As an outcome of a five-year international research project “RECON – Reconstituting democracy in Europe”, this volume presents country case studies from Central and East European (CEE) and comparative findings on the transformation of collective identities in this part of Europe under the conditions of an enlarging Europe. The main aim of the present publication is to show how the emerging collective European identity is correlated with the processes of democratization and Europeanization. The underlying assumption here is that the EU enlargement process and EU democratization projects often clash with national and cosmopolitan concepts of identities. Relying on a large number of primary and secondary data and fieldwork research, as well as by the use of quantitative and qualitative methodology (and an innovative Q-method), the chapters collected in this volume raise questions about the relationship between identities and the ongoing transformation of democracy in Europe. In particular, they provide insights into the influence of Europeanization and globalization on national and regional identities; the existing and new links between democratization, EU accession, and the transformation of collective identities in CEE; the role of national elites, public, and the media in the identity transformation; and the salience of regional, national, supranational, and global components of collective identities in the context of the EU.
The Nexus between Democracy, Collective Identity Formation, and EU Enlargement
The Nexus between Democracy, Collective Identity Formation, and EU Enlargement

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## Introduction: Democratization, Collective Identity Formation, and the EU Enlargement

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List of Abbreviations

ASCR – Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
CEO – Chief Executive Officer
EC – European Commission
ECR – Union for the Europe of Nations (Poland)
ELTE – Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest
EP – European Parliament
EPP – European People’s Party
ESS – European Social Survey
EU – European Union
EVS – European Values Study
IntUne – *Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe*
Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary
JUK – Jagellonian University in Cracow
LMP – Politics Can Be Something Else (Hungarian Green Party)
MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum
MEP – Member of the European Parliament
MIIEP – The Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MKMP – Hungarian Communist Workers Party
MP – Member of Parliament
MSZP – The Hungarian Socialist Party
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMS – New Member State
ODS – Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic)
OMS – Old Member State
PiS – Law and Justice Party (Poland)
PO – Civic Platform (Poland)
PSL – Polish Peasants’ Party (Poland)
RECON – *Reconstituting Democracy in Europe*
SLD – Democratic Left Alliance (Poland)
SZDSZ – Liberal Party (Poland)
TU – Trade Union
UMCS – Marie Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin
Introduction

Democratization, Collective Identity Formation, and the EU Enlargement

Hans-Jörg Trenz, Zdenka Mansfeldová, Petra Guasti, and Jessie Hronešová

Collective identities have been at the forefront of interdisciplinary research on the effects of the EU enlargement on societal transformation and democracy. Identities matter in the process of enlargement, which is often merely referred to as the outcome of a negotiation of interests [Schimmelfennig 2003]. However, the question is why collective identities matter and how can we describe their interplay with the parallel processes of democratisation in the accession states and the democratic constitutionalization of the EU. In this introductory chapter, we attempt to clarify the concept of collective identity and its intrinsic relationship to democracy and Europeanization. We also discuss possible configurations of democracy in the European Union that give expression to different national, supranational, or post-national identitarian projects (the so-called three RECON models). We examine the various identity models introduced in the RECON project in terms of their relationship to democracy and we look at how they can change over time our perceptions of democracy and identities. Finally, we outline the contributions of this volume that look at the various sources of changes in identities and show exemplary ways how to apply collective identity research to the process of the EU enlargement and accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states.

1. European Studies and collective identities

A ‘scientification’ of collective identity research as an integral part of European studies has been commonly promoted from a social constructivist perspective [Checkel 2007; Delanty 2005; Herrmann et al. 2004]. Social constructivism emphasizes the creativity of individuals and groups as the ‘inventors’ of their identities. Constructivists do not see identities as set in stone but as a fluid, flexible, changeable, and dynamic phenomena that depend on “socially constructed” factors [cf. Barth 1969]. Traditional national identities are thus not primordial-
ly given but can be changed and adapted to new challenges such as Europeanization or globalization. At the same time, social constructivism has stressed the constraints under which societal interaction takes place because individuals act as members of particular groups and believers in contextualized norms and values. Therefore, people who move within a transnational context are not simply driven by power and interests but constrained in their choices and expression of preferences by their inherited identities. Hence, norms and ideational factors can drive European integration as much as they can constrain it. From the ‘identitarian paradigm’, we have to take the self-understanding of different social groups seriously, which compete with each other about the appropriate confinement of the political community [Kohli 2000].

Parallel to the ‘scientification’ of collective identity research within European studies, we have also witnessed a ‘politicization’ of collective identities across the European space [Börzel and Risse 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009]. Since the late 1980s, Europe is on the move to redefine its borders and projects of belonging in relation to its own internal consolidation and external delimitation. These newly salient identity struggles remind us that collective identities are not only constructed but also normatively loaded, culturally bound, and contested. In this sense, the scientific debate on the dynamics of identity transformation in response to the European integration is closely related to the political mobilization of ‘new’ and ‘old’ identities in Europe. To make sense of collective identity as a problem of interdisciplinary research and scientific reflection can only mean to account for this essentially political and contested character of collective identities [Risse 2010].

From the constructivist perspective, we can also systematize the intrinsic relationship between the constitution of a European political order, its so-called ‘identitarian underpinning’ and democracy. In a democracy, collective identities are needed to signify the political community as a collective of political self-determination [Offe 1998]. This is done through particular discourses or narratives that classify inclusive and exclusive relationships of belonging among the members and non-members of a political community [Eder 2010; Giesen 1999]. At the same time, collective identities need to be justified in a particular way as ‘natural’, ‘fair’, or ‘just’ in order to convince the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ of their general relevance and validity. The identity of a particular group needs to claim recognition by the ‘self’ and by the ‘other’ (whether it is de facto recognized remains an open empirical question) [Honneth 1995]. Within the constructivist

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1 Primordialism conceptualizes ethnic identities as given, innate, and enduring, i.e. defined by birth through blood (descent), religion, shared language, or customs [Geertz 1963:109].  

[12]
paradigm, collective identity should not be studied as something external to democracy. We are thus primarily concerned with how collective identities are given a meaning and a form through democracy and democratization. The current processes of reconstituting democracy in Europe can in this sense be considered as the prime example for analyzing how collective identities are reconstituted in response to the democratization of a newly emerging political order. Over the last years, many groups have emerged in the new as much as in the old member states that insist on their ethnic, religious, and cultural belonging. If we want to understand how these many societal fractions can be brought together under the umbrella of a European democracy, we should disregard the essence of their identity claims and focus on how their identitarian struggles within the European context can contribute to the construction of a collective ‘self’ of the European people [Fossum 2003].

2. Modelling collective identity and European democracy

By analyzing the ‘reconstitution of democracy in the European Union’ (RECON) we have placed emphasis on the question how identity struggles are related to the struggles of democracy and democratization that took place in the new member states and beyond. The underlying idea has been that there is a correlation between democratization and collective identity formation that fundamentally affects the European societies in transition. To systematically account for this correlation between collective identity and democracy, RECON has constructed three models that combine analytical components and normative assumptions about the possible constitution of the popular will in a democratic political order that comprises national, supranational, and international (global) components [Eriksen and Fossum 2008].

The RECON models open three possible scenarios for the accommodation of democracy with different types of collective identities in a democratically constituted political order of the European Union: first, the EU as an association of ‘patriotic nation-states; second, the emergence and consolidation of EU-patriotism that replaces national identities; and third, the EU as a post-national union with a cosmopolitan imprint in which different local, regional, national, and post-national belongings are reconciled.2 The aim of these models is to show potential prospects for (in-) compatibility of collective identities with the European framework.

2 The following section is adapted from Góra et al. [2011].
The first, ‘audit’, model of democracy in Europe builds on the classical division between a national order and international anarchy. Popular sovereignty and identity can be allocated only within fully sovereign nation-states whereas the international or European arena remains restricted to interest negotiation. In the EU enlargement process, the governments of the new member states would thus appear as delegated representatives of national interests. The kind of trust and solidarity that is needed to make democracy work would be provided by relatively stable and historically rooted national identities. It is only because of the particular notion of nationness that citizens can participate in opinion-forming processes and put the decision-makers to account. Different national identities would stand in a zero-sum relationship and European integration is aimed at taming potential conflicts between them. A European identity would not only be unnecessary, it would also potentially harm the integrity of the national community. This is manifested in the increase of conflicts between the two levels that can only be overcome by a clear delimitation of competences and a self-restriction of the EU to market-building, negative integration, and auditing the normative integrity of the member states.

The second, ‘federal’, model of democracy equally perceives the interrelation between collective identities as a zero-sum game with the new elements of supra-national identification slowly replacing the traditional elements of national and sub-national identities. The European institutions appear in this story as representatives of common interests. Democracy would be grounded in a thick European identity with the potential to overcome national identity, or at least allowing for restricted identity pluralism by territorially demarcating the sub-identities within the federal union. A strong political identity needs to prevail at the federal level grounded in constitutional patriotism, which gives expression to the will of unity of the new political entity rooted in citizenship rights and practice and establishing bonds of mutual recognition between its plural cultural expressions [Magnette 2007]. However, European political belonging would be built on the basis of a ‘thin identity’ in the sense of being constituted by an attachment to abstract universal norms and principles. This simultaneously opens the possibility for a thicker identification with Europe, which would be anchored in a historically specific culture and in a particular institutional setting [Fossum and Trenz 2007; Kumm 2005].

The third, ‘cosmopolitan’, model of a European democracy conceives political belonging as resulting from a positive-sum relationship between nested iden-

tity games. The model relies on human rights universalism and global solidarity with a particular democratic arrangement. In a post-national, cosmopolitan union, European identity would be nested happily in persisting patterns of national identification [Checkel and Katzenstein 2009:5]. In order to be able to display this reconciliatory function, the European constitutional project needs to give expression to a cosmopolitan vocation that can be transposed to the universal and inclusive community of democracy [Eriksen 2006]. European institutions would appear in this story side by side with international organizations and global civil society as elements of an inclusive and encompassing democratic process that represents humanity. The EU-setting would thus be post-national, in the sense of renouncing a strong identity, and the persisting plural identities would be significantly constrained by the necessity to respect diversity and cosmopolitan values. In this sense, there would be an institutional guarantee that the particularity of collective identities is always counterbalanced by reflexivity, which is displayed in the discursive references to the ‘unity in diversity’ of the shared political space of Europe. There would be only ‘weak’ and ‘self-restrained’ collective identities under the common principle of ‘shared humanity’.

3. Collective identities and the EU enlargement

Since the late 1980s, post-socialist societies in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone large-scale transformative processes, best described in terms of re-nationalization, democratization, and Europeanization. How does the regain of national sovereignty, democracy, and European integration affect the expression and mobilization of collective identities? Has the process of the EU enlargement and accession to the EU been given expression in new identity projects? What are the broader implications for the formation of collective identities with regard to past, present, and future EU enlargement processes? In brief, what are the effects of the European political processes on changes in collective identities? The aim of this volume is to answer these and related questions by various methods and theoretical concepts.

Contributions to this volume put into question a straightforward approach to the relationship between collective identities and the European integration that would suggest that accession to the EU automatically irreversibly changes collective identities. On the one hand, identities undergo substantial changes under conditions of fluid borders, markets, and transnational migration. However, on the other hand, the newly re-constituted identities later affect our understanding of the European Union and what it represents. Some of the chapters includ-
ed here thus track various types of identities over time and the effects of Europeanization on collective identities. In contrast, other chapters adopt the opposite approach and look out at how new identities in Europe affect public perceptions about the European Union.

Nonetheless, the underlying assumption of all the chapters collected in this volume is that the EU enlargement process and the EU’s democratic mission reveal a tension between contextualized (localized) and cosmopolitan (universalistic) strategies of defining collective identity in and belonging to Europe. This tension points toward a direct opposition between the RECON model one and model three while model two, which would ask for the consolidation of a federal union at the supra-national level is not considered as a viable identity project for Europe. The chapters in this book illustrate how this tension in principles between nationalist and cosmopolitan identity projects structures public and media discourse and how it is given expression and mobilized by young people, students, and political elites. The past, present, and future enlargement process becomes the principal laboratory for the exploration of the meaning of collective identity in a multi-level political and institutional setting. A process of shifting borders has direct impact on the traditional and new ways of defining people’s belonging. Perceiving enlargement as a process of simultaneously deepening and widening the European Union was one of the major incentives for manoeuvring the EU into constitution-making. The question of collective identity comes in when the enlarged Europe of enhanced diversity is confronted with the question of its unity in terms of internal coherence and external borders. Analyzing these processes of collective identity construction is of crucial importance for understanding the prospects of democracy in Europe and to establish how much trust and commonality is needed to enter into a process of positive integration.

In this publication the three RECON models are variably referred to for the purpose of reconstructing collective identity formation in the process of the Central and Eastern enlargement of the European Union. Some of the chapters here make use of the RECON models as evaluative schemes for testing out the viability of different options for the democratic reconstitution of Europe [see especially Gora and Mach]. In other chapters the models are applied more as narrative templates for signifying possible constituents of a European democracy among university students and young people [Kurucz, Brezińska et al., and Sackmann], political elites [Sojka, Vasquez, García and Lacina], and the media [Kołodziej]. The chapters also illustrate the variety of methodological approaches that can be applied to the study of the re-constitution of collective identities in relation to democracy and democratization. However, changes in collective identities in the new member states are not exclusively studied by using traditional quantitative
data (opinion surveys), which treat collective identities as mere aggregates of individual attitudes. To account for the discursive character of identity transformation, the different partners in our RECON project have cooperated to develop qualitative Q methodology and media discourse analysis. The present volume comprises both country case studies of CEE countries and comparative findings from the research based on such methods.

Finally, the different studies on changes in identities in the course of the EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe provide important insights for re-addressing the question of democracy beyond the nation-state. The introduced identity projects expressed by students and by political elites indicate new ways of rebalancing the membership in a community of compatriots with the all-inclusive requirements of the cosmopolitan society. In all of these instances, the question of how much trust and commonality is needed to establish democracy as a means of collective will formation is hotly debated. The quest for democracy in Europe has thus to take into consideration that there are different kinds of political allegiances and communities – thick and thin – corresponding to different levels of governance and their adjacent allocation of responsibilities [Eriksen and Fossum 2007]. Therefore, the modelling exercises by normative political theory that are underlying the chapters of this volume cannot draw an ultimate conclusion about the viability of democracy in Europe. The experience of Eastern enlargement teaches us that the search for the expression of the collective will of the Europeans has become subject to fierce political battles among the members and non-members of the European political community.

4. Outline of the volume

This volume is the outcome of a five-year-long collaborative research project under the title “Reconstituting Democracy in Europe” (RECON), Work Package No. 8 – “Identity Formation and Enlargement”, which involved four national teams from Bremen (Jean Monnet Centre, Bremen University), Budapest (Eötvös Loránd University), Cracow (Jagiellonian University), and Prague (Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic). First working drafts of the chapters included in this volume were presented at a workshop organized in Prague by the Institute of Sociology (ASCR) and the RECON Project on 6-7 May 2011 that was titled “The Nexus between Democracy, Collective Identity Formation, and Enlargement”. The present publication combines original RECON research as well as secondary analysis of empirical data on the interplay between national and European identities. In addition, the contributions
in this volume apply both qualitative and quantitative approaches and provide a rather synergic overview of the topic. The main emphasis has been placed on the relevance of the findings to the three RECON models (1. national, 2. federal multinational, and 3. cosmopolitan democracy), as well as on the various aspects related to the interactions between democracy, the EU enlargement, and collective identity formation.

4.1. Applying Q Methodology to the Study of Identities

The present volume is loosely divided into two main parts. Chapters 1 to 4 pay attention to new methodological approaches to the study of Europeanization and apply an innovative method called the Q method. These four chapters comprehensively engage with the Q methodology, first through a thorough theoretical explanation of the method (Chapter 1) and then through three case studies of young people in three countries – Poland (Chapter 2), Hungary (Chapter 3), and Germany (Chapter 4). The three country-specific chapters are the result of a cooperative international research, coordinated and led by Ulrike Liebert at Bremen University, which was set up to make a contribution to the study of content of European identities. This international project was based on the assumption that students as representatives of a young generation that is generally more supportive of the EU project are more likely to reflect on the ongoing changes of identities in a globalized world. Therefore, these three case studies empirically examine identity patterns and the way they translate into the support for different models of democracy as formulated in the RECON project.

The primary aim of David Skully’s contribution “Q methodology, Common Identity Patterns, and Models of Democracy in Europe” is to explain the research methodology employed in this volume. Skully presents the Q methodology as a form of exploratory data analysis that is used to generate hypotheses and raise questions about assumptions. His contribution shows how the Q methodology was applied in the research of this volume and what are the possible advantages of this approach. Second, Skully identifies the common identity patterns of individuals (Polish, Hungarian, and German university students) by the use of this method. He then examines how closely these various identity patterns correspond to the three models of democracy created by the RECON project. Finally, he analyzes whether there are cross-border commonalities among the identified identity patterns. The author concludes by pointing toward the limits in application of the Q method.
In her contribution “Collective Identity Patterns among Hungarian University Students”, Erika Kurucz explores the collective identity patterns recently formed among Hungarian university students. The first part of her chapter provides an overview of the existing research on identities in Hungary. By the use of quantitative data such as the World Value Survey, European Social Survey, Eurobarometer, and other survey material the author explores Hungarian cultural values and existing stereotypes as the basis of traditional identity patterns. The next part of this chapter analyzes young people’s attitudes towards, perceptions of, and reflections about the EU, its failures, achievements, and responsibilities, as well as other specific issues such as the quality of democracy and local, European, and global responsibilities. This analysis is grounded in a survey-based research that operationalized the three RECON theoretical models of democracy by the use of Q methodology. The research findings of this study led Kurucz to identify four identity patterns among the studied groups of students. The collected data clearly show some general trends regarding contemporary young people such as the positive correlation between the level of knowledge of a foreign language and attitudes towards the EU.

Olga Brzezińska, Beata Czajkowska, and David Skully combine quantitative and qualitative methods in their chapter titled “Universalist, Traditionalist, Pragmatic, Instrumental: Narratives of Europe among Young Poles”. Their research on identities and attitudes toward the EU among Polish university students revealed four factors, for the sake of investigation and description labelled as 1. the Universalists, 2. the Traditionalists, 3. the Pragmatists, and 4. the Instrumentalists. The authors describe these factors in a similar fashion as Erika Kurucz, i.e. as identity patterns. Based on the gathered empirical material and by the use of explanatory interviews, the authors examine how representatives of each individual factor perceive the contemporary European political and social reality, assess the role of the nation-state and the European Union, and reflect upon the contemporary state of affairs in Europe. In the next step, this chapter also brings together and compares the four identity patterns (factors) identified among Polish students and the three RECON theoretical models of democratic governance. The authors conclude that future research should focus on combined, rather than isolated, identity patterns as various types of identities interact and overlap.

Rosemarie Sackmann in her chapter “Structured Diversity: Patterns of European Collective Identities in Comparative Perspective” uses the framework of the same research project as the previous two case studies but opts for a sociological approach that operationalizes the concept of culture and cultural plurality. The author is trying to find answers to the question of what ordinary people have in mind when they speak about the EU or when they call themselves European.
The main aim of this chapter is to capture the underlying cultural differences that account for the convergences or divergences in identity patterns. Sackmann also applies the three RECON democracy models to the processes of identity creation in Central Europe. The author is looking for both similarities and differences in perceptions of the generally shared concept of the European identity between the studied countries (Germany and Hungary in particular).

4.2. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Assessing Emerging Identities

The next five chapters in this volume present some theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of new collective identities in the EU among elites and the public in Central and Eastern Europe. The dynamic changes in collective identities under the conditions of an enlarging Europe stand at the forefront of all of these chapters that assess such changes through various theoretical and methodological approaches. Apart from their thematically novel contribution to the research on identities framed around the influence of the European Union, these chapters exemplify how the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in the study of identities at various levels can lead to fruitful outcomes. In particular, the authors of these chapters focus on the regional, national, and European identities and the interplay between collective identity formation and the notion of democracy. They clearly show how the existing identities, identifications, and allegiances overlap and interact. Their contributions thus help us to identify not only the newly evolving interplay between various types of identities, but they also pinpoint the agents of these changes and the importance of the two-way interaction between the elites and citizens, i.e. they combine the top-down with the bottom-up approach.

Examining the issue of citizenship and identity, Chapters 5 and 6 rely on datasets gathered within the project IntUne (Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe) financed by the European Union within the 6th Framework Programme in the period from 2005 to 2009. The principal aim of the project was to provide researchers with a specific tool for exploring the views of both the elites and public on different aspects of citizenship and identity across the European Union. The international research team developed questionnaire surveys in two waves: in the spring of 2007 and in the spring of 2009. The first wave of the IntUne survey included a public opinion poll, a political elites’ survey and an economic elites’ survey, whereas the 2009 study left out the eco-
nomic elite while adding smaller samples of media and trade union elites. The *IntUne* dataset is especially interesting for its international nature and for the variety of surveyed groups, which is clearly showed in both of the chapters.

In their analysis titled “Dimensions of European Identification among Elites: An Exploratory Study within the Enlarged EU”, Aleksandra Sojka and Rafael Vázquez García aim to provide some preliminary insights into the current patterns of European identification within the context of the recently enlarged EU. The authors develop an exploratory descriptive analysis of the question of European identification among different types of elites across the enlarged European Union, comparing four selected CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) to the old and new member states in general. They assess different dimensions of the European identity and different perceptions about its content among political representatives, mass media, and trade union elites. Their focus on elites stems from other previous research that showed that the European and national political elites have been the decisive driving force behind the European integration. Sojka and García stress an important factor in the study of European identities, that is, that the considerable theoretical and empirical efforts notwithstanding, European identity remains an elusive concept.

Tomáš Lacina in his chapter “Feeling European: Elites vs. Masses?” challenges the view that national elites are the main driving force of the European integration. Lacina compares the sense of a belonging to Europe between masses and elites with respect to their region, country, and Europe as a whole. The most important questions addressed in his chapter are the following: Are elites generally more attached to the EU than the mass public? Does the East-West divide make any difference? Does an elite perception of identity influence the position of the mass public? Are there differences in identification among particular types of elites? Apart from these research questions, Lacina also creates a set of corresponding hypotheses that he tests on the basis of quantitative data from various surveys combining two levels of analysis: the elite (*IntUne* 2009 data) and the mass level data (Eurobarometer 2008). Lacina’s chapter provides a sound starting ground for other research on self-perceptions and various senses of identification with Europe.

Combining an extensive bulk of empirical data and interdisciplinary theoretical approaches Jacek Kołodziej in Chapter 7 titled “‘Axiological Europeanization’ and Identity Change: the Case of Polish Elections to the European Parliament in 2009” concentrates on the so-called ‘axiological legitimization’ which

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4 The 2007 and 2009 public opinion and political elites survey thus offer opportunities for comparisons between these two time periods.
has become the dominating paradigm of the EU integration. He uses the term axiological legitimization (and bias) as a particular inclination in public communication to favour the moral (ethical) aspects of the EU at the cost of the natural ones. He opines that this is usually accompanied by EU-centrism, overly positive attitudes about the integration, and wishful thinking, as well as by the rhetoric based on a simplified philosophy of values. In particular, Kołodziej applies the concept of axiological legitimization to the case of Polish elections to the European Parliament in 2009 and the political behaviour of Polish political parties. He focuses on a ‘axiological Europeanization of political parties’ that is explained as an attempt of the parties to reach a high degree of coherence by harmonizing values of the normative EU constitutional message, the EP group priorities, and party priorities in domestic politics. In addition, the author examines the potential impact of different media on the process of political Europeanization.

The term ‘urbanogentsia’, as a newly emerging social stratum, is introduced in the chapter by Marcin Galent and Paweł Kubicki under the title “Not Just a Nation Set in Stone: The Undercurrents Making the National Structure More Porous”. ‘Urbanogentsia’ is used to describe educated urban Polish middle class, which has become an important social actor in the processes of (re-)negotiating the gradually changing Polish identity. This particular segment of Polish society is chosen because of its primary responsibility for the changes in the character of the Polish national identity. In order to empirically illustrate this transformation and the role of ‘urbanogentsia’, the authors employ comparative methods that stem from a fieldwork research carried out in three Polish cities: Cracow, Wroclaw, and Szczecin. Their focus is on how residents in these cities slowly replace their so-far most important frame of reference, the nation-state, by a supranational, i.e. European frame. The chapter suggests that these developments are strongly determined by the dominant discourses used by members of ‘urbanogentsia’. Chapter 8 suggests that while the national identification is losing its dominant and exclusive character, identification with Europe is important especially for young people in urban centres because of the dynamic opportunities the EU offers such as physical mobility.

The last concluding chapter of this book, “Conclusions: Transformation of Collective Identities in Europe and Democracy” by Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach, aptly summarizes the findings of the various research studies conducted in recent years within the RECON project. The authors analyze the interplay between the transformation of collective identities in contemporary Europe and the notion and practice of democracy. They draw attention to the fact that the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries into the EU,
i.e. states that used to be perceived as the “other Europe” before 1989, created a problem of a European collective identity. Who are Europeans? Where does Europe end? And most importantly, who will now be the “significant others” of Europeans? These questions are explored also with reference to Turkey as the most controversial and at the same time exemplary case of states whose European identities are deeply contested.

This publication aims to contribute to the existing research on identities in Europe in three important ways. First, this publication provides both theoretical and empirical insights into a methodology that could be widely applied in the study of identities in general – the Q methodology. Second, we conceptualize the relationship between the political community and the democratic polity in Europe on the basis of three innovative polity models developed within the RECON project (national, federal multinational, and cosmopolitan models). These models also represent three possible ways for solving the thorny issue of how democracy should be organized in the EU and what consequences that would have for possible changes in identities. Third, we present the reader with new sets of empirical data, some of which have not been published elsewhere until this moment in a coherent and logical way (such as the IntUne survey data and the EP political campaigns data). The chapters included in this volume do not adopt a singular approach to the analysis of democratization, Europeanization, and collective identities. Instead, they represent a range of prisms that constitute an important contribution to the debate on the role of the European integration in Central and East European post-1989 democratic transitions. Nonetheless, the main underlying message here is that nation-states are losing their leading role in the field of identities. The concept of nationality becomes more inclusive and the symbolic construction of national identity appropriates a more inclusive, open, and diverse character.

References


1. Q-Methodology, Common Identity Patterns, and Models of Democracy in Europe

David Skully

1. Introduction

The objectives of this chapter are threefold: first, to identify the common identity patterns of individuals (university students) in Germany, Hungary, and Poland; second, to examine how closely these various identity patterns correspond to the three models of democracy elaborated by the RECON project; and, third, to examine whether there are cross-border commonalities among identity patterns. This chapter primarily explains the research methodology employed in this book in order to identify and compare identity patterns.

Each individual has a unique constellation of subjective perceptions of and reactions to propositions about democratic processes and civil membership that constitutes his or her unique identity construction. The concept of ‘a common identity pattern’ refers to a set of subjective political attitudes that many individuals hold in common, but with varying degrees of agreement. Thus, someone revealing strong subjective agreement with a common set of attitudes called ‘social democratic’ also retains some eccentric individual attitudes: individual uniqueness persists. Analogous to a Weberian ‘ideal type’, one does not expect to find a perfect manifestation of a common political subjectivity in any particular person; in fact, an observation of a perfect manifestation would likely be viewed as accidental.

The model and inspiration for the present cooperative research effort is the 1993 article by Dryzek and Berejikian, “Reconstructive Democratic Theory”. The authors expressed concern that democratic theory had become increasingly detached from the demos, from the citizens who would inhabit, staff, and govern the alternative democratic structures postulated by theorists:

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1 This paper emanates from RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe), an Integrated Project supported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme (contract no. CIT4-CT-2006-028698). More on this study: see Brzezińska et al. [2011].
Particular theoretical voices reach restricted audiences as the languages they speak become arcane and specialized. Think, for example, of the mathematical formalizations of public choice or the dense terminology of hermeneutics and critical theory [Dryzek and Berejikian 1993:49].

To provide an empirical anchor to theoretical enthusiasm, they employ qualitative-quantitative methods to examine the kinds of political discourse that resonate with actual citizens. They argue that their “approach is reconstructive in that it does its utmost to find its categories in how its subjects actually do apprehend the world, not in how the researcher expects them to do so” [Ibid.]. The starting point of the analysis is a set of observations of individuals’ expression of their personal political subjectivities.

There are a variety of social scientific methods for eliciting subjective responses. Large-scale public opinion surveys, such as Almond and Verba’s [1963] landmark study, “The Civic Culture”, can identify central tendencies and deviations with a high degree of confidence. Such large-N studies are costly and particularly sensitive to question construction and ordering. Intensive small-N ethnographic studies through contextual immersion and thick description can overcome the arbitrary risks of large-N instruments; but they too are costly and limited in scope and generality. Dryzek and Berejikian [1993] employ ‘Q methodology’, a small-N approach that combines the complementary aspects of survey research and thick description in a relatively low-cost manner.

Q methodology was developed in the 1930s by William Stephenson, [1935, 1953] a psychologist and pioneer in the field of psychometrics. Q methodology is a variation on factor analysis, discussed later in this chapter. It became applied to the study of political subjectivity largely through the efforts of Steven Brown in his 1980 seminal work on this topic, titled “Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science”.2

Q methodology is a form of exploratory data analysis. Exploratory data analysis is inductive: it employs statistical methods to find patterns, similarities, and dissimilarities within a data set. The objective is to let the data speak for itself:

2 “Political Subjectivity” is now out-of-print. Brown [1980] has posted the book online: http://reserves.library.kent.edu/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=203&page=docs. The mathematical chapters of the book have been superseded by advances in computing and statistical software see Note 5 but the application of Q methodology to test Lipset’s [1963] arguments about value patterns of democracy is an excellent example of the method in operation. Also useful is McKeown and Thomas [1988] as are the contributions of Costello and Osborne [2005] and Watts and Stenner [2005]. Interesting and relevant applications of Q methodology include: Zechmeister [2006], Sullivan et al. [1992], Addams and Proops [2001].
this means refraining from imposing theoretical assumptions or hypothetical constraints on the exploratory process. Exploratory data analysis is contrasted with confirmatory data analysis [Tukey 1962], which involves statistical hypothesis testing. Q methodology cannot support the statistical inferences necessary for hypothesis testing. Although it cannot test hypotheses, Q methodology – like other exploratory data methods – is used to generate hypotheses and raise questions about assumptions, particularly when the exploration uncovers theoretically anomalous patterns.

The balance of this chapter describes how Q methodology is applied in our research; it is discussed in the following four sections: ‘Eliciting identity patterns: statements, subjects, sorts and interviews’; ‘Data analysis’; ‘Interpretation of factors and construction of factor narratives’; ‘Comparative analysis and agreement with models of democracy’.

2. Eliciting identity patterns: statements, subjects, sorts and interviews

2.1. Statements

Q methodology starts with identifying a discourse or set of discourses from which a set of statements is drawn with the objective of stimulating a subjective response by study participants. As the focus of our study is identity patterns and how they relate to models of democracy and to European and national identities, our set of 70 statements included 46 statements constructed to represent aspects of the three models of democracy theorized by Eriksen and Fossum [2007, 2009] among others. The other 24 statements were drawn from popular political discourse. As Dryzek and Berejikian [1993] demonstrate, few people (other than political theorists) think in terms of democratic models; it is necessary to include vernacular political sentiments to the statement set. The 70 statements were determined by the research teams from the three countries at a workshop in Cracow in April 2009. The discussion and original statements were in English and subsequently translated by each country’s research team.

3 At the Bremen workshop in September 2009, several of these 46 democracy model-related statements were determined not to represent unambiguously a distinct model. The annex to this chapter provides a table of the final model-related statement sets.
2.2. Subjects

Each case study involved 40 participants. All participants were full-time university students, no older than 25. Students were selected from a variety of disciplines from two universities in each country: one in a metropolitan centre and the other in a smaller regional town. An equal number of male and female respondents were drawn from each university. It is important to emphasize that Q methodology does not require a random sample – it makes no pretence to be representative; it merely requires variation among participants.

2.3. Sorts

Each statement is printed on a card. Participants were asked to sort the 70 statements by arranging the cards in a format shown in Figure 1.1. The template was drawn on a sheet of poster board. The column on the far right labelled +5 allows two statements to be ranked as most important, the column on the far left labelled -5, allows two statements to be ranked as least important; the middle column marked zero indicates complete indifference. What importance means is determined by the individual respondent: it is subjective. In practice, cards placed in the leftmost columns are usually statements to which respondents have a strong negative reaction; statements that elicit relative indifference are generally placed in the middle columns; and statements placed in the rightmost columns usually indicate strong agreement. The triangular arrangement of cells in the template forces respondents to assign values resembling a normal distribution. The larger central columns spare respondents the chore of making fine distinctions among statements of indifferent subjective value. A common complaint by respondents was that there were too few places in the extreme columns; this induced anxiety is deliberate: the template design forces distinctions among the strongest responses.

4 In the Hungarian study the distinction is between universities in Budapest and universities outside of Budapest.
2.4. Interviews

Respondents’ subjective rankings of the statements provide a data set amendable to quantitative analysis. The objective of the quantitative side of the analysis is to identify distinct subsets of individual respondents based on their subjective rankings of statements. The qualitative side of the analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with respondents. Immediately following the sorting of statements, with the sorted statements in front of them, respondents are asked about their sorts. The interviews focus on the statements placed in the far left and far right columns (-5, -4, +4, +5); but discussion is not limited to these columns. Respondents explain why these statements are positively and negatively important to them. Each interview elicits the subjective narrative behind the respondent’s sorting. Information from the interviews provides a check on whether the distinct subsets identified as sharing a common identity pattern in the quantitative analysis are internally consistent. Thus, Q methodology is an iterative interpretive processes combining both qualitative and quantitative information.

3. Data analysis

The empirical dataset of the Q method is the set of statement orderings, or sorts, made by study participants. Each individual sort is a row of 70 numbers, with integer values ranging from -5 to +5; these are the rank-values assigned to each statement by a participant in the sort process. Each case study engaged 40 participants. Thus the data set is a matrix of 40 rows and 70 columns.
The Q-method statistical analysis of the data set is a variant of factor analysis. Standard factor analysis identifies differences and similarities between the columns of the matrix. That is, it focuses on traits or scores, this is called R method. (R and Q come from the letters used to represent matrices in linear algebra). Q methodology, in contrast, identifies differences and similarities between the rows of the matrix, that is differences and similarities between individual participants.

Figure 1.2. Factor Analysis R Method and Q Method

Q methodology was initiated in Stephenson’s [1935] article “Correlating Persons Instead of Tests”. Until this contribution psychometrics was primarily concerned with intelligence tests and whether there was one underlying measure of intelligence, or whether intelligence is composed of several distinct factors. The common distinction between mathematical and verbal ability stems from the factor analysis performed on the columns of a matrix composed of individuals’ answers to test questions. Stephenson’s innovation, to examine correlations among individuals, allowed for empirical methods to be employed in the identification of personality types.

The fundamental idea underlying factor analysis (whether of columns or rows – the discussion here is in terms of rows) is to identify factors common to subsets of individual responses: these common factors are represented by the ovals connected by arrows to the data matrixes in the two figures above. Factor analysis is

5 The specialized statistical software used in this study is PQMethod; it is in the public domain and available from: http://www.lrz.de/~schmolck/qmethod/.
a data-reduction method. The objective is to represent as much of the information contained in the data matrix by as few common factors as possible.

