reception. Informal discussions with colleagues and friends, such as Gorbachev, appear to have been more encouraging. During the Prague Spring era, Mlynář published many articles in the media and participated in public debates where he advocated for incremental reform under the leadership of the KSČ. Equally important was his influence in the drafting of the KSČ’s Action Programme (April 10 1968). This document became the official blueprint for reform. It was at this point that Mlynář became a Secretary within the UV KSČ and assumed a more important role in the Prague Spring era. In early May, the Mlynář teams’ political attitudes survey was fielded to a national sample of over three and half thousand respondents. This research was to provide empirical evidence for the political reform proposals to be drafted in the autumn of 1968. During the summer of 1968 senior members of the KSČ such as Dubček and Mlynář felt that some constraints on the emerging mass reform movement were necessary in order to...
ensure the KSČ’s leading position. In this respect, it is important to note that Mlynář always defined himself as a “reform communist, not a non-communist democrat.” Legislation to restrict the re-emerging Social Democrats, KAN, and KSČV was never enacted due to the Warsaw Pact invasion (Hoppe 2009).

Following the invasion, Mlynář initially played a central role in the negotiations in Moscow, but was progressively sidelined because of his refusal to openly endorse normalization. He resigned from the ÚV KSČ on November 16, 1968, and was expelled from the party in September 1969. Thereafter, he worked in the Entomology Department within the National Museum; where he published some research work. He went into exile to Austria after helping organise and sign Charter 77. In exile, he worked as an academic developing an international reputation as a political scientist specialising in the development of Soviet political systems. His book Mráz přichází z Kremlu (Night Frost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism, 1978⁄1980) provides one of the most detailed insiders accounts of the events of 1968 from within the upper echelons of the KSČ.

With the ascent of Gorbachev to leadership of the Soviet Union in 1985, Mlynář was much in demand because he was one of the few people in the West who knew Gorbachev personally. With the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia in late 1989, Mlynář returned home. His hopes that a post-communist Czechoslovakia would embrace a ‘humane socialism’ were misplaced. Although he was unsuccessful in his aspirations for a political career, he retained his links to the Czech political scene through Left Bloc – a small leftist political grouping. When not in Prague, he continued with his academic career at the University of Innsbruck where he remained until his early retirement on grounds of ill health in 1993.


discussion of T.G. Masaryk (the founding President of independent Czechoslovakia), of Philosophy, ČSA V where he did research in the fields of philosophy, the social sciences. His book Mráz přichází z Kremlu (Night Frost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism, 1978⁄1980) provides one of the most detailed insiders accounts of the events of 1968 from within the upper echelons of the KSČ.

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Radovan Richta (1924 – 1983)

He was part of the communist resistance during the Second World War being eventually captured and sent to the Terezín concentration camp. Here he became ill with tuberculosis and suffered from persistent ill health thereafter. After the war, he studied natural science and philosophy at Charles University (1945–1950). During his studies he was active in the Students Union, and following graduation he became Head of the Marxism-Leninism Department at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education. From 1954, Richta was a member of the Institute of Philosophy, ČSA V where he did research in the fields of philosophy, the sociology of T.G. Masaryk (the founding President of independent Czechoslovakia), and Humanist Marxism. Between 1960 and 1964, Richta abandoned full time work in order to undergo treatment for tuberculosis, but used this time to study the link between the development of technology and society, especially under socialism. This became the basis for a doctoral thesis submitted to ČSA V. Thereafter, he returned to work and later became Director of the Institute of Philosophy, ČSA V in 1968. In the period 1965 to 1968 he was the director of a large and influential inter-disciplinary team. This group was commissioned by the KSČ to provide a blueprint for socialist development within the framework of a “scientific-technical revolution.” This work had a major impact on the Communist Party’s reform programme, and the Prague Spring movement more generally. His most influential ideas are evident in Člověk a technika v revoluci našich dnů (Man and Technology in the Revolution of Our Day), and Civilizace na rozcestí (Civilization at the Crossroads) published in 1963 and 1966 respectively. Richta supported the normalization process and became a member of the UV KSČ (1968–1971). As Director of the Philosophical Institute, he was responsible for the purges undertaken within the social sciences in the early 1970s. During this decade he developed an international reputation for his conceptualisation of technological development, and ended his career as a senior figure within ČSA V.

Ota Šik (1919 – 2004)

Prior to the Second World War, Šik studied art at Charles University. With German annexation of the Sudetenland and occupation of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, he joined the resistance. Following his arrest in 1940, he was sent to Mauthausen concentration camp. Here he met Antonín Novotný who later became the political leader of communist Czechoslovakia; and this fact proved influential when dealing with the KSČ leadership in the 1960s. After the war, Šik studied social sciences and assumed a career within the Communist Party. From the late 1950s, he and others began to voice increasing concerns about economic stagnation and decline in Czechoslovakia under communism. During this period Šik became Director of the Institute of Economics, ČSA V. He also led a research team whose task was to produce plans for economic reform between 1963 and 1967. In essence, Šik and his research team advocated for a liberalisation of the command economy through decentralisation of managerial control. These ideas are evident in Plán a trh za socialismu (Plan and Market in Socialism, 1964) and K problematice socialistických zbožních vzáeh (Problems in Socialist Market Relations, 1968). Resistance to his economic reform policies implemented from early 1967 led him to conclude that political change would be a necessary component of any economic reform programme. During the Prague Spring era, Šik...
became a Deputy Prime Minister where he initiated a rapid process of economic reform. His plan for “market socialism” used some features of the Yugoslav model of economic self-management within state enterprises. After the Warsaw Pact invasion, Šik went into exile in Switzerland and worked as an academic at the University of St. Gallen. Here he published a number of critical works such as *Czechoslovakia: The Bureaucratic Economy* [1972], and proposed a “third way” focusing on elements of socialism and capitalism. Šik returned to Prague after the Velvet Revolution hoping to play a role in shaping economic development during the 1990s. His “third way” proposals were rejected in favour of market liberalisation, and so he returned to academic life in Switzerland.

**Ivan Sviták (1925 – 1994)**

During the Second World War, Sviták was a member of a forced German labour brigade. Following the war he studied at the Law Faculty at Charles University, and later at the School of Political and Social Sciences in Prague. In the mid-1950s he lectured in philosophy at Charles University, and also worked at the Institute of Philosophy, CSAV. Intellectually Sviták became a leading exponent of Humanist Marxism thinking. His ideas were controversial and conflicted with the official views of the communist regime. As a result, his access to public life and intellectual debate became increasingly restricted. He was removed from the Institute of Philosophy in 1964. For the following three years he worked at Prague’s Film Institute, where he wrote articles on the philosophy of aesthetics, and a number of books (*Lidský smysl kultury*, 1968). During the Prague Spring era, he became well known for his demands for democracy, was involved with KAN, and wrote a number of influential articles concerning political reform. He left Czechoslovakia following the Warsaw Pact invasion, and thereafter was stripped of his citizenship and given a prison sentence in absentia. Sviták was a visiting scholar at Columbia University (1968-1970), and later took a position at the University of California, Chico. One of his most influential works regarding the Prague Spring was *The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968-1969* [1971]. Sviták returned to Prague following the Velvet Revolution, and became a member of Left Bloc (a left wing coalition). He was elected a member of the Federal Assembly in 1992. Later during the 1990s he opposed the ODS governments’ liberal economic policies.

