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**Poland - a Surveillance Eldorado?
Security, Privacy, and New Technologies
in Polish Leading Newspapers (2010-2013)**

Contribution to the SECONOMICS project and
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In this discussion paper series, the Prague *SECONIMICS* team intends to allow the broader academic community taking part in an on-going discussion about risks and threats as well as trade-offs between them and security. This research focus stems from the fact that until now, social scientists have primarily studied threats and risks through the perspective of social psychology by conducting the so-called “risk assessment” analyses, especially looking at the concept of “risk perception”. This research thus aims to probe these concepts in order to broaden our understanding of the multivariate study of risks and threats in social sciences by adding some context-dependent and temporal aspects.

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1. Introduction

Contemporary Western societies, though safer than ever before, seem to be more concerned with security than ever before in history (Vrablikova 2013). Although human life has always been subject to risks and threats, Ulrich Beck argues that nowadays we live in what he has famously termed a “risk society” in which “the risks and consequences of modernization, which are revealed as irreversible threats to the life of plants, animals, and human beings... can no longer be limited to certain localities or groups, but rather exhibit a tendency to globalization”, crossing national borders and creating global threats (Beck 1992, 14). One of the main preoccupations resulting from exposure to these global risks is how we can prevent or minimize these threats which are a by-product of modernization (Beck 1992, 19). New technologies offer the possibility to reduce some of those risks. However, they seem to come at the cost of citizens’ privacy. Specifically, surveillance-oriented security technologies, which are becoming more and more ubiquitous in modern Western societies, are thought to enhance security, but they simultaneously infringe on privacy. There seems to be an inherent dilemma in trading in our privacy for increased security.

Privacy can be broadly defined as the point of tension between the individual and the community (Friedewald and Pohoryles 2013). More specifically in relation to the new surveillance technologies, it can refer to the right of the individual to have one’s personal information protected from governmental and private organizations, except in exceptional circumstances dictated by the law (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2012). Therefore, when analyzing the social consequences of new surveillance technologies, the main question is where to draw the lines and how to protect citizens from unnecessary intrusion into their private lives by those who develop such safety measures, be it the private or state organizations. Nevertheless, as some authors argue, those who are preoccupied with privacy do not appreciate the increased security which comes with these technologies. Meanwhile those preoccupied with security do not problematize these measures’ effects on privacy (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2012). Though it has always been a sensitive issue, privacy is currently becoming a major preoccupation of citizens in modern societies. This is particularly true following the revelations of massive US surveillance of electronic communication all over the world. It is from this perspective that we approach the topic of security vs. privacy in the present study. However, while security and privacy can seem universal concepts, it is necessary to take into account their different social contexts, shaped to a large extent by diverse historical experiences, as well as cultural and socio-economic conditions in different national contexts. Particularly in relation to modern surveillance technologies, it seems relevant to take into account how the social implications of these technologies are conditioned by the historically formed attitudes between citizens and the state (Björklund 2012). This kind of context-sensitive approach is offered in the present case study as part of a comparative project “Seconomics - Socio-economic meets security.”

The *Seconomics* project focuses on the definition and perception of risk and security in different settings: airport security and air travel, critical infrastructure, and urban

transport. For each of these settings a topic has been chosen which could make it easier to compare the discussion of these issues in different national contexts - specifically these issues are 3D body scanners, the Stuxnet virus, and CCTV cameras. The country case studies seek to describe and analyze the ways in which leading national media outlets discuss these topics and how those discussions reflect on these three contexts. The present report is a Polish case study conducted as a part of this project. My main research question is how the Polish media frame the implications of security technologies in regards to citizens' privacy and safety. In this sense, I am interested in the perceived trade-offs between security and privacy, as well as the kind of issues dominating the national security debate. In terms of actors, I look at who is given voice in these debates, as well as who raises concerns about privacy issues, or, on the other hand, who are the actors that argue in favor of the new security technologies.