The specific mechanism employed to determine these common factors is Kaiser’s [1958] varimax algorithm. This algorithm searches for the set of factors which best preserves the information content of the data matrix. The result is a set of equations, one for each individual sort that relates the individual sorts to the factors. Specifically, the sort of respondent N can be expressed as follows.

\[ \text{Sort}_N = B1\text{Factor}_1 + B2\text{Factor}_2 + B3\text{Factor}_3 + B4\text{Factor}_4 + e_N \]

Each factor is itself a set of 70 statement rankings: in essence, each factor is a synthetic sort that represents a distinct commonality identified in the data matrix. Each respondent’s sort can be expressed as a linear function of all identified factors plus an individual error term. To understand the equation above, assume for the moment that \( \text{Sort}_N \) is identical to \( \text{Factor}_2 \). If this were the case, then the coefficient for \( \text{Factor}_2 \) (B2) would equal 1.0; the coefficients for the other factors would equal zero; and the individual error term (\( e_N \)) would also equal zero. The result is the equation \( \text{Sort}_N = \text{Factor}_2 \). If \( \text{Sort}_N \) differed just slightly from \( \text{Factor}_2 \) the equation might read: \( \text{Sort}_N = 0.99\text{Factor}_2 + e_N \), where \( e_N \) is no longer zero. Similarly a sort that is exactly half \( \text{Factor}_1 \) and half \( \text{Factor}_2 \) can be written \( \text{Sort}_N = 0.5\text{Factor}_1 + 0.5\text{Factor}_2 \). The coefficients associated with the factors are a measure of closeness or similarity between an individual sort and a factor. Sorts with large positive coefficients on one factor are called defining sorts: these sorts are closely related to that factor.

There is an element of judgment in factor analysis about how many factors to include in the analysis. Factors are identified by statistical methods; the first factor identified has the greatest explanatory power and each additional factor has less explanatory power. More factors provide more explanatory power, but at the cost of less data-reduction.\(^6\)

### 4. Interpretation of factors and the construction of factor narratives

The difference between R method and Q method lies in the interpretation of factors. In R method, with the focus on columns, there are no interviews to turn to for contextualization of the statistical results. In Q methodology, with the focus

\(^6\) The Kaiser criterion is to include only those factors for which the eigenvalue exceeds 1.0. Eigenvalues, in this context, are measures of explained variance and are generated by the PQMethod program. The cost of including a factor with an eigenvalue less than 1.0 exceeds its benefit, in terms of explanatory power and parsimony.
on the rows and the commonalities among persons, the interviews provide context. To construct a common identity pattern one attempts to reconstruct the common narrative that sustains a set of similar sorts. The statistical results indicate which sorts are similar and thus likely to share a common narrative.

The statistical software, PQMethod, generates the following information: a table reporting the identified factors, specifically the ranking of statements for each factor; a table showing how the factors differ significantly – specifically, which statements the factors differ most in their rank-values; and a table showing how closely individual sorts are associated with each Factor – specifically, it reports the coefficients or factor loadings for each individual sort. In the terminology of Q methodology, those sorts which are closely related to a particular factor are called ‘defining sorts’ – that is, they serve to define the narrative.7

Most statistical methods are sensitive to outliers, i.e. observations that stand outside the general distribution of the data set in one or more dimensions. An observation (a ‘sort’ in our context) may be so unusual that the PQMethod algorithm identifies it as a unique factor; that is, the factor has only one defining sort. One-sort factors pose an interpretative problem: do they represent a distinct common identity pattern but by chance we only have one member participating in our study? Or are they simply eccentric? Or, perhaps they stand out because they have an unusual interpretation of a statement? The interviews can help solve this interpretive problem. For example, one participant in the Polish study assigned the value +5 to the statement, “Diversity causes problems”. This response stands out because most Polish participants assigned negative values to the statement, indicating disagreement.8 The interview provided the context: the participant explained that because diversity can cause problems, it is imperative that we do everything we can to create an inclusive society; creating an inclusive society is so important to this participant that this statement was given the highest rank, +5. Except for this statement, this participant’s sort was very similar to respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement. Of the 120 sorts in our three case studies we identified seven such significant outliers. These rows were deleted from the data matrices and the statistical analysis was performed anew. Although

7 A defining sort in this context generally means at least a loading (coefficient) of at least 0.50.
8 The mean rank of the 40 Polish sorts for this question is -1.95; the standard deviation is 2.35, yielding a standardized score (z-value) for +5 of 2.98 – highly significant. Without the interviews one would need to employ robust methods to detect and diagnose significant outliers. See Hubert et al. [2008] for a recent review of robust methods as well as Chatterjee et al. [1991].
the sorts were removed from the statistical analysis, the interviews were used, when appropriate, in the interpretation and construction of the factor narratives.

Having excluded influential outliers, the analyses resulted in four viable factors in each country. The country chapters discuss the interpretive process undertaken in each case, but some summary statistics comparing the factors in the three cases are presented in the table below. Table 1.1. shows the proportion of variance explained by each factor and the number of defining sorts for each factor. The penultimate column provides summations; and the final column reports the number of sorts (that is, less excluded outliers) used in the analyses. The four factors account for between 42 percent and 55 percent of the variance; this is a significant reduction in data. The number of defining sorts ranges between 17 for Hungary and 32 for Germany. There is nothing unusual about having a large proportion of non-defining sorts. Non-defining sorts are simply not highly correlated with any single factor; rather they are weakly correlated with several factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G1</th>
<th>G2</th>
<th>G3</th>
<th>G4</th>
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<th>N</th>
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<td>10%</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<th>H3</th>
<th>SUM</th>
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<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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<td>6</td>
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Table 1.1. Statistical Characteristics of the Country Factors

G = Germany; H = Hungary; P = Poland

The objective of Q Methodology is to re-construct from statistical analyses and interviews, narratives representing the essential elements of common identity patterns. The convention in Q Methodology is to give these common factors descriptive names. This has heuristic value – naming forces one needs to identify what is distinctive about a factor. It also has convenience value – simplifying discussion. In preparing for the discussions in the country chapters, the first two data columns in Table 1.1. have been aligned to compare similar factors. In all countries the first factor – the one accounting for the greatest proportion of variance and also the greatest number of defining sorts – represents a similar identity pattern: the three factor sorts, G1, H1, and P1 are named: G1 – Cosmopol-
itan perspective; H1 – Liberal-democratic Identity; and P1 – Universalists. All express agreement with the universalist statements and tend to disagree with the nationalist ones. The factors in the second data column share scepticism about a more federalized European Union and support for assertions of national identity and traditional values. They are named: G2 – National perspective; H4 – ‘Hestia National’ Identity; and P2 – Traditionalists. Similarities among the remaining factors in the third and fourth columns exist but are not as immediately apparent.

5. Comparative analysis and agreement with models of democracy

5.1. Quantitative comparative analysis of factors

The Q methodology based analysis provides quantitative data that can be used to construct measures of agreement and disagreement between factors identified in the analysis. Each factor consists of an array of 70 ranks ranging in value between -5 and +5. There are many ways to measure the distance or similarity/dissimilarity between factors. The correlation coefficient as a measure of similarity/dissimilarity is employed in this study. Correlation coefficients are used to measure the relative similarity or dissimilarity between factors in case studies (Country Factor Structure). At the country level, factors, to be distinct commonalities, must exhibit dissimilarity: correlation coefficients between factors will be less than 0.50.

Correlation analysis is also used to examine the similarities or dissimilarities of factors identified in the different case studies. Two factors from different case studies which are highly correlated may be indicative of a shared underlying commonality. The strength or weakness of such commonality can be assessed by examining those statements for which the highly correlated factors most closely agree and those statements for which they agree least.

5.2. Quantitative measurement of agreement with models of democracy

Q-methodology analysis provides quantitative data that can be used to construct measures of agreement and disagreement with the three RECON models of democracy. Of the 70 statements used in the study the research group selected 30 statements that can be unambiguously associated with one of the three models. Ten statements are uniquely associated with the national (RECON 1) model of
democracy; eleven statements are uniquely associated with the federal (RECON 2) model; and nine statements are uniquely associated with the cosmopolitan (RECON 3) model. The ranks assigned to these statements by the factors identified in the case studies can be used to construct an index of agreement (or disagreement) for each factor with respect to the three sets of statements relating to the democracy models.9

Figure 1.3. below reproduces the 70-statement template. Suppose, for example, that a participant wished to express maximum possible agreement with the national model, represented by ten statements. In this case, these ten statement cards would be placed in the right-most columns (shown in dark grey). They would occupy the two positions in the +5 column, the four positions in the +4 column and four positions in the +3 column. The sum of these scores is $38 = 2 \times 5 + 4 \times 4 + 4 \times 3$; thus 38 is the maximum possible score for the national model. Maximum possible disagreement with the national model, as shown by the light grey cards in the same figure, results in a sum of scores of -38. To construct an index we divide the observed scores by the maximum possible score and multiply by 100. This results in a scale that ranges from -100 to +100 and that allows comparison with the scores for agreement with the other models which are represented by a different number of statements and therefore have different maxima and minima.10

\[ \text{Agreement Score}_{ij} = 100 \times \left( \frac{\text{Score}_{ij}}{\text{Maximum Possible Score}_{ij}} \right) \text{ for factors } i \text{ to } m, \text{ and models } j = \{ \text{national, federal, cosmopolitan} \}. \]
It is important to emphasize that ‘agreement with model N’ means agreement with the set of statements used to represent the model and as measured by the agreement score. Other sets of statements could have been employed to represent the models; indeed, alternative representation of the models is a potentially fertile direction for future Q-methodological research.\textsuperscript{11}

It is also important to note that there is lack of symmetry among the three model statement sets. All statement sets contain statements designed to elicit respondent’s loci of identity norms and their values regarding democratic practices and the distribution of power at the national, federal, and cosmopolitan levels, respectively. However, only the national and federal statement sets contain statements about institutions, power, and governance; the cosmopolitan-model statement set lacks statements about the institutional configuration of democracy in Europe.\textsuperscript{12} In part, this absence is an artefact of the ambivalence about domination and coercion in cosmopolitan theory and the lack of institutional specificity in the elaboration of the RECON-3 model itself.\textsuperscript{13} The lack of statements about the existence or locus of military or fiscal authority in the cosmopolitan-model statement set thus biases the cosmopolitan-model agreement scores. We know from our country-level case studies that cosmopolitan factors are ambivalent or adverse to institutions of domination: they assign negative values to statements about domination in the national-model and federal-model statement sets. Because the cosmopolitan-model statement set lacks corresponding statements, the agreement scores observed for the cosmopolitan model are higher than if statements about power had been included. Keeping these caveats in mind, the agreement scores do apply a common standard of measurement across factors and across countries and allow one to measure similarity and dissimilarity of identity patterns.

5.3. The inferential limits of Q-methodology analysis

There are limits to what one can infer from Q-methodological studies. One can infer that the identity patterns identified reflect underlying common constella-

\textsuperscript{11} Alternative agreement measures are possible. For example, we have weighted the statements in our analysis equally; but unequal weights could be used.

\textsuperscript{12} “As an organization form, modern democracy, at a minimum, requires both a polity and a forum” [Eriksen and Fossum 2007:16].

\textsuperscript{13} For a literature review and the canonical descriptions of the RECON-3 model see: Eriksen and Fossum [2007]: 30-36 and 38-39; and Eriksen and Fossum [2009]: 26-32 and 35-36. Dryzek [2007] and Castiglione [2009] provide critical perspectives on the deliberative democracy and cosmopolitan identity, respectively.
tions of values and beliefs. They indicate individuals who share a common narrative, at a minimum, by those participants who are defining sorts. One can also develop propositions from comparing and contrasting factors. However, Q methodology cannot be used to make claims about the larger population; this is because Q methodology is not sample-based. Although in our case studies we have selected students from a diverse range of disciplines and ensured gender balance, this is not sufficient to be a representative or random sample. Thus there is no basis for concluding that, for example, if 22 percent of respondents are defining sorts that resonate with model 3, then 22 percent of university students share a liberal-universal-cosmopolitan identity. To make such statements a properly-designed, large-N survey would be necessary.

References


The Nexus between Democracy, Collective Identity Formation, and EU Enlargement


2. Collective Identity Patterns among Hungarian University Students

Erika Kurucz

1. Introduction

Various research projects such as RECON have been searching for answers whether a collective European identity has been formed, or is under construction, and whether a global identity is emerging. If these developments are true, what is happening to our national identity? To what extent has the accession to the European Union changed our conception of the EU, of our political and economic role in Europe, of our opportunities to live, work, and study abroad, etc.? Given that it is natural to be a citizen of a country, the EU and the global world all at once and given that we can all enjoy the opportunity to cross borders freely, study and work abroad, and experience multicultural diversity, what are the impacts of such a great mobility on our traditional national identity and on any potentially emerging European and global identity?

Theoretical and empirical research should find answers to these questions not only from an economic point of view but also with respect to social and political integration processes. We also want to know more about contemporary young people’s attitudes, feelings, perceptions, and reflections towards the EU and specific issues such as democracy; EU achievements and failures; depth and content of the European integration; local, European, and global responsibilities; functioning of the EU and its institutions, etc. Research should also attempt to find out to what extent young people’s identity conceptions agree with different models of democracy in the European Union.

This chapter is a case study on conceptions of common identity among Hungarian university students. It explores the collective identity patterns that have been recently formed among young Hungarian citizens. Our research draws on a comparative framework established within the RECON project for analyzing

1 I owe very special thanks to Mária Heller and Borbála Kriza from the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) of Budapest in Hungary for their professional and personal support, and also for their advice and constructive comments on my work. They participated also in conceptualizing this comparative, empirical research together with the German and Polish colleagues, to whom I would extend my special thanks for their help and energy.
identity constructions among young people in three EU member states, comparing students across the Hungarian, Polish and German contexts. In this paper, we seek to identify the concepts that young people attach to being a European Union citizen in Hungary. The research also aims at analysing which of the three theoretical RECON models of the EU can be detected in young people’s conception of the EU.

In total, 40 interviews were conducted with university and college students, 18 to 25 years of age, at various institutions of higher education in Hungary. Our sample of respondents cannot be considered representative in any sense, but representativeness did not guide the objectives of this study. Our principal goal was to make the group of interviewees as diverse as possible in order to include as many different views as possible. Thus, we included students majoring in a broad range of subjects (e.g. sociology, law, biology, physics, art theory, design, geography, architecture, medicine, agricultural engineering, etc.). Both elite and less prestigious universities were selected, not only in Budapest but also in the countryside, and we also focused on state-run as well as church-run institutions. Half of our interviewees were male and half female in the capital and elsewhere. As candidates in social sciences are typically more knowledgeable about European issues and other social questions given their focus, we maximized the ratio of social science students to 30 percent in the research.

Although the number (40 cases) of questionnaires does not allow us to draw any far-reaching statistical conclusions, they still provide important qualitative data that need to be considered. The data clearly shows some general trends regarding contemporary young people, such as the proportion of foreign-language speakers that can be related to the attitudes towards the EU. Spending time abroad, interacting with other young people from different countries and their culture, life-styles, and values can all have important influence on people’s attitudes, skills, and personality. Such intercultural experiences can promote positive attitudes towards democracy, social justice, tolerance, and solidarity as well as foster feelings of cosmopolitan identities.

The analysis developed in this chapter is structured as follows: This first introductory section is followed by the second part that provides background to the Hungarian case study through a presentation of the existing previous research. The third part presents the findings of the conducted empirical research and focuses on young Hungarians’ identity patterns. Finally, we provide answers to the outlined research questions in the conclusion.

2 See Introduction and Skully in this volume.
2. Hungarian cultural values and traditional identities

In general, many social factors (such as level and quality of education and health care, cultural values, mentality, inclusiveness of vulnerable groups, etc.) have a strong impact on the potential economic achievement and competitiveness of a country. Economic development and growth highly depend on social and political processes in society. As part of an international comparative project, TÁRKI [Keller 2009] conducted a research for the World Value Survey, examining the influence of mentality, cultural and other values, and attitudes on a country’s economic progress.

The TÁRKI survey yielded some key findings about the character of Hungarian values and mentality. The Hungarian value systems can be characterized as secular, traditional, and located on the periphery of the Western Christian cultural world. Hungary also seems to form a closed inward-looking society. However, in terms of traditional-religious and secular-traditional ways of thinking Hungary is closer to the Orthodox cultural realm of Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia than to its immediate neighbour, Slovenia. Hungarian society is also characterized by a low level of social trust, with preference for conformity in thinking and lack of interest for civil and political rights, political participation, and active citizenship [Keller 2009].

Another international survey also highlights the negative aspect of the Hungarian national mentality. At the turn of the millennium, Abramson and Inglehart [1995] came to the conclusion that the ratio of people with post-materialist values is higher in developed and rich countries. However, they identified Hungary as an outlier because of the highest rate of people with materialist values and the lowest rate of people with post-materialist values in the sample (even less than in

Table 2.1. Average social-welfare factor scores in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

India, China, and Nigeria). The Hungarian culture holds material goods, financial income, and career as much more important than free time, cultural habits, spending time with friends, and personal independence [Andorka 2006:577].

A recent European Social Survey (ESS) reveals some positive changes. As we can see in Table 2.1., in terms of social values, Hungary takes up a mid-range position. Hungarian young people appear to consider values such as equality, loyalty, environmental protection, and helping socially disadvantaged people as more important than the youth in other post-socialist countries.

The presence of strong discriminative attitudes against minorities is a good indicator of a society’s closed mentality. In the period of 1994 to 2002, i.e. prior to the EU–accession, TÁRKI conducted a survey in Hungary on people’s ethnic and political attitudes regarding Jewish minorities as well as foreigners. The researchers identified three types of anti-Semitism (political, discriminatory, and religious). Shockingly, political anti-Semitism was as popular among young, highly educated adults as among the average population. Hostile attitudes towards immigrants were also identified and increased in this period [Enyedi, Fábián, and Sík 2004].

Similar data surfaced in another recent independent research study [Vásárhelyi 2009]. The conducted survey of 700 young people in the age group of 18 to 30 showed that political anti-Semitism was strongly present. 30 percent of the respondents were directly anti-Semitic and 29 percent believed in stable negative stereotypes. The first directly anti-Semitic group was also characterized by conservatism, national radicalism, and sympathy towards the newly formed extremist right-wing party, Jobbik. Many respondents expressed hostile attitudes towards the Roma minority. The study concluded that four fifths of the Hungarian youth had strong and stable prejudices towards minorities and believed in radical and extreme solutions.

According to the data from a Eurobarometer survey on perception about ethnic discrimination [Special Eurobarometer 2008], 61 percent of Hungarian people believed that ethnic discrimination had become more widespread in Hungary in the last five years. The proportion of young people who thought that discrimination was widespread was 28 percent for ethnic discrimination, 19 percent for discrimination against disabled people, and 18 percent for age discrimination. As for gender discrimination, only half of the Hungarian youth believed that equal wages for men and women were important [Gáti 2010]. According to this study, Hungary was the only country where people considered gender discrimination more widespread than five years ago.

[44]
In light of these findings the question emerges whether the inward-looking character of Hungarian society, low level of tolerance, and pessimistic attitudes is shared by the well-educated part of the young generations (i.e. students), who are to become the potential future leaders of the country.

A national survey conducted with 1800 students studying in higher education institutions led to surprising findings [Gazsó 2007]: it concluded that young people had ambivalent attitudes to the EU and its institutions. With the exception of students in special classes on EU affairs, the EU was of no interest and was a scarce research topic – Hungarian students also did not think it was important to be updated on the situation within the EU. A striking difference was discovered in terms of media consumption – the Internet was used as the main source among the youngest generation of students, while the TV had been losing its importance. Such attitudes could be explained by the very limited foreign language competencies of Hungarian students. According to the ‘2008 Youth Survey’, approximately one third of the informants had an elementary knowledge of English or German, over one third had an intermediate knowledge of English and around one fifth knew German at a medium level. Only a very small group of students were fluent in one foreign language (only 7 percent in English). The ‘Youth’ survey [2008, 2009] pointed to an absolute indifference of young Hungarian to politics (60 percent). Such an interest was positively correlated with the level of education – the higher the achieved degree, the more interest in political affairs was discovered. Moreover, another finding of the survey showed that young people did not trust political and some other civil institutions.³

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the young population is very critical also about democracy. According to the Eurobarometer 72 [2009], only half of the Hungarian population was satisfied with the way democracy worked in the EU and only 23 percent said that democracy worked properly in Hungary. One of the most surprising findings of the Youth survey [Youth 2008] was that 14 percent of people between 20 and 24 (i.e. a similar age group as in our empirical research) considered dictatorship better than democracy under certain conditions and only 42 percent believed that democracy was better than any other political regime. 11 percent were unable to decide.

In the following section, we elaborate on the results from our Q-research. Our survey-based research examined conceptions of democracy and views about the EU by operationalizing three theoretical RECON models (see Skully in this volume). We analyzed a set of statements presented to the informants for evaluation

³ Answers to our questions related to the EU, revealed that most students considered Hungary’s EU membership as a positive move Eurobarometer 2008 came to the same findings.
and recorded interviews. The research also attempted to find out whether the ongoing processes of European constitutionalization and legal harmonization had a direct effect on young people’s conceptions of the EU and democracy.

3. Identification patterns of Hungarian students

The RECON framework proposes three main models of identification: the first one is directly associated with the nation-state, the second one presents Europe as a federal multinational state, and the third one operates with global and cosmopolitan characteristics that compose a model of deliberative democracy. Statements from our Q-set were constructed according to these models. Nonetheless, our research conducted in Hungary demonstrated that the empirical types resulting from the Q-factor analysis represented mixtures of these characteristics rather than absolutely homogenous ‘pure’ types. There are certainly common characteristics that have appeared in our interviews with most Hungarian young people but also some important differences.

Unsurprisingly, most students highly valued travelling and studying freely in the EU and the common Euro-market, but many of them had a feeling of inferiority when describing themselves as European citizens. They saw Hungary as lagging behind the EU and being treated as a second-class country. Statements comprising words and expressions like “world peace”, “solving environmental problems”, and “fighting against global poverty” were highly appreciated, especially among women, although the meaning attributed to them in the Hungarian context was diverse. Both male and female respondents agreed that, “Women and men are equal”. But while men tended to give the statement, “Women should care more about family and home” a positive value, women considered this statement in very negative terms.

During the interviews some extremist or radical nationalistic views appeared among young people, but those were rare; therefore, they did not constitute a distinct identity pattern-group. Some students rejected the EU and would have asked for compensation for some historical injustices (such as the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, which is still considered a national tragedy by many Hungarians).

4 For instance, the statement, “The EU is involved in fighting global poverty” was interpreted by many of the respondents as, “I believe that fighting against global poverty is important, so I agree with it.” In other words, the role of the EU was not taken into consideration
Such responses clearly absorbed the increasingly powerful radical right-wing thinking among Hungarian students and young people in general.\footnote{5}

This analysis allowed us to identify four factors that kept reappearing in the responses. These can be divided into diverse identity patterns affiliated to divergent politico-ideological orientations. The first factor represents a ‘liberal-democratic’ pattern of pro-European identity, the second factor a ‘macho-nationalistic’ pattern of a Eurosceptic identity, the third a utilitarian-instrumental identity pattern, while the fourth one represents another variety of a Hungarian national identity that is more emotional but less nationalistic than the second type; therefore we called it the ‘Hestia-identity’ pattern.\footnote{6}

3.1. The ‘liberal-democratic’ identity pattern (Factor I)

The liberal-democratic identity pattern emerged in Hungary, where seven interviewees belonged to this group. In terms of gender distribution, this factor was proportionately mixed (four female and three male). The most important statements ranked by the first subgroup represented the third theoretical RECON model, which is the most open, tolerant, and liberal model, associating the EU with global issues, global responsibility, and the like. According to Eriksen and Fossum [2009], identity formation attached to this notion of democracy “is based on universal norms, fundamental rights and democratic procedures”.

The two most central statements expressed the importance of individual and universal human rights, which also found support in the interviews. This standpoint attaches high importance to democratic norms and practices such as importance of gender equality and mutual tolerance regarding community and cultural activities. Such a tolerant and democratic standpoint of our interviewees is especially important in view of the general belief that extreme right-wing movements under a cultural disguise are on the rise.

By examining the statements that distinguish this factor from the other three factors, we can see that holding individual and fundamental human rights in high esteem is the core element of this identity pattern. It seems that people who belong to this type are concerned and associate the EU with universal rights and norms much more than other people belonging to other factors (as they rated these statements on average higher than the other subgroups). “The EU should

\footnote{5}{A good example of this tendency at a more general level is the success of Jobbik during the 2009 EP elections – the party obtained three out of the 22 Hungarian mandates. In the 2010 national legislative elections, Jobbik obtained 12 percent of the vote.}

\footnote{6}{Hestia was the Greek goddess of family and domesticity.}
respect, protect, spend more money, and fight for universal human rights on the global scale” statement received 5 on this factor, while it received only 1 on the other factors. Another statement, “Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone” received a positive value only on this factor, while it received 0 or a negative value on the other factors. Supporting a European constitution is also a distinguishing feature of this factor, especially compared to the fourth factor that contained a negative value for this statement (“The EU should have a constitution”).

Students belonging to this subcategory seemed to be much more informed about everyday social and economic issues as well as about ongoing political debates and processes. Moreover, they were more aware of environmental issues and applied energy-saving practical solutions in their own lives, as revealed by the interviews.

The importance of individual freedom is supported by another highly ranked statement, “Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe upon rights and freedom of others”. This subgroup also agreed that gender was very important, but difficult to turn into reality (“There have been many attempts to realize gender equality but even in the EP it is not a successful story” [H06SEMEF]). Not only women supported equal rights; the following quotation comes from a male student’s reaction to the statement “Women should care more about family and home”: “All people have the right to decide on how much time they spend on house-work, we cannot decide for them” [H12MOARM].

Regarding the negative scores of the ranked statements, we can see that this subgroup is very much against using violence for achieving political goals, and prefers more peaceful co-operation (e.g. “It is somebody’s mistake if problem solving turns into force.” [H12MOARM]). Moreover, this group is almost free from the inferiority complex that characterizes the other subgroups. In this group we see the highest level of respect for diversity and tolerance towards minorities among all identity types.

Summarizing the results, the liberal-democratic subgroup can be characterized by cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, pro-European identifications, and appears to be more open and tolerant towards diversity, gender equality, and individual freedom.
3.2. The ‘macho-nationalistic’ identity pattern (Factor II)

This factor consists of two defining sorts that were both sorted by male medical students.⁷ The factor called ‘macho nationalistic identity’ shows a high correlation with the fourth factor, the affective ‘Hestia’-nationalistic identity pattern. This is not coincidental given that Factor II and IV basically represent the masculine and feminine sides of a similar nationalistic pattern. Among Hungarian students we found strong, but gender differentiated, attachments to a nationalistic identity – with a number of notable variations.

The two top-ranked ethno-centric statements of this factor were – “My home is my country,” and “I am proud of being Hungarian”, both clearly belonging to the first RECON model. Nationalism is rather typical in Hungarian society and has not been significantly weakened over the last decades, not even during the 1989 regime change. On the contrary, it has become more common in the public discourse [Heller and Rényi 1996]. A longitudinal study [Csepeli et al. 2005] by the use of aggregated measures obtained from statements expressing nationalistic attitudes showed very similar patterns in 1995 and 2003, though they were almost 10 years apart.

Despite their nationalistic feelings, respondents belonging to this factor were concerned with European issues and felt a certain degree of identification with Europe. This was the only factor that scored relatively high on the statement, “I am proud to be European”. In fact, people who were identified as ‘macho-nationalists’ were rather pessimistic and sceptical about democracy and the EU. The normalized factor scores for Factor II show a relatively high score in the case of these two statements, “Women and men are equal” and “Women should care more about family and home”, which at first seem to be quite contradictory, but no female respondent shared this pattern. One of the interviewees argued that, “Women are able to do everything that a man can do. There is legal equality today. But there are certain differences between men and women, for example, in their mentality; and another example is that only women can give birth. Therefore, their task is primarily to stay at home and take care of the home and domestic life” (H05SEMEM). According to the male interviewees, these two statements could stand together with similar weight without any problems.

Another international survey [Pongrácz 2006] showed that Hungarians assigned an outstandingly high priority to the role of women in taking care of the

⁷ Originally, there were three significant sorts belonging to this factor, but only two were defining sorts. The third sort had a significant factor-load not only on the second but also on the first factor and thus represents a more open and more liberal national identity pattern compared to the two medical students.
family and children, much higher than concentrating on their work – even in comparison to Poles, Lithuanians, or Romanians. Part of our empirical research (regarding Factor IV) supports this result, as the ‘Hestia-identity’ pattern (affective nationalistic identity) among young women was in agreement with the existing gender-defined roles. Our research results also signalled the presence of a substantive gender-equality conception and thus make us believe that a small part of the (female) younger generation thought about gender issues somewhat differently, stressing equal rights and treatment of people.

As mentioned earlier, the ‘masco-nationalistic’ identity type was more concerned with the importance of European economic issues such as a common currency (Euro), as well as with European diversity and values. These respondents also considered the EU as the source of working and studying opportunities. Some statements like, “We need strong leaders” were typical for this factor and got relatively high scores. This identity pattern did not include characteristics reflecting the first liberal-democratic identity pattern (third RECON model). For example, “being a global citizen” and “feeling at home in the whole world” are feelings far from this value-structure.

To sum up, this factor showed ethno-centric nationalistic traits and could be characterized by a conservative conception of gender-based roles. It thus stands in opposition to global cosmopolitan values and gives priority to national interests. Group members share Euro-sceptic and pessimist perspectives in terms of democracy.

3.3. The utilitarian-instrumental European identity pattern (Factor III)

There are three defining Q-sorts that belong to this factor. This group is not as Euro-sceptical as the second group. People belonging to it see many advantages in being EU-citizens although they share some feelings of inferiority as inhabitants of a ‘late-comer’ country.

Here, the top three statements in our sample described the power and economic utility of the ‘progressive EU’ (“The Euro should become a common currency of Europe”, “The EU should financially contribute to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution”, ”It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe”). This fact is also supported by the factor arrays. This factor is closest to the second RECON model. The statements and interviews reflected the expectations of the EU as a multinational federal state that provides protection to citizens and member states. Our respondents affirmed that the EU also comes with some privileges like working and studying abroad and winning tender bids
2. Collective Identity Patterns among Hungarian University Students

(‘EU money’), which contribute to the development of national agriculture, infrastructure, etc. Not all respondents would call themselves EU-supporters, but as one of them put it, “I am moderately Euro-sceptical, which means ultraliberal in Hungary” [H15ELLAM].

The high ranking of the statement, “Some minorities demand too many rights” can be interpreted in several ways. It is clear that it has a certain discriminatory meaning, expressing anti-minority feelings or even racism. This intolerant view can be related to the feeling of frustration and inferiority of the late-comer countries compared to the more developed member states. The in-between status of the utilitarian group can be clearly demonstrated on opinions defining the minority group by living standards that are below their own, and from which they want to distance themselves. This subgroup does not want to look back to the past, but definitely looks forward to the future (suggested in the very negative score for “We are the slaves of Europe” and “Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past”).

3.4. The ‘Hestia’ nationalistic identity pattern (Factor IV)

The female ‘Hestia’ group does not exhibit nationalistic feelings comparable to their male counter-parts (Factor II). But young women associated with it show protective and caring attitudes related to domesticity and they are rather alienated from the EU. This factor can be also linked to the first RECON model since it contains strong nationalistic attitudes. The name ‘Hestia’ suggests a strong protective attitude, empathetic solidarity, and emotionally charged national feelings that characterize this identity type. The interviewees seemed to focus on caring and protecting and they valued women who stayed at home and cared for the family.

This factor consisted of five defining sorts and all of them were sorted by female students.⁸ This clearly showed an attitude based on traditional gender roles. The first two sorts came from students in Budapest, and the other three from students studying in the countryside⁹. Six female sorts scored greatly on Factor IV, unlike on any other factor.

The two most significant statements expressed a strong nationalistic feeling (“My home is my country” and “I am proud of being Hungarian”). The interviews showed that these statements disguised two types of feelings. These

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⁸ There were two other female sorts that might have belonged here, had they not had strong correlations with the first factor as well.
⁹ The subjects they study show quite a variety.
young women were attracted to a safe and secure shelter provided by the nation-state, i.e. the motherland. This feeling could be detected in the importance they attached to their roots, to the place where their family and relatives lived and had lived for decades. At the same time, a certain fear or repulsion could be sensed from their answers revealing a considerable distance from the EU, which represented the ‘unknown’, a far-away place lacking the usual safety of home. These emotions were demonstrated on statements such as, “I would feel myself a foreigner anywhere else. I would miss my familiar environment and my usual things” [H14]. The same young women held the opinion that abroad she could never feel at home although she had never even left Hungary.\footnote{It is quite telling that two female students out of five in this factor have never been abroad.} Members of this group spoke about the EU as of a rich person who could provide help and assistance for Hungarians or people living in the Third World. They also saw the EU as an interesting, pleasant place surrounding Hungary, but not attractive enough to live in. They rejected the possibility of replacing their national Hungarian identity with a supranational European one.

Women belonging to this group considered the role of EU being very important in global peace-making as well as in solving global economic crisis, but the real motivation behind such statements was an idealistic “love, peace, and understanding” view, rather than a real cosmopolitan attitude. Statements expressing cosmopolitan identity (e.g. “I am a global citizen”) also received very low scores.

\subsection*{3.5. Comparative analysis and factor structure}

As for the correlations between these four factors, the lowest one was between Factor III and Factor IV. The meaning behind this statistical fact is that while Factor I represents the most positive and supportive attitude towards the EU, Factor IV is the most negative towards the success, results, and utility of the EU. Members of the utilitarian group III were keen to live in the EU and rank all positive outcomes in the hope of being able to share the benefits coming from the EU. They gave positive evaluations especially to the economic achievements of the EU such as economic stability and the economic union. Their choice was not based on abstract values that were usually associated with the EU but on personal or collective interests, e.g. study or work abroad for a higher salary. They did not appreciate the EU because of intercultural adventures or the experience of cultural diversity. They only emphasized economic and personal advantages.
In the interpretation of the two gendered nationalistic factors we stressed the fact that Hungarian society is rather conservative and traditional, whereby the institution of family is highly valued by both men and women. Unequal treatment of women is present in many spheres of society (low promotion opportunities, differences in salaries, low percentage of women as economic and political decision-makers). Despite the high ratio of women with university degrees, in 2008 only 5.5 percent of the common and corresponding members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences were women, a very shocking number that clearly shows the unequal access of women to higher positions [Yearbook of Welfare Statistics 2009]. Considering Hungary’s cultural and traditional background in terms of gender-roles, it is not surprising that the overall expectations and orientations of women and men differ to a great extent. Our two national factors (Factor II composed of men only and Factor IV composed of women only) clearly expressed these traditional differences in attitudes and values. As we discussed above, although both subgroups highly valued their Hungarian identity and believed that their country was their only thinkable ‘home’, the underlying reasons were quite different between the macho and the Hestia groups.