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**Ludvík Vaculík (1926 – )**

Born near Zlín in Moravia, Vaculík started his working life in the Bat’a shoe factory and thereafter was employed as a teacher in a private boarding school. Later, he embarked on a writing career becoming among other things an editor with *Literární listy*. This official journal of the Czechoslovak Writers Union became well known in the 1960s for publishing articles proposing sweeping reforms of the political system by writers such as Václav Havel, philosophers such as Karel Kosík, and historians such as Karel Kaplan. Vaculík was expelled from the KSČ in 1967 following a critical speech he made at the Fourth Czechoslovak Writers Congress (June 27-29 1967). His party membership was reinstated in 1968. During the Prague Spring period, his outspoken articles and support for wide ranging change in public debates led him to become one of the best known reformers. Vaculík’s publication of the *Two Thousand Words* (June 27 1968) proved to be both popular and controversial in equal measure. For the UV KSČ, this document was viewed as a rival plan for political reform that proposed moving beyond socialism; and was considered by orthodox communists and the Soviet leadership as counter-revolutionary. The manifesto sought to mobilise the Czechoslovak public to thwart efforts by conservatives within the KSČ who wanted to block the Prague Spring reforms. Moderate reformers saw Vaculík’s activities as undermining the reform process by polarising the situation, especially with regard to an already sceptical Soviet leadership. With normalisation, he was again expelled from the Communist Party, and he was placed on the index of banned authors. With the fall of communism, Vaculík continued writing, and still makes frequent contributions in newspapers such as *Lidové noviny* about contemporary Czech politics. Some of his most famous novels which provide commentary on Czech cultural and political life have been translated into English. These include: *The Axe* [1966], *The Guinea Pigs* [1970], *Czech Dreambook* [1980], and *A Cup of Coffee with My Interrogator* [1987].
Survey Items for Trust in Political Leaders Time Series

One of the senior researchers at UVVM, Čeněk Adamec, noted in an article in the Slovak journal Pravda on October 21, 1968 that polling data measuring trust or confidence in political leaders items were politically sensitive and were not always published [Skilling 1976: 541, fn. 48]. All of the data reported comes from UVVM who undertook face-to-face interviewing with national quota samples. Methodologically it is important to be aware of four potential problems with the trust in public figures time series. First, the survey questions used the terms “trust” and “confidence” interchangeably. This means strictly speaking not all items are comparable as scholars treat these concepts as related, but distinct features of public opinion. Second, respondents appear to have been free to select political leaders though the number of choices varied from 1 to 5 and there were different strategies used to tabulate this data creating the possibility of methodological effects. Third, the ordering of questions asked is unknown for all surveys and there is the possibility of methodological artefacts. Asking political ratings at the beginning or end of surveys is known to produce systematic bias. Fourth, the political climate under which opinion polling was undertaken during 1968 and 1969 varied considerably, and this is likely to have influenced respondents’ level of cooperation, level of opinionation, and expressed preferences.

Question 1 (March 24–28, 1968, Czechoslovakia, N=1,476): UVVM
“In whom do you have the most trust and confidence?” Note, that this data are derived from Ithiel de Sola Pool [1970: 15, Figure 1] and Piekalkiewicz [1972: 268, Figure 7]. The exact question wording is unknown; the text above is taken from the item asked on September 14–16, 1968. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 256-269] presents data from a series of trust and confidence questions, but these do not always match the data presented in the accompanying figure. It seems that the results of this survey data were reported later in the media in May 1968. See Rudé právo, May 5, 1968, and also Literární listy.

Question 2 (June 30 – July 10, Czechoslovakia, N=397, (N=1,610): UVVM
“Please identify the personalities in contemporary public and political life in whom you have the most confidence. Pick a maximum of three individuals.” Unprompted verbatim responses recorded. For the “percentage of respondents expressing confidence in a specific politician” it seems that this was calculated us-
ing a total sample of 297 cases. This was reported to be a “random sampling” of the total number of questionnaires (N=1,610). However, there is some confusion within Piekalkiewicz [1972: 4, 34, 57, 143, 145, 257] as to the number of cases where it varies between 297 and 397. Most of the survey data reported from this survey suggests that there were 397 cases. Consequently, the confidence estimates calculated using 297 cases may be too wide. The revised estimates based on 397 indicate levels of confidence that are one quarter lower than those calculated by Piekalkiewicz [1972: 257]. It is not completely clear which of these estimates is correct. Skilling [1976: 450 fn. 111] suggests this may have been a postal survey, although Piekalkiewicz [1972: 348-349] states that “a group of professional poll-takers administered the survey” implying it was a face-to-face interview – typical of ÚVVM’s methodology. Some of the results of this survey were published in Rudé právo, July 13, 1968; Rudé právo, August 20, 1968; Klímová [1969: 3]; and ČSAV výzkum / Polls 3(4), 1968, p.17.

**Question 3 (September 14-16 1968, Czechoslovakia, N=1,882); ÚVVM**

“In whom do you have the most trust and confidence?” Response options appear to be recodes of verbatim answers. This was one of the first post-invasion surveys and may have been subject to significant polling climate effects. An initial quota sample of 1,987 cases was constructed. However, 105 potential respondents refused to be interviewed. Of those interviewed (N=1,882) interviewers reported that 261 respondents expressed misgivings about the survey and 69 respondents feared the results. No exact data for the whole sample (N=1,882) is given. It is assumed here that the Czech subsample constituted 70.5 per cent of the total sample, and this is the basis for the estimates provided. The 70.5 per cent figure is based on national breakdown that is available for a specific question (N=1,873) where the loss of respondents seems to be due to item non-response or some other form of data loss. Some details of this survey were reported in: Jan Hysek, ‘Rozhovor o veřejném mínění,’ Nova Mysl, 12, December 1968.

**Question 4 (December 6-13 1968, Czechoslovakia, N=1,894); ÚVVM**

“In whom do you have the most trust and confidence?” Note, that this data are derived from de Sola Pool [1970: 15, Figure 1] and Piekalkiewicz [1972: 268, Figure 7]. The exact question wording is unknown. The text above is taken from the item asked on September 14-16 1968. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 256-269] presents data from a series of trust and confidence questions, but these do not always match the data presented in the accompanying figure. There is little other information about this survey or any indication if the results were published in the media.

**Question 5 (March 11-18 1969, Czechoslovakia, N=1,638); ÚVVM**

“Please identify those individuals in public life whom you trust the most? Please choose up to five individuals.” Unprompted verbatim responses recorded. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 265] states that the “percentages were calculated in the following manner: The total number of the respondents [who] identified the particular individual for any of the five places was divided by the total number of respondents (1,638).” Other individuals recorded as being trustworthy in the Czech lands were: František Kriegel, Edvard Goldstucker, Lubomír Strougal, Pavel Kohout, Emil Zátopek, Evžen Erban, Zdeněk Mynář, Jaroslav Seifert, and others. Within Slovakia other public figures seen to be trustworthy were: O. Klokoc, Martin Dzur, and Josef Zrak. Data from this survey (and other surveys) examining the issue of workers councils was published in Rudé právo, October 1969, pp. 16-23; D. Slejška (a sociologist), Politika, September 1969, pp. 14-15; See also, D. Slejška, Reportér, April 24 1969; and M. Bártá, Odbory a společnost, 1969, 4, pp. 54-69.

**Vote Intention Questions, July 1968**

The first survey was initially based on a sample of 320 respondents who were interviewed by a team of 40 interviewers. Each interview took between 45 and 80 minutes. For unknown reasons, only 269 of the original 320 (minus 51 cases) were used in the analyses reported. The geographical scope of this survey was Eastern and Northern Bohemia, South Moravia, Prague, and Plzen. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 349, 350] appears to duplicate this survey by denoting it as “Survey 16” poll 1 and “Survey 20” (for which he provides no data), as both have the same methodological details. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 350] also states this survey was “unusual” in having a one hundred percent response rate. The second survey was based on a starting sample of 500 drawn from a register of postal addresses where every 30,000th citizen was selected for interview. Questionnaires were posted to all 500 potential respondents. The geographical scope of this survey was simply denoted as “Bohemia and Moravia”. There was a response rate of 56 per cent to this postal survey. Due to item non-response the proportion of useable questionnaires declined to 43.6 per cent of the original sample of 500, i.e. leaving 218 cases for analysis. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 349] decided to pool both samples as both were conducted simultaneously and presumably with identical questions. There is no way to check that these two assumptions are true, as there is no information available about these individual surveys. Both surveys appear to be quota samples based on age, education, and KSČ party membership. Piekalkiewicz [1972] incorrectly states this survey was undertaken on May 8-16 [Skilling 1976: 538, fn. 40].
Question: “To whom would you give your vote if there was a general election this month, based on the independent candidacy of all political parties?” The number of response options was the only difference for both items. Legend for subgroups: (1) All respondents, (2) KSČ member, (3) Not a KSČ member. NA denotes that data are not available in Piekalkiewicz [1972: 229]. There is rounding error in columns 4 and 6 (i.e. totals=98 per cent).