Arguably, the main point to consider in the Polish context is its post-socialist character. The transformations of the last two decades have brought about major changes in the economy and politics, as well as social structures and public opinion. The post-socialist transformation has, on the one hand, made Poland more vulnerable to global terrorist threats, as the country has integrated into international political institutions. On the other hand, this rejection of an authoritarian regime has affected perceptions and attitudes towards new surveillance technologies. Thus, one might expect that, in a country with a very recent experience with an all-controlling, non-democratic state, citizens might be more cautious about the use of modern surveillance techniques. However, in what follows we will see that, for a number of reasons, this is not the case in Poland (see also Svenonius 2011 and Björklund 2012, for a similar point). This is mainly due to how Poles conceive of privacy, and also that they consider these technologies to be a part of the Western social paradigm, and, as such, deemed more acceptable in the context of "catching up with the West." The latter process represents a prevalent idea that Poland belongs to Europe and, thus, must endorse all Western values and social practices in order to prove such belonging. These situational issues, all of which are quite import for our case study, are discussed in more detail in what follows, allowing us to contextualize the analyzed media.

The present report is structured as follows: in the first section a detailed overview of issues related to security and privacy in Poland is offered, including main events in recent years. The second section presents an overview of the media landscape in the country, in order to contextualize our media selection and analysis. The third section is devoted to the methodology of the project. The fourth section describes the material selected for each topic and presents the main findings of the analysis. In the last section we draw together the contextual issues with the findings from the media content analysis and try to address the main research questions of the *Seconomics* project for the Polish case study.

2. Polish national context

As noted in the introduction, one of the most relevant contextual issues to consider when analyzing the Polish case is that it is a post-socialist country. Just like the other former Eastern bloc countries, it has experienced major societal, political, and economic changes in the recent decades as part of the so-called “triple transition” (Offe 1996) from state socialism to market-oriented liberal democracy. These changes are not without implications for security issues, as well as for how security and privacy are perceived and discussed. On the one hand, in the recent decades Poland has integrated into Western institutions, becoming a more active player in European and global foreign politics, with important implications for external threats. On the other hand, the economic, political, and societal changes within the country have shaped perceptions of security and the meaning and value of privacy. This process was largely dominated by a discourse of “catching up with the West,” that is the need to adopt Western values and practices in order to prove Poland’s place in Europe. In what follows we discuss the principal implications of these issues for the topics considered by the *Seconomics* project, drawing together the description of the most significant events in the recent years with public perceptions of security and privacy issues.

As far as external terrorist threats, the most relevant fact is that after the changes of 1989, Poland has become part of NATO and the EU. In spite of strong support for European integration, Poland has traditionally maintained a firm pro-Atlantic orientation in terms of foreign policy. This has led the Polish government to join US-led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹ This means Poland can be deemed an ally of the US on the global stage, a potential target of terrorist attacks. However, it is also true that the country lacks international clout of the kind other countries targeted by terrorist attacks in the recent years do have. The threat of a terrorist attack in Poland, in spite of participating in the US-led campaigns related to the “war on terror,” has so far been considered low by the authorities.²

Nevertheless, in 2007 it became known that Poland hosted a secret CIA prison on its territory, assisted with the transfer of secretly detained individuals in and out of Poland, and offered the use of its airspace and airports for such transfers.³ More recently a Saudi citizen, one of the prisoners who were detained by US officials on the Polish territory, accused Poland of illegal detention at the European Court of Human Rights. The plans (announced in February 2013) to make the case documents public have, according to the Ministry of Justice, exposed Polish citizens to a

1

Poland was one of the six countries which contributed troops to the US invasion of Iraq.

2 Level of terrorist threat to the Republic of Poland according to the government webpage: http://www.antyterroryzm.gov.pl/portal/CAT/151/858/Poziom_zagrozenia_terrorystycznego_w_RP.html

3 For the details of Polish involvement see the report “Globalizing Torture” published in 2013 by the Open Society Justice Initiative. <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf>

terrorist threat.⁴ Despite these recent revelations and the strong pro-Atlantic orientation of Poland, the real danger of an attack has so far been considered quite low.