Another interesting difference relates to the perception of political institutions and participation including the inefficiency of democracy. While Factor II showed that men were very sceptical about democracy and did not think that, “Democracy introduces order in the world”, people belonging to the ‘Hestia identity’ Factor IV were not of such negative views. Similarly, opinions on gender issues differed to a great extent, as well as the importance of a common European army. While the men of the second group tended to agree with the idea of a common European army, women from the fourth group strongly disagreed. There was another noteworthy difference between men and women concerning their feelings of being European. Men from group II scored quite highly, while the scores of women from group IV were quite low.

Both male and female respondents from groups II and IV rejected the statement that, “Some political goals can be achieved by force”. Our respondents made it clear that they had different background worldviews and thus understood the meanings of this sentence differently. Women rejected the idea of force, power, and the related concept of army, while men focused on managing and arranging problems through the use of domination, even if it required the use of force in some cases.

Table 2.2. gives a geometrical meaning to the Hungarian factor structure. As we can see, F II and F IV factors are located closest to each other, while F III is located far from the others. The correlation is the smallest between Factor III and Factor IV. (The meaning of these distances is discussed below.)
4. Summary of findings

For the Hungarian case, our analysis identified four factors. Table 2.3. summarizes the most important findings of our analysis regarding each factor, which will help us to create summary profiles for each of the four identity patterns. In order to sum up the results, first of all we will take up the factor values for each subgroup, rank them in order of the factor-specific sort (based on the normalized factor scores), and flag the significant variables. These specific statements – that

11 As a rule of thumb, only subjects with a value of at least 0.5 were considered as significant on a given factor. If a subject had more loadings of a value of at least 0.25, then we could consider the subject belonging unambiguously to one factor only if the loading on one factor was bigger than the double of the loading on any other factors. Every considered factor had to have at least two sorts loaded on it, otherwise we could not distinguish what was so particular about the factor and what came only from the unique sorting (basically it means that the reliability of the factor equals the reliability of the person). Those subjects (Q-sorts) that loaded significantly on more than one factor were eliminated from the analysis. Considered factors had to have at least two sorts loaded on them. Finally, 7 defining sorts characterized the first factor, 2 the second factor, 3 the third factor and 5 defining sorts characterized the fourth factor.
subgroup members ranked higher or lower than the overall average – highlight the differences between subgroups [Donner 2001].

Table 2.3. The Original Factor Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
<th>Factor IV</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of defining sorts</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% explained variance</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of new def. sorts</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see in Table 2.4., Factor II shows a considerably high correlation with Factor IV, while Factors III and IV show a relatively high correlation with Factor I. We can also see that the correlation between Factors III and IV is rather low. Also the correlation between Factors II, I, and III is very low.

Table 2.4. Correlations Between Factor Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
<th>Factor IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor I</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>0.3618</td>
<td>0.4102</td>
<td>0.4213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor II</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>0.3150</td>
<td>0.2190</td>
<td>0.2110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor III</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>0.1941</td>
<td>0.4862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor IV</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Q-research is not aimed at examining the factual knowledge about the EU and EU-related issues demonstrated by students. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the first subgroup (Factor I) had the most knowledge about both the general and the specific statements, as well as about the ongoing political issues and processes (e.g. concerning the EU constitution, EU-enlargement, decision-making processes, etc.).

5. Conclusion

In recent decades several research projects have aimed to explore how social changes and democratization processes have affected the Hungarian youth. Joining the EU has not yet affected many people’s everyday lives and has not contributed to major changes in society. Young people’s hopes and life expectations are still rather negative. They are afraid of unemployment, deprivation, and decreasing living standards. Eurobarometer survey from 2008 reported that 40 percent
of Hungarians believed that further negative changes would occur. Our research results support these findings.

Our empirical research showed that young people’s perceptions of the EU are not very comprehensive; they approximate RECON Model 1 of liberal democracy [see Eriksen and Fossum 2009]. Our Q-set research helped to identify four different identity types that reflect different concepts of political affiliation and participation. The four patterns were described as democratic-liberal European, utilitarian-instrumental, and two gender-based nationalistic and traditionalist varieties. The survival and strong presence of traditional, nationalistic, and conservative values represent a closed, insular way of thinking, traditional gender roles, the prevalence of national identity compared to a European or global sense of belonging, the rejection of universalistic values, and frustration due to new, unfamiliar ideas and surroundings. The persistence of these patterns founded on the same basic identity complex could possibly be explained by the transmission of the conservative value system from the older generations. European-identity patterns, including the appreciation of democratic values and universal human rights seem to be weak among Hungarian young people. In our research, these patterns emerged only in one identity type (the liberal-democratic).

Negative attitudes towards minorities and the persistence of traditional mindsets (of both young men and women) regarding gender issues may be subject to change in the future. This could happen if the democratization process and consolidation of European and global universal norms further develops in Hungary. These improvements will be the necessary preconditions for the development of an open, tolerant, democratic, multicultural, and inclusive society.

References


3. Universalist, traditionalist, pragmatic, instrumental: Narratives of Europe among young Poles

Olga Brzezińska, Beata Czajkowska, David Skully

1. Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 marked a historical moment in the development of European cooperation. Attention shifted to the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, with a two-pronged focus – on the way the EU accession affects new members and how their presence in integrated Europe affects the Union. Economic and political aspects aside, we wish to gain more insight into identity issues in the re-configured European constellation. Research teams from the University of Bremen, Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, and the Jagiellonian University in Cracow set out on a joint project under the auspices of the RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe) Project. This chapter shows the results of the Polish case study conducted in 2009 as part of the three-country research to empirically examine some salient identity patterns and the way they translate into support for different visions of democracy as formulated in the RECON project. To this end, Q methodology is employed to gather quantitative and qualitative evidence about students’ identity patterns with a special focus on their affiliation with the RECON models, namely RECON-1: national democracy, RECON-2: federal multinational democracy, and RECON-3: cosmopolitan democracy (see Skully in this volume).

We interviewed 40 students of 19 to 25 years of age from two universities in Poland: Jagiellonian University in Cracow (JUK), a major university in Poland with history dating back to the 14th century; and Marie Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin (UMCS) in eastern Poland. The choice of these two universities was determined by the desire to gather material among young people studying at a renowned academic establishment, with a well-developed network of international cooperation, that is also based in a major city (JUK) and compare it with the data gathered from students from a lesser-known university with less experience in international cooperation (UMCS). We assumed that students from a large and important university, benefiting from contacts with international stu-

1 More on this study see Brzezińska et al. [2011].
students and professors, could have different opinions and have the ability to transcend a narrow perspective on the issues studied than students from a university that does not provide so many opportunities to broaden horizons.2

Another assumption of our present study is that students, representatives of a young generation pursuing higher education, are likely to reflect on the developments and changes of the modern world in the process of identity construction. We also believe that access to unrestricted information via modern technology and a desire to gain experience and explore the world encourage cross-border mobility and ever-increasing contacts with people from various cultures, nationalities, and backgrounds. This creates conducive conditions for international integration and the creation of a broader, more inclusive sense of ‘we’.

Since the objective of our research was to observe and plausibly quantify students’ subjective perceptions of Europe, the EU, and various forms of democratic governance, we employed Q methodology, which combines quantitative and qualitative evidence and allows for a systematic study of subjective values, viewpoints, and opinions that individuals’ hold on a given topic or issue. The ultimate product of a Q method study is the identification of common factors or constellations of values and opinions common to several individuals: we also refer to these structures as identity patterns. An elaboration of the narratives of such patterns is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the Polish factor structure and discusses how it was determined. Section 4 is a summary of the findings of the study and Section 5 presents conclusions.

2. Four narratives of Europe

The analysis of the data gathered in Poland revealed four factors, for the sake of investigation and description labelled as follows: 1. the Universalists, 2. the Traditionalists, 3. the Pragmatists, and 4. the Instrumentalists. The first two categories have clearly distinguishable identity patterns and they stand against each other. The other two factors, Pragmatists and Instrumentalists, are distinct from the first two, but converge on many grounds; the distinctions between these two common identity patterns are much subtler. The observable difference is that unlike Instrumentalists, Pragmatists are Euro-centric. The latter consider a strong European Union that respects its composite members as a natural point of reference and do not consider global issues – those beyond the boundaries of Europe

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2 The analysis found no significant differences between JUK and UCMS respondents and between male and female respondents.
– to be relevant. Instrumentalists focus on the government as a means and instrument for solving problems: they support national, European, and global action depending on the problem to be addressed.

2.1. Universalists (Factor 1)

Universalists have clear views and preferences: they are the most likely to see Europe as ‘a state of mind’ and define it through shared common values (respect for human rights, respect for individuals, gender equality, free movement of people within the EU, cooperation not rivalry at the local European level, respect for diversity) and shared culture. As one of our respondents stated, “I think that with time it [the EU] is becoming more of a state of mind. Thanks to travel, meeting new cultures, we find out that in fact we are not that different” [Jkind]. At the same time, Universalists extend their identity to global citizenship: “I am a global citizen – I like that very much. And I think that way too. I value it more than national values” [Mmpol]. They also argue that human values are universal, not European or Polish: “European values? They are universal values – universal human rights. There is no such thing as European human rights” [Mkbib].

Universalists were born in Poland and live in Poland but this does not generate any particular pride; on the contrary, they feel uncomfortable about the statement, “I am proud of being Polish” (Q16) and associate it with the nationalistic rhetoric that they oppose. Similarly, they disagree with the statement, “We are the slaves of Europe” (Q68). They view being Polish as an accident of birth. Some note that being Polish may have led to a feeling of inferiority for older generations; but for this generation (and this group) being Polish is no liability: they are as comfortable in other European countries as they are in Poland. As one respondent said, “I live in Poland, but at the same time I am a European, because Poland is in Europe, and Europe is in the world – there are no borders” [Mkpra].

Universalists favour common European solutions (such as the common foreign policy); they see the EU as an active player in solving global problems but acknowledge the need and effectiveness of working at the local level. They are open to others and trust other people; they also have a sense of responsibility at the individual/local level and see the EU as having global responsibilities like environmental protection and solving the global economic crisis. Universalists are particularly vocal in their annoyance about dwelling on the past or demanding compensation for the past injustices. They also disagree that force is necessary or ever justified.
The impression we draw from the interviews is that Universalists are confident about their preferences, comfortable about their global identity and open to the ‘other’. They value diversity, wish for more of it and state that “[…] it is not diversity that causes problems, but lack of abilities, tolerance, ability to manage diversity […]” [Mmpol].

The confidence and comfort that Universalists reveal about their identity translates into trust. They strongly disagree with the statement, “One can only trust family and close friends”: “I am definitely in favour of trusting as many people as possible, thus encouraging them to trust others. If they show more trust, they will deserve trust in return” [Jmgeo]. This trust may also emerge from positive experiences from travel, study, and work elsewhere in Europe. It is a distinguishing characteristic of Universalists that they extrapolate positive European experiences into a positive global outlook.

Universalists perceive democracy as a desired system and they regard it as functioning and efficient as long as it is participatory and equally recognizes all subjects engaged in unrestricted deliberation: “For me democracy means participatory democracy. Simply, when everybody can influence what is actually happening. And this is how I would imagine the world in the future – that ideal” [Jmgeo].

Generally speaking, after careful analysis of the Q-statement distributions and explanatory interviews, we perceive Universalists as idealistic individualists, who have a very positive outlook on the future.

2.2. Traditionalists (Factor 2)

Traditionalists are sharply distinguished from other factors by their level of trust. Traditionalists limit their trust to the closest circle of family and friends because family “is a basic unit of society on which the healthy cooperation of society rests” [Mmhis]. This group is generally suspicious of anything public – institutions in particular: “I don’t trust any [EU] institution because it is not possible for an average person to monitor how they work. […] Besides, these institutions are so big that there must be something shady going on there, for sure” [Mmhis]. Nor do Traditionalists trust politicians; they believe politicians do not act in the public interest: “There is not a person out there who could represent me and also work in Poland’s interest” [Mkmat]. They are not willing to grant competencies to the European Union, for example, to form a common army: “The EU is too new of an institution to entrust it with an army. The EU is shattered by internal conflicts […] It is a union of nation-states that are going to quibble” [Mmhis].
Thus, a national army is necessary for national security: “The Warsaw Pact had one army. If you know history, you know the dangers [of a non-national army]” [Mmhis]. Their opposition to the common foreign policy is also based on arguments related to national security: “Each country needs its own policy that is a function of its location” [Jmhis].

Traditionalists have a pronounced Polish identity: “Poland is my home and I plan to stay here. I want to travel a lot but I want to return to Poland. […] Just because I can travel to different countries does not mean that the world can become my home” [Mkmat]. They are proud to be Polish: “I share [our] values such as religiosity, especially our religious traditions. […] It is our tradition that I am Catholic, I go to church and pray” [Mkmat]. For Traditionalists, who are more socially conservative and identify themselves as Catholics, the common Christian legacy is what binds Europe together: “No matter how divided Europe used to be, between Eastern and Western Christianity, the values remained the same” [Jmhis].

Traditionalists do not reject the European Union; they do not question the benefits of membership, or want Poland to leave the EU. Their relationship with the EU is economic, focused on receiving goods and services: “I like the free flow of goods and people and that we can work and study where we want” [Mmhis]. It is important to stress that Traditionalists are not extremists or radicals. They do not advocate historical revisionism – “Our country suffered a lot from its neighbours. It is true but it doesn’t matter now” [Mkmat] – but feel strongly about the preservation of competencies at the national level – “I think that social policy, regulations, and social security should stay in the nation-state” [Mmhis]. The study found only one respondent, sorted in the Traditionalist group, who spoke very critically about the EU and thought Poland would be better off without the membership: “For me the European Union deals only with little, unimportant matters. It makes everything more difficult for citizens. […] The EU is forcing some standards on us” [Mkmuz].

“Poland has so much to offer” [Mkmuz] is a common sentiment and a source of comfort for Traditionalists. Their identity and preferences are defined by and grounded in the experience of the nation-state. They are proud of Poland’s history: “The Polish republic was really the first democratic country in the world where the Parliament stood above the king. A country where Muslims, Protestants, Christian-Orthodox, Jews lived together” [Jmhis]. Symbols are important to them (national flag, national constitution, etc.). They feel Polish uniqueness should be preserved in the European Union: “It is impossible to have one history book for Europe. Each country must present its point of view and justify its sins, show the sins of neighbours. A common history book in not achievable” [Jmhis].
It may be the unspoken fear that their country may not be respected that makes the Traditionalist retreat into the familiar, into the comfort of what they know.

2.3. Pragmatists (Factor 3)

Pragmatists are most comfortable with the current arrangement of the European Union – the union of nation-states. Their frame of reference is clearly defined by the contemporary experience of Poles living in an EU member state. For Pragmatists, a common and shared European heritage is a core asset and a fundamental value of the European Union: “It is a foundation on which Europeanness may be built, this Europe that is a state of mind and not a geographic term […] I think about this state of mind as a composite of values, attitudes, trends, and ways of thinking” [Mmfil].

Pragmatists find global issues to be remote, external to their interests and concerns. They appreciate the here and now and do not focus on the unattainable. They are at ease with dual identity (Polish and European); it is not a source of tension for them: “Being Polish and European is not contradictory” [Jkmed]. They are Polish because they were born here; they are European because the European culture makes Europe familiar, known, and secure: “When I travel to France or to Italy, I do not feel a stranger there. I am not exactly on my turf but close” [Mmfil]. They see Poland as part of Europe, “It is my little motherland in a great European motherland” [Jmche].

Pragmatists perceive Poland’s membership in the EU as a desirable arrangement and an obvious fact. They are satisfied with the current state of affairs and the level of European integration. Some show no support for further integration of the EU: “Each state should preserve its uniqueness […] I support the union but the union of nations, the union of cultures” [Jkmed], while others perceive integration as a logical outcome: “There is no alternative to integration. […] Unless Europe unites into one real country, we will be marginalized” [Jmche]. They conclude, though, that it is too early to give up the idea of the nation-state. “The time to think about one and only Europe has not come yet. Not in our lifetime; maybe our grandchildren will be ready for it. For now there should be diversity of identities, emphasized by separate passports” [Jmche]. At the same time, Pragmatists support the idea of the EU enlargement as long as the new countries share the ‘European culture’. The particulars of which country may enter the EU differ. For example, some support Turkey’s membership unlike others. “It is not about religion. I have nothing against Islam. It is a question of mentality, […] the European thinking” [Jmche].

[64]
Pragmatists are also realists who understand the benefits of the European Union – the ease of travel, harmonization of laws and norms: “I don’t agree that the harmonization of laws threatens sovereignty” [Jkgeo]; access to the European institutions: “The ability to go to the court [of Human Rights] in Strasbourg is very important. These [European] institutions are a guarantor of sensibility and normality of laws here. Practically speaking, there is no other policeman” [Mminf]. They think that the EU should have a common foreign policy because speaking with one voice guarantees effectiveness and consistency. From the Polish perspective, it also improves security: “When it comes to foreign policy, the biggest conflict is with Russia. It is a sensitive matter and I think that because of Russia it is necessary to have a single policy” [Jkepi].

Pragmatists live in the present. They are critical about building identity on the past: “Does the past help us understand the future? I don’t think so. […] Twenty years ago nobody would have thought about being in the same community with Germans; now we are and who knows what is going to happen in twenty years” [Mmfil]. They understand and appreciate the value of democracy and responsible leadership: “A leader is a person who listens and can make a decision, take responsibility which is difficult for some […] and move forward.” [Jkepi]. They value diversity and think that more diversity would be good for Poland in order “to teach some of us to be more tolerant” [Jkgeo]. Diversity is a problem only “when it is used as a weapon. Non-aggressive diversity cannot cause problems” [Mmfil].

2.4. Instrumentalists (Factor 4)

The fourth factor distinguished in our study, Instrumentalists, does not provide unambiguous classification. The Q-statement distribution and explanatory interviews reveal a mixed, hybrid identity pattern. Instrumentalists support the current state of affairs and the direction of its development. They make frequent references favouring a strong nation-state, but at the same time view positively the workings of the European Union and would like to see some global progress, especially in terms of universal rights, “The right to vote, equality of men and women, freedom of expression. […] I believe that the Union should also fight for this” [Jkmat]. There is not an unequivocal support for the realization of democratic order in the confines of the nation-state, or at the European level. Instrumentalists seem to be ‘cherry picking’ from the abundant pool of options they see at present. Thus, we named this factor ‘instrumentalists’ to underline its shared trust in the systemic solutions, at the European and the global level. Based on the inter-

[65]
views, we conclude that this factor remains in search of identity, or rather in the process of its construction.

However, this group is also characterized by a low level of knowledge and scant understanding of the basic terms connected with democratic order, “[...] I do not understand the procedures, financial regulations, and taxation” [Mkpsy], as well as by lack of interest in the topics discussed, “And I do not know [if democracy is most effective at the local, state, or EU level]. I cannot find examples either way. I simply do not know” [Jminn]. This may explain why they show a high degree of confidence in politicians addressing state and public issues. It remains uncertain if their poor competency to talk about political issues is a result of lack of knowledge or of interest.

Instrumentalists perceive the European Union mainly in practical, instrumental terms, hence their name. Europe is understood as a geographical term and identification is the strongest with the state, “I have only one home, simply, and I do not think that the whole world can receive me in the same way, or that I would feel anywhere at home” [Mkpsy]. As much as they feel mostly Polish (culturally), they also refer to identification with Europe, whereas global level seems to be more distant in identification, “Europe is not the world. We can somehow identify with Europe, but not necessarily with the whole world” [Jkmat]. However, this derives mostly from the acknowledgement of some commonalities in the EU, which predominantly boils down to appreciation of practical solutions, such as the opportunity to travel, work, and study in other European countries, “[...] what appeals to me most is education, job, internship opportunities abroad, and it is very, very important to me [...] what opportunities the EU provides” [Mkpsy]. They also acknowledge the benefits stemming from the membership in the European structures in terms of the significance of the country on a global scale, “Obviously they will not attack a member of the EU, so we are more respected, since they look on us as a member of this community” [Mmche].

Instrumentalists support the enlargement of the EU and some common policies in the name of solidarity with the poorer and weaker, and again they perceive it in practical, financial, and economic terms, “Since we, Poles, got such a chance, then other countries should also be given such an opportunity” [Jkmat]; “[enlargement] is connected with the fact that the EU can afford it, and this is mainly about economy. The rest is less important – I mean politics” [Jminn].

Instrumentalists, just like our other factors, do not want to dwell on the past, “For me the argument that our country suffered a lot is pointless. Every country suffered. [...] We suffered, but we also caused suffering” [Jkmat]. They would prefer to focus on the present, to ensure effective functioning of the European Union, preservation of cultural and political integrity of the country and coopera-
tion on a global scale. Global scale is referred to with regard to protection of values, universal rights, but in the process of development of global decision making the Union is granted a crucial role, “I believe this is one of the main aims of the European Union, to create one voice” [Jminm].

3. Polish identity patterns and models of democracy

This sub-section explores the relationship between the four Polish factors (i.e. common identity patterns) and the three models of democratic governance. The Q method process provides quantitative data that can be used to construct measures of agreement and disagreement with the various visions of democratic governance depicted in the three models.

Of the 70 statements in the Q-sort analysis, 30 statements are democracy-model-specific statements. There are 10 national-model statements, 11 federal-model statements and 9 cosmopolitan-model statements. The agreement score, explained in the chapter by Skully in this volume, is a quantitative measure of how strongly a factor agrees or disagrees with a set of democracy-model-statements. The agreement score ranges from -100 percent, representing the lowest disagreement, to +100 percent, representing the highest agreement. Values close to zero are interpreted as neutral or indifferent.

The objective of the Q-sort method is to identify distinct subsets of individual respondents based on their subjective sorting of statements. The Q-sort algorithm searches for groupings of respondents that maximize the differences between groups and minimize the differences within groups. The algorithm usually identifies implicit polarities: the present analysis corresponds to this common pattern. There is a strong, primary opposition between Universalists and Traditionalists; and a weaker, secondary opposition between Pragmatists and Instrumentalists. Although the factors are determined based on the full set of 70 statements, these polarities persist in the analysis of the subset of 30 democracy-model-related statements.

Consider the primary opposition first. It is immediately apparent from the Figure “Democracy-Model Statement Agreement Scores” (Figure 3.1.) that Universalists and Traditionalists are in opposition in all models. Universalists disagree (-42 percent) with national-model statements, are indifferent (-7 percent) to federal-model statements, and agree (+57 percent) with cosmopolitan-model statements. In contrast, Traditionalists agree moderately (+26 percent) with national-model statements, disagree strongly (-83 percent) with federal-model statements, and are indifferent (-9 percent) to cosmopolitan-model statements.
Traditionalists’ strong disagreement with federal-model statements stands in contrast against the other 3 subjectivities which are indifferent to them, with agreement scores ranging from -7 percent to +10 percent. Only for Traditionalists do these statements elicit a strong reaction. The strong disagreement with a federal European Union and greater harmonization of policy among EU member states is coupled with mild agreement (+26 percent) with national-model statements. With regard to cosmopolitan-model statements the Traditionalist factor is indifferent (-9 percent). The distinguishing characteristic of Traditionalists is not a modest support for the nation state but strong opposition to a federalist European Union.

national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.” But Traditionalists voice disagreement or indifference regarding nation-state powers: [-2] “Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state”; [-1] “The power of the EU should be limited”; [-1] “National borders should be controlled by individual member states”; [0] “We need a national army”; and [0] “Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from citizens”. Consequently, it is not appropriate to interpret Traditionalists as firm supporters of the national model: Anti-Federalist is a more accurate characterization.

Comparing Traditionalist rankings across democracy-statement sets, one finds that “proud to be Polish” (National) [+4] is consistent with “proud to be European” (Federal) [+1] and being a global citizen (Cosmopolitan) [+1]. Thus, for Traditionalists, pride in being Polish is primary but not exclusionary – they take pride in being European as well as in being global citizens.

Universalists are unique in their disagreement with national-model statements (-42 percent). No other subjectivity reveals aggregate disagreement with national-model statements: Traditionalists show mild support for nation-model-related statements (+26 percent), while Pragmatists and Instrumentalists are indifferent or very weakly supportive (+5 percent, +11 percent, respectively). Universalist disagreement with national-model statements is coupled with agreement with cosmopolitan-model statements (+57 percent) and indifference to federal-model statements (-7 percent).

Two themes emerge from examining Universalist rankings of democracy-model statements. First, Universalists disagree with statements of a ‘patriotic’ nature; this is best described as anti-chauvinism or aversion to being mistaken for being chauvinist. It holds at the national level: [-2] “Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one”, [-1] “I am proud to be Polish”, and [-1] “My home is my country” (National). And it holds at the EU-level: [-1] “I am proud of being European” (Federal). However, universal, inclusive statements elicit strong agreement: [+4] “I am a global citizen” and [+3] “The whole world is my home” (Cosmopolitan).

Second, Universalists reveal an aversion to the coercive powers of government. They are strongly opposed to a common EU army: [-4] “We need a strong national army” (National); [-4] “Europe should have one common army” (Federal). But they agree [+3] that, “The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale” (Cosmopolitan); presumably by non-military means. Similarly, they view fiscal power unfavourably: [-2] “Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from citizens” (National); [-1] “Our taxes should be split between the national and the EU administration” (Federal). This accounts for much of the Universalists apparent support for the cosmopolitan-statement set; how-
ever, one should not assume that this support is conclusive. The cosmopolitan model is deliberately vague about the locus of these coercive state powers. The aspects of state-power Universalists oppose are unspecified in the cosmopolitan model, thus there is nothing for them to oppose: they give all cosmopolitan-model statement non-negative ranks – a unique occurrence for a Polish factor-model pair. Thus it is difficult to interpret their high (+57 percent) cosmopolitan-statement agreement score with positive support for the cosmopolitan model; this pattern of agreement is also consistent with support for general social democratic values, a global development agenda and an aversion to power and political institutions.

The distinction between Pragmatists and Instrumentalists is subtle; it lacks the well-defined contrasts between Universalists and Traditionalists. Pragmatists and Instrumentalists are relatively indifferent to all democracy-statement sets. The highest level of agreement or disagreement is found among the cosmopolitan-model statements: Pragmatists reveal a slight disagreement (-20 percent) and Instrumentalists reveal a slight agreement (+17 percent). Instrumentalists are in a borderline agreement with the national-model statements (+11 percent) and federal-model statements (+10 percent); while Pragmatists are almost perfectly indifferent to them: (+5 percent) and (-2 percent).

The key to understanding the difference between Pragmatists and Instrumentalists is in examining the differences in their rankings of specific statements. Interviews with Instrumentalists revealed that they have relatively little interest in or knowledge of politics; however, they would like problems to be solved. They reveal support for institutions they feel capable of solving problems at all levels of governance: this is the primary source of their mild or borderline agreement with all models of democratic governance. Instrumentalists give ranks 3 or more points greater than Pragmatists on the following Q-sort statements: national – “Our politicians should do their best to represent national interests” (+4 vs. +1 for Pragmatists) and “Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state (-1 vs. -4 for Pragmatists); federal – “Foreign policy should be made at the EU level” (+2 vs. -1 for Pragmatists) and “The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent…” (+2 vs. -2 for Pragmatists); and cosmopolitan – “The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale” (+3 vs. 0 for Pragmatists) and “Global collective decision-making should be fostered” (+5 vs. +2 for Pragmatists). On this last statement, Universalists rank +1 and Traditionalists rank -3. Contrary to Universalists, Instrumentalists have a positive attitude towards power if it is aimed at solving problems.

Pragmatists are distinguished by their lack of interest beyond the borders of Europe. They are extremely proud to be Polish (+5 National) and European (+3

[70]
Federal), but they give the least support (-2) to the statements “I am a global citizen” and (-4) “The whole world is my home” (Cosmopolitan). They give the lowest ranking of all Polish factors to the global initiatives listed among the cosmopolitan-model statements.

The overall indifference that Pragmatists and Instrumentalists reveal for all three democracy-statement sets emerges because there are aspects of each model that they favour and disfavour and, when summed, they cancel each other out and leave the balance close to zero. Consider also that the respondents who comprise these two factors are not highly political, nor are they interested or perhaps even aware of the kinds of distinctions between the various models of democratic governance. They perceive politics as an amalgam of overlapping and often contradictory spheres of governance, the crisp theoretical distinctions are not clear to them.

We can summarize our analysis of the relation between Polish factors and models of democratic governance as follows: There is no clean mapping between the Polish factors and models of democratic governance. The closest match is negative – the Traditionalist factor reveals strong Anti-Federalist attitudes. Traditionalists strongly oppose a more federalist European Union, but they are only mild supporters of the nation-state and indifferent to cosmopolitan-model statements.

The Universalist factor, which reveals superficial support for cosmopolitan-model statements, is best described as a composite of anti-nationalistic or anti-chauvinistic statements (anti-National), a general aversion to institutions of power (anti-National, indifference to Federal and lack of opposition to Cosmopolitan), and general support for social democratic values and a global development agenda. Combined, this produces a net agreement with cosmopolitan-model-related statements. However, if institutions of power (fiscal, security) were concretely specified in the cosmopolitan model, Universalist agreement with the cosmopolitan-statement set would diminish.

The other two Polish factors, Pragmatists and Instrumentalists, are essentially indifferent across all democracy-model statement sets. They support the distribution of power and competency at different levels of governance because different competencies work best at different levels. Support and opposition roughly balance for each democracy-model set of statements. This may be an important result for a further elaboration of the RECON paradigm: it indicates that many respondents do not perceive the distinctions drawn between the existing RECON models. They rather view ideal governance as an amalgam of models. What matters for them is whether it works. Thus, fair and effective governance may be a more important source of democratic legitimacy than the construction of post-national or cosmopolitan identities.
4. Polish Factor Structure

The diagram “Polish factor structure” (Figure 3.2.) illustrates the relations between the four Polish factors. These are based on correlations between the four factors.

Figure 3.2. Polish Factor Structure

The bold equilateral triangle represents the correlations among factors P1, P3, and P4. These three factors are essentially ‘equally’ correlated with each other (49 percent, 49 percent, and 51 percent) and they are weakly correlated with P2 – Traditionalists (12 percent, 8 percent, and 25 percent). The three factors share a positive disposition toward Europe and the European Union but differ in ‘flavour’. Factor P1 – Universalists – has 12 significant (or defining) sorts. Factor P3 – Pragmatists – has 6 significant sorts; factor P4 – Instrumentalists - has 5 significant sorts; and Factor P2 – Traditionalists – has 4 significant sorts.

Table 3.1. “Determining the optimal factor structure” (see below) provides a summary of how the optimal factor structure was determined. The initial, 40-sort, 8-factor analysis is reported in the top part of the table. We report the percent of significance explained by each factor and the number of defining (significant) sorts for each factor.
In the original 8-factor analysis, Factors 5, 6, 7, and 8 contain only one or two members. Factor 6 exists because respondent #40 gave +5 to Q69 “Democracy is expensive” and Factor 8 exists because respondent #4 gave +5 to Q57 “Diversity causes problems”. Both are unusual rankings and are thus statistically significant. Factor 7 has statistical significance because respondents #10 and #37 gave an average of +3 to Q70 “Certain political goals can only be achieved by force”, which was unusual. On reading the interviews we discovered that the unusual rankings given by respondents #40 and #4 had little to do with their general political subjectivity: #40 supports democracy processes and #4 has no animosity to diversity and inclusion. Similarly, #24 (the defining sort, along with #19, for factor 5), gave +5 to Q46 “Europe is a state of mind”; but the interview revealed that the respondent simply liked the way the statement sounded – it had no particular significance; were it not for this answer, #24 would load significantly on Factor 1. Therefore, three sorts (numbers 4, 24, and 40) were excluded from the statistical analysis. The bottom part of Table 3.1. displays the results of the 37-sort analyses for Factors 8, 6, 5, 4, and 3. We selected the 4-factor analysis because it provides the highest number of significant sorts with the fewest number of factors; moreover, all factors have at least 4 defining sorts. This results in a longer list of distinguishing statements as well as more interview transcripts and is thus most supportive of the construction of plausible composite factor narratives.

Table 3.1. Determining the Optimal Factor Structure

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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td># sorts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defining sorts:

| % signif | 23 | 9 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 68  |
| # sorts   | 11 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 26  |

Excluding sorts: 4, 24, 40

| % signif | 23 | 9 | 10| 9 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 61  |
| # sorts   | 11 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 24  |

| % signif | 22 | 9 | 13| 8 | 6 |   |   |   | 58  |
| # sorts   | 12 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 3 |   |   |   | 27  |

| % signif | 22 | 10| 13| 10|   |   |   |   | 55  |
| # sorts   | 12 | 4 | 6 | 5 |   |   |   |   | 27  |

| % signif | 24 | 11| 15|   |   |   |   |   | 50  |
| # sorts   | 13 | 4 | 7 |   |   |   |   |   | 24  |
5. Conclusion

Several years have passed since Poland acceded to the EU. The accession process and its consolidation induced numerous changes, including personal perceptions of national and European identities. Our study focused on the generation that grew up within a democratic system in order to observe the emerging constructions of identity. We identified four factors: the Universalists; the Traditionalists; the Pragmatists; and the Instrumentalists. While distinct, the four factors share several common characteristics.

There is a shift in the construction of identities, a movement from a national, monolithic identity – Polish – to a mixed one. Identity is perceived and understood in cultural terms. Our respondents pointed to the commonality of European values, universal rights, and symbols. There was little mention of political systems; most respondents revealed indifference or aversion to politics and the exercise of power.

The respondents were not obsessed with Polish history; they believed that one can learn from the past to avoid repeating mistakes, but history should not be used to advance grievances, as atrocities were committed in all European nations. Polish students seemed to be focused on the present and were generally satisfied with the status quo. They appreciated and felt comfortable with Poland as a member of the European Union. The issues of belonging to Europe, being a part of Europe, or of the positive impact of the EU were not questioned. Even the Traditionalist sceptics, appreciated open borders, freedom of travel, and the ability to study in other countries.

A sense of security and the lack of feeling a real external (military or cultural) threat to Poland and/or the EU were shared by our respondents. Few identified themselves as pacifists but the majority strongly disapproved of the use of force to achieve political goals. They appeared to have internalized a concept of Europe as a peace project. Our respondents advocated conflict-resolution through negotiation, debate, and discussion.

A democratic system of governance elicited strong support, be it at the national or European level. Although often viewed as costly and perhaps inefficient,

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democracy was identified as the preferred system. However, our respondents displayed very scant knowledge about the actual working of democratic processes. Support observed for a ‘strong leader’ meant a desire for better politicians: professionals with the requisite leadership skills who can capably represent the country in international forums. Such ‘strong’ leaders, though, should be elected: they were not viewed as an alternative to democracy or as a remedy for the imperfections of the democratic system.

The respondents were generally open to further enlargement of the European Union as long as the aspiring states abide by common rules and share ‘the European culture’. For example, Turkey’s membership in the EU was conditioned by respecting human rights. The Balkans were perceived as a natural extension of the EU, as were the Ukraine and Belarus because they would benefit from the EU membership in the same way that Poland did.

With regard to the conceptual framework of the RECON project, we conclude that there is no clean mapping between the Polish factors and the three theoretical models. The strongest relationship we find is negative: the Traditionalist factor disagrees strongly with the federal-model statements. Traditionalists are anti-federalists and oppose further strengthening of the European Union. However, they are not strong supporters of the nation state and they are indifferent to cosmopolitan-model-related statements.