Data from these surveys were reported in article examining public support for capitalism, see Klímová [1969: 3]; ČSÁV výzkum / Polls 3(4), 1968, p.17. Klímová argues that support for the creation of new parties was based support for the principle of pluralism, and was not an indication of electoral support for new parties [Skilling 1976: 551, fn. 77]. Survey results are reported in Skilling [1976: 533]. Similar media items were asked in an earlier survey of Aug 4-15 1968.

It is important to note the limits of these estimates. Piekalkiewicz [1972: 246] concluded from this data that the KSČ would win a general election because it would be able to mobilise the votes of its many members. However, Skilling [1976: 545, fn. 64] notes that the KSČ in 1968 had approximately 1.5 million members; and there were 4.5 million non-members indicating that non-KSČ electoral forces could predominate if properly organised. In addition, this data does not include estimates for Slovakia and there is a high level of uncommitted voters (30 per cent).

These poll estimates indicate that KSČ electoral support was similar to that recorded in a pre-election survey in 1946 (36 per cent), and actual votes received in the elections (40.2 per cent). These survey results for 1968 suggest that popular support for the ČSL and ČSS had fallen dramatically (i.e. halved) since 1946. It is worth noting that the (defunct) Social Democrat Party had received 25 per cent support in the pre-election survey, and actual election results in 1946 indicating the potential support for a “new” party [Adamec 1966: 393-394; Skilling 1976: 554].

Information on the National Political Attitudes Survey, August 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: August 4-15 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample: National population of Czech lands aged 18 years or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size: N=2,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mode: Postal survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample type: Quota sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey organisation: Central Committee, National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of questions: 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Themes: The survey questions addressed: (a) attitudes toward reforms; (b) attitudes toward socialist democracy; (c) perceptions of external threats; (d) trust in the media; (e) attitudes toward CSL and CSS; (f) electoral system preferences; (g) attitudes toward the National Front; (h) impact of reforms on the economy.

Notes: According to Skilling [1976: 364, fn. 114] this “general poll as conducted, presumably by the National Front.” The ‘national’ sample refers to respondents who came from the Northern and Eastern Czech lands, Southern Moravia and Prague. An initial sample of 4,310 was selected and questionnaires were sent to all addresses. Within the following ten days 2,947 completed questionnaires were returned. There is no information on the sampling frame used, sampling method, definition of the respondent (individual or household), use of weighting, etc. There are also no details of who organised and implemented this research and where the results were published. It seems that some “pre-research” or pilot work was undertaken between July 6-18 1968 where there were two samples (N1=269, N2=218). The first sample refers to interviews undertaken in Eastern and Northern Czech lands, in parts of Prague and Plzen, and in Southern Moravia. The second sample refers to data from both Bohemia and Moravia (there are no other details). Piekalkiewicz [1972: 230] combined this pre-research data to give a sample N=487, and used this to report a single question. Many of the questions replicate for a national sample the questions asked to ČSL and CSS members in surveys 4 and 6 undertaken simultaneously with the same methodology. These data are quoted in Piekalkiewicz [1972: 235] and Skilling [1976: 534, 538-539]. Similar media items were asked in an earlier survey of July 8-16 1968.

Information on the ČSS Political Attitudes Survey, August 1968

| Date: August 5 to 20 1968 |
| Sample: National sample of ČSS (Czechoslovak Socialist Party) party members |
| Sample size: N=1,008 |
| Survey mode: Postal survey |
| Sample type: Random sample |
| Survey organisation: Central Committee of the National Front |
| Number of questions: 13 |

Notes: In mid 1968 the ČSS had a membership list with 18,144 members in the Czech lands. A random sample of 1,650 members were sent a questionnaire on political issues. 1,103 questionnaires were returned by post within two weeks. However, 95 respondents were rejected due to incomplete information. Therefore, data was obtained on 1,008 ČSL members, or 5.6 per cent of the total listed membership. Analysis of this survey focused on differences based on sex, age, and education. The ‘national’ sample refers to respondents who came from the Northern and Eastern Czech lands, Southern Moravia, and Prague. Many of the
Appendix – Chapter 3

Methodological Issues Regarding Aggregate Data Analysis

A number of methods have been developed for the presentation of summary statistics for survey questions with multiple response options. The estimator employed depends on two interrelated criteria. First, there is the purpose of the analysis which may range from reporting the most popular response to level of consensus on an issue evident within public opinion. Second there is the theory of the survey data. Are the data considered nominal, interval, or ratio scale? For simplicity, the question of whether the data are considered to be dominance or similarity will be ignored to keep matters simple [see, Coombs 1964]. In practice, these two aggregate analyses are combined when using an estimator. Typical examples of estimators are the following: (1) the most popular answer where the data are judged to be nominal and the mode is the estimator chosen; (2) the middle answer represented by the median is selected because the scale is seen to denote a preference and the goal is to see what option the majority prefer, here the data are considered ordinal; (3) the average answer estimated using the mean is presented, where the data are considered to be interval or ratio scale, and it makes sense to think of an average response as a useful summary measure of the attitudes of an entire sample; (4) the extent to which there is disagreement in answers given by respondent, here one may use statistical measures of dispersion such as the standard deviation to estimate disagreement or their opposite (e.g. the reciprocal of a standard deviation) as an estimator of public agreement or consensus. In each of these four cases the response options are not combined in any way, and are examined in a manner that respects the independence of the original response options.

An alternative approach is to provide an estimate of public opinion by combining the response options in sensible ways. For example, in Likert scales one might sum all of the positive (strongly agree and agree) or negative (strongly disagree and disagree) to present an estimate of those who support or oppose a specific proposition. One limitation of this estimation approach is that it ignores information inherent in the distribution of responses given in the survey data. A simple, extension of this approach is to divide the difference between positive and negative responses by the total, i.e. positive% – negative% / total%. This is of course the arithmetic mean of the response distribution. An objection to this mean estimator is that those who do not express an opinion by responding “uncertain, undecided” or “don’t know, no answer” are allowed to have the same importance as those who express a definite opinion. This may not make substan-
tive sense in situations such as elections or referendums where participation is strongly related to level of opinionation. Consequently, it may be more reasonable to estimate an arithmetic mean on the basis of all those who have opinions and ignoring those who do not. This is the logic of the ‘Acceptance Ratio’ (AR) proposed by Galtung [1976: 50-51] which may be expressed in general term as:

\[ AR = \frac{(a - b)}{(a + b)} \]

Such a strategy has sometimes been used in other areas of political science such as estimation of left-right position of parties derived from content analyses of election manifestoes [Laver and Budge 1992; Klingemann 2006]. The acceptance ratio has the merit of easy interpretation. A value of -1 suggests the public has a strong or unanimous negative opinion, while +1 indicates the opposite. An AR coefficient close to zero suggests that public opinion is close to being evenly divided, or is evenly divided when the coefficient is zero.