In terms of how the terrorist threat is perceived by the citizens, we can get an interesting picture from recent opinion polls. The perception that Poland could possibly be in danger of a terrorist attack has risen during recent years. In June 2013, 43% of Poles said that they thought there was a real danger of a terrorist attack in Poland, 11% more than three years earlier (CBOS 2013). This could be due to the fact that international terrorist attacks, such as those in New York, Madrid, London, Moscow, Norway, or more recently, the Boston Marathon, received extensive coverage in the Polish media, contributing to the perception of the global terrorist threat as an issue relevant to the Polish context. Nevertheless, while the percentage of those who think Poland could be targeted by a terrorist attack is increasing, in general Poles are not afraid of terrorism (72%). Interestingly for this study, 80% of the surveyed would agree to more security controls at airports, borders, and train stations in order to increase their safety. However, less than half of the respondents would be willing to bear additional costs of such measures.

As far as internal threats are concerned, no known separatist or terrorist organizations operate within the country. An internal terrorist attack is, thus, even less likely, in spite of the fact that in recent years the presence of radical right-wing nationalist organizations has been on the rise, perpetrating acts of vandalism and attacking sporadically left-wing marches and manifestations. Nevertheless, the only significant terrorist attempt in the recent years was that of a Polish citizen with no prior criminal record. In 2012 the Internal Security Agency (*Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* - ABW) prevented him from carrying out his plan to attack the Polish Parliament with a car full of explosives. The plans for the attack were discovered well their intended operation date. However, this has sparked some serious debate in Poland over just how safe are the main government buildings from such a threat. In relation to that, according to a recent public opinion poll, 58% of Poles think that Polish state institutions are not prepared to prevent terrorist attacks (CBOS 2013).

Finally, on the topic of terrorist attacks and external threats, it is important to mention the airplane crash in Smoleńsk (Russia) which killed the Polish president and a large number of top Polish officials in April 2010. Although, the crash was an accident, there are speculations spread by the members of the party of the late President, led by his twin brother, about this being an attack on Poland from Russia. Without a doubt, the political row which has since then surrounded the issue has not been without importance for just how safe the Poles feel, especially the voters of the Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) which tend to be the older and less economically advantaged. Recent public opinion polls confirmed that it is this group that fears a possible terrorist attack the most and considers it the biggest

⁴ „Gowin: odtajnienie skargi ws. więzień CIA w Polsce zagraża bezpieczeństwu Polski” [Gowin: Making public the complaint on CIA prisons in Poland is a threat to the security of Poland]. February 5, 2013, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Available online: http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114884,13348793,Gowin_odtajnienie_skargi_ws_wiezien_CIA_w_Polsce.html

threat to Poland (CBOS 2013). Moreover, the topic of the Smoleńsk crash is relevant to our study of media content, in so far as it fully dominated the Polish media in the months following the crash (from April 2010 onwards). This could account for the fact that we only found four articles on the three topics under consideration in the six months following the crash (April - September 2010).

In terms of how public security and safety is related to crime and perceived in Polish society, according to most recent public opinion poll data, Polish citizens nowadays consider Poland a safe country to live in (a view expressed by 64% of the respondents in June 2013). These positive perceptions have been rising since the 1990s when only around 20% of Polish citizens held such a positive view of their country in terms of safety (CBOS 2013). Also, Polish citizens feel safe where they live - almost 90% of the respondents to the same recent survey affirm that they consider their place of residence to be safe, the highest number since late 1980s (CBOS 2013). These increasingly positive perceptions of safety as related to crime are without a doubt a consequence of the modernization of public services and the country in general, part of the post-socialist transformations. This is of the utmost importance for the present study, since the perceptions of safety are closely related to how modern the country has become.

Modern surveillance technologies have become an inseparable part of such conceptions of modernity and development in the Western sense. An image of urban security is one of the key features of a so-called “post-modern city,” where security as protection from undesirable groups constitutes a prestige symbol (Coaffee and Van Ham 2008). In this sense CCTV systems in contemporary Poland are considered a symbol of social status, development, and Western modernity. Thus, the issue of public and private domain monitoring in relation to privacy has been largely not problematized in the Polish context.⁵ On the contrary, the assumed direct connection between safety, modernity, and surveillance has made CCTV cameras a source of pride for those who implement it - be it city councils, private companies, housing estates, or citizens. Nevertheless, it is not widely known that the first CCTV system was introduced in 1976 by Edward Gierek (a socialist leader known for his efforts to modernize the country at the expense of foreign debt), when the new Warsaw Central Train station was built.⁶ Despite this legacy, it is only recently that CCTV cameras have become ubiquitous in Poland. While some of the richest Polish cities also have the highest number of cameras (Gdynia, Gdansk, Poznań), these networks are nowhere near the size of Warsaw, the capital city.⁷ The Warsaw City Council is very proud to have recently inaugurated a new modern building of the Department of