The Universalist factor shows agreement with the cosmopolitan-model statements and disagreement with the national-model statements. Disagreement with the national model is partly an opposition to the perceived nationalistic or patriotic statements. Universalists reveal an aversion to political institutions and power, which lowers their agreement scores on the national-model and federal-model-related statements and it also raises their agreement with cosmopolitan-model statements because the cosmopolitan model lacks well-defined institutions of power.

The pronounced oppositional pattern between Universalists and Traditionalist mirrors the polarity in contemporary Polish political discourse. In contrast, Pragmatists and Instrumentalists are relatively indifferent to all three models of democratic governance. This partly reflects their relative lack of interest in politics: they lack the polarized identity patterns we find among Universalists and Traditionalists. This also reflects an acceptance of the status quo and of an amalgam of governance models – local, national, European, and, for Instrumentalists, international organizations can govern simultaneously. For them multi-level governance is a logical way to govern. The legitimacy of governance lies in efficient public administration – in the quality of governance – it has little to do with their national or European identity.
References


1. Introduction

European identity has been in the focus of social scientists for decades. Until the early 1990s, Eurobarometer surveys were the main data source for studies on this topic; since then research activities and theoretical discussions have multiplied. However, there have been very few attempts to study what ordinary people have in mind when they speak about the EU or when they call themselves European. The following pages present some main findings from a cooperative international project of social scientists from Poland, Hungary, and Germany on lay concepts of European identity. The project was set up to answer two questions: Do European citizens share collective identity constructions across countries? And do lay collective identities resemble theoretical concepts of European identities? Furthermore, this chapter rethinks the different logics of comparison in a cross-country analysis.

2. Theoretical perspective on collective identities

Our research started with the idea that European identity is a new phenomenon that cannot be analyzed through the prism of the concept of the old national collective identities. Moreover, European identity has been created in the European context of cultural plurality and diversified worldviews. European citizens are potential bearers of a collective European identity. A collective is defined through a shared symbolic space. In contemporary functionally differentiated and culturally plural societies a political community will usually encompass different groups (people with different attitudes, which follow different goals, emphasize different values, etc.). As long as these groups refer to the same political community, they are members of a ‘collective’ in the sense the term is used here. However, we do not believe that all people belong to a collective, nor do we assume that everyone should be a member of a collective.
Collective identities are systems of symbols and symbolic contents related to a ‘collective’, or an imagined group [Peters 1998, 2003]. Collective identities refer to a specific field of meaning. Questions about collective identities include enquiries into, ‘Who are we? What kind of group are we? What binds us together? How do we interpret our common past? What are we striving for?’ The most important elements of collective identities are the following: criteria of membership; collective self-images; self-attribution of certain characteristics; collective ideals and ideas about principles of social order; specific feelings of obligation; solidarity and trust among group members; collective pride and honour; collective memories and expectations for the future. Collective identities may (but do not need to) include a separation from other groups. Individuals can have several collective identities. Certain identities exclude each other; in other cases membership in different collectives is possible. Collective identities can differ in their inclusiveness or exclusiveness, and in their emotional quality and intensity. Additionally, constructions can differ in their coherence. Theoretically, all these dimensions are variables and their combinations generate empirical questions. Overall, collective identities may be of different variety and solidity. They do not necessarily contain all of the listed elements; they may be vague and diffuse or highly differentiated and articulated. Within a collective the strength and coherence of identity constructions may vary considerably.

3. Research on collective European identities

‘In the near future do you see yourself as (nationality) only? As (nationality) and European? As European only?’ These Eurobarometer questions have provided the data set for most of the existing research on European identities. The distribution of answers among the European population has been widely discussed. But what does this data tell us about European identities? Obviously, they do not tell us much. We know which categories respondents would use for their self-description, but we learn nothing about the meaning connected with the term ‘European’. Other approaches are more promising, because they connect theoretical and empirical concepts more closely. Bruter [2005], for example, has developed a questionnaire that draws on three concepts: a general identifica-

1 Since the 1990s, the research repertoire has been developed and the Eurobarometer questionnaire expanded. It includes a lot of information about the opinions of Europeans on a wide range of issues associated with the EU. However, surveys like the Eurobarometer offer only isolated pieces of information. For the combination of such data see Citrin and Sides [2001]; Green [2007]; Fligstein [2008].
tion with Europe, a civic European identity construction (measured for example through the relation to symbols of unity like the European flag), and a culturally determined identity in which a common culture is seen as the basis for the community of Europeans. The advantage of this approach is the connection between in-depth conceptual considerations and empirical research. However, the conceptual side is deeply influenced by the model of identities associated with the nation-state. Most debates on European identity are based on somewhat similar concepts like those used by Bruter. Especially widespread is a distinction between the so-called essentialist, or communitarian, notion (which presupposes an encompassing homogenous culture as the basis for a community of people) and a constructivist notion of collective identity (which presumes that the units for identification and identities are constructed in discourses).

Recently, Eriksen and Fossum [2009] have distinguished between three constructions of European identities which are all somewhat related to the EU [see also Fossum and Menéndez 2009]. The first model envisages democracy as directly related to the nation-state; the EU-level structure is seen as a functional regime set up to address tasks the member states cannot solve when acting independently. In the second model the EU is seen as a multinational federal state. Lastly, the third model is premised on democracy beyond the nation-state; the EU is understood as an organization based on mutual acknowledgments of citizens’ rights and duties, but the community of citizens is not considered a kind of nation and the EU is not regarded as a kind of state [see Introduction to this volume]. These three types of a collective European identity offer a useful summary of the existing conceptual discussions.

Another strand of research tries to find out who identifies with Europe. It is well known that young and well-educated people identify themselves more often as Europeans than others; but research has now moved beyond the standard socio-structural indicators to more sophisticated theoretical concepts. Fligstein [2009] adopts the idea that identity can hardly be separated from interests and interactions. People who have something to gain from the EU will accept its activities more easily than others; and people with frequent contacts across borders may more often see themselves and others as European than people without such contacts. The differentiation between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and between mobile and immobile people certainly has some informative power. Identities may be in-

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2 For an instructive conceptual overview see Ifversen [2002] and compare Haller, Ressler [2006].
3 A somewhat different approach follows Tietz [2000] who draws a distinction between community (communio) and society (commercio); see Biegon [2006] and Kantner [2006].
fluenced by interests as well as by interaction; but that does not mean that interests are people’s main driving force. And while experience certainly has an influence on perceptions, we should not ignore the power of ideas and imagination. Generally, ideas and ideologies are important factors in social processes. Symbolic meanings are open to interpretations and interpretations are influenced by discourses (and not merely by interests). However, subjective interpretations are formed at the basis of existing schemes; and cultural schemes are usually differentiated along lines of social stratifications. Thus, we can expect to find regularities in interpretations of different types of actors. But, what differentiates between types of actors (or interpreters) is an open question. What is especially missing in the discussions about European identities is knowledge about lay concepts of European identity. The explorative research presented below belongs to this research field. The departure from the idea, that political communities are encompassing cultural wholes, has consequences for research on collective European identities. This is especially true with regard to the European Union. The question is not whether most of the EU citizens share one and the same collective identity. The question is how collective identities look like. Of special interest here are existing differences within societies and similarities between them.

4. Comparative research

Comparative analysis is one of the main components of social sciences. It is usually regarded as a substitute for experiments, and as such, it is the main guarantor for a scientific content of sociology. However, the rationale of comparisons has always been contested and is a matter of intensive debates even today. Let us assume that comparisons are possible and useful procedures. We are still left with several problems. One of them is the sample selection. Can we use nation-states as units for comparison if assumptions about their unity and homogeneity are contested or rejected altogether? In other words, What does a cross-country analysis imply?

Melvin L. Kohn presents four types of cross-national research [1996]. In the first type nations, or (nation-) states, are the ‘objects of study’. Each country is seen as a particular case in its own right. This is the logic of case studies. In the second type of analysis, the research aim is to test general assumptions about,

4 Kohn has chosen the term cross-national because in his opinion “nation has a relatively unambiguous meaning” [1996:42]. He uses ‘nation’ in the same way as we use ‘country’ in our project. That means, ‘nation’ can stand for institutional structures, for economic and political systems, or for cultures.
for example, the way certain institutions operate and nations are taken as exemplars of a category. Research based on the assumption that collective identities are mainly influenced by the degree of education (or by interests, and so on) fit into this perspective. The third type of cross-national research takes the nation (a state or culture) as a ‘unit of analysis’. Kohn describes it as follows:

What distinguishes research that treats nation as the unit of analysis is its primary concern with understanding how social institutions and processes are systematically related to variations in national characteristics. Such analyses need not treat nation as a homogeneous entity, but may study intranation institutions and processes (...). Nor need research that treats nation as unit of analysis assume that each nation exists in an international vacuum (...). A unit of analysis does not need to be a closed system. (...) The unit of analysis in comparative research is any unit in which the process of interest is known to operate [Kohn 1996:30].

From this perspective, research is interested in the shaping and colouring of general processes through the context (here the nation-state) in which they operate. This perspective is especially important for our project.

Finally, in the fourth type of cross-national analysis, nations are taken as parts of a larger international system. Kohn calls this type transnational. Even if we do not analyze societies as parts of a bigger structure, we have to take transnational influences into account. Especially in the realm of ideas and symbolic meanings, processes of diffusion and transfer have to be considered. This aspect is well known since the formulation of Galton’s problem in the 19th century, but it gains more importance in a globalizing world. Moreover, in the context of the EU, we should expect influences of the so-called ‘soft’ power of Europeanization, which are built on transfer, interpretation, and discussion of ideas [Liebert and Sifft 2003].

These four perspectives of cross-national research are not separated completely; they can come close to each other and they may overlap. Broadly speaking, all four types of cross-national analysis are relevant for our project, albeit to different degrees.

5 Sir Francis Galton pointed to the problem of social diffusion: diffusion implies that a given social phenomenon originates from outside of the unit of analysis [Tylor 1889].
5. Empirical questions and research design

Our study was set up to make a contribution to the question of content of European identities, which has been raised by several researchers [see Green 2007 for an overview; Kupfer 2009]. We have analyzed lay concepts of European identities in three countries.6 We concentrated our empirical research on students for their well-known and relatively high degree of identification with the EU. We were interested in concepts of European identity, not in the distribution of such concepts within or across societies. Our research project was designed for a cross-country analysis in which populations of nation-states were taken as (the first) unit of analysis. However, factors influencing collective identities may not be situated at the level of societies and states (based on structures, institutions, history); they may be situated at lower levels like regions or milieus. Especially openness towards the world, a high degree of internationalization of a city (or of a university), for example, may influence identity constructions. Thus, we have taken milieus (different cities, different universities; a wide range of faculties) into account.

We were also interested in meaningful concepts and their patterns, not in mere statements of identification. We used Q methodology which is especially designed for the exploration of subjective opinions and attitudes of a participant group [cf. Dryzek 2005; Müller and Kals 2004; Skully in this volume; Watts and Stenner 2005]. What makes the method specific is its focus on opinion patterns, thematically defined and interconnected statements. A basic assumption of this approach is that ‘meaning depends on patterned relations’.

The Q method is based on a ranking procedure: a set of statements is ordered by the participants according to the grade of importance which they ascribe to every statement (or by strength of agreement with a statement) [see Skully in this volume]. To do research with Q methodology we need first of all a set of statements on the topic under study, in our case ‘European identities’. This set of statements is called the ‘Q set’. The Q set for our study was designed through intensive discussions among the experts from the participating countries. We hold this for extremely useful, especially because qualitative research with an interest in symbolic meaning is typically organized as a case study (nation-states as ob-

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6 The idea for the international project was brought up by Ulrike Liebert (Bremen) and Zdzisław Mach (Cracow). Members of the research teams were: In Budapest Erika Kurucz, Borbala Kriza and Maria Heller-Soignet (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest), in Krakow Olga Brzezińska, Beata Czajkowska and David Scully (Jagiellonian University, Krakow), and in Germany Rosemarie Sackmann. The project received financial support by RECON.
jects). That means that research tools employed are designed from the perspective of one country (risk of cultural bias), or different perspective in case of larger national sets, whereby researchers work independently on their country cases (risk of different research designs). Under such research designs, conceptualization, operationalization, and data gathering precedes the actual comparative analytical work. The pitfall of this approach is the tendency to stress divergences, rather than convergences of the cases. We designed our research differently. The cross-country cooperation in the development of a common research instrument reduced the danger of cultural bias. Our cross-country analysis is designed to detect similarities. However, the research design was generally open. Thus, the main finding could have been that the respondents in the various countries have different ideas about the concept of European identity.

6. Research findings

Our four analyses – one cross-country analysis and three case studies – resulted in findings that point towards both similarities and differences that allow us to use a comparative approach. In what follows, I refer to a five-factor data analysis based on the Q sorts from all three countries (Germany, Hungary, and Poland). The first two factors are the most important ones. These factors are similar to the first two factors in the country studies [see chapters by Kurucz; Brzezinska and Czajkowska in this volume; cf. Brzezinska et al. 2011; Sackmann 2011 for the German case study].

6.1. Similarities in the cross-country analysis

The cross-country analysis shows that two identity constructions were shared by respondents from all three countries. The first construction belongs to the category of a ‘cosmopolitan perspective’. It represents opinions which are in favour of a universalization of democratic principles beyond the borders of single states or regions, and which are strictly against a traditional national conception of democratic order. The highest rankings were found on statements referring to (human) rights: the interviewees thought that individual freedom and choice should be protected and that cultural groups have the right to be different. Additionally, they believed that democracy meant first of all participation of free individuals in public issues. The respondents were proud of being European because Europe was generally viewed as a ‘peace project’.
The interviewees also thought that the EU should have a constitution. Like many other respondents, the supporters of the cosmopolitan view emphasized that being part of the EU foreign policy framework meant more power. According to them, Europe had to speak with one voice in order to be heard in the world. However, the respondents were against a common European army. As the interviews showed, the generally negative stand on this issue stemmed from a disagreement with the use of military force. Many cosmopolitans emphasized that they did not believe that political goals could be achieved through force (which they identified with violence); to them negotiation and deliberation were the only appropriate means of our time.

Moreover, many bearers of this identity construction emphasized the responsibility of Europe against countries in a bad economic situation; partly, this responsibility was grounded on historical injustice, partly the wealth of Europe was seen as a sufficient reason. Human rights were seen as one of the most important issues at all levels; and the EU had responsibilities with regard to the protection of human rights. The EU was perceived as obliged to distribute the ideas of human rights and peace through communication and through negotiations. The factor behind this Europeanized cosmopolitan identity construction is the most important factor in the statistical analysis of our data.

The second construction is the ‘Europeanized, traditional, national perspective’. In this construction the emotional identification with the home country is very high and the respondents are proud of their nationality; additionally, they like the idea that the national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one. Our respondents saw the national constitution as the main source of rights and laws and they wanted the influence of the EU to be restricted. For them, the EU was not ‘Europe’. ‘Europe’ to them stood for a cultural heritage, for ‘occidental, Christian values’. Emotional identifications, culture, and the past were important issues. The respondents agreed with the statement that common European culture was derived from diverse national sources; they disagreed with the idea that Eastern and Western parts of Europe shared the same values and they agreed that we should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones. The interviewees ranked the statement ‘the past helps to understand the future’ very high; and they believed that their country deserved compensation for abuses from the past. In some regards, the EU was evaluated positively: the interviewees emphasized that the EU facilitated travelling and that it gave them opportunities to work and study in other countries. Additionally, the interviewees thought that the EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale. Individual freedom and choice were given the highest esteem; with regard to group rights the respondents emphasized that some groups demanded too many rights,
and they made it very clear that immigrants should assimilate. The relation to the field of democracy was mainly characterized by mistrust: the respondents believed that one could only trust family members and close friends, that politicians act mainly according to their own interests, and that certain groups had too much power; the respondents also agreed with the statement ‘we need strong leaders’.

With regard to the question if Europeans in different countries shared collective identity constructions, the answer was clearly positive. The two perspectives described above were built on stable factors. And both factors appeared not only in the cross-country analysis but also in the three case studies. How can we explain these similarities?

*Where one finds cross-national similarities, then the explanation need not, indeed should not, be focused on particular histories, cultures or political or economic circumstances of each of the countries, but should focus on social-structural regularities common to them all* [Kohn 1996:34f].

In our research project an obvious candidate for the explanation of the cosmopolitan identity construction across all three countries is the influence of higher education. It is common knowledge, that higher education fosters universal orientations and individualization; both are characteristic of the cosmopolitan identity construction in our study. Our respondents shared an interest in human rights, saw themselves as global citizens, wanted the EU to be active in the fight against poverty and other evils in the world; and they agreed with the idea that every citizen should be responsible and take part in decision-making processes, even at the global level. However, universalism was not their only belief; the EU played an important role in this construction as an organized collective actor who could (and should) act on behalf not only of Europeans but all humankind. While education may be the decisive influence behind this identity construction, Europeanization was equally involved.

Thus we could follow the often-used references to the level of education to explain the (shared Europeanized) cosmopolitan identity construction [cf. Green 2007; Fligstein 2008; both analyzing findings of diverse studies]. But, this leads us to the question how to explain the (Europeanized) national variant of a European collective identity. Or, more generally: How can we explain different iden-

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7 Every country team has named this identity construction somewhat differently. However, the respective factors in the cross-country analysis and in the three country analyses share decisive features. Thus, the different names should not obfuscate the similarity between the factors and the identity constructions connected with them.
ity constructions within the population category of students? In our study, we included some differentiations as possible explanations: gender, experience with foreign countries (longer stay abroad), regional milieus, and the influence of the field of studies. None of these possible factors seems to be systematically related to the different identity constructions.

6.2. Theoretical and empirical concepts

Regarding the question whether theoretical models correspond to general concepts of collective identities, the answer is again positive. The two factors shared across the three countries resemble two of the three RECON models: the model of ‘audit democracy’ and the ‘cosmopolitan model’. Brief characteristics of the theoretical models can demonstrate the similarity.

‘Cosmopolitan democracy’ model with regard to the EU has been described as follows:

*This model is premised on democracy beyond the nation-state. It envisages the European Union as a political community based on the citizens’ mutual acknowledgment of their rights and duties, but where these are embedded at the supranational level of government in a Union that is neither a state nor a nation (...) This model ... posits that the Union is a subset (or perhaps more appropriately a vanguard for) an emerging cosmopolitan order [Fossum and Menéndez 2009:66-70].*

And further:

*Political power emanates from citizens coming together in public forums and reaching agreement on the rules for social coexistence and the collective goals they should realise. Power is collective, communicative and inter-subjective by nature; it is created in the interaction between agents; it is only in operation and is only strong as the people are assembled and agree [Eriksen and Fossum 2009:27].*

These features resemble the general concept of a Europeanized cosmopolitan identity construction, which we found among students from all three countries in our study [see Brzezinska et al. 2011].

Likewise, the Europeanized national identity construction, which we found in our study, has a counterpart in the theoretical model of an audit democracy. ‘Au-
dit democracy’ in connection with the European Union has the following characteristics:

*The audit-democracy model envisages democracy as being directly associated with the nation state (...) The EU-level structure is envisaged as a functional regime that is set up to address problems, which the Member States cannot resolve when acting independently [Eriksen and Fossum 2009:16-17].*

And further:

*The Member States insist that the Union’s legitimacy is derived from the democratic character of the Member States. (...) This model is set up to limit synthesis at the European level precisely because the model understands constitutionalism to continue to be situated in the Member States [Fossum and Menéndez 2009:56-9].*

The two most important lay concepts of European identity in our study share decisive features with the theoretical democracy models. However, Eriksen [2009] have presented three democracy models; only two have counterparts in our empirically uncovered concepts of European identity.8

### 6.3. Differences in the cross-country analysis

*Interpreting differences ... is where things become much less certain and much more difficult. The key, of course, is the truism that is consistent findings have to be interpreted in terms of what is common to the countries studied, the inconsistent findings have to be interpreted in terms of how the countries – or the studies – differ. This truism, unfortunately, gives no clue as to which of the many differences between countries or between studies lies at the heart of the differences in findings [Kohn 1996:35].*

The advantage of our research design is that our cooperative cross-country approach reduces probability that divergences are due to differences in the concep-

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8 The model, which perceives the EU as a federal state, is not represented among our respondents. However, this model appears as a (negatively evaluated) counter-model for the traditional (national) identity construction. This is in itself is an interesting finding, which demands further investigation in the future.
tions and methods of the country studies. Since the two most important factors in the cross-country analysis are shared across countries, we can conclude that similarities dominate the cross-country analysis. However, one apparent difference is striking: one of the five factors in the cross-country analysis is present only in the German case. No matter how we adjusted the factor analysis – by reducing or increasing the number of factors – as long as the factor analysis makes any sense, the German factor would always appear (albeit with some changes in the defining sorts, of course). Additionally, another factor in the cross-country analysis is built on the Hungarian and Polish sorts only. Thus, the findings of the cross-country analysis confirm the idea of similarities among the European collective identities across the three countries, but they confirm the idea of meaningful, and perhaps deep, differences between the countries, too.

With regard to the Hungarian and Polish factor, our joint research did not find any deeper meaning in it. Clearly, it is quite possible and not unusual that a statistically produced factor has no meaningful interpretation. However, only the German factor needs further analysis, which follows.

6.4. Specificities in the case studies

In the following sections I compare the Hungarian and German variants of the cosmopolitan and the traditional/national (audit democracy in the RECON models) identity constructions. I will compare Hungary and Germany because the differences between these two cases are the most striking in our study. With regard to the findings from Hungary, the two national identity conceptions are clearly important, as well as the gender-specific differentiation between these identity constructions [see Kurucz in this volume]. The Hungarian case study provides additional data from several opinion surveys. Given the political climate in Hungary, with its strong support for nationalism, these studies showed that negative stereotypes against ‘others’ were widespread. Additionally, only 42 percent in the age category between 20 and 24 years thought that democracy was better than any other political regime, while 33 percent believed that for people like them there was no difference between democracy and other political systems. Furthermore, 14 percent of respondents thought that – under certain conditions – autocracy was better than democracy [Kurucz in this volume]. The idea of democracy seemed not very well established in contemporary Hungary. Additionally, and in accordance with the preponderance of nationalism, traditional gender roles were still important social differentiations in Hungary. It is thus not surprising that national versions of European identities were more important in
the Hungarian sample than in the other ones. However, only four of the Hungarian respondents reported in the questionnaire that they identified themselves as Hungarians only; thus, most respondents had a (somewhat) positive attitude toward the EU. Overall, the Hungarian specificities can be explained by context. But which contextual factors are decisive? It may be that public discourse plays a role in Hungary. But it may also be that other factors are more important (such as history and tradition).

A clear particularity of the German case is a factor, which represents an individualistic political identity conception. This specific view can be found not only in the case study but also in the German factor in the cross-country analysis mentioned above. Regarding the EU, the opinions summarized in the individualistic perspective were characterized by caution and by demands – respondents feared that further EU enlargement could endanger the economic stability of Germany and they stressed that enlargement should be subject to sustainability. The EU was seen as a global actor; however, in the eyes of the individualists it should not become a global power like the USA. The survey respondents did not reject the EU as an institution and organization completely, but they demanded more information and more transparency. According to them, the EU had to fulfil several tasks, but “the EU should not create law; it should support co-ordination, discourse, and deliberation” [Gw09sozm]. Nation-states were seen as nearer to the democratic basis; they were regarded as more democratic than the EU and they should, thus, not diminish. On average, the respondents agreed with the statement that democracy could only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state. However, some respondents emphasized that they did not want the EU to become a super-state as a large state could be dangerous for the rights of individuals. These were the main features of the German factor in the cross-country analysis.

I call this perspective ‘individualistic’ for two reasons. First, the respondents did not identify with a ‘collective’. They showed neither a connectedness with their nation nor with Europe; and they did not mention any other belonging into the group dimension during the interview. Second, the respondents emphasized the individual and the necessity to protect the rights of every single individual against politics and against group pressure of any kind. Additionally, most supporters of the individualistic perspective were strongly in favour of direct political participation. With regard to explanations we could assume that this identity construction was an outcome of the overall process of individualization in mod-
ern, industrialized, Western, and democratic societies. However, this explanation may be too broad to be really satisfying. A more specific explanation could refer to the image of post-war Germany as a post-national society [Kreckel 1993]. In opinion polls in Germany, typical features of national identity constructions, especially national pride and culture, are not as strong as they are in neighbouring countries. Thus, a strong emphasis on individualism seems to be very specific for German society.

6.5. Differences within similarities

Looking for differences within the generally shared concepts may allow us to grasp some cultural differences. In the following, I use the data from our case studies. As in the previous sections I will draw on the case studies from Hungary and Germany.

If an average Hungarian and an average German bearer of a cosmopolitan European identity construction talked to each other, on which points would they disagree?

• They would clearly disagree on the importance of global collective decision-making and global institutions. According to our findings, an average German cosmopolitan thinks that both issues are important, unlike an average Hungarian.
• On the other hand, Hungarian cosmopolitans think that their national politicians should do their best to represent Hungarian interests in the EU, unlike their German counterparts.
• Hungarian cosmopolitans agree with the statement that we need strong leaders; the Germans do not. However, if the two talked longer, they might become aware, that their attitudes do not differ completely as the Hungarian cosmopolitans support responsible leadership and German cosmopolitans would not reject this completely either. However, German cosmopolitans to not like the hints to power in the idea of leadership.
• Another sensitive point is pride. Hungarians are proud to be Hungarian and (even more) European. German cosmopolitans regard (at least) national pride as wrong or as meaningless, and as potentially dangerous.

These are the most important differences between the Hungarian and German cosmopolitans. What about those respondents, who shared traditional, national (but Europeanized) identity constructions? Before we can compare Hungarian
and German traditionalists, we would have to decide, which of the two Hungarian national identity constructions to use [cf. Kurucz in this volume]. The Hungarian traditionalists of the cross-country analysis reappeared as bearers of the male national identity construction in the Hungarian case study. The Hungarian female national identity construction was less important in the analysis; and it was much more Europeanized. Thus I have chosen the first variant for the comparison. On which points would an average (male) Hungarian, who holds a Europeanized traditionalist (nationalist) identity, disagree with his German counterpart?

- An average German traditionalist thinks that his country should have a national army, unlike an average Hungarian traditionalist (nationalist).
- German traditionalists want global collective decision-making to be fostered, while Hungarian traditionalists are not interested in this issue.
- German traditionalists believe that the EU strengthens Germany’s role in the world and they opine that the EU should have a constitution and speak with one voice in foreign affairs. All these points are not regarded as important by Hungarian traditionalists.
- Hungarian traditionalists think that it is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage and they believed that Europe shares a common cultural heritage; Hungarians emphasized that the common European culture was derived from diverse national sources. German traditionalists in our study disagreed.
- Hungarian traditionalists believe that ‘we need strong leaders’ is a valid statement; Germans do not agree with this.
- Germans emphasize freedom of speech unlike Hungarians.
- Hungarian traditionalists agree with the statement that women should care more about family and home; German traditionalists do not.

Obviously, the (Europeanized) national perspectives in the two case studies showed more differences than the cosmopolitan perspectives. The most important differences on this list can be summarized under two headings: German traditionalists (nationalists) show more interest in the EU than Hungarians; and Hungarian traditionalists (nationalists) are more interested in culture than Germans.
7. Conclusion

This chapter has presented research findings from a cooperative international study. The study was set up to make a contribution to the study of content of European identities. Overall, the analysis revealed five concepts of European identities. These concepts differ in their complexity, but all of them stand for meaningful positions within a symbolic space. Two of these concepts are shared across countries: a Europeanized cosmopolitan identity construction and a Europeanized national-identity construction. The factor behind the Europeanized cosmopolitan identity construction is the most important factor in the statistical analysis of our data. Interestingly enough, this concept has no counterpart in the Eurobarometer surveys. In the cosmopolitan identity construction, the EU is seen as vanguard for a globalized society. There, responsibility was the keyword and responsibility of individuals and political organizations reaches beyond national and regional borders.

While many of our respondents supported a cosmopolitan European identity construction, a nationalistic construction had many supporters as well. In this concept, the EU is accepted as much as it is regarded as a necessity in a globalizing world; but sovereignty remains of the main domain of the nation-state. Overall, it is obvious that the different constructions bear the potential for conflicts. The cosmopolitan and the national variant of European identity oppose each other in most aspects. In both constructions the EU is accepted as an institution; but its role is understood quite differently.

Compared with the differences between the two concepts, national specificities in the composition of each of these constructions seem to be rather small. The young and well-educated Hungarians in our study are (on average) more traditional and more national in their orientations than their German counterparts; and this is even visible in the cosmopolitan identity construction. Generally, Germans are more individualistic. Overall, the perspectives were culturally coloured, but the kernels of the two-shared concepts are equal across the countries.

10 If we look at the European Value Study (EVS), which provides information on the place of belonging (local, regional, country, Europe, and the whole world), we see that the whole world is usually mentioned by a higher percentage of European respondents as place of belonging than Europe [Kohli 2000]. However, the cosmopolitans in our study are not just cosmopolitans. The EU is an important part of the picture; thus, the concept is Europeanized.

11 And cultural coloring may be the explanation for most of the differences. However, it may be that at least some of these differences are due to different degrees of Europeanization (which might be explained by the time-span of membership). Unfortunately, we cannot answer these questions on the basis of our data.
The two most important lay concepts of European identity, the cosmopolitan and the national identity construction, in our study share decisive features with two of the three theoretical democracy models proposed by Fossum and Eriksen [2009]. We did not find an equivalent to the unionist identity concept in which the EU is seen as a multinational federal state. Our respondents did either prefer the national or the global aspects in their identity constructions.

References


5. Dimensions of European Identification among Elites: An Exploratory Study within the Enlarged EU

Aleksandra Sojka and Rafael Vázquez García

1. Introduction

In the last decades, the question of identity has received much attention in the scholarship on the European Union (EU). The public support for the widening and deepening of the European Union, its democratic legitimacy, the possibility of emergence of a European public sphere, and the politicization of EU treaties and policies, constitute only some identity-related issues which have emerged as important research topics [Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008; Cerutti, Lucarelli, and Schmidt 2011; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009b; Diez Medrano 2003; Pridham 2007; Risse 2010]. There seems to exist a general agreement that some sort of collective identity within the European Union is necessary for its further development as a supranational polity that would reach beyond a mere economic integration [cf. Bruter 2005; Cerutti 2011; Fuchs 2011; Green 2000]; even more so in light of the recent EU enlargement waves. The accession of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has changed the European scene in important ways – overcoming historical divisions of the continent on the one hand, while creating new diversification within the EU on the other. As far as the question of a common European identity is concerned, these changes entail new challenges for researchers. As some authors point out, the eastward enlargements have significantly transformed the core unit of analysis for research on European identification processes [Katzenstein and Checkel 2009:215], which might even require the development of completely new frameworks of analysis in order to account for the effects of European integration in post-socialist societies [Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006].

Within this context, the aim of this chapter is to provide some insights into the processes of European identification across the enlarged EU. We assess different dimensions of European identity and different perceptions about its content among political, mass-media, and trade-union elites in old and new member states, with special reference to four CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The academic research on the role of elites in the Europeanization of identities is particularly important for two reasons. Firstly, Eu-
European and national political elites have been the decisive driving force behind the European integration, especially in the framework of the ‘permissive consensus’, which dominated the European affairs until the 1990s. Secondly, the existing research has shown that elite discourses in important ways shape the degree of Europeanization of identities within specific countries [Bruter 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Pridham 2007], primarily by developing narratives that connect national histories and symbols to Europe [Risse 2010:63]. Therefore, it is important to investigate the ways in which elites conceptualize European belonging in order to explain wider patterns of identification within contemporary Europe.

In this chapter we develop an exploratory, descriptive analysis of European identification among different types of elites across the enlarged European Union, comparing four selected CEE countries to the old and new member states in general. On the basis of survey data gathered within the IntUne Project across Europe, we discuss some principal aspects of the question of identification within the EU.

Firstly, in order to investigate patterns of identification with Europe and establish the salience of Europe as a geographical as well as imaginary space of reference, we consider the results on the variable ‘attachment to Europe’ among elites and the public. Secondly, the variance of answers regarding the question of ‘feeling national and/or European’ allows us to analyze the two dominating patterns of identification among the citizens of the studied EU members – exclusive national identity versus Europeanized national identity [Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010] and apply this approach to the national elites. Then, we consider the different elements of what it means to be a true European through groupings into three dimensions: ascribed identity, cultural identity, and civic identity. The ways in which some elements of these dimensions are valued and combined by elites in different member states provide us with important findings on the variability of European identities. This point will be discussed against the idea that we can

1 The IntUne Project (2005-2009) funded under the 6th Framework Programme of the EU, has been coordinated by Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia (University of Siena). It covered 18 European countries and involved 29 European institutions with more than 100 scholars on the research team across Europe. The aim of the project was to provide researchers with a specific tool for exploring the views of elites and public opinion on different aspects of citizenship and identity across the European Union. The research team developed questionnaire surveys in two waves: in the spring of 2007 and in the spring of 2009. The first wave of the IntUne survey in 2007 included a public opinion poll, and political and economic elites’ survey in all countries included in the project. The 2009 second wave of the study included another public opinion poll and a survey of the political elites (these results might be compared to the 2007 wave), as well as smaller samples of media and trade union elites. A more detailed description of the dataset is given in Chapter 6.
distinguish two ways of understanding the identification with Europe – the civic and the cultural model [Bruter 2003:2005]. Finally, we look at perceptions of external threats by the elites in order to determinate how the ‘others’ of Europe are conceptualized by elites in old and new member states in general, and in the selected cases. These three elements of this empirical study provide us with significant insights into the patterns of Europeanization of elite identities in the contemporary enlarged European Union.

In the first section, we briefly consider some theoretical elements which guide our empirical analysis. We discuss the concept of identity in the context of the European Union. Secondly, we consider the role of elites in the processes of Europeanization of identities and the challenges the enlarged EU poses for their research.

2. Elites and European identification

In the context of the European Union – a multi-level polity in the process of transformation from a vehicle of economic integration into a supranational political and social entity – the identity question has been recently gaining importance, especially in relation to the issue of democratic legitimacy of a polity under construction [cf. Cerutti, Lucarelli, and Schmidt 2011; Featherstone 1994; Moravcsik 2002; Pridham 2007]. However, it must be noted that the notion of a European identity is contested and there is no agreement on how to conceptualize it. For the purpose of this chapter, we refer to identity as the feeling of belonging to a political community — in this case the EU — and focus on the markers of such belonging within the enlarged EU from the point of view of the national elites. In order to apply this perspective, we work with two assumptions: 1) that people can hold multiple non-conflicting political identities [Herrmann and Brewer 2004], and 2) that the emerging European identification must not necessarily replace but complement national identities [Risse 2010].

As far as the first assumption is concerned, there seems to exist an agreement in the approach to the phenomenon of European identification from the point of view of multiple identities [Bruter 2005; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2010]. The issue of European identification has mostly been explored within the framework of the nation-state and in terms of the (in)compatibility of identities at the national and European level [Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 2008]. Accepting multiple and multi-layered identities allows for the conceptualization of the complex relationship between different social and political identities [Herrmann and Brewer 2004:8] without inferring any necessary conflict between national and European identifications [Bruter 2005].
However, the apparent tension between contemporary national and European identifications seems to lie in the distinction between exclusive and inclusive national identities. Such a distinction refers to the difference among those people who identify themselves as exclusively national and those who hold some kind of double or mixed identity, both as nationals and Europeans [Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010]. This distinction serves as a basis for the first part of our analysis, where we compare the ways in which national and European identifications are combined in national contexts.