Conversely, one might reasonably think that data indicating respondents were uncertain or unwilling to provide a definite answer in a survey interview is an important piece of information. Lack of opinionation may be an important measure of public ambiguity or ambivalence on an issue: and this may be the defining feature of such opinion. Examples, of these types of issues are attitudes toward abortion and race in the United States. Therefore, it may make sense to weight the Acceptance Ratio estimator by those who express no definite opinions [see, Alesina et al. 2001: 9]. This yields the following: Weighted Acceptance Ratio (WAR) = \( (a - b) / (a + b) \times (1 - (dk / 100)) \) where ‘dk’ refers to “don’t know” and all non-definite responses such as uncertain, undecided, no answer, etc. This estimator ensures that the net figure receives a lower weight if the share of respondents who replied “uncertain, undecided” or “don’t know, no answer” was large.

In other situations it makes more sense to think directly about the distribution of responses. One possibility is to explore the extent to which survey data exhibits a profile that is indicative of consensus or agreement on an issue. In this respect, Granberg and Holmberg [1988] proposed a Coefficient of Consensus (CC) based on comparing the standard deviation of an observed response distribution with dispersion in a uniform distribution of the same scale. In general, CC = \( 1 - \frac{So}{Su} \) where So is the observed standard deviation and Su is that for a uniform distribution. This estimator of public opinion consensus has been criticised because estimates of the standard deviation in rating scales with a fixed number of categories capture not only the dispersion in the data, but also skewness; and thus the CC is not a valid and reliable measure of disagreement. This is because in highly skewed distributions where the mean is located close to one end of the scale a small number of cases at the opposite end of the same scale can have a disproportionately strong effect on the standard deviation estimated. This makes the observed data distribution appear more dispersed (implying greater public disagreement) than is probable in reality. Alternatively, in a less skewed response distribution those cases that are different from the mean have a disproportionately small effect because the data are less peaked and their influence is essentially ‘masked’. As a result, public opinion has the appearance of greater consensus than is really the case. There have been two solutions proposed for the problems associated with the Coefficient of Consensus (CC).

In the first solution, Thomassen and Jennings [1989] proposed an alternative measure of attitudinal homogeneity based on dividing the observed response data into two categories: (a) the modal category and, (b) an adjacent one that contains by definition the second largest number of cases. This approach has two main problems of its own [quoted in van der Eijk 2001: 339 fn.2]. First, this homogeneity measure loses discrimination power if the number of cases defining the modal and adjacent categories becomes small and it says nothing about the distribution of the remaining data which may contain most responses. Second, the absolute value of the homogeneity measure is determined by the size of the scale examined (i.e. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 or 11 point scales yield different estimates of homogeneity) and make it unsuitable for inter-scale comparison.

In a second solution van der Eijk [2001] developed a measure of Perceptual or Preferential Agreement (PA) through two general steps: (1) decomposing empirical survey data distributions into components that are of an ideal type, (2) estimating consensus among responses in the ideal decomposed components in a valid and reliable manner. The key feature of this approach is the representation of observed response distributions as a weighted set of ideal distributions (i.e. uniform, unimodal, bimodal, and multimodal). These ideal distributions or components are weighted and then summed together to yield the observed response profile or distribution. The central advantage of this approach is that it is much easier to validly estimate agreement coefficients for a set of ideal distributions weighted on the basis of their contribution to the final solution, than it is to estimate an agreement statistic for the empirical one directly as Granberg and Holmberg [1988] attempted. The Perceptual Agreement statistic (PA) has an intuitive meaning. It ranges from -1 indicating complete disagreement to +1 denoting complete public agreement. Values close to zero suggest no public consensus.

This overview of the methods used to estimate aggregate measures of agreement or consensus within public opinion reveals that the coefficient used can have important consequences on the results obtained, and the substantive interpretation of the results reported. Ornauer et al. [1976] mainly employed Galtung’s Acceptance Ratio (AR) coefficient where attitude scales are treated as nominal scales of positive and negative responses. Here the “uncertain” middle answers are ignored as not providing substantively interesting information about public opinion. The
goal is to provide a summary measure of net opinion. In contrast, van der Eijk’s [2001] Perceptual Agreement statistic (PA) would treat all scales as ordinal and uncertain responses are included in the estimation of the public opinion consensus measure. However, the “don’t know” and “no answer” responses are excluded from analysis as they provide no information concerning public perceptions or preferences. This limitation may be overcome by using WAR, as noted earlier. The Perceptual Agreement statistic (PA) indicates the extent of consensus within public opinion and gives no information concerning net opinion. In sum, Gal- tung’s [1976] acceptance ratio and van der Eijk’s [2001] agreement statistics are complimentary in providing summary measures of the direction and consensus of public opinion on an issue. Consequently, both coefficients will be reported in the aggregate data analyses presented along with other appropriate measures.

### Table 3.2 Public opinion regarding technocratic solutions for attaining economic and security goals, 1967-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Communist states</th>
<th>Liberal democratic states</th>
<th>Ath#</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ČSSR</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Images of the World in the Year 2000 Surveys, 1967-1970. Q.16: We would like to know what you feel about the likely advances in science by the year 2000. Do you feel that ... (d1) In the year 2000 scientific knowledge will make it possible to decide in advance the economic development of a country? (d2) Would you like scientific knowledge to make this possible? (e1) In the year 2000 scientific knowledge will make it possible to organize the world so that there will be no wars? (e2) Would you like scientific knowledge to make this possible? The response options: (1) Yes, (2) Uncertain, (3) No, (0) Don’t know.

* Estimates for Poland were derived from the pre-test sample (N=100) as these items were not included in the national questionnaire.

Note the following country codes. ČSSR: Czechoslovakia; ČR: Czech lands; SK: Slovakia; PL: Poland; YU: Yugoslavia (Slovenia); GB: Britain; D: West Germany (FRG); SF: Finland; J: Japan; NL: Netherlands; N: Norway; and E: Spain. # Spain had an authoritarian form of government between 1939 and 1975. Please note that DK refers to the proportion of non-committal responses, i.e. uncertain, don’t know and no answer. Mode refers to the most popular or modal response among those giving definite answers.
Table 3.3 Comparison of public evaluations of future social development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Communist states</th>
<th>Liberal democratic states</th>
<th>Ath#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ČSSR</td>
<td>ČR</td>
<td>SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. More happiness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. More unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. More social convergence</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c. More social stratification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
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<td>-0.17</td>
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<td>FA</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>Less</td>
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<tr>
<td>3a. More gender equality</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>0.24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b. More opportunities for young</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Q.13: What do you think will be the situation in your country by the year 2000? Do you think that ... (a) People will have more or less happy than they have today? (m) There will be more unemployment or less unemployment than there is today? (n) People will be more similar or less similar to each other than they are today? (0) There will be more difference or less difference between people high up and people low down in society than there is today? Response options: (1) More, (2) About as now, (3) Less, (0) Don’t know.

Q.14: What do you think will be the situation in your country by the year 2000? Do you think that ... (a) It will be more common or less common with women in leading positions than it is today? (b) It will be more common or less common with young people in leading positions than it is today? Response options: (1) More, (2) About as now, (3) Less, (0) Don’t know.

Note country codes and statistical estimates are broadly the same as in Table 3.2.

* The modal response for Poland was both ‘more’ and ‘less’ indicating that public opinion was equally divided, thus no clear popular response can be reported.
Table 3.4 Sense of political efficacy and scope of political interest at the individual, group, and national levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>AR</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>Level of personal interest</th>
<th>Level of national interest</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. INDIVIDUAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sense of efficacy</td>
<td>Level of influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of national interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
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<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. GENERATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National progress</td>
<td>Level of influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>More realistic</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
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<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
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<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.80</td>
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<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


INDIVIDUAL: Q37: Do you expect your own future to be determined predominantly by what you yourself make of it or by external events and circumstances over which you have little control? Response options: (1) Predominantly by what you do yourself, (2) Predominantly by external circumstances, (0) Don’t know. Q38a: Do you think that you personally have too little, adequate or too much influence on the public affairs of your country? Response options: (1) Too little, (2) Adequate, (3) Too much, (0) Don’t know. Q40: What do you think is the best thing for you personally to do? Response options: (1) To be concerned with all matters of general interest, (2) To be concerned only with matters of interest to you personally, (3) Or to adjust only to what happens around you? (4) Don’t know.