⁵ Polish academia also exhibits a concerning lack of interest in the topic. There is only one doctoral dissertation written on the topic of CCTV systems, from the point of view of criminal law. It has been published as a book: Waszkiewicz, Paweł. 2010. *Wielki Brat Rok 2010*. Systemy monitoringu wizyjnego - aspekty kryminalistyczne, kryminologiczne i prawne [Big Brother. Year 2010. Camera monitoring systems: criminal and legal aspects]. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska.

⁶ Marek Henzler. 2011. “Mają na nas oko” [They are watching us]. September 5, 2011, *Polityka*. <http://www.polityka.pl/kraj/analizy/1518972,1,kamery-w-miastach---wszedzie-nas-widza.read>

⁷ For detailed statistics on the presence of cameras in the Polish cities see the report “Monitoring in the Polish cities and in the eyes of the society” published in 2012 by the Panoptykon Foundation and available online: http://panoptykon.org/files/cctv_seminarium_10-10-2012.pdf

Monitoring, which centralizes the 414 public area monitoring cameras present on the streets of the capital in what has been deemed as the “Warsaw Pentagon,”⁸ clearly indicating inspiration in Western, and most notably, US security technologies. But one must note that Warsaw’s urban transport security regime cannot be easily singled out from the general surveillance and security system in the city, as the city council of Warsaw and the Warsaw police jointly administer the whole of city’s CCTV system network – the urban transport CCTV being just one part of it (Svenonius 2011). Therefore, the city’s CCTV is mostly discussed in general terms as the public monitoring system, in contrast to the private cameras.

In terms of citizens’ perceptions, CCTV cameras have become in a very short time a social status symbol and constitute an inseparable part of the post-1989 modernization processes. Its merits as crime prevention technology remain for most part unchallenged. This is why, according to a survey from 2012, 61% of Polish citizens are in favor of increasing the number of CCTV cameras, while only 15% think that the number of cameras should be limited or reduced (Panoptikon 2012). The findings of a qualitative part of the same research project suggest that citizens who support CCTV cameras’ installation do so because they think it increases safety, but have a very limited understanding of its working (Ibid).

Another significant issue concerning privacy and security in Poland is the use of the data from surveillance technologies by Polish Special Services, also known as the National Internal Security Agency, or ABW. This has become a topic of hot debate especially after 2010, when it became public that between 2005 and 2007 (when the conservative PiS Party was in government) the National Internal Security Agency (ABW) had been spying on some prominent journalists by means of soliciting information from their mobile phone providers.⁹ Again in 2011, this became an issue when it was revealed that the Department of Justice was checking the calls of two journalists who published information regarding the Smoleńsk plane crash. The issue of access to phone call information in Poland has been an important debate concerning the right to privacy and the limits of public authorities (be that the police, justice system, or Special Services). Only in 2011 these forces issued two million queries for information to mobile phone providers, a number which puts Poland at the top spot of European countries in terms of this type of state monitoring of communication.^{10 11} Poles are very doubtful of such governments’ surveillance of

⁸ Kozubal. Marek. 2012. “Pentagon przetestowany” [Pentagon, tested]. March 12, 2012, *Życie Warszawy, Rzeczpospolita*.

⁹ Czuchnowski, Wojciech. 2010. „Dziennikarze na celowniku służb specjalnych” [Journalists, the target of Special Services] October 8, 2010, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Available online at: http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,8480752,Dziennikarze_na_celowniku_sluzb_specjalnych.html

¹⁰ Siedlecka Ewa. 2012. „W śledzeniu obywateli Polska jest mistrzem Europy” [In spying on citizens, Poland is the champion of Europe]. April 4, 2012, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Available online at: <http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,11463553,W sledzeniu obywateli Polsk a jest mistrzem Europy.html>

¹¹ This is possible as data retention has been made compulsory for mobile phone and internet service providers when the so-called Data Retention Directive, 2006/24/EC, was adopted in the aftermath of the London bombings in 2005. The data retained includes websites visited, phone calls made, and the precise location where the phone call was made (Maras 2012).

its citizens. Almost 80% of the respondents reject the possibility that the government could be monitoring their phone calls or correspondence for the sake of public safety (CBOS 2013).