In terms of the dimensions of European identifications, some authors argue that European identity should be conceptualized as a purely political identity based on shared democratic values and procedures [Cerutti 2011:11; Fuchs 2011:71]. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this chapter we test the relevance of both political institutions and cultural elements for the formation of Europeanized identities among elites. In this sense, Bruter [2005] proposes distinguishing between political identities in the EU in their civic dimension (the identification with the European Union as a political structure) and cultural dimension (identification with Europe as the continent, its cultural and historical heritage). Such theoretical approach provides basis for the second part of the analysis where we consider how certain elements which might denote what it means to be a true European are perceived and valued by the national elites.

The variables taken into account refer to ascribed identities (to be born in Europe, to have European parents), cultural elements (to share European cultural traditions, to be Christian, to speak a European language), and the civic aspect (to respect EU laws and institutions, to participate in EP elections, to feel European). It is important to note that the two dimensions of European identifications (the civic and the cultural one) are not exclusionary – elements of both dimensions can be important to an individual. In any case, our aim is to explore the ways in which elements of both are combined in the perceptions of national elites in the four CEE countries and old and new member states in general.

Finally, an important point to be considered from this perspective is the perception of external threats. The drawing of boundaries and the delimitation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ constitute basic processes of identity formation [cf. Neumann 1998]. How threats are perceived in national contexts significantly depends on

2 However, the importance of subnational — regional and local — identifications should not be overlooked. Especially in certain European contexts, regions constitute strong points of reference for political identities. Moreover, the EU constitutes an important promoter of regional development through regional policies. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present study of national elites’ perceptions we refer only to national and European identifications and their relationship.
specific national histories and memories [Risse 2010]. This provides us with an interesting perspective for the understanding the identity-formation process within the EU. Therefore, in the third point of our enquiry we look for significant differences in the perception of external threats between new and old member states, and the four CEE states.

Apart from the various concepts related to the emergence of Europeanized identities, we must consider the role of the elites in these processes. As noted in the introduction, the basic assumption of this chapter is that it is essential to investigate the ways in which elites conceptualize the notion of a European belonging in order to be able to explain wider patterns of identification within contemporary Europe. National elites, political in particular, have been the driving force of the European integration processes for decades [see Lacina in this volume]. Their role has been especially significant in the framework of the ‘permissive consensus’, which had dominated the European discourse until the 1990s. Despite the progressive politicization of the public opinion on the EU issues — especially as a result of referenda on treaties and other aspects of EU policies [Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a; Hooghe and Marks 2005], the role of the national elites remains central to the politics of European integration.

This fact bears important consequences for the emergence of Europeanized identities, as it is mostly the political elites that define and articulate the national versions of European identity and, consequently, shape the degree of Europeanization of identities among the national mass public [Bruter 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010; Schmidt 2011]. However, their role in the construction of such Europeanized identities is not univocal. While elites and intellectuals might positively influence the way EU is depicted and incorporated into national discourses, they can also constitute an obstacle to the development of European identifications [Bruter 2005:4]. In this sense, Sonia Lucarelli points to the problem of “short-sighted elites that abuse the EU to justify unacceptable policies while failing to acknowledge Union’s merits in achieving political successes” and hinder the legitimacy of the EU among the citizens [Lucarelli 2011:204].

Therefore, the place of the European Union in political elites’ discourses bears important consequences for the formation of Europeanized identities. As argued in the literature, if political elites remain supportive of the European integration and do not use it as a field of political contestation, they can successfully promote national identities that include the attachment to Europe. However, if there is a division among elites on the issue of EU support, Eurosceptic attitudes can emerge [Hooghe and Marks 2005]. In any case, there seems to be an important link between the way political elites engage in the European integration and the perception of the EU by the public opinion, even though the effect of public opin-
ion preferences concerning the European integration on political elites’ agendas should not be overlooked [cf. Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007].

Finally, the process of formation of a European identity must be analyzed within the historical, social, and cultural specificities of each national context [Bruter 2005]. This is even more important in the context of the recent enlargements that also brought into the EU a significant diversity in terms of historical state formation, nation-building, democratization, and identity formation [Ichijo and Spohn 2005:2]. As noted previously, the enlargement waves make the emergence of a European identity more problematic than ever before, due to some East-West differences, especially in terms of the importance attached to religion as a constitutive element of European identity in the new member states [Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a:14]. The latter assumption is tested in our empirical analysis of elites’ perceptions, where the importance of being Christian constitutes one of the variables considered under the dimension of cultural European identification. Furthermore, in this sense we include in the analysis the perception of external threats in order to look for patterns of difference among the selected CEE member states.

We base our analysis on the notion of multiple, non-exclusionary, political identities as feelings of belonging to certain communities. In the context of the EU, we recognize the importance of elite discourses for the processes of formation of political identities as inclusive of identification with Europe. We also work with the premise that the most significant divide in the contemporary European Union in terms of political identities is between people with exclusive national identities and those who have combined national and European identities. Furthermore, the two ways of conceptualizing European identity — in civic and cultural terms — are analyzed from the prism of different elements, which constitute both dimensions.

The enlarged European Union provides us with new challenges for researching the formation of Europeanized identities as new member states with distinctive experience of block division and democratization have been incorporated and the main objective of this exploratory analysis will be to confirm or reject the assumption that there is something distinctively different in the ways identities become Europeanized in these states.

3. Empirical results

As mentioned before, the empirical data used in the analysis has been gathered through the pan-European IntUne Project. While the outcomes of the first wave of the study have been already explored in some recent publications [cf. Ilonsz-
ki 2010; Conti, Cotta, and Almeida 2011], the 2009 data has been made available only recently. In this chapter we analyze the elite results for the 2009 wave, which includes political (national MPs), media, and trade union elites. There are 16 EU countries included in the dataset which covers the whole geographical spectrum of the enlarged European Union: Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece), Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Great Britain) – jointly considered as the Old Member States (OMS) – and Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia) – called the New Member States (NMS). The special value of this data stems from the fact that despite abundant empirical analysis on public attitudes towards the processes of the European integration — mainly based on the Eurobarometer data [Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 2008; Fligstein 2008; Fuchs 2011; Green 2007], systematic comparative research on elites, especially on different types of elites, is somewhat scarce. This study offers precisely such a comparative empirical approach to the study of elite perceptions of Europeanizing identities. We must note that the use of quantitative methods in research on European identity is by far not a clear-cut issue [Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a; Lucarelli 2011]; however, we consider the IntUne survey data as a solid basis for the assessment of elites’ perceptions of European identities in a cross-national perspective.

Finally, given the recent occurrence of the eastward enlargements, it is difficult to assess the real effects of this process on identification patterns as they need to be evaluated in a long-term perspective. However, the 2009 IntUne data, collected five years after the first enlargement, offer a vantage point for an exploratory analysis of the degree of Europeanization of national identities in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet in order to provide deeper explanatory results a longitudinal analysis would be advisable for further research.

3.1. Attachment to Europe

We begin our empirical analysis with the variable of attachment to Europe, comparing elites and public opinion in order to provide a broader picture of the attitudes and orientations in the enlarged EU.

3 Total number of interviews conducted for each group/type of elite: old member states (P 652 / M 298 / TU 167 / Total=1117), new member states (P 417 / M 223 / TU 95 / Total 735), the Czech Republic (P 44 / M 35 / TU=16 / Total=95), Hungary (P72 / M35 / TU15 / Total 122), Poland (P 85 / M 35 / TU 15 / Total 135), Slovakia (P70 / M35 / TU15 / Total 120), where P stands for Political elite, M for Mass Media elite and TU for Trade Union elite.
Table 5.1. Attachment to Europe (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. VERY ATTACHED</th>
<th>2. SOMEWHAT ATTACHED</th>
<th>3. NOT VERY ATTACHED</th>
<th>4. NOT ATTACHED AT ALL</th>
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<td>48.4</td>
<td>83.9</td>
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<td>48.8</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<td>86.6</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you?

*Note: not survey data available for Czech Republic

As Table 5.1. demonstrates, we do not encounter significant differences between old and new member states regarding the attachment of political, media, and trade union elites to Europe. Moreover, the levels of attachment to Europe for all types
of elites are generally very high, over 80 percent in all cases. In the case of the Polish and Slovak political elites, the percentage of responses ‘very/somewhat attached to Europe’ is quite high with about 95 percent, while Hungarian and (especially) Czech political elites’ responses remain low, showing results below the average for the new member states’ political elites (90 percent). In the case of mass media elites in Slovakia and Hungary, levels of attachment to Europe of over 90 percent can be observed, while in Poland and in the Czech Republic, responses from this particular type of elites are below this level. Among trade union elites percentages are between 86.6 and 100, always above the average for OMS. Based on the results in Table 5.1., we could affirm that no relevant patterns of difference exist among the different types of elites regarding their attachment to Europe, neither among old and new member states, nor among CEE countries.

Considering the results of the IntUne Mass Survey4, we find that public opinion exhibits a clearly weaker feeling of attachment to Europe than the national elites in old as well as in new member states. This is also true when comparing elites and public opinion in individual countries of CEE. The most pronounced mass versus elite gaps are observed in Poland and Slovakia. It is important to note that these results are in line with the hypothesis that a significant difference in attitudes towards the EU between elites and the public opinion exists, where elites tend to be more aware of the European process and positively oriented towards it, while citizens remain much more critical of the EU integration due to their lack of knowledge [see Inglehart 1970].

In sum, the majority of respondents, both among the mass public as well as the elites, exhibit some kind of an attachment to Europe, with percentages of just over 60 among the public in the NMS. The levels of public attachment to Europe are slightly higher in old member states (68.5 percent) and levels among all elites are generally the highest (over 80 percent in all cases). Such results can be interpreted as indicative of the relevance of the question of Europe for the processes of identification within the EU despite a gap between the public and the national elites.

3.2. European and national identity: inclusive and exclusive

The usefulness and explanatory value of the variable of attachment to Europe notwithstanding, the question of feeling national and/or European could offer a

4 There are no public opinion survey data for the Czech Republic in the 2009 wave of IntUne project.
more exhaustive explanation concerning the main goal of the study of Europeanization of identities. As can be observed in Table 5.2, that resumes the responses of elites to the question of feeling national/European, an exclusive national feeling is stronger in the political elite of the new member states than in the old ones. Especially Czech elites (political, media, and trade unions) stand out as having by far the highest levels of exclusively national identification (as high as 34.1 percent in the case of political elite). Hungarian and Slovak percentages of exclusive national feeling, on the other hand, remain even lower than the average levels in the old member states (9.3 percent).

The highest percentage of responses for all types of elites and geographical areas are obtained for ‘feeling national and European’ where we encounter almost similar numbers in old and new member states (78 percent). In the case of CEE, Hungarian political elites present a substantially higher degree of such identification, which is also the case of the media elites in Hungary and in Poland, while the Slovak trade-union elites demonstrate the highest percentage of such feeling among this kind of elite. When considering the other possible double identification — ‘feeling European and national’ —, the new member states in general are seven percentage points above the average for the old member states in the case of political and trade union elites, while there are no relevant differences for media elite. Among all CEE countries, Slovakia presents the highest percentages of such double identification for all three types of elites.

The responses of feeling ‘only European’ are absolutely scarce in old as well as new member countries. No respondents among the political elites of the Czech Republic and Hungary exhibit such feeling, just as media elites in Hungary and Poland and trade union elites in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. In contrast, Slovak political and Polish trade unions elites have a surprisingly high — 7.6 percent and 6.7 percent respectively — exclusively European identification. However, this is probably due to the small total number of interviews for each elite type. Yet in accordance with the previous observation of high levels of ‘European and national feeling’, political and media elites in Slovakia exhibit some recognition of such exclusive identification with Europe.

On the basis of these results we have calculated the ‘net European identity’ [see Risse 2010] for each type of elite and geographical area. Net European identity refers to the percentage of responses which include some European identity element, either as ‘national and European feeling’, the ‘European and national feeling’, or ‘exclusively European’ identification from which we subtract those which denote an exclusively national feeling. This way we are able to conclude which kind of identity (some version of a Europeanized identification or an exclusively national feeling) dominates in each national context.
more exhaustive explanation concerning the main goal of the study of Europeanization of identities. As can be observed in Table 5.2, that resumes the responses is stronger in the political elite of the new member states than in the old ones. Especially Czech elites (political, media, and trade unions) stand out as having exclusive national feeling, on the other hand, remain even lower of elites to the question of feeling national/European, an exclusive national feeling (percent in the case of political elite). Hungarian and Slovak percentages are obtained for ‘feeling national and European’ where we encounter almost Hungarian political elites present a substantially higher degree of such identification, which is also the case of the media elites in Hungary and in Poland, while the Slovak trade-union elites demonstrate the highest percentage of such feeling — ‘feeling national and European’ which denotes an exclusively national feeling. This way we are able to conclude each elite type. Yet in accordance with the previous observation of high levels of some recognition of such exclusive identification with Europe. However, this is probably due to the small total number of interviews for each type of elite and geographical element, either as ‘national and European feeling’, the new member states in general are closer to the perception of this identification. Among all CEE countries, Slovakia presents the highest percentages of Europeanization of identity — 83.5% for national and European feeling, just as media elites in Hungary and in Poland. In the CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, and SLOVAKIA the responses of feeling ‘only European’ are absolutely scarce in old as well as new member countries. No respondents among the political elites of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. In the CZECH REPUBLIC and Hungary exhibit such feeling, just as media elites in Hungary and in Poland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NET EUROPEAN IDENTITY</th>
<th>OLD MEMBER STATES</th>
<th>NEW MEMBER STATES</th>
<th>CZECH REPUBLIC</th>
<th>HUNGARY</th>
<th>POLAND</th>
<th>SLOVAKIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2. National, European and net European identity (%)

Question: Do you see yourself as…? (One answer only)

*Note: Net European identity is calculated as in Risse (2010, 92) in the following way: (Nationality and European) + (European and Nationality + (European Only) - (Nationality Only)

Interestingly, in the case of national elites the Europeanized identification always outweighs the exclusively national one, which is not the case of the public opinion as demonstrated by other studies [Risse 2010:85]. Looking for geographical differences within the patterns of Europeanized elite identification, the average results for all elite types are higher in OMS, which at first sight points to the socialization hypothesis. However, when we look closer at the specific cases of the national elites of the CEE countries no meaningful patterns in this respect can be discerned.
If we order the results according to the net European identity of the elites in general, the CEE states spread along the spectrum of the graph. Slovakia turns out to be the most Europeanized case (92 percent), with results above the average for old members, Hungary (83.5 percent) is placed below this average but above the average for the new member countries, while Poland (66.7 percent) and the Czech Republic (51.8 percent) remain below the OMS’ average with results especially low in the case of the latter. Looking at specific types of elites, it is again in the Czech Republic where political elites exhibit the lowest levels of Europeanized feeling (31.8 percent), while the media elites seem to be the most Europeanized elites in all of the CEE countries.

3.3. Dimensions of European identification within the enlarged European Union

Having established that the Europeanized identification outweighs the exclusive national feeling among all national elite types in all EU states, the elements constituting the idea of what it means to be a true European need to be considered. The variable included eight possible responses grouped into three dimensions: ascribed identities (to be born in Europe, to have European parents), cultural elements (to share European cultural traditions, to be Christian, to speak a European language), and the civic aspect (to respect EU laws and institutions, participate in EP elections, to feel European). As already noted, these dimensions are by no means exclusive as elements of different dimensions might be combined and aspects of the same dimension might be given different importance.

In general, elites in old and new member states agree with the idea that the European identity is mainly constituted by civic elements (to respect EU laws and institutions, to participate in EP elections, and to feel European), though some other ingredients of the cultural dimension are also recognized as important (mastering an EU language and sharing European cultural traditions). In general, the ascribed dimension (to be born in Europe and to have European parents) and the importance of being a Christian are clearly less valued than the other elements. Nevertheless, when looking for patterns of difference between elites of new and old member states, the former put much more significance on the ascribed dimension of the European identity (a difference of 10 percent). New member-states’ elites also place more emphasis on the importance of sharing common cultural traditions and Christianity as an important element of being a genuine European. However, the civic components of the European identity are equally appreciated in all EU states. The only difference can be observed in the
case of participation in the EP elections, which is considered slightly less important by the elites of new member states.

Regarding the CEE countries, as far as the elements of the ascribed identity are concerned, to be born in Europe is slightly less relevant for elites in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, whereas political elites in Poland and Slovakia, mass-media elites in Poland, and trade-union elites in Slovakia attach more importance to having European parents as a condition for being truly European. As for the cultural dimension, all types of CEE elites perceive it quite important to share European cultural traditions and to master a European language. Nevertheless, significant differences can be discerned in terms of the

Table 5.3. Dimensions of European identification (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD MEMBER STATES</th>
<th>ASCRIBED IDENTITY</th>
<th>CULTURAL IDENTITY</th>
<th>CIVIC IDENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW MEMBER STATES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECH REPUBLIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: For being European, how important it is to:

Note: Percentages of “very important” and “somewhat important”

[107]
importance attached to being Christian – with Polish political elites score significantly above the results of the rest of the elites in this region.

Regarding the civic dimension, no significant patterns of difference have been discovered among the four CEE countries as far as the importance of respect of EU laws and institutions and feeling European is concerned. However, the perception of the importance of participating in the elections to the European Parliament varies widely among elites and across countries. Polish and Czech political elites, Slovak mass-media elite, and Czech trade-union elite consider it much more important than the rest.

It seems to be clear that the civic dimension (respect for EU laws and institutions as the most significant variable within this dimension) constitutes the most relevant element of perceived European identity with percentages above 90 for old and new member states with the exception of Hungary and the Czech Republic. The second most important is the cultural aspect (sharing cultural European traditions as an indicator), presenting percentages above 80 percent and valued especially in Hungary (with more than 95 percent) and in the Czech Republic. For all elites in general, being born in the EU (indicating the ascribed dimension) is significantly less important than the other two dimensions. However, the situation differs across the CEE region. For example, Slovakia reaches over 60 percent, while Hungary scores as low as 40 percent.

When focusing on the cultural dimension exclusively, it becomes clear that all elites in Europe place much more emphasis on mastering a European language (more than 90 percent of positive responses) and sharing European cultural traditions (above 80 percent) than the remaining cultural aspect of being Christian (less than 25 percent).

Nevertheless, it is also noticeable that on the religious variable for the new member states (our four CEE countries plus Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria) 31.9 per cent of elites assume that being Christian is very or somewhat important for being European, while in the old EU countries the percentage remains under 20 percent. Looking at specific cases, it is unsurprisingly the Polish elites that attach the highest importance to being Christian as an ingredient of being European with an average of around 50 percent for all types of elites and values especially high for political and trade union elites.

These results seem to remain in line with the hypothesis about the growing importance of Christian values that accompanied the eastward enlargement [Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a; Risse 2010; Schanda 2003]. However, we must note that it is mostly the political elite of the new members that values Christianity as an important element of their European identities. There is also a significant amount of heterogeneity among the countries – for example, the Czech Repub-
lic exhibits the same low levels of importance of Christianity as political and media elites in the old member states and even lower than their trade union elites.

Finally, the civic dimension of the common European identity differs across Europe. According to our findings, in OMS the three aspects of this dimension are considered highly relevant (over 80 percent), but in the new member states participating in the EP elections it does not score as high, although the percentages are still around 70 percent in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia and just under 60 percent in Hungary. Such results may indicate that there is a stronger predisposition to distrust many of the EU mechanisms and traditional institutions as the EP and the European Commission [cf. Pridham 2007].

3.4. Europe’s others: perception of threats

We now turn to the last point of our analysis – the perception of external threats. We have included three facts which can be perceived as external threats in our study: immigration from non-EU countries, accession of Turkey, and Russian interference in EU affairs.

Table 5.4. External threats perceptions for the European Union (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLD MEMBER STATES</th>
<th>NEW MEMBER STATES</th>
<th>CZECH REPUBLIC</th>
<th>HUNGARY</th>
<th>POLAND</th>
<th>SLOVAKIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration from Non-EU countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48,3</td>
<td>56,8</td>
<td>27,1</td>
<td>46,4</td>
<td>56,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>19,8</td>
<td>31,7</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>32,4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>16,6</td>
<td>47,3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35,7</td>
<td>53,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement to include Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>34,5</td>
<td>45,2</td>
<td>38,6</td>
<td>38,2</td>
<td>57,3</td>
<td>47,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>32,3</td>
<td>33,6</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>34,3</td>
<td>35,3</td>
<td>20,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>31,9</td>
<td>43,2</td>
<td>46,2</td>
<td>33,3</td>
<td>15,4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia interference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>37,4</td>
<td>59,2</td>
<td>61,4</td>
<td>49,3</td>
<td><strong>79,8</strong></td>
<td>43,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>41,7</td>
<td>67,1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54,3</td>
<td><strong>70,6</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60,5</td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td>33,3</td>
<td><strong>71,4</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions:
Do you think that Immigration from non EU countries is a threat for the EU?
Do you think that Enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a threat?
Do you think that the interference of Russia in European affairs is a threat?

Note: Percentages in the table correspond to the responses “big threat” and “quite a big threat”
In general, all of these threats are perceived as much more important sources of concern for new member states than the old EU countries. This is particularly true for the cases of immigration (48.3 percent against 30 percent) and the potential interference of Russia in European affairs (59.2 percent versus 37.4 percent). In the case of non-EU immigration, elites in the Czech Republic and Slovakia seem particularly sensitive to this problem, with higher percentages of worry among political and trade union elites. Although Hungarian elites exhibit the lowest levels of fear of non-EU immigration, its level is still higher than the average in the old member states.

On the possibility of accepting Turkey as a member state of the EU, it is interesting to note that the percentage for old and new member states remain comparable, unlike the perceptions of the other threats. Among the CEE countries, more than half of the Polish political elite perceive Turkey’s accession as an important threat, clearly above the average in the EU. As for the media elites, the results remain in line with the average for Europe, with a slightly lower percentage for the case of Slovakia. Finally, in the case of trade unions elite there are some important differences – the level of threat is measured as 46.2 percent for the Czech Republic and only 15.4 percent for Poland.

Regarding the fear of interference of Russia, there are clear differences between the old and new member states. Whereas for the old member states Russia is not perceived as a direct problem, out of clear historical reasons, it remains the main source of perceived threat for the post-socialist, new member states of the EU. All studied CEE countries exhibit significant preoccupation with a possible Russian interference in the EU, especially notable among the Polish elites.

4. Concluding remarks

The aim of this chapter was to provide some preliminary insights into the current patterns of European identification within the context of the recently enlarged EU. We have taken into account different dimensions of the common European identity and different perceptions thereof among political, mass media, and trade union elites in old and new member states, with special reference to four CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Our analysis was based on the assumption that it is the elite discourse that significantly influences the processes of formation of political identities as inclusive of identification with Europe.

In the first part of the study we looked for patterns of Europeanization of identities. The basic premise was that the most significant divide in the European Un-
ion in terms of political identities is between people holding exclusive national identities and those with a combination of national and European identities. For this purpose we considered the variables of attachment to Europe and of feeling national and/or European. It turned out to be quite difficult to find relevant patterns of difference between old and new member states and among the different types of elites when analyzing their attachment to Europe. The most pronounced result seems to be the existing gap between elites and the public, the latter presenting a much weaker attachment to the EU.

The analysis has further shown that the national feeling of belonging is to some extent stronger for the political elite of new member states than in the old ones. Regarding this variable, the Czech elites seem to hold the most exclusively national identity in the CEE region. When considering the net European identification, we found out that in the case of national elites, the type of identity inclusive of Europe always outweights the exclusively national one, which is not the case of the public opinion.

Looking for geographical differences within the patterns of Europeanized elite identification, the average results for all types of elites are higher in old member states than in the new ones, which might point to the socialization hypothesis. However, looking closer at the specific cases of the national elites of the CEE countries, no meaningful patterns in this respect can be discovered. The Slovak elite emerged as the most Europeanized one, while the Czech elites exhibited the smallest degrees of net European identity.

As far as the two ways of conceptualizing European identity — in civic and cultural terms — are concerned, old and new member states’ elites value the idea that the genuine European identity is mainly constituted by civic elements in similar terms, with smaller importance attached to the participation in the EP elections in the case of the new member states. The cultural dimension is also deemed important, especially in terms of mastering a European language and sharing European cultural traditions, much less so for being Christian, though. When analyzing the religious variable for the new member states we encountered higher percentages than in the old EU countries. Unsurprisingly, the Polish elites placed the most emphasis on the importance of being Christian as an essential ingredient of Europeanness. The third, ascribed dimension of European identity, is considered notably less important across all of the EU states. The fourth and final point of our analysis has revealed that new member states are much more concerned with the three threats considered, especially regarding the potential interference of Russia in the EU affairs.

To sum up, the main objective of this exploratory analysis was to test the assumption that there is something distinctively different in the ways identities be-
come Europeanized in the new member states. In the light of our empirical find-
ings, we can confirm that despite some significant differences between old and
new member states, there is even more heterogeneity among the studied CEE
countries and in the ways they incorporate European elements into their identi-
ties. Future research should aim at offering some significant explanations about
how the variables within each dimension constitute European identification —
considered as the controlled variable, as well as analyzing intra-regional vari-
ability.

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6. Feeling European: Elites versus Masses?

Tomáš Lacina

1. Introduction

The more than fifty-years-old unique process of European integration that aimed to unite nations previously at war has been recently challenged by some significant changes. In particular, these changes involve a politicization of what was originally a project of a multinational economic cooperation. From a primarily economic contract, the European Communities (the later European Union) have been gradually transformed into a political construct [Bruter 2005]. Given the current complex situation, it is necessary to examine the question of the emergence and existence of a European identity. It has been generally accepted that the emergence of a corresponding political identity can be considered as the primary source of legitimization of a political community (cf. Rousseau’s “Social Contract” [(1762) 2008]). Weber [1946] argued that without identity there is no true and durable legitimacy attached to a political entity, no conscious acceptance of the power of the state and its monopolistic right to use coercion. This implies a significant challenge to political science. It is of crucial importance to examine whether the transition into a deeper political union is merely a design of the European political elite or whether it also corresponds with a new European ‘social contract’, or the so-called ‘permissive consensus’ with the people, and whether it represents new political identities of European citizens [Bruter 2005]. As Bruter points out, empirical political scientists have been more interested in the degree to which European citizens support European integration than in the extent to which they identify with the new political entity. Focusing on support while leaving identity aside would run against the hierarchical assumption of the study of political behaviour, i.e. the idea that beliefs influence attitudes, which consequently influence behaviour [Bruter 2005; Feldman 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987].

The main task of this chapter is to analyze some fundamental assumptions about the identity of masses and elites with respect to their region, country, and Europe as a whole. The most important questions addressed here are the following: Are elites generally more attached to the EU than the mass public? Does the East-West divide make any difference? Does an elite perception of identity influence the position of the mass public? Are there differences in identification
among particular types of elites? The presented research focuses on perceptions of identity by the masses and elites in 16 EU countries, including both Old Member States (OMS) and New Member States (NMS). This chapter relies on two main sources of survey data: Eurobarometer (for the mass level) and the *IntUne Project* dataset (for the elite level). It starts with a brief theoretical overview of general perspectives on identity and elite identity specifics. Six main hypotheses are then formulated based on several theoretical approaches, followed by the used data and methodology description. The main part of the text presents the findings, comparing the sense of a European and national identity between elites and masses, analyzing these identities both across elite types and citizens and across Eastern and Western Europe. The last section then provides an evaluation of the hypotheses and concluding remarks.

2. Perspectives of identity

The concept of identity as used in this study is grounded in social psychology – the Social Identity Theory [Brown 2000; Tajfel and Turner 1985] and the Self-Categorization Theory [Turner 1985, 1999] in particular. According to these theoretical approaches, a ‘social group’ is a group that is psychologically significant for its members, who subjectively categorize themselves into a particular group out of social comparison and due to an acquisition of norms and values [Turner 1987]. Membership in a social group entails a shared collective identity that is based on the awareness of a social distinctiveness, emotional attachment, a certain set of values, and a continuous process of comparing a particular social group to other within a similar realm leading to a hierarchical system of differently valued social groups [Tajfel 1978]. For example, membership within a nation is emotionally significant to most people, who share the same feeling of a belonging into the same group and who continuously evaluate themselves *vis-à-vis* other similar ‘social groups’ (nations), where the specific national characteristics are evaluated more positively than the characteristics of the other group [Flockhart 2005].

There are two main perspectives used by scholars for the study of identities, and European identity in particular: a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ perspective [Bruter 2005]. With regards to the study of the European identity, the top-down prism focuses on questions such as who should be considered a European, what

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1 *IntUne*, standing for ‘Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an ever Closer Europe’, financed by the European Union within the 6th Framework Programme. See Introduction to this volume for more information about the project.
unites Europeans in terms of geography, politics, and culture, and what constitutes the natural borders of Europe. Studying European identity top-down involves understanding what unifies Europe and Europeans and characterising its cultural heritage, values, and norms. In contrast, the second tradition of social science research takes a behavioural bottom-up perspective and tries to answer questions such as: Who feels European? Why do some citizens identify with Europe while others do not? What do people mean when they say that they feel European? [Ibid.].

Traditionally, the sociological and psychological literature separates two types of identities – personal and social [c.f. Breakwell 2004]. Personal identity is made out of the family, upbringing, personal and cultural characteristics. In contrast, social identity is a set of references to existing social communities and encompasses feelings of belonging to distinct social categories (e.g. gender, race, class, sexual orientation). Social identity thus derives from a group that is socially expected to matter and that is found to include or correspond to the individual [Bruter 2005]. Political identity is commonly seen as a part or derivate of social identity. But does this hold? Bruter rightly argues that political identities are a form of identity in their own right involving components of both personal and social identities. The argument underpinning this theory is that political identities involve an affective dimension – like any element of personal identity. This affective dimension can be demonstrated on emotional reactions of fans during football championships and the like.

Therefore, studying the European identity assumes the emergence of a new political identity. This brings into question the evolution of identities and multiple allegiances. Can citizens simultaneously identify with several communities? Up to the 19th century, most political thinkers believed that individuals could only have one allegiance to a given state [Bruter 2005]. Later, the introduction of new political designs such as federalism, confederalism, and decentralization showed that multiple hierarchical levels of government are compatible; therefore, multiple allegiances would be legitimize and stabilize the new multi-levelled structures of governance.

In the context of the European integration, this principle can be demonstrated on the idea of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity has an equivalent in terms of identities. According to the theory of identity creation, several identities can coexist but they are additive and based on territorial proximity. A citizen will ‘naturally’ feel closer to people from his own city than to people who are from the same region but another city, closer to people from the same region than to people from another region but the same country, closer to people from the same country than to Europeans from another country, etc. [Bruter 2005]. A political identity can
be further influenced by personal background such as minority status, education level, and social class background – aspects that reach beyond the scope of this study.

For our purposes, macro-institutional factors are more important in order to hypothesize about phenomena to be observed. In this respect, we focus on assumptions concerning the differences in the perceptions of European identity in ‘new’ and ‘old’ EU member states. The argument here is that individuals in a country that has broader linkages to the international community (meaning the EU in our case), would be more strongly influenced by the norms of the community. Exposure to international/EU norms would then lead individuals to favour a cosmopolitan/multi-national identity, the EU, over a particularistic one, the nation. Within the EU context, exposure to the EU apparatus should lead individuals to internalize European identity. From a neo-institutionalist point of view, it can be expected that subjective affiliation to Europe would be stronger the longer a country has been a member of the EU [Hadler, Tsutsui, and Chin 2007]. However, the institutionalist assumption can be contested by the argument that post-communist states reap a greater financial benefit from the EU than the Old Member States, which provide the New Member States (the vast majority represented by post-communist states) with financial resources. This might suggest that people in post-communist states are more likely to identify with the EU [Ibid.].

3. Elite identity

The domestic public can often have different views on what constitutes a common national interest in international negotiations from actors who are directly involved in such negotiations, take political decisions, and have a strong interest in them. This seems to be particularly evident in the area of European integration – it is generally recognized that the political elite tends to be more supportive of the ideas of the European integration and Europeanization than the public. There is a persistent elite-mass gap that influences the development of European identities [Checkel, Katzenstein 2009].

In order to operationalize elite and mass identities, it is necessary to conceptualize the elites and the masses as social groups. According to Flockhart [2005], they can be conceptualized as two distinct and differently constructed social groups, which are undergoing different ‘self’ and ‘the other’ categorization processes, leading to different conceptions of interest and political preferences and hence views about the EU integration. In general, elites tend to have a stronger identification with the EU because of factors such as higher education
and more intensive cross-border interaction that lead to a better appreciation of the finer points of the European integration [Flockhart 2005]. Political elites are also greatly exposed to institutionalization and political socialization, which, according to Laffan [2004], generates a common political culture, in turn, expected to create a political identity.

Furthermore, we have to turn our attention to one of the most essential tools of the political elite – channels of communication towards masses, the mass media. Some important findings regarding the impact of political communication must be looked at when assessing the expected effects of the messages of both political institutions and mass media on citizens’ identities [Bruter 2005]. Norris [1999] and Evans and Norris [1999] have also shown that exposure to the mass media can influence people’s party identification. This allows us to hypothesize that political communication can influence citizens yet more fundamentally than previously argued in the literature. It seems that not only behaviour but also attitudes are influenced by media messages. Consequently, more deeply embedded identities can be further influenced by political communication. Findings in the literature point out to a combined effect of the actual media news and the subjective political messages media outlets transmit. The result is that political attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing according to citizens’ perceptions of the successes and shortcomings of their leaders [Bruter 2005].

Finally, another type of elites, naturally inclined towards the European integration, is the economic elite. As Mansfeldová and Špicanová-Stašková [2009] argue, economic elites are more pro-European than national political elites due to their more extensive contacts and work experience within the supranational sphere and due to their economic interests.

4. Hypotheses

Based on the above-outlined theoretical assumptions the following hypotheses can be formulated:

H.1: Political, media, and trade union elites will be more attached to Europe than the mass public in both the new and old EU member states due to their greater exposure to and understanding of the European integration.

H.2: The strength of a European identity among both the masses and elites in post-communist countries will be lower than in Western Europe because of a lower level of exposure and understanding of the European integration.

H.3: In countries where elites exhibit a stronger European identity, also citizens will identify with Europe more strongly.
H.4: Patterns of identification with Europe will be similar among the political elites and citizens because party competition and frequent elections strengthen the representative function performed by this elite group.

H.5: Media elites will adopt the weakest levels of attachment to their region, nation, and to Europe, because of their role in transmitting critical news at all levels of governance and because of commercial pressures that lead them to seek out stories of political inefficiency and corruption.

H.6: Trade union elites will have intermediate degree of identity at all levels (region, nation, Europe), because each level of governance offers opportunities and threats to their role as representatives of workers’ interests in collective bargaining with employers and the government.

5. Research methods

The hypotheses are tested using the data at two levels of analysis: the Elite and the Mass level. The Elite survey data come from the above-mentioned European project *IntUne*. The project ran from September 2005 to 2009. The main aim of the project was to explore views of the national elites and the wider population on the EU through surveys that were distributed in the spring of 2007 and in the spring of 2009 [Ilonszki 2009]. This study employs the data from the second survey that included 16 member states (both old and new members). Three groups of elites were surveyed: political elites, media elites, and trade union elites.