GENERATION: Q35: Do you think they [younger generation] will promote domestic progress and development more, about the same or less than the older generation? Response options; (1) More, (2) About the same, (3) The will be worse than the older generation of today, (0) Don’t know. Q36: Who do you think has the most realistic view of the world today: the younger generation or the older generation? Response options: (1) Younger generation, (2) Older generation, (0) Don’t know. Q40b: Do you think that the younger generation have too little, adequate or too much influence on the public affairs of your country? Response options: (1) Too little, (2) Adequate, (3) Too much, (0) Don’t know. Q41: What do you think is the best thing for your country to do? Response options: (1) To be concerned with matters of interest to all countries, (2) To be concerned only with matters of direct interest to your country, (3) Or to adjust only to what happens around you? (4) Don’t know.

Note country codes and statistical estimates are the same as in Table 3.2.
## Appendix – Chapter 4

### Overview of the Common Survey Questions Asked in 1968 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent candidacy</td>
<td>Q.3 Do you agree or disagree with the fact that every citizen should have the opportunity to stand for the public offices of members of the National Committee or National Assembly, without being nominated by someone?</td>
<td>Q.1 Do you agree or disagree that each citizen should have the possibility to stand for election to the Chamber of Deputies without being put forward a political party?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No censorship</td>
<td>Q.4 Do you think that is correct or incorrect if state authorities deem it appropriate, may limit the freedom of the press, free expression, or the right of assembly?</td>
<td>Q.2 Do you think that it is right or wrong that State institutions should be able to restrict the press, free speech and right of assembly?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local elections</td>
<td>Q.5 If you were asked if you would be a candidate for a public function in your community would you accept this nomination?</td>
<td>Q.3 If you were asked if you would be a candidate for a public function in your community would you accept this nomination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional elections</td>
<td>Q.6 If you were asked if you would be a candidate for a public function in your region would you accept this nomination?</td>
<td>Q.4 If you were asked if you would be a candidate for a public function in your region would you accept this nomination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National elections</td>
<td>Q.7 If you were asked to run for a public or other function at the national level would you accept this nomination?</td>
<td>Q.5 If you were asked if you run for public office in elections to the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate as a candidate, would you accept this nomination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppressing minority views</td>
<td>Q.9 Do you consider it right for a minority, even if it is convinced of the rightness of its opinions, should be subjected to majority decisions and the minority should not resist enforcement of such a decision?</td>
<td>Q.6 Do you consider it right to a minority, even if it is convinced of the rightness of their view, to subject it to majority decisions and the minority should not stop the promotion of the majority view?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest representation</td>
<td>Q.12 We are interested in your opinion on this question: An independent organisation (or organisations) seeks to promote and secure their interests. Do you think it is right or wrong to allow them to do so?</td>
<td>Q.7 We are interested in your opinion on this question: A group of people that want to promote and satisfy their interests and needs decides to establish an independent organization. Do you think it is right or wrong to allow them to do so?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics not influence life</td>
<td>Q.14 Do you think that politics should have the right to influence all aspects of social life?</td>
<td>Q.8 Do you think that politics should have the right to influence all aspects of social life?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views on status quo</td>
<td>Q.15 Do you think that it is right or wrong to allow the public expression of opinions that are not socialist?</td>
<td>Q.9 Do you think it is right or wrong to express opinions in public that go against the current system of democratic governance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest for civil rights</td>
<td>Q.16 Do you think it is right or wrong for citizens of our republic to defend their civil rights, through strikes if necessary?</td>
<td>Q.10 Do you think it is right or wrong for citizens to defend their civil rights through actions that the government would define as being illegal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest against status quo</td>
<td>Q.17 Some people today say that there should be action taken against those opposing the democratic process. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?</td>
<td>Q.11 Some people now say that action should be taken against those who are against the current system of democratic governance. Do you agree or disagree with this view?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal politics</td>
<td>Q.18 Do you think that politics concerns you personally?</td>
<td>Q.12 Do you think that politics concerns you personally?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political pluralism – status quo</td>
<td>Q.19: Currently there are many different, even conflicting views on political events in our country. What is your view? It is right that public policy has one position binding on all, or is it right that several groups each with their own preferences should vie with one another?</td>
<td>Q.13 Do you agree that action should be taken against those who seek to change the current political system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>Q.20 Do you think that privacy and their family rather than participating in public life?</td>
<td>Q.14 Do you think this argument is correct: Today, the world is changing so quickly and is so complicated that it is often difficult to decide which rules of civil and social life we have considered are correct?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free expression for all</td>
<td>Q.21 Do you agree with the opinion, which calls for citizens who hold political opinions other than those held by the majority to be restricted in some ways, such as limiting their ability to establish associations or organisations, or scope to speak on the radio, etc.?</td>
<td>Q.15 Do you agree with the opinion, which calls for citizens who hold political opinions other than those held by the majority to be restricted in some ways, such as limiting their ability to establish associations or organisations, if they wish to speak in public, etc.?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the question text used in 1968 and 2008 is the same for six items (i.e. questions 3-4, 8, 12, 14 and 20 using 2008 question numbering); “mildly different” for seven items (i.e. questions 1-2, 5-7, 18-19); and “different” for the remaining seven items (i.e. questions 9-11, 13, 15-17). The term “mildly different” refers to items that have slightly different wording but have the same meaning. In contrast, “different” relates to questions that have the same functional meaning but the wording used is not the same.
Interpretation of the Czech multidimensional unfolding map for 1968

### Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

#### Quadrant #1: Low sense of efficacy with Pluralism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Dim 1</th>
<th>Dim 2</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>q_18_m: Personal politics</td>
<td>-10.788</td>
<td>7.035</td>
<td>Q.18 Do you think that politics concerns you personally? [no to yes]</td>
<td>Politics does not concern me personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>q_27_m: Does not express views</td>
<td>-9.732</td>
<td>2.270</td>
<td>Q.27 Do you express an opinion in public, if you have one, rather than be quiet and solely listen to the discussion of others? [passive to active]</td>
<td>Not active in expressing own opinion in public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>q_5_s: Local elections</td>
<td>-8.750</td>
<td>1.347</td>
<td>Q.5 If you were asked if would you be a candidate for a public function in your community would you accept this nomination? [no to yes]</td>
<td>Would not volunteer to be a local election candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>q_6_s: Regional elections</td>
<td>-6.733</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>Q.6 If you were asked if you would be a candidate for a public function in your region would you accept this nomination? [no to yes]</td>
<td>Would not volunteer to be a regional election candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>q_7_m: National elections</td>
<td>-5.121</td>
<td>-1.674</td>
<td>Q.7 If you were asked to run for a public or other function at the national level would you accept this nomination? [no to yes]</td>
<td>Would not volunteer to be a national election candidate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Quadrant #2: High sense of political efficacy with Pluralism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Dim 1</th>
<th>Dim 2</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>q_25_d: External political efficacy</td>
<td>10.754</td>
<td>3.355</td>
<td>Q.25 Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Today things are changing so rapidly and are so complex that often a person knows only with difficulty from current arrangements those statements and programmes that can be considered correct? [Agree to disagree]</td>
<td>High sense of external efficacy or knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>q_21_d: Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>9.722</td>
<td>2.322</td>
<td>Q.21 Do you think this argument is correct: Today, the world is changing so quickly and is so complicated that it is often difficult to decide which rules of civil and social life we have considered are correct? [yes to no]</td>
<td>High sense of internal efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>q_4_m: No censorship</td>
<td>4.194</td>
<td>3.682</td>
<td>Q.4 Do you think that is correct or incorrect if state authorities deem it appropriate, may limit the freedom of the press, free expression, or the right of assembly? [correct to incorrect]</td>
<td>No censorship</td>
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</table>