While Polish citizens largely discount the possibility of state surveillance of their communications, they seem to be largely in favor of monitoring public spaces. How can one explain this apparent paradox? Here one must consider Poles' limited conception of privacy that is a legacy of socialism. Poles consider privacy to be the ability to conduct themselves in the private sphere without the interference of the state. This is similar to the conception of property, and so the focus seems to be on protecting the intimate (Björklund 2012, 47). Therefore, issues of privacy become less relevant if we analyze them in conjunction with public monitoring, which in principle does not affect the intimate sphere. Such a socially embedded concept of privacy explains the rejection of some kinds of state surveillance techniques, such as state services monitoring personal communication, as they constitute a painful reminder of the socialist state's intrusion in private lives of its citizens. However, other surveillance techniques, most notably the CCTV cameras, are, to say the least, not problematized and met with approval by society also because they are regarded as part of becoming more "modern," and, thus, getting closer to the ultimate aim of the post-socialist transformations of "catching up with the West." A similar point has been made by Svenonius in her comparative study of urban transport security regimes - she finds that the communist past is almost invisible in contemporary Poland's surveillance practices and discourses regarding the urban transport (both among the supporters, as well as opponents of these techniques) and they are mostly framed in terms of Western modernization. In other words, old experiences have been decoupled from the new ones (Svenonius 2011, 270). Such a situation, where we find no concern for CCTV as an invasion of privacy, has also been noted in other post-socialist countries (Budak, Anić, and Rajh 2013).

In spite of such widespread approval for modern surveillance techniques, many still hope to shift the debate. They highlight the danger of equating modernity with surveillance and hope to bring the debate over privacy vs. security to the Polish national agenda. The main issue they have raised, an issue which is slowly gaining traction in public debates, as shown in the following content analysis, regards the lack of any regulations for CCTV camera use in the Polish law. There is no comprehensive statute which indicates where it is legal to install public or private monitoring cameras, where and for how long the recordings may be stored, and who should have access to this data. Neither is it stipulated in the law whether it is legal to use surveillance technologies in the workplace, schools, or hospitals. As one of the activists notes, Poland can be deemed a "CCTV Eldorado."¹² In the recent years, there has been a number of public initiatives regarding the need for a comprehensive law on public and private domain monitoring, especially on the part of the Polish Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO), who has repeatedly noted that he receives complaints regarding the use of CCTV cameras but he is unable to act on them because there is virtually no regulation which could justify his

¹² Klicki. Wojciech. 2013. "Monitoringowe swiatelko w tunelu" [Monitoring light in the tunnel]. *Panoptykon Foundation*. Available online at: <http://panoptykon.org/wiadomosc/monitoringowe-swiatelko-w-tunelu>

intervention, for instance, in private companies. GIODO, together with the Polish Ombudswoman, have also repeatedly asked the Ministry of Interior to take action on this issue - the Ministry's response so far has been that they are initiating work on a possible project, but no details have been made public.¹³ In terms of the Polish civil society, the most visible actor in this debate is the *Panoptykon* Foundation - a non-governmental organization dedicated to the issues of surveillance. It has also intervenes with the Ministry on a number of issues, organizes informative sessions, and offers comprehensive information regarding the use of different surveillance technologies in Poland on their webpage.¹⁴

These repeated interventions by GIODO and the Ombudswoman, as well as on part of the *Panoptykon* activists, have recently attracted the interest of the Polish government. In May 2013, the Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the new Minister of Interior, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, announced that the government is working on a comprehensive law which will regulate many aspects of surveillance technologies use - from the entitlements of different government services to access personal data, to the rules of installing public and private domain monitoring. In the words of the Prime Minister Tusk, "the law will protect Polish citizens from surveillance."¹⁵ This fact is interesting insomuch as until recently Polish voters' interest in these issues has been rather weak, and as such politicians had little incentive to voice critical opinions on it. Rather, they could benefit in electoral terms from promoting surveillance technologies as favorable to citizens safety (Björklund 2012, 26). Therefore, we can observe a significant change in the political discourse in Poland, as the topic of the tradeoffs between security and privacy in relation to new surveillance technologies has been taken up as relevant by the government itself. We can thus anticipate an increasing importance of these issues for the public debate in Poland.