As for the sample composition, political elites are mainly Members of Parliament (approximately 70 per country) with proportional quotas of 10 to 12 for each of the following groups: frontbenchers, female MPs, senior MPs (at least 2 legislatures of experiences), MPs under 50 years of age, and regional representatives (constituency of election where applicable, and region of residence). The sample for the media elite survey includes at least 35 top publishers, CEOs and editors-in-chief of television channels, radio, print media, and online newspapers. The 15 national trade union leaders were selected by the number of members and sector. For the Mass level, the study employs data from *Eurobarometer* 69.2: ‘A special study of National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change’ fielded in the spring of 2008.

2 Only political and economic elites were interviewed in 2007, which left only a little opportunity for comparison over time. Moreover, a brief look at the first-wave data on political elites shows no significant variation to the second wave.

3 Frontbenchers are former or present ministers, Junior ministers, Presidents and vice Presidents of the Upper and Lower Houses/parliamentary groups/standing committees, Former EU commissioners.
The two datasets are comparable because of the overlap in the interviewing period and the similar type of questions on identity. The analysis is based on two survey questions exploring the perception of respondents’ attachment to geographically based units – Region, Country, and Europe. The exact wording of the questions is as follows:

Elite level (IntUne):
People feel different degrees of attachment to their region, to their country, and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached, or not at all attached to the following: Your Region, Country, Europe?

Mass level (Eurobarometer, QA57):
I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity. Different people think of this in different ways. Some people might think of themselves as being European, a national of a country, or from a specific region. Other people might say that with globalization, we are all growing closer to each other and becoming ‘citizens of the world’.⁴

As Mansfeldová and Špicanová-Stašková [2009] argue, a certain degree of doubt can be cast as to whether the respondents always identified Europe with the EU. This study is based on the assumption in the literature that people generally tend to identify with the EU (as a definable entity), rather than with Europe [Ibid.].

Both surveys used a four-point scale: 1) To a great extent, 2) Somewhat, 3) Not really, 4) Not at all, and the last one as 5) Don’t know. For the sake of clarity, the scale was adjusted so that 1 means low attachment and 4 strong attachment (‘Don’t knows’ were left out). In the Eurobarometer survey the ‘global’ category was also left out. Subsequently, the means were calculated for particular levels and its subgroups to test the hypotheses.

6. Empirical Results

The main subjects of analysis presented in this section are comparisons of mean positions on identity scales among citizens and elites throughout the 16 EU member countries with respect to European and national identity, comparisons

of European identity across elite types and citizens, identity profiles in Eastern and Western Europe, and profiles of regional, national, and European identity.

Figure 6.1. Comparison of sense of European identity among elites and masses, EU-16 2008-2009

When comparing the sense of European identity among elites and masses in the EU 16 sample, we can see that the mean sense of European identity is generally higher among elites across all the countries in our sample. However, in many countries the mass and elite groups have essentially the same level of identification with Europe on the ‘somewhat’ European answer. There is no significant division between the OMS and the NMS. The greatest elite-mass differences are exhibited in Britain, Italy, and France. These differences appear to be determined by national political processes. British public is known for being one of the most Eurosceptic in the EU, whereas British political elite is forced to be more conciliatory with respect to the country’s commitments in the EU. Also political socialization within the European political environment can be one of the probable explanations. In France, the situation appears to be somewhat similar, though more extreme. Undoubtedly, the French (together with German) political elite is the leading force in fostering the European integration process. Therefore, a stronger European identity among elites is to be expected. On the other hand, it is well-known that these feelings have not been shared and supported by the French public. This was finally revealed in the 2005 referendum concerning the so-called ‘Constitutional Treaty of the EU’.
Figure 2 shows the sense of national identity across the same sample of EU countries. The main finding is that the sense of national identity is stronger than the European identity. In many countries, citizens and elites have an equally strong sense of national identity. Looking at the exceptions, we can see that Belgian elites have a weaker sense of national identity than the citizens. This may reflect the current political tensions within the state that is strongly divided between regional (Flemish and Walloon) political identifications and interests. Furthermore, elites in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Greece score somewhat lower on the national identity variable. This can possibly reflect the frustration with domestic politics in areas of economic and institutional reform and slow progress in dealing with corruption.

It is also important to look at the mean scores on the European identity variable across the individual elite types and compare them with the overall mass public results. It is clear from Figure 3 that the three elite types are comparable at the European level but exhibit significant variation at the national and regional levels. Political elites express the strongest sense of identity at the regional, national, and European levels, while the media elites show the lowest levels of identification with Europe. The general public (mass) have a significantly stronger national and regional than European identities. Politicians are most similar to their voters in their regional and national sense of identity, but have a significantly stronger sense of a European identity. Concerning the economic elite surveyed in the first wave of the IntUne project (not included in the graph), the mean scores suggest that this type of elite displays the lowest level of attachment to
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Figure 6.3. Comparison of sense of identity across elite types and citizens, EU-16 2008-2009

Figure 6.4. Comparison of sense of identity across elite types and citizens living in ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states, 2008-2009

[124]
their region and the second lowest level of attachment to their country. This corresponds to the rather cosmopolitan and global nature of activities and interests of economic elites. With regard to the European identity, economic elites definitely exhibit stronger identification than the mass public, but reach the average when compared with other elites. The political elite remains the group with the strongest sense of a European identity.

Looking at the identity profiles in Eastern and Western Europe, we can observe that regional identities are the weakest among media elites in Western Europe followed by their counterparts in Eastern Europe. Citizens in the EU-15 member states (i.e. the OMS) have the weakest European identity. This is significantly lower than their fellow citizens in the NMS. There also appears to be a greater gap between citizens and elites in Western Europe than Eastern Europe, suggesting more divided loyalties in the OMS. National identities are strongest among political elites in Eastern Europe and citizens in the NMS.

Figure 6.5. Comparison of sense of identity across elite types and citizens living in ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states, 2008-2009
Finally, the sense of regional, national, and European identities across elite types and citizens living in ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states needs to be examined. The findings suggest that there is a stronger sense of identity across all levels both among citizens and political elites in the NMS than their fellow citizens/politicians in Western Europe. Media elites in all of Europe (both OMS and NMS) have lower levels of regional and national identity than any other elite group, but have an intermediate level of identification with Europe. Trade union elites in Eastern Europe are different from other elites in their strong sense of national identity. As for political elites, they are significantly different in the strength of their identity at the regional and national levels but have the same sense on the European identity variable.

7. Conclusion

This study presented some general findings that can be surprising with respect to the widely accepted theoretical assumptions. The findings suggest that the sense of identity at the regional, national, and European levels tends to be very similar among masses and elites, implying that elites cannot be considered as the main promoters of the European integration. The findings of this study suggest that not all of our hypotheses can be confirmed although many still hold. Hypothesis 1, claiming that political, media, and trade union elites are more attached to Europe than the mass public in both the new and old EU member states was fully confirmed. Political elites and citizens were found to have a similar level of identification at the regional and country level, which gives partial support to Hypothesis 4. However, this is not the case at the European level. Hypotheses 5 and 6 were also only partially confirmed. Media elites exerted the weakest levels of identity at the regional and national levels. At the European level the exact numbers did not give any support to the hypothesis, but minor variation in elite identification was observed at the EU level. This supports Hypothesis 6, which claimed that trade union elites would have intermediate levels of identity at all levels. Again, due to a minor variation in elite identification at the EU level, we can confirm this hypothesis only partially at the European level, but fully at the regional and national levels. On the contrary, Hypothesis 2, suggesting a positive correlation between the effects of a longer institutional exposure to the EU and the strength of a European identity, did not find any support in the data. The strength of European identity among both masses and elites in post-communist countries was actually found to be higher than in Western Europe. Finally, Hypothesis 3, claiming that countries exhibiting stronger levels of European identi-
ty among elites will also have higher levels of identification with Europe among citizens, was refuted by the presented data.

Our findings lead to the conclusion that national politics and the importance of domestic political debates account for the differences between the elite and mass sense of European and national identities. We further observed that at the elite level, there were some important intra-elite differences, whereby political leaders exhibited the strongest levels of identification while the media the weakest. In contrast, citizens were found to have the weakest sense of European identity within the IntUne sample unit of analysis. The sense of a European identity was observed to be stronger in Eastern Europe than in the OMS, refuting the institutionalist argument.

The purpose of this chapter was to outline and capture some general phenomena regarding self-perceptions of European identities at the elite and mass levels. This study allows for some further and more detailed research questions broadening the understanding of this salient topic. Suggested topics for future research are the following: the effects of socio-demographic and other individual-level factors on the sense of identity at both the elite and mass level and an examination of the strength of causal relationships Elite->Mass, Mass->Elite. An important task would also be a creation of a common analytical framework for the elite and mass senses of identity by the use of multilevel models. From a methodological point of view it would be desirable to focus on the sense of a European identity in order to maximize comparability, i.e. the same stimuli for all EU citizens and elites.

Note: The Standard Error values are not shown in the following graphs for the sake of clarity. The Standard Errors were below the significant level only in a few extreme cases.

References


Jacek H. Kołodziej

1. Constitutional rationale for EU axiological persuasion

In the last decade ‘European values’ have appeared to be the key strategic argument for a further integration of the European Union. One can detect a meaningful moment in 2002 when Romano Prodi amplified his Commission’s ‘deeper Union’ project with setting up the ‘Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe’ [Biedenkopf, Geremek, Michalski et al. 2004]. For the first time in the EU history it became obvious that the hitherto prevailing routine of proceedings – based on strengthening economic ties – may be insufficient without ‘founding common grounds’ within the European culture and identity [Jakubowicz 2010:112]. These plans required more than a normative legitimization – establishing a common axiological system – the heart of the new ‘Constitution for Europe’.

The language of European elites – at least those representing the visionary and optimistic ‘Constitutional patriotism’ – developed its special form marked by an ‘axiological bias’1, with a specific tendency to meta-axiological frames2. The process of defining European identity was fostered by external as well as internal factors. As one of the first stimuli, the US intervention in Iraq triggered the process of reshaping the borders between ‘the European’ and the ‘significant others’, including the American depositaries of Western values [Derrida and Habermas 2003:44-6]. At the same time it was clear that the axiological strategy of the EU legitimization would have to face the problem of aligning norms, rules, and formal duties with values. While norms can be commonly shared, negotiated,
and then legally obeyed, values essentially have to be felt and experienced, realized as deeply rooted cultural beliefs and judgements that are thus nearly impossible to standardize [Lacroix 2009:141].

Nevertheless, ‘European values’ (listed below) appeared as a core category of the EU Constitutional Treaty of 2004. After its rejection by the French and Dutch voters in the 2005 national referenda, European values remained a substance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as the main strategic argument for shaping a future ‘European demos’. The 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 2007 marks the definite end of this process. It brought a whole number of instances reaffirming the axiological stance of the EU (e.g. the Brussels Declaration3, the Vision for Europe Group4, the Berlin Declaration5, and the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030).

The Vision for Europe project and the Brussels Declaration rest on the assumption that a European identity, based on a unified (and at the same time diverse) system of values, is the prerequisite of peaceful and safe future of Europe. It assumes that rethinking and organizing European priorities into a coherent axiological system makes the prerequisite of a successful integration. The authors of the document declare:

As the 50th anniversary of the creation of the European Union approaches, the principles and values on which modern Europe was founded are once again under threat. Recent events have thrown into sharp focus the divisions that exist between those who share our liberal, humanitarian values and those who seek to create a more authoritarian society, or would use our culture of tolerance to promote intolerance and undermine democracy. Unless we stand firm and defend our values now, fundamentalism and authoritarianism will once again ride roughshod over our rights. We offer this Vision for Europe to the people of Europe as a restatement of our common values, the liberal values of individual freedom, democracy and the rule of law on which modern European civilisation is based. They are not the values of a single culture or tradition but are our shared values, the values that

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3 Formally launched in Brussels on 27 February 2007 to promote the idea of common European values.
4 Originally, the International Humanist and Ethical Union, the European Humanist Federation and Catholics for a Free Choice signed this document to show and formalize support for the Brussels Declaration by politicians, community leaders, academics, writers, and non-governmental organizations from all EU member states, from Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. See https://www.iheu.org/v4e/.
5 The Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome, signed in Berlin in March 2007.
enable Europeans of all backgrounds, cultures, and traditions to live together in peace and harmony [Vision for Europe 2007].

The laudable idea of ‘sharing common values’ for the sake of a better Europe is much easier to express at a general level, by abstract and empty words indicating few values which are at the same time difficult to contest – like freedom or democracy. In fact, these words denote notions which are nebulous and, in many occurrences, ambiguous; however, always generally accepted in their positive connotations. The second option means to remain at the level of a meta-axiological language – as in the example above – though this can be sometimes problematic. In this case the crucial problem results from the question: in what ways and to which limits can a common system of values be culturally diverse? And furthermore: can one propose a system of universal values based on the need of exclusion of selected values – e.g. Christian?

The Berlin Declaration from 2007 is very illustrative of all these aspects. It is a joint declaration of the three main EU institutions: the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, and the European Commission. It starts with the strongest possible wording, ‘We, the citizens of the European Union’, with the intention to accelerate the development of ‘common grounds’ for the 2009 European elections and normalization of the Treaty of Lisbon. The first symptomatic problem occurred at the level of semantics. For example, the German version called for happiness and fortune (Glück) as a common European goal. However, the optimistic German fortune – by all means for political reasons – was ‘lost in translation’ or simply skipped in other countries [2007], where it was simply too much to declare that the European Union represented a fortune (or luck). Discrepancies in translations to other language also included cases where the English version had ‘better’, the Danish used ‘the best’, etc. The second problem manifested at the meta-axiological level concerned the original omission of any mentioning of Christianity that led Pope Benedict XVI and some other countries, including Poland, to protest or even threaten to veto the Declaration.

Nevertheless, axiological legitimization, i.e. the tendency of EU-related actors to justify the EU-project in terms of common universal values, has become the dominant paradigm of a future integration. It has been corroborated by the values enlisted in key documents and institutionalized by Felipe Gonzales’ ‘Reflection Group’6 – as the main motivational tool for facing the challenges in the longer EU horizon from 2020 to 2030. Before the European elections in 2009, axio-

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6 Established in 2008 with the aim to face all the EU challenges outlined in the Berlin Declaration.
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logical EU persuasion was defined as a suggested way of ‘reaching out to citizens’ and ‘addressing their expectations and needs’. This pro-integration message, founded on the idea of ‘public ownership of the EU’, is expressed in the ‘Project Europe 2030’. The report of the ‘Reflection Group’ reads:

The EU is more than a common market. It is also a union of values, embodied in a commitment to human rights, peace, freedom, and solidarity. These values have universal significance. With the support of European citizens, scientists, and politicians at all levels, the EU can lead international efforts to address major global challenges, including social cohesion, climate change, sustainable development, and peace between nations [Project Europe 2030, 2010:43-44].

It further continues as follows:

Throughout the history of European integration, the relationship between the Union and its citizens was mostly characterised by a ‘passive consensus’. However, in recent years this relationship has begun to change. Europeans have become more demanding of the EU and also more critical of its performance, casting doubts on the legitimacy of the European project. This was illustrated with a bang in the negative referenda which took place in France and the Netherlands, and subsequently in Ireland. Public ownership of the EU will only return when our populations are confident that their values and interests are better served by the Union. Strengthening this sense of ownership must become the driving force of all our collective action [Project Europe 2030, 2010:39].

The reasons for a broader and, potentially, more emotional way of explaining the necessity of ‘public ownership of the EU’ are justified by the context of a democratic deficit, crisis of social trust, lack of genuine European public sphere, financial crisis, global challenges, etc. So the overall idea is as plain as useful – it takes a great deal of presumption that the whole top-down elitist endeavour would imply analogical (and somehow harmonized) push from below. However, the conspicuousness of the aim – the revival of citizens’ will to believe in the European project, in the ‘honesty of European leaders’ and the EU which ‘can lead efforts to address major global challenges’ [Project Europe 2030, 2010:6] – has been defined from the perspective of a Euro-optimistic conviction, based on the idea that the relatively low level of social trust in some of the European societies (e.g. the CEE members of the EU) would be ‘magically’ elevated by the very power of constitutional declarations.

[132]
2. ‘European values’ – the nexus of Europeanization

The constitutional logic of a further integration based on the idea of European common values can be seen as a top-down process of propagation and dissemination of certain structures of meaning together with frames for their interpretation. It is interesting how the process of institutionalizing the axiological rationale for a more cohesive European demos has been transposed into the political practices of the EU institutions. One of the clearest examples is the European Parliament and the process of negotiating constitutional values between EP groups, the European political groups, and their national affiliates in particular. To show a clearer picture, the analysis was narrowed to the EP groups, which have been consistently declaring in their public announcements that a European identity based on common values is a core argument for a further integration. Such practices are clearly implemented in respect to a party’s support for a stronger integration. It is thus not a coincidence that compared to the other parties, the biggest EP group, the European People’s Party, is in the lead of axiological and meta-axiological statements [see e.g. EPP Group 2009].

In the following paragraphs we consider the assumed functional connections between the axiological EU normative message institutionalized by the most pro-integration European Parliament groups in their priorities and programmes and their political resonance at the national levels. To what extent and in which direction have the national priorities on the so-called ‘European values’ been successfully negotiated with national political priorities? How are they internalized at the mass, grass-roots level?

The resonance mechanism is based on an active role of modelling these European groups which create ‘the logic of appropriateness’ [Schimmelfennig 2010:8] in their socialization practices. In the context of the European Parliament, the primary targets of the EU efforts to disseminate its norms and values (political parties) are at the same time the main tools of persuading the national audience in the respective member states. Thus, political parties are both mediating factors and mediators (the role of socialization and imitation overlap). The European elections are another important factor because of their hypothetical ‘second-order’ nature within domestic politics [Reif and Schmitt 1980]. Nonetheless, the simple model of their secondary importance leaves much to be explained. After all, these elections are a true catalyst for making European issues sharper and more visible on the public agenda.

By focusing on the issues of axiological homogenization and resonance during European elections, we refer – in our opinion – to the core mechanism of Europeanization, but it needs some conceptual clarification, especially in the con-
text of collective identity formation. Europeanization as a general concept in the governance school of European integration studies refers to a one-directional influence: it is understood as ‘the impact of policy outcomes and institutions at the European level on domestic polities, politics, and policies’ [Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b:5; see also Jakubowicz 2010; Olsen 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a]. This, though, is insufficient. Europeanization – as every process of transnational flows and influence – must be constructed by two sub-processes: top-down dissemination of ideas and patterns, where institutions are the main agent of change and redistribute resources at the domestic level [Börzel and Risse 2000:2; see also Cowles, Risse, and Caporaso 2001], and horizontal sub-process of accommodation/rejection together with optional feedbacks in the bottom-up direction. In the latter we focus on the diverse effects of change, including the potential transformation of social awareness. Such a broader concept of Europeanization derives from the European Union but reaches beyond the institution as such. It is understood as the integrated system of liberal democracy, constitutionalism, human rights, and the rule of law – thus its political socialization is based on the dissemination of these European values [Jakubowicz 2010:227; Schimmelfennig 2009].

European values as an epistemic category lie at the very heart of the process of Europeanization. They not only frame institutional politics and legitimize policies; most importantly, they organize and justify social relations and identities according to the appropriate logic of European integration. In order to get a complete picture, our analysis includes both perspectives: the content of axiological message of selected European parliamentary groups and national parties taking part in the elections in Poland and social awareness and understanding of European values among Poles in order to measure their potential impact. It is also crucial to reconstruct the role of the (potentially) most influential inter-mediating factor – the media. Therefore, the TV news coverage of the campaign was also taken into consideration. All the data were gathered during the last two weeks before the European elections on 7 June 2009. 7

7 The research included: (1) content analysis of political manifestos of all EP groups (websites) and ten Polish parties which qualified into the national campaign (websites and printed material); (2) national representative survey (questionnaires and direct interviews) of adult Poles on the understanding of European values (one open question with up to five answers possible, 1038 respondents, 5190 declarations); (3) content analysis of audiovisual political campaigns before the elections (frequency and vocabulary analysis, keyword analysis, cluster analysis, concept maps, axiological analysis); (4) content analysis of the news coverage during the campaign in the main four Polish TV stations. The research was possible due to the EU Framework programme “Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society”: Reconstituting Democracy in Europe (RECON), CIT-4-028698, 2007-2011.
3. Axiological Europeanization at the level of political parties

Axiological Europeanization of political parties means the achievement of a high degree of coherence by harmonization of values at three levels of: the normative EU constitutional message, EP group priorities, and party priorities in domestic politics. Political parties cross all these domains. To check the resonance between ‘the centre’ and ‘the periphery’, the political programmes of European groups and their Polish affiliates were scrutinized. At the outset, we found it symptomatic that the most influential and ruling Polish political party – Civic Platform (the clear winner of the 2009 elections with more than 44 percent of the vote) had so vehemently adjusted its political manifestos to its ‘European mother party’ – the European People’s Party. Originally, this conformed to the EU constitutional logic. Civic Platform’s axiological distinctiveness reached its peak exactly during the EP campaign of 2009. Key values of both groupings were arranged in the following way:  

(1) Values interpreted as absolute:
EPP: freedom, human being, democracy, equality, knowledge
PO: freedom, human being, dignity, democracy, diversity

(2) Values interpreted as utilitarian for individuals and the community:
EPP: democracy, security, safety, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, gender equality
PO: modernization, decentralization, common wealth, justice, safety, democracy, environmental protection, countryside development, social trust, entrepreneurship, knowledge, private ownership, work

(3) Values interpreted as utilitarian for the European Union and integration:
EPP: ‘strong European values’, development, efficient single market, European social model, rule of law, solidarity, dialogue, agreement, diversity

8 With the turnout of 24.53 percent, the 2009 EP elections had the following results: PO (Civic Platform): 44.4 percent, PiS (Law and Justice): 27.40 percent, SLD (Democratic Left Alliance): 12.34 percent, and PSL (Polish Peasant Party): 7.01 percent. Apart from PiS, all of these parties followed the axiological EU ‘logic of appropriateness’.
9 The analysis included all parties’ manifestos and programmes published within a year before elections. ‘EPP’ stands for European People’s Party and European Democrats (before 2009), later European People’s Party, and PO – for Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform); ECR – for Union for the Europe of Nations (before October 2009), and European Conservatives and Reformers (since October 2009), PiS – for Law and Justice.
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PO:  *European values, Western values, community, integration, solidarity, diversity, modernity, civil society*

(4) Valuable tools (instrumental values):
EPP:  *European values, employment, dialogue, human rights, family, education, food safety, joint immigration policy*
PO:  *European values, free market, employment, friendly state, decentralization, privatization, knowledge, equal rights, family, low taxes*

Apart from some isolated cases, easily explainable by country peculiarities (*solidarity* in Poland or *gender equality* in Western Europe), the harmonization of values was quite remarkable. It is especially important that in the Polish case the value of *consistence* went hand in hand with the high election results. Working on this as a premise led us to construct a model matrix of Europeanization based on the criterion of axiological coherency (presented in Table 7.1.).

**Table 7.1. Axiological Europeanization matrix (own source)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUROPEAN ELECTIONS PRIORITIES</th>
<th>DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRIORITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COHERENCE WITH THE SYSTEM OF EU CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The central assumption here is that we put the vision of Europe determined by a constitutional patriotism and optimistic views about a further integration at the core of Europeanization. Following this ideological justification, the matrix can serve as a hypothetical tool to map the forms of Europeanization in this narrowed sense. The harmonization of values is the agent of Europeanization, and at the same time the corroborative evidence for it. In the context of the European elections this mechanism was easily observable in Poland. The Civic Platform was the only Polish party, which demonstrated ‘comprehensive Europeanization’. Its
coalition partner, much smaller peasant party PSL (Polish Peasants’ Party), was an example of a ‘mismatched Europeanization’ (because of a clearly nationalistic rhetoric). The social-democratic opposition (SLD), particularly in this campaign, proved to be a case of ‘defective Europeanization’ (because of the value conflict between commonly known pro-European approach, and the strategy of focusing on strictly domestic political games). Both of these parties did not play a major role in the elections.

However, equally interesting cases were those of the relatively strong, conservative opposition PiS (Law and Justice), and the mayfly, albeit pan-European, party Libertas, founded by the well-known Irish critic of the Lisbon treaty Declan Ganley. Both applied the simple model of political identity based on the national–European cleavage.

The national and conservative PiS kept its undisputable position of the second strongest and also oppositional party. According to the matrix, it represented ‘simulated Europeanization’. Its relatively bad result (27.4 percent) had many reasons. One of them was an observable value conflict between the declarations of a pro-European stance, national domestic priorities (highlighted in the campaign) and the ‘European mother party’ programme (declared at the same time). This time the source of the conflict was the considerable lack of coherence within the conservatives’ priorities interpreted because of a domestic legitimization and those interpreted for a European legitimization. The campaign was in fact equivocal and multi-valued. The following list shows some of the main axiological inconsistencies (in bold):

(1) Values interpreted as absolute:
PiS: nation, state, truth, God, life, health
ECR: realism, openness, accountability, democracy, sovereign of nations, competitiveness, growth

10 For example, at the inaugural meeting of the new EP group of Conservatives and Reformers with the British conservatives and the Czech ODS (Civic Democratic Party), which took place in Warsaw on 30 May 2009, the leader of PiS Jarosław Kaczyński highlighted the importance of a common sense, pragmatism, effectiveness, free market, human rights, and decentralization (literally following British conservatives’ ideas). At the same time he was constructing his domestic campaign on the thesis that the main opponents, Civic Platform, ‘obviously is not a Polish party’ because it does not fight in Brussels for Polish interests in the German Opel factory.
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(2) Values interpreted as utilitarian for individuals and community:
PiS: nation, solidarity, security, social justice, Poland, patriotism, stabilization, the right, tradition, realism, responsibility before the state, work, social security
ECR: dignity, solidarity, equality of people, tradition, security, democracy, entrepreneurship; later: individual liberty, honesty, responsibility, family, democracy, competition, modern services, limited government

(3) Values interpreted as utilitarian for European Union and integration:
PiS: sovereign states, peace, community, sustainable development, axiological neutrality of the European Union
ECR: sovereignty, nation, cultural diversity, solidarity; later: nation, sovereignty of nation-states, equality of states, common market, deregulation, security, democracy, cost-effectiveness

(4) Valuable tools (instrumental values):
PiS: Christian values, tradition, legalism, social care, family, low taxes, lustration, decommunization, European constitution based on Christian values, the IV Republic of Poland
ECR: sovereign states, human rights, equality of opportunities, family; later: low taxes, free market, fair trade, real subsidiarity, NATO, immigration control, modern public service, transparency, clear energy, climate change control

The grouping Libertas is an interesting case for another reason. It is an example of a ‘fictional Europeanization’, based on, paradoxically, a high conformity with the ‘European mother party’ (Libertas Europe). The axiological message of this party was simple, clear, categorical, as well as quite uncompromising. Yet it was in deep conflict with the axiological systems of the European Union and with the vast majority of Polish society. In Poland Libertas received a marginal support of only 83,754 of the electoral vote (out of 35 million of eligible Polish voters).

(1) Values interpreted as absolute:
Libertas Europe: liberty, sovereignty
Libertas Poland: freedom, liberty, independence

(2) Values interpreted as utilitarian for individuals and community:
Libertas Europe: democracy, accountability, sovereignty, nation
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Libertas Poland: Poland, patriotism, homeland, sovereignty, family, Christian values

(3) Values interpreted as utilitarian for European Union and integration:
Libertas Europe: direct democracy, legitimisation, anti-elitarism, pan-Europeanism
Libertas Poland: Europe of nations, Christian Europe

(4) Valuable tools (instrumental values):
Libertas Europe: Lisbon Treaty, referenda, corruption, transparency, democratic deficit
Libertas Poland: Lisbon Treaty, bureaucracy, Polish shipyards, Polish sugar mills, Polish currency, Decalogue

It must be stressed that the matrix is simplified also in the axiological sense. By taking only one hierarchy as the normative model, it assumes monistic hierarchy of values. The problem is that the European reality is much more complex. Good point is that by narrowing the perspective we obtain a clearer image – e.g. looking from the point of view of a member state, we may describe its Europeanization level by assessing ‘the adequate harmonization of political, institutional, axiological, and cultural Europeanism implemented into the EU logic, with own interests and identity’ [Jakubowicz 2010:229]. ‘The goodness of fit’ condition has much broader practical consequences concerning party and political systems in member states as this model of Europeanization fosters a further development of political parties matching the normative ideals in a long-term perspective. The three hypotheses formulated below refer to these critics of the secondary (or even tertiary) role of the European Parliament. They claim that the EP elections have only a limited impact on the political development of the EU, but can seriously decompose the main domestic areas of activity [Hix and Lord 1997:88]. It can be hypothesized that:

(1) When based on a consistent system of values, comprehensive Europeanization fosters a party stabilization in both European and domestic political systems. This form can be the paragon of double winners. It can influence collective identity as much as it succeeds in the consolidation of European and domestic social values. This thesis is corroborated by the case of the Polish Civil Platform.

(2) A strong party position at the national level and weak or unstable EP representation leads to axiological conflicts, which can weaken a party’s national position. In the case of additional inconsistencies between value systems (e.g. clashing national and European hierarchies) it may lead to a double–loser’s ef-
fect. As far as collective identity is concerned, this option fosters two possibilities: either stipulates empty axiological rhetoric (ostensible declarations leading to incoherency between European and social values), or induces a Eurosceptic bias. In both cases the lack of a common axiological platform may cause backlash and a boomerang effect, making political communication incoherent and thus ineffective, eventually weakening a party’s national position (and reinforcing the pluralism of European values).

(3) Political parties with low support may increase their domestic popularity if they aspire to a strong EP group and if their minimum prerequisite is to work out and express the system of values, which could consistently bond their axiological propositions with social and European values.

Additional regularities were observed during the analysis of campaign identity rhetoric, particularly in comparison with the preferred model of axiological Europeanization. We followed a simple assumption that the more open and comprehensive the rhetoric (meaning most of all argumentation and verbal tools concerning European identity) – the better for European identification.

Table 7.2. Form of axiological Europeanization and identity rhetoric in political communication before EP elections in 2009 (own source)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensive Europeanization (autopresentative motives dominate)</th>
<th>Contested Europeanization (significant others’ motives dominate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>monophonic identity - legitimation ‘in order to’</td>
<td>monophonic identity – legitimation ‘because’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>past and present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>own strength</td>
<td>weaknesses of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationality, consequentialism</td>
<td>authenticity of experience, persistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive values</td>
<td>negative values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common values, consolidation</td>
<td>differentiation, separate identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal, ceremonial values</td>
<td>unique advantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>success, modernity, knowledge, freedom, agreement, equality, human rights, safety, security</td>
<td>personal merit, group interest, conflict, disagreement, claims, resentments, problem-narration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\leftarrow \text{simulated, fictional or defective Europeanization} \rightarrow \]
| complex, twofold or blurred identity |

It was not surprising that the most rhetorically consistent identity patterns were constructed by the parties with the clearest stance on the EU integration: Civic Platform (with its comprehensive Europeanization stance) and the radical, small, and anti-integrationist groupings which contested Europeanization (see Table
7.2). Somewhat more surprising was the fact that in both of the cases there was a clear pattern of a one-sided communication based on the phenomenon we term ‘monophonic identity’. Paradoxically, the parties of unclear or inconsistent strategic visions about the European integration, during the campaign presented a more elaborate model of identity. If simulated, fictional or defective Europeanization fosters a more profound model of identity in campaign rhetoric, then political communication – in its current, very pragmatic and strategic form – cannot be considered a useful agent for transformation.

4. Identity transformation as the potential effect of axiological Europeanization

The crucial questions concerning a common European identity read as follows: Can a system of values be successfully imposed on society? And if so, what are the rules of and factors for a value transformation and in what conditions can it affect the existing collective identity? It is a truisms to say that to answer these questions one has to compare the symbolic message with its effects – i.e. any possible reaction or change made as a result of the influence. It is also crucial to realize and include the role of the main mediating factors. In our research we found two of them: political culture, particularly the cultural norms of political communication, and mass media input in the process of shaping public knowledge on European integration. It turned out that both of them did not play a very constructive role.

In order to be concise and informative, the following paragraphs focus on the collective identity issues. The main message is that the ongoing research concentrates on the background for the social, multi-layered, and much more complex European identity formation processes. The following points have crucial importance in this context:

1) What is the coherence between the EU normative message and social hierarchy of European values? According to our belief, the higher the level of agreement between them, the better for European identification.

2) What is the hypothetical role of the media on the political process of Europeanization? According to our belief, the more informational, consensual, and impartial the media – the better for European identification.

The reconstruction of how Poles understand and conceptualize European values was planned as the foundation for the subsequent analyses of the hierarchies of values in political persuasion and in the TV news coverage of the campaign. Assuming that there is a distinct catalogue of key values defining what consti-
tutes a European identity, we asked the representative sample of adult Poles the following open question: “We are Europeans. Europe becomes the community based on shared values. Which of these European values are the most important to you? Could you please name up to five of them, starting from the most positive one?”

In 2872 cases (out of 5190 answers in 5 preferences), i.e. in the narrow majority of all cases, respondents did not provide any answer, and some of them expressed the opinion that such phenomenon as European values simply did not exist. It is then a fact that more than half of the sample population had fundamental problems with understanding the collective sense of European values. The further analysis corroborated common views according to which in most cases the age, education, place of residence (urban), occupation, and political activity influence the knowledge of European integration in a positive way. On the other hand, women, the elderly, people with lower education levels, and unemployed people, who do not generally take part in elections, or vote for small radical parties, marked the group of relatively lower European awareness. Interestingly, the level of religiosity did not make any impact in this aspect.

The respondents who could express and rank European values according to their subjective understanding (approximately 45 percent) initially showed a typical tendency to understand common Europe by its potential to organize and secure the very material and existential requirements – as opportunity to work and freedom to travel (see Table 7.3.). It is known from the Eurobarometer surveys that “a relative majority of Europeans believe that the EU means ‘freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU (42 percent)”¹¹. As usual, it is the phrasing of the question that plays an important role. Europeans asked about the “attachment to the EU” (“What does the EU mean?”) answered mostly “freedom to travel, study and work”, then “European currency” (33 percent), “peace” (25 percent), “a stronger say in the world” (23 percent), “democracy” (22 percent), and “cultural diversity” (19 percent) [Standard Eurobarometer 71:85-6]. However, when asked to choose¹² between “the most important elements making up the European identity” – they stressed “the single currency, the Euro” (40 percent) and “democratic values” (37 percent) [Special Eurobarometer 303:34].