#### Quadrant #2 continued...

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<tr>
<th>ID</th>
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<th>Dim 1</th>
<th>Dim 2</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
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<td>6</td>
<td>q_9_m: Suppressing minority views</td>
<td>3.292</td>
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<td>Q.9 Do you consider it right for a minority, even if it is convinced of the rightness of its opinions, should be subjected to majority decisions and the minority should not resist enforcement of such a decision? [no to yes]</td>
<td>Support minority rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>q_14_s: Politics not influence life</td>
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<td>7.105</td>
<td>Q.14 Do you think that politics should have the right to influence all aspects of social life? [yes to no]</td>
<td>Politics no right to influence all life</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>q_26_m: Support private sphere</td>
<td>-5.485</td>
<td>5.201</td>
<td>Q.26 Some of our citizens do not want to participate in public life and devote themselves instead to privacy and their family. Is it right, if they are condemned by society for doing this? [no to yes]</td>
<td>Support private sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>q_22_d: Free expression for all</td>
<td>4.915</td>
<td>5.400</td>
<td>Q.22 Do you agree with the opinion, which calls for citizens who hold political opinions other than those held by the majority to be restricted in some ways, such as limiting their ability to establish associations or organisations, or scope to speak on the radio, etc.? [agree to disagree]</td>
<td>Free expression for all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Quadrant #3: High sense of political efficacy with monism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Dim 1</th>
<th>Dim 2</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>q_17_d: Protest against status quo</td>
<td>2.067</td>
<td>-7.616</td>
<td>Q.17 Some people today say that there should be action taken against those opposing the democratic process. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?</td>
<td>Oppose action against opponents of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>q_3_m: Independent candidacy</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>-9.663</td>
<td>Q.3 Do you agree or disagree with the fact that every citizen should have the opportunity to stand for the public offices of members of the National Committee or National Assembly, without being nominated by someone?</td>
<td>Disagree with having independent candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>q_15_d: Views on status quo</td>
<td>4.061</td>
<td>-10.426</td>
<td>Q.15 Do you think that it is right or wrong to allow the public expression of opinions that are not socialist?</td>
<td>Oppose allowing the expression of non-socialist opinions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Quadrant #3 continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Dim 1</th>
<th>Dim 2</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>q.19_d: Political pluralism – status quo</td>
<td>3.138</td>
<td>-11.583</td>
<td>Q.19: Currently there are many different, even conflicting views on political events in our country. What is your view? Is it right that public policy has one position binding on all, or is it right that several groups each with their own preferences should vie with one another?</td>
<td>Oppose political pluralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Quadrant #4: Low sense of political efficacy with monism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Dim 1</th>
<th>Dim 2</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>q.12_m: Interest representation</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-12.619</td>
<td>Q.12 We are interested in your opinion on this question. An independent organisation (or organisations) seeks to promote and secure their interests. Do you think it is right or wrong to allow them to do so? (right to wrong)</td>
<td>Disagree with plural interest representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>q.16_d: Protest for civil rights</td>
<td>-2.035</td>
<td>-12.762</td>
<td>Q.16 Do you think it is right for citizens of our republic to defend their civil rights, through strikes if necessary? (wrong to right)</td>
<td>Reject right to defend civil rights through strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>q.23_d: Multiparty system</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-13.436</td>
<td>Q.23 The leading force in the implementation of democratisation of life in our country is the Czechoslovak Communist Party. In your opinion, would the guarantees of democracy still be consistent if there were other influential political parties besides the Czechoslovak Communist Party? ([no to yes])</td>
<td>Oppose creation of a multiparty democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>q.28_s: Political pluralism – opinions</td>
<td>-1.821</td>
<td>-13.958</td>
<td>Q.28 Do you think it is right or wrong that every group in society should have the right to express their opinions and interests in public life? (wrong to right)</td>
<td>Oppose expression of group ideas and interests (political pluralism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Stress and fit statistics for the multidimensional unfolding model of socio-economic and political opinion questions, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Czech lands</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iterations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>557</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Function Value</td>
<td>Stress part</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Penalty part</td>
<td>1.700</td>
<td>1.633</td>
<td>1.654</td>
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<tr>
<td>Function Value Parts</td>
<td>Normalize stress</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kruskal’s stress-I</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.419</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kruskal’s stress-II</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>1.657</td>
<td>2.597</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young’s S-stress-I</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young’s S-stress-II</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badness of Fit</td>
<td>Dispersion accounted for</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variance accounted for</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recovered preference orders</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spearman’s Rho</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kendall’s Tau-b</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation Coefficients</td>
<td>Variation proximities</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variation transformed proximities</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variation distances</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degeneracy Indices</td>
<td>Sum-of-Squares of DeSarbo’s Intermixedness Indices</td>
<td>1.657</td>
<td>1.488</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shepard’s Rough Nondegeneracy Index</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note diagnostic statistics for MDU models presented in Figure 4.2. Overall these statistical measures suggest that the models estimated do not strongly violate the assumptions underpinning MDU, and the model fit is reasonable.
## Appendix – Chapter 5

### Size of Populations and Samples (count, percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Population (individuals)</th>
<th>Random sample</th>
<th>Sample interviewed</th>
<th>Final sample</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>450 (41%)</td>
<td>70 (16%)</td>
<td>51 (11%)</td>
<td>43 (10%)</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>248 (23%)</td>
<td>75 (30%)</td>
<td>75 (30%)</td>
<td>75 (30%)</td>
<td>+16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>392 (36%)</td>
<td>77 (20%)</td>
<td>89 (23%)</td>
<td>75 (19%)</td>
<td>+3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,090 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>222</strong></td>
<td><strong>215</strong></td>
<td><strong>193</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the percentages in parentheses in the ‘random sample’, ‘sample interviewed’, and ‘final samples’ refer to the population, e.g. 70/450 = 16%, and are not column percentages that sum to one hundred. These four columns refer to successive steps in the elite survey research design and implementation yielding the final data set. This data in this table provide a measure of the degree to which the representativeness of the original ‘population’, or total sampling frame, changed through implementation of the research design. The ‘sample interviewed’ differs from the ‘random sample’ because 31 respondents (14% of the random sample) could not be interviewed. A strategy of respondent substitution was used where 24 additional individuals were added to the random sample. Not all of these substituted respondents were selected randomly. The ‘final sample’ indicates changes in the sample due to post-interview problems where 22 interviews were removed from the final dataset. ‘Diff.’ refers to the difference between the initial (population) sampling frame and the final sample. The Diff. estimates show that political elites are under-represented and mass media are most over-represented. This evidence suggests the data quality for the political elites is likely to be less valid and reliable when compared to the other two sectors, but says nothing about the data quality in absolute terms as there is insufficient evidence to judge the validity and reliability of the ‘population’ estimates.

### Timing of elite interviews by sector (count)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Timing of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Representatives</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(politicians)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(journalists, etc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectuals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(artists, scientists, etc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that ‘0’ denotes interview timing is unknown; 1: Before March 31 1969; 2: March 31 to April 17 1969; 3: April 18 to May 5 1969; and 4: After May 5 1969. This table shows that most political elite interviews (86%) were undertaken between May 5 and early July 1969 when the process of purging the KSČ/KSS had begun in earnest. In contrast, more than half of the mass media interviews (61%) were completed before March 31 when there was still public opposition to the Warsaw Pact Troops presence. Almost all the interviews with intellectuals (88%) occurred after Husák’s rise to power, i.e. after April 18 when the level of repression increased.
Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

Appendices

would like to know their (a) age, (b) education, (c) occupation, and (d) function at work.