¹³ Siedlecka Ewa. 2012. "Polacy na podglądzie" [Poles, watched]. October 15, 2012, *Gazeta Wyborcza*.

¹⁴ www.panoptykon.org

¹⁵ Video recording and transcript of the statement are available at the Polish Government's official web page: "Będzie ustawa przeciw Wielkiemu Bratu" [We will have a law against Big Brother]. May 29, 2013. Available online: <https://www.premier.gov.pl/multimedia/wideo/bedzie-ustawa-przeciwko-wielkiemu-bratu.html>

3. Media landscape in the country

The current media system in Poland, as well as in the rest of Central and Eastern European post-socialist countries, is the outcome of over two decades of economic and political transformations after 1989. The democratization process, as well as the so-called “shock therapy” (a number of severe transformational measures which introduced market economy in Poland in the early 1990s) shaped the media system in terms of structure, ownership, as well as its connection to the political scene. Some of the most fundamental decisions concerning the media have been taken already during the so-called “Round Table Talks” between the communists and the opposition in 1989. Most importantly to this study, it was agreed that censorship of the press would be done away with and a new daily would be created, *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Electoral Gazette), as a platform for the political communication of the democratic opposition. As Dobek-Ostrowska notes, these decisions freed the press market from censorship and opened it to free competition, blocking, at the same time, the reform of radio and television (2010, 1). The latter was initially obstructed due to the perceived importance of TV and radio for political communication. The new political elites wanted to keep hold of them, and their reform did not take place until 1992. The result of the reform was the creation of a National Broadcasting Council (*Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji* - KRRiT), a highly politicized institution whose members are appointed jointly by the Polish Parliament and the President of the Republic, and thus reflect the political power structure at a given moment.

Though the radio and television market took longer to develop and is still, to large extent, dominated by the public media and the very politicized National Broadcasting Council, the the press is in a quite different situation. The stabilization and normalization of the press market took place more rapidly. By 1993 new market structures based on the free market and pluralism of press content were put into place (Dobek-Ostrowska 2010, 2). It was during the consolidation of Polish democracy, i.e. after 1997, when the democratic constitution was finally passed, when media market mechanisms came into full effect and the process of diversification and internationalization of media ownership gained pace, with the formation of media holding companies and the introduction of foreign capital to the Polish media market.

The result of these early changes is, to a large extent, the current structure of media ownership in contemporary Poland. While radio and television are characterized by a strong position of the publicly owned media, Polish print media is diverse and privately owned. According to the *European Journalism Centre*, German and other foreign owners control approximately 80% of the Polish media press market. These foreign investors include: *H. Bauer* (operating in Poland as *Wydawnictwo Bauer*), *Verlagsgruppe Passau (Polskapresse)*, and *Axel Springer (Axel Springer Polska)*. For more than two decades, the only major domestic competitor has been *Agora SA*, the owner of, amongst others, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, with an 18% share in the market.¹⁶ Most recently, a Polish media group, *Gremi Media*, the property of Polish businessman Grzegorz Hajdarowicz, became the only shareholder in *Presspublica*, the publisher of

¹⁶ Lara, Ania. *Poland: Media landscape*. European Journalism Centre. Available online at: http://ejc.net/media_landscapes/poland

Rzeczpospolita [The Republic]. Hajdarowicz bought out all *Presspublica*'s shares from the British *Mecom* and the Polish state. This recent development of the Polish press market has been deemed by some observers as the moment of a formal end of the post-1989 press market transformations.¹⁷