¹² The question QD21 say: ‘The European identity can be composed of several elements. In your opinion, which of the following are the most important elements that go to make up the European identity?’
### Table 3. Three hierarchies of European values represented by Polish: public opinion, party propaganda and television news (June 2009) (own source)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declarations of Poles</th>
<th>% of N = 1038 respondents</th>
<th>Political propaganda</th>
<th>% of N = 1973 paragraphs</th>
<th>TV news</th>
<th>% of N = 876 modules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 2318 answers</td>
<td></td>
<td>N = 52 news programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the freedom to travel</td>
<td>261 11,3</td>
<td>Poland 749 17,4</td>
<td>conflict, fight, disagreement 221 13,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment</td>
<td>154 6,7</td>
<td>Europe 428 10</td>
<td>personal interest (incl. party interest) 148 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the freedom of speech</td>
<td>110 4,7</td>
<td>success 298 6,9</td>
<td>hypocrisy 89 5,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom, liberty</td>
<td>109 4,7</td>
<td>agreement, consensus 206 4,8</td>
<td>threat 84 5,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolerance</td>
<td>103 4,5</td>
<td>knowledge 181 4,2</td>
<td>success 60 3,6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common good</td>
<td>96 4,2</td>
<td>localness 178 4,1</td>
<td>Poland 49 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>96 4,1</td>
<td>the left 152 3,5</td>
<td>employment 48 2,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solidarity</td>
<td>82 3,6</td>
<td>modernity 140 3,3</td>
<td>discrimination, xenophobia 47 2,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equality</td>
<td>79 3,4</td>
<td>community 138 3,2</td>
<td>community 41 2,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common market</td>
<td>77 3,3</td>
<td>conflict, fight, disagreement 136 3,2</td>
<td>agreement, consensus 41 2,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfying of material needs</td>
<td>70 3</td>
<td>human rights 134 3,1</td>
<td>corruption 40 2,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement, consensus</td>
<td>67 2,9</td>
<td>personal interest (incl. party interest) 111 2,6</td>
<td>justice 39 2,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety, security</td>
<td>60 2,6</td>
<td>freedom, liberty 104 2,4</td>
<td>failure 31 1,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the freedom of religion</td>
<td>59 2,5</td>
<td>satisfying material needs 105 2,4</td>
<td>ignorance 32 1,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>honesty</td>
<td>54 2,3</td>
<td>the lack of material goods 99 2,3</td>
<td>solidarity 29 1,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the community of norms and values</td>
<td>50 2,2</td>
<td>patriotism (attitudes, actions) 94 2,2</td>
<td>lack of dignity 26 1,6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture, civilisation</td>
<td>50 2,1</td>
<td>national state 72 1,7</td>
<td>war 27 1,6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge</td>
<td>46 2</td>
<td>dignity 68 1,6</td>
<td>democracy 25 1,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legal equality</td>
<td>43 1,8</td>
<td>solidarity 53 1,2</td>
<td>Europe 25 1,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common currency</td>
<td>38 1,6</td>
<td>threat 47 1,1</td>
<td>unemployment 25 1,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian values</td>
<td>35 1,5</td>
<td>homeland (country of origin) 47 1,1</td>
<td>no sovereignty, dependence 25 1,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion, faith</td>
<td>33 1,4</td>
<td>safety / security 43 1</td>
<td>injustice 23 1,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>justice</td>
<td>30 1,3</td>
<td>employment 45 1</td>
<td>knowledge 22 1,3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the community of acquaintance</td>
<td>31 1,3</td>
<td>hypocrisy 44 1</td>
<td>patriotism (attitudes, actions) 20 1,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration</td>
<td>31 1,3</td>
<td>integration 44 1</td>
<td>satisfying of material needs 19 1,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. ‘Axiological Europeanization’ and Identity Change: the Case of Polish Elections
Thus, the growing tendency to treat Europe in an instrumental and pragmatic way was eminent; however, it went hand in hand with expressing the importance of more universal norms and values. The latter thesis seems to be characteristic of Poland and the engine for the systemic organization of the hierarchy of European values. The results of our survey show a ‘specific tension between pragmatic and idealistic approach to the value of an integrated Europe’. The opportunity to find a good (read: well-paid) job in Europe is the central element in the system, the sort of ‘precondition and touchstone of our existence’. However, the phraseological analysis of the answers led to the second dimension of understanding ‘work’ – as the tool for realizing our freedom, which seems to be of higher axiological rank here. The respondents went along the following path of associations: the right to work – the elimination of job barriers in Europe – the access to the common market – the freedom to choose work – the increased self-respect, opportunity to realize personal freedoms and liberties. Thus in the system of European values, work and employment are combined with the egalitarian and material indices, as well as with the marks for community and universal values. The way our respondents were expressing their attitudes to the relations between values helps to reconstruct the hypothetical hierarchy with freedom at the very top and community and dignity on the sides.

5. Conclusion

Respondents in Poland perceive European values as a system working in a hierarchical way. The top level is tied with divergent means of realization and symbolic universal notions such as tolerance, democracy, solidarity, and equality. A sense of commonness proved to be a real (i.e. felt and declared) value – apart from the technical aspects of the integration (common market, common legal norms, common currency), it was also understood as the process of building a common acquaintance, based on a common culture and civilization. According to the respondents of this study, the whole system rests on moral values – justice, agreement, honesty, trust, the good for other people, and environmental protection. This partially explains the hypothesis of the value deficit.

For the Polish population, freedom is perceived as the highest and most universal value. It is combined with different concretizations and tools for its realization (e.g. the freedom of speech, the freedom to exercise religion, the freedom to travel). In addition, freedom is considered a condition for the integrated, harmonized, and peaceful life in dignity. Having a job is the material precondi-
tion for one’s respectful life, which should be safe and secure. And it is Europe, which encompasses all of this, Europe as the value in itself.

The results of the national survey clearly corroborate the resonance mechanism, proving that European values have successfully been internalized (at least for a considerable part of Polish society). Moreover, they are understood in the axiological sense – that means that they are conceptualized in a hierarchical manner, where high universal values (freedom, dignity) are as much functional as the utilitarian ones (common market).

The potential media impact on the process of political Europeanization was the subject of research at the second, additional level. As was specified earlier, the overall comparative analysis comprised also the audiovisual political party campaign material before the Polish elections to the European Parliament and the Polish TV news coverage of the campaign. Table 7.4. presents the results in the most concise way. It shows three hierarchies of values – representative for the reconstructed axiological systems of ‘ordinary people’, political party persuasion, and TV news coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREEDOM</th>
<th>EUROPE</th>
<th>DIGNITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>common market</td>
<td>integration</td>
<td>peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common currency</td>
<td>tolerance</td>
<td>security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common relations</td>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>social care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common norms</td>
<td>solidarity</td>
<td>freedom of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trust</td>
<td>equality</td>
<td>freedom of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture</td>
<td>justice</td>
<td>agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civilisation</td>
<td>honesty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge</td>
<td>environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material equality</td>
<td>welfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material satisfaction</td>
<td>work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>freedom to travel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The correlation\textsuperscript{13} between the hierarchies of Polish people and party persuasion is significant at the level of +0.383. It is not very high, but one can call it ‘a meaningful concurrence’. This means that Polish politicians in particular managed to find common grounds with the public regarding the priorities of the European integration, whilst the politicians’ hierarchy is peculiar and often far from the stable hierarchy of positive social values. This finding refutes the idea that political persuasion at the national and European level must be constructed in separate ways. The second conclusion is that there is a common space for successful political persuasion on the European integration: politicians did not lose a sense of priorities and voters embraced the values put forward by politicians.

On the other hand, the hierarchy of television news values does not make any correlation with the Polish public or with the party persuasion. There is a negative, but not statistically significant correlation between the values of the Polish population and the media (–0.120). Interestingly enough, the correlation between politicians and the media values is negative and statistically significant at the level of –0.269.

To conclude, political communication channelled by the electronic (audiovisual) media is the subject of the most extensive transformation of political messages. Considering the overwhelming routines of political infotainment, we may hypothetically say that the European message may not only be put out of tune, but meaningfully deconstructed – in compliance with a particular logic of commercial market of ideas and pictures.

References


\textsuperscript{13} Spearman’s rank correlation, significance level for \( p = 0.01 \).

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Deklaracja wyborcza PSL. 2009. (Programme Declaration of Polish Peasant Party), Warszawa: PSL.
The Nexus between Democracy, Collective Identity Formation, and EU Enlargement


8. Not Just a Nation Set in Stone: The Undercurrents Making the National Structure More Porous

Marcin Galent and Paweł Kubicki

1. Introduction

This chapter examines the gradual change in the main characteristics of the Polish national identity caused by a belated urbanization. For several reasons cities in Poland and their inhabitants had a limited political, cultural, and social influence on mainly rural Polish society [see Galent Kubicki 2010]. As a renowned Polish sociologist pointed out in the late 1980s, “Poland is a country of a hasten industrialization but delayed urbanization” [Turowski 1988:200-201]. Since 1989 we have witnessed a number of complex and interdependent processes such as an economic transformation creating the economic and legal foundation for the growth of the bourgeoisie, globalization, domination of new economy, European integration, and the emergence of a network society. These processes have created all of the structural changes that have brought about the redefinition of the role of the city and urban culture in Poland, and by this token, have shifted the main traits of the Polish national identity from its ethnic elements toward the civic ones. One of the consequences of these rapid social changes has been the emergence of a new social category, which has influenced the dynamics of the reconstruction of national discourse in an important way. We call this phenomenon ‘urbanogentsia’ and we treat it as a loose term that requires further sociological research as described in the next section. The term ‘urbanogentsia’ is a neologism used here to describe an emerging new social power combining the traditional Polish intelligentsia and a new urban middle class.

Manuel Castells in his seminal trilogy “The Information Age” [1996, 1997, 1998] argues that thanks to communication technologies, an increasing number of cities are being included in global networks. For Poland, this network first opened after 1989 and especially after the 2004 accession to the EU. Subsequently, new opportunities for cities and their inhabitants have come about. The underlying assumption of this chapter is in line with the theory of network society that sees major (Polish) cities as emerging ‘nodes’ in European networks. These nodes create new social fields, where new ‘flows’ brought about by Eu-
Europeanization and globalization processes most significantly influence identity construction. The inclusion into a network of exchanges allows a dynamic spread of cultural patterns and creates opportunities to directly experience new possibilities to reconstruct traditional collective identities. Therefore, Polish urban centres which are joining transnational networks are going through a more dynamic process of social change than those which for many different reasons stay outside of these networks.

Therefore, our research focuses on this segment of Polish society that is considered as primarily responsible for changes in Polish national identity. We study how inhabitants of three major Polish cities gradually replace their so-far most important frame of reference – the nation-state – by structures of collective identities generated by urban centres. In our view, this process leads to a renegotiation of the traditional Polish national identity based on ethnic and homogenous traits (characteristic for rural societies) and turns it into a civic and pluralistic one. This chapter suggests that these developments are strongly determined by the dominant urban discourses in which they undertake their social activities. The key player in this process of redefinition has become a new actor – ‘urbangentea’, so the main question for this research was to discover how new narrations produced by its members influence national identity of the Polish people.

2. Methodology

This research is grounded in particular on the methodological framework of Clifford Geertz that can be described in the following way:

Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, constructing social expression on their surface enigmatical [Geertz 1973:5].

According to Geertz, it is possible to interpret cultures of any social setting through the method of ‘thick description’ of symbolic meanings. We assumed that similar persons, characterized by similar social traits, and who undertake similar social activities, in a different way interpret their actions and by this token discourses they produce contribute in a different way to constructions of their collective identities. Therefore, we chose three different large Polish cities: Cracow (with a population of 754,624), Wrocław (634,630), and Szczecin.
(413,154). Initially, we started comparing Wroclaw and Cracow only. Our case selection was governed by their comparable population size, their importance as cultural and scientific centres, and their historical role as regional centres with far-reaching networks of partner cities – Wroclaw with Prussian and Saxonian cities and Cracow with several cities of the former Habsburg Empire. Moreover, during the formative period for contemporary collective identities in the 19th century, they structured their identities with relation to symbolically homogenous contexts (Polish in Cracow and German in Wroclaw), despite their multi-ethnic composition and heritage. As far as differences between the two are concerned, their demographic reproduction patterns are substantially distinct. Wroclaw has preserved and reproduced its traditional bourgeois character, whereas Wroclaw serves as a typical example of a post-migrant city with an entirely reconstructed identity because of the post-World War II population shifts.¹

The first stage of the research showed that the changes of identity renegotiation was much more significant in Wroclaw. Therefore, we decided to carry out another fieldwork in Wroclaw in 2009 and later also in Szczecin in 2010, as a city with historical similarities regarding its post-migrant character but different as far as the way the process of reconstruction of its identity is concerned. Despite their similar social history and comparable development opportunities, Wroclaw is taken as one of the most successful cities in Poland in terms of economic, social, and cultural growth. Wroclaw has created chances for the growth of ‘urbanogentsia’ and institutions which managed to link the city with the European and global networks. In contrast, Szczecin is one of the most spectacular examples of lost chances brought about by the EU enlargement.

In total, we conducted nearly 100 in-depth interviews, dozens of informal conversations, and participant observation. Our sample consisted of opinion-makers and influential community members, involved in activities influencing the image of their cities such as journalists and NGO workers in the sector of urban and civic development and representatives of local governments. We focused on members of the respective communities that have a great impact on the creation of local narratives and dominant discourses, which determine perceptions and active involvement in urban life of the population. The average age of our respondents was 35. This is because the radical social changes, which have taken place during the last two decades, have become inextricable intertwined with their personal and professional biographies.

¹ The entire German population of Wroclaw was expelled after 1945 and gradually substituted by ethnic Poles.
3. ‘Urbanogentsia’

When talking about macro-structural changes in Polish society, two terms are generally used – the ‘new middle class’ and ‘intelligentsia’. Both of these terms are inherent in ‘urbanogentsia’. The new middle class is a term associated with the recent post-communist Polish social structure, whereas intelligentsia has been used since the end of the 18th century to describe a newly created privileged social class [Chojnowski and Palska 2008; Micinska 2008]. We decided to use a brand new term out of two reasons: firstly, the recent social changes blur boundaries between the middle class and intelligentsia, whereby these two concepts often overlap; and secondly, it is often overlooked that Polish society is being significantly transformed by the urban way of life. At least since the beginning of the 21st century, the urban middle class in Poland has been growing. However, Polish middle class cannot be understood in the classical sense of the 19th century bourgeoisie. Polish bourgeoisie has never been strong enough to become a dominant social stratum, neither economically, nor politically, nor culturally. In Poland, it was historically the intelligentsia that acquired a similar position and role as bourgeoisie in Western Europe in the 19th century; it was the Polish intelligentsia that assumed the role of the most important social actor in creating the Polish national identity. Intelligentsia became the natural spearhead of the Polish national case out of two reasons. First, it was the 19th century nationalism that created a new and unprecedented framework of identification – the nation as a secular religion, whose main preacher was the intelligentsia. Second, Poland had a brief history of modern independent statehood only, which prevented the country from making use of state apparatuses such as the army, administration, and state education in order to maintain and foster its national identity. Therefore, intelligentsia felt responsible for guiding the national case and assumed the role of national pioneers and missionaries who ultimately turned peasants to Polish citizens.

Today, the Polish state is fully sovereign, its independence unquestioned, borders secure and free from neighbours’ claims, and the state apparatus operates according to the will of national politicians. Moreover, the very idea of the nation as a primordial and perennial community has lost its power [Bauman 1997]. New identities have been emerging that are based on local, regional, and ethnic ties as well as social identifications that Michel Maffesoli [1996] called ‘new tribes’. Similar to the rest of Eastern Europe, ‘Polishness’ has primarily been based on ethnic characteristics such as language, religion, culture, and descent. Moreover, the fundamental baseline for identity construction resting on the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ has been understood as a clear boundary between the pri-
vate (informal) and the public (formal) sphere. This lack of intermediating social structures was described by the distinguished Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak as a ‘sociological vacuum’ [1979]. This vacuum represented a chasm between the level of identity derived from primary groups such as family and friends, and the level of national identity, which was derived from the very abstract notion of the ‘motherland’, imagined and expressed as a spiritual and cultural entity. At the beginning of the 21st century, this chasm seems to be filled with new urban discourses and structures.

Nowadays, new generations, born and socialized in urban cultures, seek new social identities and narratives that are difficult to categorize into clear-cut social classes. There are little common characteristics among them and social boundaries separating them from other social classes are very weak and fluid. Moreover, under postmodern conditions also the identities of ‘urbanogentsia’ are weakened and more fluid. They are a cultural hybrid, in the same way as the contemporary culture has progressively become fragmented, fluid, and hybrid. While trying to characterize this new social phenomenon, one can use many already existing labels used by sociologists to describe past and current forms of urban culture such as the 19th century ‘flâneur’ [Benjamin 2002], ‘yuppies’, the ‘Bohemian bourgeoisie’ denoting the elites of neoliberal capitalism [Brooks 2000], and the ‘creative class’ [Florida 2002]. All these labels serve as mere intuitive tools to grasp the constitutive traits of these emerging urban identities. Nonetheless, there are strong premises to claim that it is increasingly gaining more importance in the social reality of contemporary Poland, which concerns the redefinition of the role of the city and urban culture in Poland. New generations of urban settlers are superior to older generations in terms of the level of education they receive, knowledge of languages, international experience, and lack of inferiority complexes towards the western urban culture. Moreover, contrary to the previous historical concepts of urban classes, urban way of life is not caused by pauperism but by social elevation, more so after a recent period of exceptional global prosperity fostered by the accession to the EU. Lastly, the new kind of urban economy is based on a symbolic production and knowledge making urban cultures attractive and loaded with more positive values. In brief, the historically defined intelligentsia has lost its raison d’être, but its values and norms such as an ability to offer private resources for a common good have not disappeared. Pro publico bono activities and attitudes are present in Poland, but they appear at a different level, especially in the local communities of cities.
4. City as a social field

Cities in Poland have become particularly important social fields. Their social structure has gradually changed with the last demographic boom of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. More importantly, today’s people in their thirties are also the generation that experienced the educational boom. According to the GUS (Polish Statistics Office) data in 2005/2006, the number of students in Poland was 1,953,000, while just ten years earlier it was only 500,000. This number is currently on a par with France, whose population is double the population of Poland. One of the consequences of such a dynamic growth of higher education has been an exodus of young people from the countryside and smaller towns; the biggest urban centres have become ‘a suction pump’. Suffice to say that the number of students in the two biggest academic centres – Warsaw (280,000) and Cracow (190,000) – is higher than the total number of Polish students in the early 1990s. The contemporary generation is also the generation of the European integration: studying and working abroad is fairly easy and legal and students participate in international flows.

Local governments have also significantly contributed to the growing role of Polish cities. Despite the official declaration of self-governance in the Polish system, this self-governance had in fact never existed before some administrative reforms (1999) and the introduction of direct vote of mayors (2002). These developments have led to a social mobilization and engagement of the public, noticeable especially in Wroclaw, where local authorities have been highly regarded by the majority of our respondents for their input into the successful expansion and development of the city after 1989.

5. Patterns of identity change

The unique nature of the city as a social space allows for experiments in a normative sphere, for the creation of new cultural elements, which would otherwise be suppressed in a framework of the traditional structure of the nation-state. This creates opportunities for constructing identities reaching beyond traditional grand narratives of national identity. These identities become more fragmented, globalized, and fluid. Studying our three cases (Cracow, Wroclaw, and Szczecin), we identified three ways of identity re-definitions, also representative for other Polish cities. They are mainly dependent on the narratives of the cities created by ‘urbanogent-sia’. Nonetheless, these narratives are determined by dominant discourses, understood here after Foucault as subjugating knowledge. In the case of Cracow, we iden-
tified that the traditional discourse depicting the city as a symbol of ‘Polishness’ was strong enough to resist deconstructionist attempts. As a consequence, new narratives created by ‘urbanogentsia’ became successful at the level of certain particular districts, the symbolism of the city as a whole became intact. Regarding Wroclaw and Szczecin, the post-WWII discourse lost its dominant position. Thanks to ‘urbanogentsia’, Wroclaw has created a new formative narrative. However, given the weakness of ‘urbanogentsia’, Szczecin has so far failed to produce new urban narratives.

5.1. The case of Cracow: a Polish city in Central Europe

The city of Cracow (Kraków in Polish) is one of the most important symbols of Polish history and culture. On the one hand, Cracow is inextricably embedded in the Polish national history, where it plays an archetypal role. It represents values of the Polish national and Catholic homogenous culture. On the other hand, it is a symbolic representation of the Arcadian myth of cosmopolitan and multicultural Central Europe. In Cracow the term ‘identity’ is rarely used and even when respondents answered direct questions about identity, their answers were often dominated by common clichés. Hegel’s notorious claim that ‘the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk’ points out that identity is perceived and is regarded as important only when it becomes problematic. Given the historical uniqueness and importance of the city, the identity of Cracow is perceived as self-evident.

The Polish state changed its shape on a number of occasions and consisted of several ethnic and national cultures during its one-thousand-year history, but Cracow had always been located in this state framework and developed in Polish ethnic surroundings. What is more, Cracow was the capital of Poland between 1320 and 1611, and the place of the king’s coronation up until partition of Poland at the end of the 18th century. However, much more important in this context is the time of the partitions of the late 18th and early 19th century, when Cracow became the spiritual capital of Poland. The conditions in the second half of the 19th century – the liberalization of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy – allowed the cultivation of Polish culture in the province of Galicia, whereas at the same time the two other invaders (Prussia and Russia) conducted oppressive politics of Germanization and Russification, respectively. Therefore, Cracow became the archetypal symbol of ‘Polishness’.

2 In that period, Cracow was multi-ethnic and multi-religious; however, national rituals, festivals, and art have created a symbolic image of Cracow as mono-ethnically Polish.
For these reasons, respondents in Cracow perceived themselves as pilgrims who were going through a national labyrinth of meanings and symbolic codes, established in the past and thus sacred. People felt that they were rather overwhelmed by history, which hindered them from creating new symbolic meanings. To our respondents, Cracow was located at the centre of their national narrative. They were not able to surpass these national structures and imagine the city as an autonomous actor. Cracow’s social memory produces a discourse of stability and a sense of the domination of national structure: Cracow will not go beyond Polish national discourse because the essence of Cracow is deeply rooted in the Polish national symbols and myths.

Therefore, since ‘urbanogentsia’ is unable to challenge the dominant symbolism of the city, its actions are most visible at the lower level of urban life, mainly at the level of separate districts. The inhabitants of such quarters as Kazimierz, Podgórze or Nowa Huta identify themselves primarily with their districts; what is more, they construct strong symbolic boundaries based on their specific histories and socio-cultural backgrounds. The majority of civic engagement takes place at the district level, not city level.

The most spectacular example of this process is the identity reconstruction of the Kazimierz quarter. Before World War II, there were about 70,000 Jews in Cracow – they made up about 30 percent of the total population and mostly lived in one district – Kazimierz. After the war, due to the Holocaust and the exodus of Jews, the district completely changed its character. The heritage of the Jewish culture has been slowly fading away, either forgotten or deliberately destroyed. The local government re-populated this part of the city with immigrants from the bottom of society, creating a district with a bad reputation inhabited by an underclass. This has again changed since the end of the 1990s due to grass-root revitalization carried out by ethnically Polish ‘urbanogentsia’. Nowadays, Kazimierz is the most fashionable and vibrant place in Cracow and this attractiveness is mostly based on its Jewish heritage.\(^3\) Very similar phenomena can be detected in the Podgórze quarter, which was a separate and independent Austrian city until 1917.

The discoveries of the multicultural heritage of these districts allow strengthening these narratives, which challenge the traditional national homogenous discourse and create competitive symbolic pictures of Cracow as a multicultural city deeply rooted in the European heritage. ‘Urbanogentsia’ in Cracow transcends the national frame of reference and creates a more open and cosmopolitan picture of the city.

\(^3\) Unfortunately, the process of revitalization recently turned into a gentrification. For more see [Smagacz 2008].
5.2. The case of Wrocław: a Central European city in Poland

Wrocław is an example of the most significant identity reconstruction process, worth our attention. The ‘urbanogentsia’ of Wrocław has managed to write completely new narratives. In this new perception, Wrocław is portrayed as a multi-cultural Central European city. The most important outcome of these efforts is the fact that the new reconstructed identity of the city leaves mono-national discourses behind.

The 20th century was not fortunate for the Central European idea of Wrocław. During all that time the symbolic space of the city was strongly nationalized – in the first part of the century by the Germans, later by the Poles. The creation of the new German state in 1871 gave a new stimulus to produce a common German symbolic universe. This process was superbly described by Eric Hobsbawm [1983a], who showed it through the example of massive creation of monuments in German cities at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. Its complex history, based on dynastic traditions of Piasts, Luxemburgs, and Habsburgs was replaced by a German ethnic vision. When the city became part of the Polish state after World War II, “there was no historiography sources available for new settlers. The history of Wrocław was written by Germans (...) the authors (...) did their best to show allegedly ‘German essence’ of this city. Since this Germanocentric vision could not offer Polish inhabitants any frames of references, its history had to be written again” [Thum 2005:257]. This new official history of Wrocław was again subordinated to national ideology and written from the Polish ethnic perspective. This one stressed the Piast tradition, which fitted very well into the model of an ethnically homogenous state and the myth of ‘perennial’ struggle between Germans and Poles. Wrocław was again cleansed from alien elements – all the non-Polish remnants were removed in order to build the myth of an ethnically homogenous Polish city.

Contrary to Cracow, the demographics of Wrocław completely changed. New inhabitants of Wrocław, mostly indifferent to the Central European heritage, came from different regions of Poland. Moreover, most of the new settlers had to struggle with double foreignness of the city – structural and cultural. The former because most of them came from rural areas and the latter because Wrocław was until 1945 an entirely German city, defined by Germans and for Germans. It was also important that these new settlers constituted a melting pot of distinctive traditions, which worked against possibilities of establishment of new social ties. That is why these new inhabitants, while reconstructing their collective identities, looked for familiar national narratives and tried to ‘Polonize’ physical and symbolic spaces of Wrocław. Their efforts were dictated not
as much by the communist propaganda, but most and foremost by everyday urban rituals.

Therefore, the history of Wrocław after 1945 can be described in terms of ‘rites de passage’ [van Gennep 1960]. Polish migrants who came to Wrocław underwent ‘rites of separation’ from their native, folk community in eastern Poland, but they did not achieve the next social status – citizens of Wrocław; they did not identify themselves with the urban culture and felt a strong sense of alienation from the German heritage of the city. This meant that for a long time, the inhabitants of Wrocław were living in ‘transition’. As van Gennep stressed, the ‘rite of passage’ ends with the ‘rites of incorporation’, when the community symbolically shows that the time of transition is finished and its members have achieved a new social and cultural position. In the case of Wrocław the ‘rites of passage’ for several reasons4 finished only at the turn of the 20th century. Thus, inhabitants of Wrocław started discovering the heritage of the city relatively recently.

* I discovered the German character of Wrocław when I reached maturity, when I came back to Wrocław after nine years of living in Cracow. And: Even though I was the best pupil, I had no idea about the history of Wrocław, I discovered it when I lived in Berlin. I was really shocked that everything was nearly the same [W/43/4].

After 1945, communist propaganda tried to eradicate the German heritage of the city, presenting it as antithetically alien and threatening Polish culture. Therefore, people who lived under the constant threat from German heritage had to suppress it and did not think or talked about it. However, when the ‘rite of passage’ ended, people in Wrocław had to start building their new identity within a new framework.

Therefore, we could observe a typical process of ‘inventing a tradition’ described by Hobsbawm [1983b] – in this case the invention of a bourgeois tradition. In contrast to the demographic census, which shows that the vast majority of new Wrocławers came from villages, almost everybody who was born in Wrocław stressed that at least one of his ancestors had come from Lwów – in their opinion the ideal of the Polish bourgeois city before the war. But perhaps much more important is the fact that they identified themselves with the former German inhabitants of the city through the category of ‘we’. The contemporary citizens of Wrocław felt a historical continuity with the pre-war German bourgeoisie:

4 For more one this topic see Marcin, Kubicki [2010].
People in Wroclaw have always been creative and open. (...) When in 1913 we were building the Centennial Hall – the symbol of modernity at the same time – in Poznań they were building a pseudo-gothic castle – a typical indicator of backwardness [W/23/7].

The recreation of the memory of a city was also observed on the attitudes to multicultural values. As a consequence of a growing interest in the history of Wroclaw, people became aware of the changeability and instability of borders and nation-states. During the 20th century, names of streets and squares in Wroclaw were changed five times, legitimizing various regimes which were based on very different values: the German Empire until 1918, the Weimar Republic until 1933, the Nazi regime up to 1945, the Polish Communist regime until 1989, and the contemporary democratic Polish Republic [Thum 2005:285-327]. Also Norman Davies, in his monumental history of Wroclaw Microcosm. Portrait of a Central European City, pointed out that for one thousand years the city belonged to different states and different cultures, and was named in several ways: Wroclitzla under the Polish Piast Dynasty, Vretslav in the Kingdom of Bohemia, Presslaw under the Habsburg Monarchy, Bresslaw in the Kingdom of Prussia and in the German Empire, and finally Wroclaw after 1945 [Davies and Moorhouse 2002].

Therefore, people in Wroclaw were aware that discourse changes, that there were no sacred, primordial values, especially those referring to national or nationalistic discourses. They could easily avoid thinking in the binary structures, typical of modernism, and did not think about their city as a dichotomy of Polish versus German. They were aware that Wroclaw was created by people from different ethnic and national cultures. They were also aware that there was no such thing as a monolithic German culture or a monolithic Polish one – that these cultures were heterogenic and produced various discourses. Therefore, the history of Wroclaw cannot be presented as the eternal struggle between Poland and Germany: “Wroclaw in itself is constructed for everyone, the Square was designed by a Czech, the best infrastructure was made by the Germans, and maybe we should add to the city something from us” [W/73/8].

Also local authorities stress the multicultural history of the city. Since the very beginning of the Polish transformation, the consecutive local authorities in Wroclaw have been consistently carrying out a strategy of restoring the European dimension. As early as 1990, the City Council restored the historic coat of arms from 1530, which was to underline the multicultural past of the city. Officially accepted in 2006, the Strategy of Development of the City of Wroclaw explicitly stressed the multicultural heritage of the city:
A city of many cultures where stones and books, as a saying goes: speak different languages. An ingenious conglomerate of lifestyles brought from different parts of Poland created by the influx of new residents during the post WWII resettlements. In particular, a continuation of important motifs of cultures of the former Polish provinces in the East – with domination of the tradition. Commitment of the City to preserve its cultural capital (identification, Lviv cultivation, display and spread of the Polish and universal values [2006:71-72].

Hence, the idea of a nation-state with a closed and ethnic identity seemed to be rather obsolete and unacceptable in Wrocław. This unwillingness to look at contemporary Europe as a space where separate national identities compete with each other can be detected at different levels. In Wrocław people can easily think and act beyond the dominant discourse of national state because they are conscious of the flexibility of social reality and national structure.

This model of identity is strongly correlated with the centre – periphery relations. In Wrocław people identified their city as on the periphery of a national state. Almost every respondent could imagine the city as developing beyond the state structures. This situation is conditioned by two main factors. Firstly, there was a strong feeling of the alienation from the centralized and oppressive national state. People in Wrocław were convinced that the city had achieved its success by the gradual growth of power of the local authorities. Thus, the feeling of alienation from other parts of Poland was often expressed for the less developed eastern regions of Poland in particular. The sense of a periphery position was also strengthened by the fact that the locals identified with their borderland position although by definition Wrocław is not in the borderland. They were aware of the specific identity of borderland and they often stressed that ‘the rest of Poland’ could not understand them.

As a consequence, nearly every respondent indicated the need for the deregulation of central state power and the strengthening of self-government. They saw an opportunity for the city within a European network. Poland’s accession to the EU completely changed the position of Wrocław, from a peripheral city to a city placed at the heart of integrating Europe. Nowadays, Wrocław has better and faster connections to Berlin, Prague, and Vienna than to the Polish capital – Warsaw. Moreover, during the last decade the city has been going through its golden age, generally connected with the accession to the EU.
5.3. The case of Szczecin: a city as a ‘carte blanche’

Contrary to Wrocław and Cracow, Szczecin is an example of a city with weak conditions for development of ‘urbanogentsia’ on the one hand and lack of connections with the European networks of cities on the other hand. Yet similarly to Wrocław, Szczecin is another typical example of a city with an entirely reconstructed identity. After World War II, the German population was removed and new Polish inhabitants moved in or were repatriated. However, Szczecin has not successfully gone through the ‘rites de passage’, from migrants to citizens. This is primarily caused by the fact that Szczecin cannot produce an independent discourse as it has no identity of its own. Contemporary Szczecin is perceived as a city of ‘carte blanche’ by its inhabitants, i.e. as open and empty – waiting for new narratives.

As in Wrocław, references to the German heritage are omnipresent – bookshops are full of photography compilations of the pre-war ‘Stettin’ (the German toponym for Szczecin) and there are many websites devoted to the pre-war history of the city.

Since the 1990s, one can notice a very significant attempt to return to this heritage. A good example could be the cemetery. In the 1980s these German tombs were destroyed, removed, and from the 1990s there is a spontaneous action were many common people started to look after them [SZ/88/3].

However, the problem is that this growing interest in the history and identity of the city is limited to very narrow social circles. For most of the inhabitants, these issues are completely irrelevant. This is mainly because the process, which allowed the residents of Wrocław to complete the ‘rite of passage’ successfully, was much weaker or did not happen at all in Szczecin. As a consequence, nearly all respondents repeated that Szczecin was a city with enormous possibilities and a great potential. One of them put it in a metaphorical way: “In Szczecin everybody is on the starting block and everybody is waiting for the gun.” This signal to start a race should be of a generational character, significant enough to mobilize the inhabitants to cooperate for a common good. Many interviews often pointed to the example of the floods in Wrocław⁵ and their consequences for the social mobilization and creation of new social ties.

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⁵ The flood in 1997 was the worst catastrophe of this type in Polish history and referred to as “the flood of the millennium”. The importance of the floods is mainly in the heroic efforts of the inhabitants and the feeling common solidarity among locals.
Here is, though, such a feeling of temporariness and lack of deep-rootedness. (...) It is said that in Wrocław it all happened after the floods. That they went through such a strong shock and this was what mobilized the inhabitants, and in Szczecin there was nothing like that. (...) After ’89 we have not experienced anything what would have helped us to take a new lease of life. Everything is so flat [SZ/95/3].

Founded in 1985, University of Szczecin, as an institution does not play an important role in creating an urban culture. According to our respondents, it is a completely invisible actor on the city’s scene, it does not influence its narratives, does not bring any input in the identity-creation processes. The local authorities did not contribute to the creation of the image of Szczecin as an open and tolerant city. Disastrous for the city in this respect were activities of the mayor Marian Jurczyk, who was in power just before the EU accession. His open xenophobic policy had very negative consequences for the image of the city. As one of our respondents put it: “He had a kind of phobia of Germans. This had catastrophic consequences for the city, foreign investors avoided us completely” [SZ/76/5].