In a similar manner, imagine three persons with whom you in the last few months have discussed most often important social and political questions. Again I would like to know their (a) age, (b) education, (c) occupation, and (d) function at work.

Q.64a /v368-371, v373-376, v378-381 – Special Discussion Partner (SDP)
In your answers to the last two questions you kindly gave us some information about people with whom you have discussed problems in your field and social and political problems. Having knowledge of their names would help us substantially in compiling our sample. Would you be willing to tell me their name? First, what are the names of the persons you had in mind when answering question 62? Second, what are the names of the persons you had in mind when answering question 63?

Response rates to sociometric questions in the Czechoslovak Opinion Makers Survey, January – July 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociometric Questions</th>
<th>Maximum number of nominations possible (M)</th>
<th>Number of nominations actually chosen (N)</th>
<th>Response rate to sociometric questions (N/M*100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.62/S64a: Special Discussion Partner in own field (SDP)</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.63/S64b: General Discussion Partner on social and political problems (GDP)</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.61: Special Influence in own field (SI)</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.60: General Influence on social and political problems (GI)</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note the maximum number of nominations possible is estimated on the basis that 193 respondents were given the opportunity to indicate a maximum of 3 nominations for all four sociometric items (193*3=579). Illner [1970] in an unpublished preliminary analysis of the sociometric data reports very similar results, however, the maximum number of nominations for GI is stated to be 354 yielding a much higher response rate of about 80 per cent. Unfortunately, it is not clear where this maximum figure derives as it suggests less than two nominations per respondent (M=386), and so the maximum choices evident in the dataset (M=579) is recorded here.

Communist party membership by sector and time of interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note estimates are count data. Zero ‘0’ denotes interview timing is unknown; 1: Before March 31 1969; 2: March 31 to April 17 1969; 3: April 18 to May 5 1969; and 4: After May 5 1969. The column entitled ‘member’ refers to membership of either the KSČ or KSS at the time of interview. Former membership of these parties was a response option, but was selected by a single (mass media) respondent. This table shows that almost a third (14/42=32%) of the politicians interviewed after May 5 were not members of the Communist Party suggesting either a selection effect or evidence of a purge.

Sociometric Questions

Introduction: As we have already pointed out earlier, you are a person whose help is invaluable in our research of public opinion-making in this country. As we would like to get an idea also about other individuals influencing the opinion-making process, we are going to ask you now some questions concerning mutual contacts among opinion makers.

Q.60 /v340-342 - General Influence (GI)
Could you please tell me the names of three people who have had greatest influence on your opinions on important social and political problems? Note, that deceased persons may also be mentioned.

Q.61 /v344-345 – Special Influence (SI)
And could you tell us the names of three people who have had the greatest influence on your opinions in your field? (1) General influential person, (2) Special influential person.

Q.62 – Special Discussion Partner (SDP)
Now, we would like to ask you to imagine three persons with whom, in the last months, you most often have discussed important problems in your field. We

[344]
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### Appendices

#### Dyadic constraint estimates for tie among Czechoslovak elite sectors, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Line-Id</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.50328</td>
<td>Foreigners.Intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.45616</td>
<td>Functionaries.Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.43315</td>
<td>Economists.Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.36173</td>
<td>Others.Intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.34550</td>
<td>Deceased.Intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.32601</td>
<td>Intellectuals.Deceased</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.30286</td>
<td>Administrators.Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.29594</td>
<td>Journalists.Intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.25762</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.19662</td>
<td>Foreigners.Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.18344</td>
<td>Journalists.Deceased</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.17250</td>
<td>Others.Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.16836</td>
<td>Legislators.Deceased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.16201</td>
<td>Intellectuals.Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.15826</td>
<td>Administrators.Intellectuals</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.15335</td>
<td>Legislators.Intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.14848</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.13507</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.12136</td>
<td>Deceased.Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.11588</td>
<td>Economists.Intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.10659</td>
<td>Deceased.Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.10005</td>
<td>Journalists.Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.09484</td>
<td>Legislators.Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.09161</td>
<td>Intellectuals.Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.09076</td>
<td>Journalists.Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.09023</td>
<td>Functionaries.Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.07911</td>
<td>Administrators.Journalists</td>
</tr>
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<td>28</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.06615</td>
<td>Others.Legislators</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.05585</td>
<td>Functionaries.Intellectuals</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.05481</td>
<td>Legislators.Private</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.04582</td>
<td>Economists.Journalists</td>
</tr>
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**Rank Line Value Line-Id**

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Appendix – Chapter 6

Socio-economic and political opinion questions, Q.17-27 /v132-142

Now we will give you some opinions on various questions. We are interested in how much you agree or disagree with these opinions, that is, whether you (a) strongly agree, (b) agree, (d) disagree, or (e) strongly disagree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
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<th>Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.17</td>
<td>A majority of people are only interested in material gain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Materialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.18</td>
<td>Differences in income should be decreased</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.19</td>
<td>A workers son does not have much hope in getting on in society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.20</td>
<td>Necessary to take strong measures against improper behaviour by young people</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.21</td>
<td>More rapid economic development requires increased central authority</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.22</td>
<td>More rapid economic development requires significant limitations on personal freedom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.23</td>
<td>The progress of society requires the rebellious ideas of young people</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.24</td>
<td>In general the majority of people can be trusted</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.25</td>
<td>A high standard of living is the most important and ultimate goal of society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Materialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.26</td>
<td>There should be an upper limit on income so that no one can earn much more than others</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.27</td>
<td>It’s long term economic development that should be the most important goal of every country</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Materialism</td>
</tr>
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Note that the column (+/-) denotes whether the item had a positive or negative tone where it is expected that preferences on similarly coded items should be similar. The “theme” of each question is a coding of the substantive content being measured with each item.
### Descriptive statistics for socio-economic and political opinion questions, Q.17-27 /v132-142

#### All respondents (N=193)

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<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Perceptual Agreement</th>
<th>Int. Median</th>
<th>Arith. Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Modal Response</th>
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Mass and Elite Attitudes during the Prague Spring Era: Importance and Legacy

Stress and fit statistics for the multidimensional unfolding model of socio-economic and political opinion questions, Q.17-27 /v132-142

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<th>Statistic</th>
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<td>Kruskal’s Stress-II</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Young’s S-Stress-II</td>
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<td>Goodness of Fit</td>
<td>Dispersion Accounted For</td>
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<td>Variance Accounted For</td>
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<td>Recovered Preference Orders</td>
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<td>Spearman’s Rho</td>
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<td>Kendall’s Tau-b</td>
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Note that these statistics provide estimates of (a) the appropriateness of applying an unfolding model to this data, and (b) how well the unfolding model estimated fits the preferences observed in the data.

Stress and fit statistics for the multidimensional scaling model of most important values in life questions, Q.13a-1-3 /v120-122

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<td>Stress-II</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-Stress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dispersion Accounted For (D.A.F.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker’s Coefficient of Congruence</td>
<td>0.986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROXSCAL minimizes Normalized Raw Stress:

\[ a \text{ Optimal scaling factor} = 1.029 \]

\[ b \text{ Optimal scaling factor} = 0.962 \]

Most important values and ideals questions, Q.13 /v120-122

Here is indicated a list of values and ideals which some people consider important in their life. Choose THREE which you consider most important and put them in order.