The circulation of press publications in Poland is analyzed on a monthly basis by the Polish Association for the Control of Press Distribution (*Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy - ZKDP*), founded in 1994. In order to be included in the ZKDP's audits of press circulation, it is necessary to disclose detailed information on sales volume. Some dailies, most notably the Catholic conservative *Nasz Dziennik*, refuse to disclose such information, and as such we cannot accurately assess their impact on Polish readership. Nevertheless, the data available from ZKDP describes quite precisely the structure of the daily press market in Poland (see Table 3.1.). We can clearly see that the biggest circulating Polish daily is the tabloid *Fakt* (Axel Springer AG), modeled on the German *Bild*, followed by *Gazeta Wyborcza*. While there have been some changes in the last decades with daily newspapers, such as *Dziennik. Polska-Europa-Świat* (The Daily Poland - Europe - the World) closing down, and the emergence of new titles such as *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* [The Daily Law Gazette], the result of a merger between the latter and *Gazeta Prawna*, specializing in law, the core of the Polish press market has been rather stable, with the two quality opinion-shaping periodicals (*Gazeta Wyborcza* [Electoral Gazette] and *Rzeczpospolita* [The Republic]) competing over readership with the two tabloids - *Fakt* and *Super Express*.

In terms of press circulation, the overall trend is negative. In June 2013, all periodicals recoded a decrease in their circulation numbers, a tendency which can be clearly appreciated over the last 5 years (see Table 3.1.). The biggest decrease in circulation has been experienced by *Rzeczpospolita*. The overall tendency is increasing the number of titles and decreasing their frequency (Dzierżyńska-Mielczarek 2012, 2). Furthermore, the importance of weeklies as opinion-shaping media must be noted. Longer, better researched pieces in weeklies such as *Polityka*, *Wprost* and *Newsweek Polska*, have great influence on opinion in Poland. As far as the readership is concerned, in a 2009 survey on press readership, 80% of Poles said they read the written press, about 43% declared reading dailies and 32% said they read opinion weeklies.¹⁸

As mentioned above, media politicization is quite strong in Poland. Since the beginning of post-1989 transformations, Polish media have been deeply involved in the political process, choosing which political actors to support (Dobek-Ostrowska 2010, 4). However, the politicization of the media has not been only a characteristic of the early phase of transition to democracy and market economy. Rather, it became an inherent quality of the media landscape in Poland. The stabilization of the Polish political scene has been a slow and painful process. Nevertheless, since 2005, it seems that we can speak of a semi-stable party system grouped around two leading parties, both with roots in the Solidarity dissident movement. On the one hand, the liberal, centre-right party of the current Prime Minister Donald Tusk - Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska - PO*), on the other, the conservative Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS*) party of Jarosław Kaczyński, twin brother of the late President

¹⁷ Prusek, Tomasz and Vadim Makarenko. 2012. "Kulisy przejęcia Rzeczpospolitej" [Behind the scenes of Rzeczpospolita's takeover] March 3, 2012, *Wyborcza.biz*. Available online: http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100896,11276318,Kulisy_przejecia_Rzeczpospolitej_kredyt_od_Lesza.html

¹⁸ European Journalism Centre - Poland: Media landscape by Ania Lara. Available at http://ejc.net/media_landscapes/poland

Lech Kaczyński.

Without a doubt, *Gazeta Wyborcza* is the biggest Polish reputable opinion-shaping newspaper. As mentioned above, it was founded in 1989 as a platform for the first democratic parliamentary election and, thus, the first independent media after the fall of communism in Poland, directly related to the Solidarity movement. Since then it has gained a vast group of devout readers and it is known for its strong opinion pieces written by acknowledged journalist and its anti-clerical and left-leaning profile (Dobek-Ostrowska 2012, 140). In terms of partisan preferences, *Gazeta Wyborcza* is mostly marked by the personality and character of its editor-in-chief Adam Michnik, a prominent figure from Polish anti-communist opposition. Thus, the newspaper has always favored left and centre-left politicians from the Solidarity movement, while members of the successor party SLD (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* - The Alliance of the Left) received much more harsh treatment due to their communist roots (Dobek-Ostrowska 2012, 145). In the present party structure, the daily is well known for its strong antagonism towards the conservative PiS and its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, without clearly supporting the other major party, the centre-right PO. It must also be noted that since 2006, *Gazeta Wyborcza* has been trying to keep up with the tabloid *Fakt* in terms of sale and readership shares, in order to keep its place as number one daily press on the Polish market. This has had some impact on the style and topics of its content which became more oriented towards the wider audience and the general strategy of the newspaper became more market-oriented and shaped to lesser extent by a political agenda, in comparison to the earlier years.