The subsequent governments could not build a cohesive strategy to overcome this negative stereotype. The official brand of the city has a pretentious name ‘Floating Garden 2050’ and has little to do with the real life. It describes a perfect city Szczecin is going to become in 2050 and does not pay much attention to current challenges. It is not surprising that its empty message lacks a mobilizing power for ordinary people to redefine the identity of the city. There is no link with history of the city, neither Polish nor German. As one of the respondents pointed out:

 CURRENTLY, A PROMOTIONAL CAMPAIGN IS BEING RUN BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT AND IT IS CALLED ‘SZCZECIN FLOATING GARDEN’. THIS BRAND WAS ASSESSED BY THE INHABITANTS VERY NEGATIVELY AND I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS NOT CONSULTED WITH US, WHY NOBODY ASKED THE PEOPLE ABOUT IT. (...) THE CITY AUTHORITIES DECIDED TO FOCUS ON DEVELOPING THE IMAGE OF MODERN CITY, AS A PLACE OF GREENERY AND WATER SPORTS, BUT COMPLETELY CUT OFF THIS CITY FROM ITS HISTORY. AND THIS MODEL WAS HARSHLY CRITICIZED BECAUSE THE HISTORY OF THE CITY IS COMPLETELY NEGLECTED. THERE IS NO PLACE FOR THE GERMAN HISTORY, NEITHER POLISH [90/SZ/12].

The feeling of peripheral location in the national state in Szczecin is even stronger than in Wrocław. The Polish state perceived as too much centralized and people in Szczecin have a strong feeling of a not only physically but also socially
periphery position. Respondents often stressed that Szczecin is the only city in Poland placed on the western bank of the Oder River – strong symbolic western boundary of Poland, and has the worst connections with other main cities, especially with the capital. Until 1945 Szczecin had no links with Polish culture as it had never belonged to the Polish state. That is why after the war, the communist propaganda about the Polish character of the city was based on a completely false basis. After the 1989 transition, the communist idea of “a city held immemorial by Poland” was broken; however, no new framework of reference has appeared.

Contrary to Cracow and Wrocław, Szczecin of today is going through the worst economic period after the transition. Cracow and Wrocław have managed to find their chance for a development in a post-industrial reality. They have been able to use their multicultural heritage to build the picture of creative and open cities. Richard Florida [2002] argues that in the contemporary world only cities tolerant of a range of people and their ethnic and social diversity, can develop successfully. Moreover, this success depends on attracting talented people, including high-technology workers. In other words, the city must utilize multiculturalism and ethnic and social minorities. These cities possess low barriers for the entry of human capital, because they encourage open-minded and creative people to settle down.

Szczecin could not transform its economic basis from industrial to post-industrial, and has not created its symbolic image as a fresh, vibrant, and creative place with lots of urban attractions, such as clubs, restaurants, art galleries, museums, festivals, etc., which attract young, well-educated people. Nowadays, many industrial factories are closed, with the most significant example – the docks – the symbol of the city. It is worth mentioning, that the Szczecin Shipyard was closed down as a consequence of the European Commission’s decision in 2008 and as an outcome of bad management of the Polish government. However, Szczecin in the 1990s was one of the fastest developing cities in Poland. In comparison with other Polish cities, the 1990s are remembered as the city’s golden age. This situation changed after the accession to the EU. European regulations, free flows of goods, services, and capitals normalized economic relations in Poland. Therefore, business centres started developing in places with reach social and cultural capital. Szczecin lacks these resources, firstly because of the weakness of higher education – talented local young people are moving out to other academic centres. Secondly, because of the disastrous actions of the above-mentioned mayor, whose xenophobic attitude deprived Szczecin of foreign investments.

All these factors contribute to the fact that ‘urbanogentsia’ in Szczecin is very weak and this is the reason why new identity discourses are lacking. Contrary to
Wrocław and Cracow, Szczecin did not manage to become part of the European network of cities. A good example of this is the lack of links with Berlin and other major European cities. In Szczecin it is difficult to perceive any influence of such a metropolis like Berlin, especially in the sphere of culture and social life.

6. Conclusions

One of the most important conclusions based on the research conducted within the RECON project is a strong conviction that we are witnessing a steady fragmentation of collective identities in Poland. Polish cities are gradually replacing the most important frame of reference which was until recently dominated by the nation-state. It means that cities have become an independent mechanism of identity discourse production. These new discourses challenge the traditional ethnic model of Polish national identity and create opportunities for constructing identities that reach beyond traditional grand narratives and become more fragmented, globalized, decentralized, and fluid.

As we tried to show on the three case studies, in the recent decades Polish cities have become a specific social space. This space allows for experiments in a normative sphere and the creation of new cultural elements, which would otherwise be suppressed in a framework of the official structure. The leading role in this space is taken over by ‘urbanogentsia’, for whom it is not only a nation set in stone, but represents other forms of civic engagement and new frames of references. ‘Urbanogentsia’ is a new phenomenon and its members need an ‘invented tradition’ (in the terminology of Eric Hobsbawm). They want to define the social world they live in on their own. Hence, new narrations are being built by the ‘urbanogentsia’ and then spread by attractive, modern means of expressions and communication such as street art, the Internet, and social media. These narrations are more attractive than the traditional ones, based on conservative images of the community described by the archaic language of the 19th century nationalism and embedded in folk culture as well as popular Catholicism. This is why urban identities are perceived as ‘cool’ and ‘sexy’ by younger generation of Poles.

One of the most important outcomes of this research is the observation that city discourses are becoming more powerful and influential and steadily fragmentize the so far dominant discourse of the idea of a homogenous nation. However, the process of identity reconstruction of inhabitants in Polish cities does not occur according to the same patterns. As Clifford Geertz argues, the same actions, conducted by similar actors in different social contexts, may have different meanings. The same rule can be applied to the social category taken into account.

[164]
in this research. Although their objective social characteristics and activities undertaken by them are very similar, the social worlds they construct differ in many respects. This is because they act in different frames of reference determined by various urban discourses.

References


9. In Place of Conclusion
Transformation of Collective Identities in Europe and its Influence on Democracy

Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach

1. Introduction

Contemporary scholarly debates in Europe focus on the quality of democracy in the enlarged and changing EU polity. As extensively reflected upon in this volume, the major question is how to ensure that fundamental principles of democracy will be met in a structure which has gone beyond the nation-state, the classical and, in recent centuries, fundamental unit of organizing democratic procedures in Europe. Therefore, as we have shown here, it is crucially important to reflect on the possible models of organizing democratic polity(-ies) that would encapsulate the democratic principles in the best possible way. This requires not only an investigation into democratic institutions and their functioning but also into the political identity of Europeans and the way in which it has transformed. However, as has already been argued within the theoretical attempt to conceptualize the relationship between a political community and a democratic polity, it is important to note that the focus on collective identity “should clarify how democracy operates through the identification of popular subjectness” [Góra et al. 2009:287].

In this concluding chapter, we focus on one aspect of collective identity in particular – its political component. We proceed as follows: First, we present the theoretical framework stemming from our previous attempts to conceptualize the relations between collective identity and polity models possible for constituting democracy at the European level. In the second part, we look at the concept of political identity as a possible link explaining the connection between transforming collective identities in Europe and the functioning of democracy. Finally, the empirical evidence from various research initiatives under the common theoretical umbrella of the RECON project that this volume has summarized is reviewed and discussed.

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2. The nature of identity constructions in Europe and EU enlargement

Reflecting on the concept of European identity, one needs to remember that identity has two aspects. First, it is an image – a symbolic construction of oneself and the other. Second, it is also an activity, engagement with, and participation in meaningless relations with others in a particular frame of reference, which determines the meaning of these relations [Mach 1993]. Both aspects of identity are symbolic – their essence consists of exchange and interpretation of meaning. As already suggested in the introduction and exemplified in the various chapters of this volume, such an approach suggests first of all that identity is a dynamic reality, a process of construction of meaningful relations with ‘significant others’, in the context of a socially developed frame of reference [Mach and Požarlik 2008]. It is thus also important to look at the institutions within which these activities develop. Identity is what we do, not only how we represent ourselves in symbolic images, which are often understood as ‘identities’. Seen from this point of view, collective identities in Europe are developed and transformed on the changing platform of social relations and within the changing frame of reference that ascribes a particular meaning to relations. This volume and other studies [Góra and Mach 2011] show that in the context of the European political, economic, and social integration, these new frames of reference develop in the process of building new political institutions, new legal frames, and new types of spatial mobility.

To see identity as a process of meaningful action makes the relation between democracy and collective identity easier to comprehend. In Europe of nation-states, collective identities together with democratic procedures develop within national frameworks. Borders of the nation-states determine the character of relations among citizens and the national institutions frame the context in which such interactions among citizens develop. To cross national boundaries means to enter a different world to which one does not belong. However, during the process of European integration it is plausible to imagine that a new common European platform is built that resembles the nation-states in terms of creating boundaries that separate the sphere of belonging from the sphere of strangers. The European institutional framework creates a platform for all kinds of activities including political participation of citizens, and it also builds a frame of reference for the development of a common European identity. It provides a space for shaping new forms of meaningful relations with other Europeans, who gradually become ‘us’ as opposed to non-European ‘others’, and a platform for the construction of a common symbolic image of Europe and Europeans.
The political aspect of collective identity is a particularly good example of the changes occurring in Europe in the field of identity. These changes are generated both by the internal processes of European integration and by the subsequent phases of the EU enlargement, especially the inclusion of Eastern and Central European states, which had been, before 1989, perceived as ‘other Europeans’ and constituted ‘significant others’ for the gradually integrating Western Europe. The enlargement created a problem of a European collective identity. Who will now be the ‘significant other’ for all Europeans? Where will the new border of Europe be? Who will be left on the other side and based on what principles? What kind of boundary will the new European border be? The development of the EU institutional and legal framework and the new categories important both for the development of democracy and the European identity, such as European citizenship, provided new conditions for the European demos and gave a new meaning to the European collective identity.

The nation-state and national identities in Europe are undergoing extensive changes. Borders previously separating nation-states are gradually disappearing, while the EU is creating favourable conditions for an intra-European (social and spatial) mobility, despite some opposition from several nation-states and institutions that try to protect national labour markets and national identities. More and more European citizens are physically mobile and increasingly involved in a variety of meaningful relations (professional, consumer, social, educational, private, etc.) that transcend national boundaries. However, as Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi argue,

> [q]uantitative evidence in fact underlines the structural marginality of mobility in Europe. On the other hand, qualitative strategies, that home in on ideal-type cases mobility in Europe, reveal a different picture of Europe: of the European Union as a process, in which hidden populations and crucial pathway to social mobility can be revealed, and in which marginal or improbable behaviour (in statistical terms) can have a much larger symbolic impact on the continent as a whole than its structural size would suggest [2011:51].

In this context it is worth stressing that activity and involvement often develop faster in a new frame of reference than the other component of identity – image and representation. But even if many Europeans think and speak of themselves in the old categories, emphasizing the traditional nation-state, their actual involvement in meaningful relations with other Europeans represents the transformation of the real meaning of identity – ‘who are we in relation to other people’. At the
same time a debate is developing in European nation-states about what it means to be a national and a citizen, what is and what should be the balance between local, national, and European levels of identity, and about the role of citizens.

The recent EU enlargements, though broadening the boundaries of integrating Europe, weakened a sense of familiarity and commonality, and reduced the commitment to a deeper integration. In many EU member states there is now a clear tendency to strengthen the nation-state, to hide behind the familiar borders of the state and not to delegate more power to European institutions. The future of the EU largely depends on whether and when Europeans regain their previous enthusiasm for further integration, and whether they develop a common sense of belonging that would combine trust in European democracy with a common European identity. The essential condition for success is to create a platform of activity for Europeans, the process of involvement which would engage people from all over Europe, so that they would develop a feeling of being one community of active citizens, engaged in one common project. This is at least as important as the development of a common symbolic image of ‘who we are’, a creation of a common concept of the European boundary and a notion of ‘the other’.

3. Democratic polity models and identity

The RECON polity models refer to three possible ways of solving the question of how democracy can be organized within the EU [see Eriksen and Fossum 2009] and what the requirements in terms of political identity as outlined in the introduction. However, the models discussed should be understood as ‘narrative templates for signifying possible constituencies of a European democracy’ [Góra et al. 2009:283], rather than evaluative schemes. The value of polity models rests upon the organized and systematic blueprints they provide for testing the narratives on the mass level.

The first polity model is the ‘audit democracy’. This model is based on the assumption that the best organization for democracy is the nation-state and that supranational institutions only complement the functions of the 27 member states. It is important to notice that political identification along with the cultural dimension is encapsulated in the nation-states (and nations in particular), and as such forms a zero-sum relationship between national identities. There is no need – from this perspective – to worry about the democratic deficit at the European

2 The concept of the zero-sum and positive-sum game proposed in several works in relation to identity [Risse 2004, 2010; Checkel and Katzenstein 2010] was developed in the field of theories of international relations (game theories), in particular in the con-
level. The legitimating channels are formed and functional within the member states, and their democratically elected and accountable representatives undertake decisions at the European level [Moravcsik 1998]. The European institutions are in a way designed to balance the conflicts between the democratic EU member states. In this model (and in practice) there are multiple types of national models of identity that function together. One can easily identify them on the scale between an ethnic, essentialist model stressing the cultural and primordial features of belonging to a group and the civic model based on a more inclusive and open construction of a nation.

However, the discourse of both of these ideal models suggests that belonging to one nation-group automatically excludes belonging to another nation or a broader reference group such as the European one. As for the possibility of a European identity to emerge, this model does not offer too much space; and if so, only in a very limited version. National identification still remains the most important point of reference; whatever can harm their integrity is opposed at a political and social level. ‘Demos’, rooted in national frames and historically developed and crystallized, is a crucial element for anchoring democratic practices. This perspective seems to be logical and coherent; however, many empirical observations regarding either the functioning of democratic institutions or processes of identification in Europe show otherwise [Eriksen and Fossum 2009; Góra, Mach and Zielińska 2011; Risse 2010].

Therefore, there are two other polity models proposed to solve the empirical puzzle [Eriksen and Fossum 2009]. The second model is ‘federal democracy’, which could be created in Europe. This line of argument, dating back to the beginning of the European integration, is based on the assumption that this process will ultimately lead to the creation of a sort of ‘United States of Europe’ and replace the nation-states with a federal polity [cf. Burgess 2000]. What is characteristic of this perspective is a duplication of the processes that characterized nation-building in Europe in the previous centuries. It is thus a crucial element of this new European nation-building process to create a thick European, cultural, and political identity based on trust and solidarity among Europeans. Another important element of the model is its fixed territory and borders that spatially define citizens, as well as ‘the other’ based on the criteria of inclusion and exclusion.

This model assumes that there is a zero-sum relationship between the European and national identities and that the former will prevail over time. Yet some
authors argue that such a thick European identity is impossible to emerge [Callou 2001; Delanty 2005]. Gerard Delanty put it bluntly, “a European people does not exist as an ethnos. There is no shared understanding of a sense of European peoplehood. At most, Europeans are united in recognition of their diversity and occasionally in response to an other” [Delanty 2005:133]. These authors opine that there is no common cultural identity and no common language in Europe. More importantly, for them it might not be necessary to strive for such common characteristics. The criticism directed at federal projects in Europe comes from different sources. For our purposes the most relevant criticism draws attention to the fact that a replication of the process of nation-building under the contemporary conditions of a globalized and fast-changing world is simply extremely difficult, if not impossible. However, things seem different when looking at the political rather than cultural identity of Europeans. In this regard Delanty claims that “there is no doubt that a European demos has come into existence” [2005:135].

What is certainly possible is the creation of multiple identities in a form of nested or blended (‘marble-cake-like’) identity models [Risse 2010:25]. The idea here is to differentiate between a cultural level, which is still dominated by national or regional identification, and at the same time develop a political sense of togetherness resulting from an existence within a common political system. In the analysis of political system two elements connect citizens with the system: people’s impact on decision-making of central institutions and the redistributive impact of the collective decision-making of these bodies [Hix 2005]. In other words, participating in European elections and other forms of direct and indirect forms of political control as well as a sense of their importance (even if only in terms of how much one gains) contribute to the sense of (political) community. How far these elements are sufficient to create a viable and stable system remains unclear. Recently, under conditions of growing economic crisis and disillusionment of European citizens with the current situation, the functioning of the European political system has been questioned. The critical situation in Europe (and the world) lasting since 2008 has shed some light on the connection between a sense of security of individuals and their identification. Juan Diéz Medrano recalled the argument of Edward Lawler from the early 1990s stating that, “people identify most with those units on which individuals depend the most for their material and physical security” [2011:45]. The security aspect to some extent explains the triumphant return of national rhetoric and nation-states to European politics.

Looking at recent developments in Europe from the perspective of these two models puts social scientists in an uneasy position. On the one hand, there is the
audit democracy model, which seems insufficient to fulfil democratic requirements. On the other hand, the federal reflection seems impossible, or even unsuitable, to establish. What, then, is the third option? Empirical observation of the post-Cold War political development has been channelled through a growing cosmopolitan and transnational reflection on democracy. Consequently, a third model was conceived which treats the EU as the nucleus of a regional-European democratic order of a cosmopolitan nature and the outset of the new possible post-national and post-state polity in Europe. This model departs from certain new assumptions such as the growing salience of universal human rights, the changes in the functioning of the nation-states and their sovereignty, and emerging forms of global solidarity. Democracy in such a cosmopolitan Europe will be embedded in the post-state functional government. As the authors of the ‘cosmopolitan democracy model’ put it,

*The model, thus, posits that the European Union’s democratic legitimacy can be based on the credentials of crisscrossing public debate, multilevel democratic decision-making and enforcement procedures and the protection of fundamental rights to ensure an ‘autonomous’ civil [transnational] society. This is the clearest manifestation thus far of democracy as a principle based on a post-conventional form of consciousness, one seen to have been generated by the struggles and processes that produced modern constitutions’* [Eriksen and Fossum 2009:29].

This definition proposes a missing link in the concept of ‘demos’ in its essentialist sense and replaces it with certain political sense of belonging to the constitutional order [Eriksen 2010]. The popular allegiance in such an emerging order will rest upon the positive-sum relationship between nested identities [Góra et al. 2009:285]. The fundamental formula of the third model is that such polity has an “institutional guarantee that the particularity of collective identities is always counterbalanced by reflexivity, which is displayed in the discursive references to the ‘unity in diversity’ of the shared political space of Europe” [Góra et al. 2009:285].

What is so cosmopolitan about this model and about the narratives of ‘we-stories’? The first observation necessary to answer such a question is the nature of the relations between the ‘we-group’ and the ‘others’. As Thomas Risse put it, “[t]he decisive feature of ‘self/other’ or ‘in-group/out-group’ boundary creation is difference rather than enmity” [2010:27]. The question is how this difference can be evaluated positively. Risse argues that the only way is via civic identity construction, in which “[t]he ‘others’ are still different, but this difference is not
regarded as inferior” [Ibid.:28]. This makes positive-sum identity possible. As Delanty observes,

*European identity is a form of self-recognition and exists as a constellation of diverse elements articulated through emerging repertoires of evaluation and social imaginaries. The kind of European identity that this suggests is one that expresses cosmopolitan currents in contemporary society, such as new repertoires of evaluation in loyalties, memories and dialogue. In other words, it is not a supranational identity, but a cosmopolitan identity* [2005:137].

Secondly, what matters it is the inclusiveness of the existing identification. Risse, inspired by quantitative and qualitative studies, forms a continuum of identifications with Europe. One extreme creates the group of ‘exclusive nationalists’, which did not see Europe as an important part of their identification. The other extreme represents Europeans for whom national identification does not form an important point of reference – some of them can even be called ‘Eurostars’, who identify themselves as Europeans only. Between these two extremes is a group of inclusive Europeans who carry a positive image of and belonging to Europe, while being attached to their nations [Risse 2010:48-49]. They are also bearers of cosmopolitan values and they worry about global issues [Brzezińska et al. 2011]. Medrano argues that,

*(...) the most significant development that we can perhaps expect is the gradual emergence of a cosmopolitan European middle or upper middle class that would join the old European aristocracy in constituting an actual European social group* [2011:48].

This argument is further studied and developed in relation to the new member states [Czajkowska 2011; Galent and Kubicki 2011].

Finally, the transformation of national identification and their Europeanization is ongoing and brings certain visible and measurable results. Europe as an ‘imagined community’ emerges over time. However, it must be remembered that, “[t]his community does not exist above and beyond the nation-states, but has come into being through the Europeanization of national communities and, thus, matches the EU multilevel polity” [Risse 2010:230].
4. Political identity in the European Union

In the modern world, the concept of political identity is transforming, as is the nature of political communities and the states in Europe [Castiglione 2009:29]. Historically speaking, the core of political identification within a community comprises citizens’ allegiance and loyalty to the group. In a way, these allegiances preceded the current nation-states and had developed in Europe predominantly in the 19th century. Moreover, as Medrano argues “nation-building processes have been relatively unsuccessful in states where sub-national imagined communities had developed before the state-led nation building processes began” [2011:47]. He draws two-fold conclusions from his overview of processes of centralization in Western and Southern Europe. Firstly, the historical record shows that even the highly centralized nation-states of the 19th and 20th century experienced problems with eradicating and unifying pre-existing allegiances and loyalties (e.g. in Spain or the UK). Secondly, Medrano [2011] concludes that in effect, the European Union might not be able to offer a competing source of loyalty and become the ultimate goal of citizens’ allegiance. This is a forceful criticism of the federal model of European integration, especially in terms of creating of sustainable ‘thick’ European political identity.

Nevertheless, if we accept the notion that a collective political loyalty and allegiances change much more slowly than political fluctuations in Europe, and that most of the old political identifications remain, we are left with important questions. What will be the nature of tensions between the established allegiances toward a region, a nation-state, and Europe? The possible conflicts – as shown by Castiglione – can be conceptualized in two ways:

*The first, and most obvious one, is a conflict of content, so to speak. From this perspective, European citizens are asked to change the priority of their political allegiances by identifying with a different territory and expressing loyalty toward different sovereign institutions. Hence, the EU and its institutions come to take the place of the nation and nation-state. The second is a more radical conceptualisation in which the EU, as transnational entity, does not simply take the place of the nation-state, but effectively undermines the very principles of territoriality and sovereignty. This changes both the form and the function of political identity, as the latter would seem to play a different role within the political system* [Castiglione 2009: 32].
4.1. Torn between the national and the European

The major focus of our research over the last five years within the RECON project has been the nature and strength of conflicts and tensions between various levels of political identification: regional, national, and European in terms of content and form. In the traditional literature on nation-building one can easily distinguish between elites and masses, the former being more involved in the nation-building processes and acting as their initiator and carrier of identity, while the latter being responsive and often instrumentally manoeuvred into the process of nation-building [Anderson 1983; Gellner 1984; Hobsbawm 1990]. Similarly, literature on the European integration and popular support stresses the difference between the elite and mass level of involvement in the integration project. Neo-functionalists in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized the role of the elites in building the European polity. Their theoretical conceptualization of the elites’ role and their great interest in European integration and support for the European project generated the idea of ‘permissive consensus’ toward the European integration [cf. Hooghe and Marks 2009]. Since the 1990s scholars have been observing the emergence of a new phenomenon, for which the term ‘constraining dissensus’ was coined. The concept of ‘constraining dissensus’ is used to describe the growing discrepancy between elites and masses in assessing the process of European integration [Ibid.].

In search for empirical evidence for conflicts between the various levels of political identification in Europe, elite activities remain at the forefront. Various empirical attempts to capture the nature of their relationship with the European Union show an ambiguity among the elites of the old, new, and candidate member states in terms of their evaluations of the European project and the process of integration [cf. Lacroix and Nikolaidis 2010]. The cases of Germany [Liebert 2011; Sackmann in this volume], Turkey [Fisher Onar 2011], and Poland [Czajkowska 2011; Galent and Kubicki 2011 and in this volume; Góra and Mach 2010] illustrate the competing visions of the European project, attitudes toward it, and a sense of European identity among the elites of these countries (based on both analysis of debates and discourse and interviews).

The German case seems to be the most remarkable, taking into account the historical interconnection between support for the European integration and the democratic nature of post-war Germany. Ultimately, the concept of constitutional patriotism, outlining an optimistic scenario for building the European civil identity based on the common constitutional framework, was created by German intellectuals [Liebert 2011]. The German debate also incorporated a competing model relying on the cultural, ‘thick’ notion of common heritage and values that
serve as the foundation for political loyalty. However, even there we can notice several pessimistic approaches and evaluations [Ibid.]. Liebert argues that,

[the post-war Federal Republic of Germany’s self-image has become defined by ongoing self-critical confrontations with the German past as well as by identifications with the West in general and with Europe in particular. In this context, Europeanization has deeply transformed the identity of the German ‘Kulturnation’ [Minkenberg 2005], but has not led to an unrivalled conception of a European identity [2011:45].

The Polish case also demonstrates general interest in the European integration and support for the European project. In the debate on Europe and the European project, the major point of contention is between the group that defends national allegiance as the most important issue and the one that promotes a different model of European integration in which the notion of ‘Polishness’ becomes modern and compatible with European values. The core tensions are between ethnic, essentialist, and civic understandings of national identity. The ethnic essentialists perceive Europe as a threat, while for the supporters of the civic model European integration is the main goal [Góra and Mach 2010].

The Polish debate on the European project offers another point for consideration, which seems to be similar to the debates in other new member states. These debates are much more inward-looking, concentrated on the domestic level and engaged more with national issues than similar debates in the old member states (in particular in Germany). This is partly because the concepts that have been discussed in the West for a long time – such as sovereignty and national independence – play a different role in the CEE countries. These concepts remain at the heart of most public debates, raising the interest of both the national elites and the public. In addition, the issues related to sovereignty and independence enjoy a nearly sacrosanct status.

Furthermore, elites in CEE countries are less active on the European platform because they feel they have less experience and suffer from a kind of ‘newcomers’ complex’. This phenomenon is connected with communication patterns developed during the EU enlargement process between the western and eastern parts of the continent. The CEE elites are torn between following established western patterns and proposing their own solutions and approaches [Góra and Mach 2010]. Similar patterns are described in relation to lay citizens’ discourse in the Hungarian case [Heller and Kriza 2011]. However, this might be a ‘particularity’ of the transition period. The possibility for changes can be demonstrated on the case of Poland that has shown a relative stability during the global crisis
lasting in Europe since 2008 and based on this developed a discourse about new member states’ possible contribution to developing models of economic governance in the EU.

A very interesting dynamic can also be observed on the Turkish case. This candidate country’s elite is displaying a growing disillusionment with the European Union and with the enlargement process in particular. The Turkish case has become the litmus test of the future EU polity. The possibility of Turkish accession opened issues such as European borders, the nature of the core values on which the European project is founded, and the role of religion – Christianity and Islam – in the political allegiance of citizens. As a result of these ongoing debates in the EU (closely followed in Turkey), of the slow progress in the technical process of accession negotiations, and of the internal dynamism of discussion on how far Turkish national identity is compatible with the European project, Turkish elites have become ambivalent toward participating in the EU, despite their positive approach to the concept of integration as such [Fisher Onar 2011]. This analysis also shows that more influence the EU’s criteria of membership have on Turkish everyday life, more attention is focused on how this in turn change the Turks themselves and the Turkish collective identity.

All three cases discussed in this analysis show that the major question at the elite level of discourse is not limited to the question of support for integration as such. The attitudes toward the European integration are overall positive (yet differ across countries and political camps in particular) and we can identify an ‘imagined community of Europe’ that is currently being under construction within the European Union. The main conundrum pertains to the type of polity that the European community should be, or in other words: it is a debate on the ‘finalité politique’ of the EU that preoccupies the European elites [cf. Lacroix and Nikolaidis 2010]. Perhaps it seems that the current situation of crisis in Europe is not a good time to discuss further integration yet,

(...) calls for a European common identity shared by old and new, economically stronger and weaker European societies will become more pertinent. But what will ultimately count more than any further ‘debating’ will be ‘doing European identity’ – negotiating what – under difficult conditions – holds Europeans effectively together [Liebert 2011:46].
4.2. Popular reading of the European project

The quantitative data provided by the Eurobarometer survey data show a very limited amount of exclusive identification with Europe; however, on average more than 50 percent of respondents chose some form of identification with Europe. It is important to note that this is a rather stable long-term trend. Nevertheless, as we argued elsewhere [Góra et al. 2009], the quantitative data on this subject is insufficient to provide more complex arguments and explanations.

For the purpose of this concluding chapter, we refer to a series of qualitative research initiatives conducted among the new member states within the RECON project that were reflected upon in the previous chapters. First, we would like to stress that the empirical research indicates inconsistent support for the EU and points toward different understanding of the European project among the case studies. This goes beyond the traditional division between the old and new member states. Empirical evidence from studies of the Hungarian [Heller and Kriza 2011] and Polish cases [Galent and Kubicki 2011 and in this volume; Niedźwiedzki 2011] in our view confirm the argument that internal factors influence the long-term dynamics of support for European integration much more than the common historical scheme of experience of the communist regime and the similar path of post-1989 transformation.

One of the most important outcomes of the various research initiatives we presented here shows that the national dimension still plays a very important role for the European public. However, national identification is losing its dominant, overarching, and exclusive character. It is becoming de-monopolized and alternative identity-building discourses are emerging in the new member states. The model of multiple (blended as they are not hierarchical) identities better explains the changes in the content of collective identities. Consequently, the European dimension becomes an important factor in shaping identities in new member states. It gives people various personal perks, such as free spatial mobility across Europe. It is particularly visible in the young, dynamic, urban groups, which benefit from the participation in European networks. Marcin Galent and Paweł Kubicki showed that within such groups, “[m]ost respondents referred to Europe as a common place to live where national culture and national borders are meaningless. For some of them it is not a national identification which plays a role but just the pragmatic challenges of everyday life” [2011:117]. Moreover, these groups in Polish cities produced new identity discourses which “challenge the traditional ethnic model of Polish national identity and create opportunities for constructing identities that reach beyond traditional grand narratives and become more fragmented, globalized, decentralized, and fluid” [Galent and Ku-
bicki in this volume]. Such changes in turn also contribute to higher interest in local government and certain demands of decentralization (or in other words relaxation of nation-state control) [Galent and Kubicki 2011; Niedźwiedzki 2011].

Yet the various research results are far from allowing us to make a justified claim that national identification is ultimately losing its salience. In the analysis of data from lay citizens discourse on the European integration in Hungary, Maria Heller and Borbala Kriza show that for some of their respondents,

[Europe] is a colourful mosaic, with rich and varied cultural heritage; it appeals to them as a space for tourism and vacation, and this conceptualisation is mainly related to their private sphere of life. They see their own nation in Europe as an important entity that has to be protected, and its values and particularities (language, culture, traditions, etc.) should get higher evaluation among other European cultures and values [2011:96].

The European dimension plays a complementary role to national identities [Niedźwiedzki forthcoming]. It is changing the nature of national identification, but it is not replacing it. Niedźwiedzki in his analysis of pendulum migrants argues that, "(...) the European identity of migrants is developed as an effect of adopting cultural elements from other national groups and by the emergence of a sense of belonging to one big cultural entirety" [2011:158].

Another interesting aspect of the empirical research is the new role of regional identities. As already mentioned, regional identification can be characterized by long endurance towards the tendencies to state centralization. The case of Spanish Catalonia is a good example. Yet we find similar examples among the new member states, like the Silesian minority in Poland. As Niedźwiedzki [forthcoming] points out, Silesians are stressing their regional self-identification and at the same time remain reluctant to identify themselves with any state (either Poland or Germany, as historically most important actors). The European dimension in this game of multiple identities occupies an important place. Niedźwiedzki observes that Silesians justify, in their eyes self-evident, European identity in various ways: cultural, territorial, historical and socio-political [Ibid]. Leaders of such regional movements evaluate the European integration positively as it contributes to the relaxation of the national discourse and allows for the developments of a regional dimension within such debates. All evidence supports the conclusion that European identity can cohabit with the national and regional identity in a blended construction as proposed by Risse [2010].

These changes are also observable in non-territorial identities. Religious, gender, and sexual identities are now being transformed and developed in many
different ways in the new European frame of reference, transgressing national boundaries [Czajkowska forthcoming; Zielińska 2011]. When it comes to interactions with other Europeans with similar goals, values, lifestyles, and problems to solve, national allegiance becomes less important.

5. Transforming collective identities in Europe

A significant transformation of national identities has been occurring among most of the European nation-states. This trend is perhaps most visible on the example of the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Traditional national identity is gradually being decomposed and its boundaries expanded. The concept of nationality becomes more inclusive, whereas the symbolic construction of national identity changes in the direction of openness, internal diversity, and inclusiveness. National identity is losing its dominant role; it is slowly becoming one of many possible identities.3

The European Union is becoming a space where new and multiple identities are morphed, where citizens engage in different types of cross-border interactions, while internal borders become permeable and lose their previous symbolic significance as frames of reference. Moreover, the EU has deliberately developed institutional instruments of identity-building, such as a European citizenship and the European Parliament, in which gradually more and more European citizens interact. However, it does not seem possible to construct a ‘thick’ type of a common European cultural identity on the basis of an integrated set of values. At the same time, it is unlikely that the EU would ever be able to claim loyalty of its citizens in a similar fashion as traditional nation-states can. It has been extensively shown in this volume that the European ‘demos’ and identity are more decentralized, individualized, and dependent on a variety of negotiations and decisions taken by individuals and small groups at the local level. What we experience today are decentralized, fragmented, highly individualized, and fluid identities, seen as the outcome but also a component of dynamic processes of relations and involvement in changing frames of reference. To be a European these days means to be part of this rich network of meaningful relations on the basis of commonly accepted rights.

3 In this respect, it would be interesting to conduct a similar comparative research with the inclusion of Western Balkan countries that have acquired a different type of collective identities that have retained a very strong national identification.
References


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Summary

As an outcome of a five-year international research project “RECON – Reconstituting democracy in Europe”, this volume presents country case studies of Central and East European countries and comparative findings from research on the transformation of collective identities in Central and Eastern Europe under the conditions of an enlarging Europe. The main aim of the present publication is to show how the emerging collective European identity is correlated with the processes of democratization and Europeanization. The underlying assumption is that the EU enlargement process and its democratization projects often clash with nationalist and cosmopolitan concepts of identities. Relying on a large number of primary and secondary data and fieldwork research from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as by the use of quantitative and qualitative methodology (and an innovative Q-method), the chapters collected in this volume raise questions about the relationship between identities and the ongoing transformation of democracy in Europe. In particular, they provide insights into the influence of Europeanization and globalization on national and regional identities; the existing and new links between democratization, EU accession, and the transformation of collective identities in CEE; the role of national elites, public, and the media in the identity transformation; and the salience of regional, national, supranational, and global components of collective identities in a newly enlarged Europe. Most importantly, the present publication presents collective identities as contested normatively and culturally loaded phenomena and their transformation as the combination of global, European, national, as well as regional processes.
As an outcome of a five-year international research project “RECON – Reconstituting democracy in Europe”, this volume presents country case studies from Central and East European (CEE) and comparative findings on the transformation of collective identities in this part of Europe under the conditions of an enlarging Europe. The main aim of the present publication is to show how the emerging collective European identity is correlated with the processes of democratization and Europeanization. The underlying assumption here is that the EU enlargement process and EU democratization projects often clash with national and cosmopolitan concepts of identities. Relying on a large number of primary and secondary data and fieldwork research, as well as by the use of quantitative and qualitative methodology (and an innovative Q-method), the chapters collected in this volume raise questions about the relationship between identities and the ongoing transformation of democracy in Europe. In particular, they provide insights into the influence of Europeanization and globalization on national and regional identities; the existing and new links between democratization, EU accession, and the transformation of collective identities in CEE; the role of national elites, public, and the media in the identity transformation; and the salience of regional, national, supranational, and global components of collective identities in the context of the EU.