1. ‘Work for economic development of society’ (MIV_econ)
2. ‘Avoid conflict and maintain good interpersonal relations’ (MIV_ipr)
3. ‘Sacrifice self for collective interests’ (MIV_coll)
4. ‘Priority of state over local needs’ (MIV_state)
5. ‘Honesty and truthfulness in public life’ (MIV_truth)
6. ‘Assist citizen participation in community decisions’ (MIV_comm)
7. ‘Strive against social and economic inequality’ (MIV_ineq)
8. ‘Seek new answers to problems and not accept status quo’ (MIV_ans)
9. ‘Don’t know’

Absolute count data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most important value in life (3 mentions)</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avoid conflict and maintain good interpersonal relations</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacrifice self for collective interests</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Priority of state over local needs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty and truthfulness in public life</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assist citizen participation in community decisions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strive against social and economic inequality</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek new answers to problems and not accept status quo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row percentages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most important value in life (3 mentions)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work for economic development of society</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid conflict and maintain good interpersonal relations</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacrifice self for collective interests</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority of state over local needs</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honesty and truthfulness in public life</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist citizen participation in community decisions</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strive against social and economic inequality</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seek new answers to problems and not accept status quo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that column percentage estimates are reported in Table 6.3.

Note that ‘1’ refers to members of Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, ‘2’ respondents employed in the mass media, and ‘3’ denoted intellectuals (i.e. artists, writers and scientists).
## Classification of survey questions on the basis of the multi-dimensional unfolding analysis into two preference dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension 1: Social (ego-centric to sociotropic preferences)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ego-centric (negative)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism (-) q.17: A majority of people are only interested in material gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality (-) q.19: A workers son does not have much hope in getting on in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom (+) q.23: The progress of society requires the rebellious ideas of young people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (+) q.24: In general the majority of people can be trusted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension 2: Economic (ego-centric to sociotropic preferences)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ego-centric (positive)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism (-) q.17: A majority of people are only interested in material gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality (-) q.19: A workers son does not have much hope in getting on in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom (-) q.22: More rapid economic development requires significant limitations on personal freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality (+/-) q.26: There should be an upper limit on income so that no one can earn much more than others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in parentheses refer to values for the items given in Figure 6.1 and denote opposite ends of the hypothesized economic and social dimensions. Survey items listed in descending order of loading on a dimension.

---

## Classification of survey questions on the basis of the multidimensional unfolding analysis into a four-fold elite preferences typology

1. **Social Liberal and economic conservative**
   - Equality (-) q.19: A workers son does not have much hope in getting on in society
   - Freedom (+) q.23: The progress of society requires the rebellious ideas of young people
   - Trust (+) q.24: In general the majority of people can be trusted

2. **Conservative in social and economic matters**
   - Freedom (-) q.22: More rapid economic development requires significant limitations on personal freedom
   - Equality (+/-) q.26: There should be an upper limit on income so that no one can earn much more than others
   - Equality (+) q.18: Differences in income should be decreased

3. **Economic Liberal and social conservative**
   - Control (+) q.21: More rapid economic development requires increased central authority
   - Materialism (+) q.27: It’s long term economic development that should be the most important goal of every country
   - Materialism (-) q.25: A high standard of living is the most important and ultimate goal of society

4. **Liberal in social and economic matters**
   - Materialism (-) q.17: A majority of people are only interested in material gain
   - Materialism (-) q.25: A high standard of living is the most important and ultimate goal of society

Note that this four-fold classification refers to the quadrants in Figure 6.1 moving clockwise from top left, to top right, to bottom right, and finishing at bottom left.
Classification of survey questions on the basis of the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) analysis into two value dimensions

**Dimension 1: Decision-making (conflict to consensus)**
- **Conflict (negative)**
  - MIV_state: priority of state over local needs
  - MIV_ans: seek new answers to problems and not accept status quo
  - MIV_econ: work for economic development of society
- **Consensus (positive)**
  - MIV_coll: sacrifice self for collective interests
  - MIV_comm: assist citizen participation in community decisions
  - MIV_truth: honesty and truthfulness in public life
  - MIV_ipr: avoid conflict and maintain good interpersonal relations
  - MIV_ineq: strive against social and economic inequality

**Dimension 2: Policy goals (development to promote equality)**
- **Development (positive)**
  - MIV_econ: work for economic development of society
  - MIV_ipr: avoid conflict and maintain good interpersonal relations
  - MIV_state: priority of state over local needs
  - MIV_truth: honesty and truthfulness in public life
  - MIV_comm: assist citizen participation in community decisions
- **Promote equality (negative)**
  - MIV_ineq: strive against social and economic inequality
  - MIV_ans: seek new answers to problems and not accept status quo
  - MIV_coll: sacrifice self for collective interests

Note that the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in parentheses refer to values for the items given in Figure 6.2 and denote opposite ends of the hypothesized economic and social dimensions. Survey items listed in descending order of loading on a dimension.
Appendix – Chapter 7

Please note that details of the common questions asked in 1968 and 2008 are given in the appendix for chapter 4.

Survey Questions Comparing the Events of 1968 and 1989

Q.23 In connection with the Prague Spring of 1968 there are frequently different views on what was its main purpose. On a scale from 0-10, where (0) means that the main purpose of the Prague Spring was limited to reforming the system for the purpose of maintaining it, and (10) says that the Prague Spring was about bringing about a revolutionary change in the political system. Please indicate on this scale your own view.

Q.24 Some people argue that the Prague Spring of 1968 was an elite movement while others suggest it was a mass movement. On a scale from 0-10, where (0) stands for the argument that the Prague Spring was elite movement led by some senior members of a Czechoslovak Communist Party and (10) argues that the Prague Spring was a mass movement. Please indicate on this scale your own opinion.

Q.25 What do you think was the primary objective of the Prague Spring of 1968? On a scale from 0-10, where (0) stands for the argument that the primary objective of the Prague Spring was political change and (10) maintains that the primary objective of the Prague Spring was economic change. Please indicate on this scale your own opinion.

Q.27 In the context of the Velvet revolution there are often different views as to what was its principal goal. On a scale from 0-10, where (0) means that the main purpose of the Velvet Revolution was reform of the (communist) system and (10) indicates that its purpose was a revolutionary change. Please indicate on this scale your own opinion.

Q.28 There is also a disagreement over whether the Velvet Revolution was a reform movement led by dissidents, or was a mass movement. On a scale from 0-10, where (0) means that the Velvet Revolution was a reform movement led by dissidents and (10) indicates that the Velvet Revolution was a mass movement please indicate on this scale your own opinion.

Q.29 What do you think was the primary objective of the Velvet Revolution? On a scale from 0-10, where (0) stands for the argument that the primary objective of the Velvet Revolution was political change and (10) maintains that the primary objective of the Velvet Revolution was economic change. Please indicate on this scale your own opinion.

Q.30 On a scale from 0-10, where (0) means that the 1989 Velvet Revolution was a direct consequence of the Prague Spring of 1968, and (10) indicates that the Velvet Revolution was a separate and independent event from the Prague Spring 1968, please indicate on this scale your opinion.
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This monograph examines mass and elite opinion before and during the Prague Spring era with a unique collection of survey datasets. This research has four key findings. First, public opinion on the eve of the Prague Spring reforms in 1967 was politically engaged and was in favour of change. Second, citizens’ political attitudes in May 1968 were supportive of key features of multiparty democracy, and these attitudes are broadly similar to those evident in the Czech Republic today. Third, public support for political reform was complex where citizens exhibited hopes for greater liberalization but were cognizant of the limits constraining reform. Fourth, the Prague Spring elite differed in terms of background but exhibited consensus with regard to political outlook. This empirical research fits with the new wave of historical work that emphasizes the importance of social change in understanding the Prague Spring era, and demonstrates the continuity in Czech citizens’ political attitudes under both communism and liberal democracy.

Cover photograph was taken in a park in Prague on July 29 1968. The caption on the pram declares „Dubcek don’t give up.“ Photograph courtesy of ČTK Fotobanka.

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