The right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita*, on the other hand, was changed from a public newspaper to privately-owned in 1989. However, 49% of the shares have been kept public. Until 2006, this high quality daily has been considered politically independent and praised for the quality of its journalism. Its first editor-in-chief after 1989, Dariusz Fikus, was a respected figure in Polish journalism, and upon his death in 1996 an award was founded in his name for the best quality Polish journalists. However, in 2006 the government of the conservative PiS party influenced the selection of a new editor-in-chief. Since then the newspaper has become more politically active, supporting the conservative party, and has been considered right-leaning and politically invested - especially between 2006 and 2011 when the editor-in-chief was Paweł Lisicki. He received the post as part of a political strategy to control the opinion-shaping media, a strategy led by the conservatives of Kaczyński. The newspaper's political meddling during this era was recently recognized by the courts, when Lisicki lost a case against a journalist who accused him of sacking journalists on partisan bias.¹⁹ As mentioned previously, in 2011 the Polish media group *Gremi Media* bought all the shares of *Presspublica*, including the shares owned by the state, and so became the sole owner of *Rzeczpospolita*. Currently, the political involvement of *Rzeczpospolita* is not as strong as in Lisicki's times. However, it maintains its conservative outlook. While *Rzeczpospolita* may have had alarmingly low sale figures in the last years (the sales have halved since 2008), it is still a top opinion-shaping newspaper. It has been repeatedly named the top cited press outlet in Poland, far ahead of *Gazeta Wyborcza*.²⁰ *Rzeczpospolita* targets a very specific audience, namely

¹⁹ Czuchnowski Wojciech. 2013. "Sąd: Lisicki był gwarantem politycznych interesów PiS" [Court confirms that Lisicki was a guarantee for PiS's political interests] July 27, 2013, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Available online: http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,14343979,Sad_Lisicki_byl_gwarantem_politycznych_interesow.html

²⁰ Olszewska, Nina. 2013. "Report on top opinion shaping media in Poland." *Institute for Media Monitoring*, June 25, 2013. Available online: <http://biuro.mediacontact.pl/imm/7bdc1fa56bd879d941f67f7238a7a637/>

lawyers and entrepreneurs (with its extensive law and economy sections), as well as policy makers, top public administration workers, and others. The newspaper states its objectives are the defense and support of Polish entrepreneurs, lawyers, and accountants, and maintains a focus on law and economy. It also pledges to monitor the government and the EU, especially in terms of unnecessary regulatory policies, a reflection of its liberal stance.²¹

Generally the press market in Poland, which has emerged after more than 20 years of post-socialist transformations, is plural and has clear political preferences, with the two principal dailies on either sides of the ideological spectrum: the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza* and the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita*. In this sense, some authors suggest that the structure of the Polish press market is similar to that of Spain, which is also built around two principal dailies, the left-leaning *El País* and the right-leaning *ABC* (Dobek-Ostrowska 2012, 132). Such a divide in political communication is also clearly recognized by politicians and experts. The divide is thought to run between the network of left-wing politicians and journalists versus the right-wing camp of politicians and journalists (Pfetsch and Voltmer 2012), where the attitude towards (either consistently for or fiercely against) the opposition conservative right party PiS of Jarosław Kaczyński seems to be the principal marker of partisan association, while the centre-right government party of Donald Tusk receives a more ambivalent treatment from both newspapers (Dobek-Ostrowska 2011) .

²¹ The editorial staff of *Rzeczpospolita* and its mission statement can be found here: <http://www.rp.pl/temat/968053.html>

Table 3.1. Polish newspaper circulation and readership (2008-2013)

| Title (Polish) | Title (English) | Type/ ideology | Readership 2012/2013 | Circulation rate | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|------------|------------|
| | | | | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 (Feb) | 2013 (Feb) |
| Fakt - Gazeta Codzienna | Fact - The Daily Gazette | Tabloid | 10.8% | 671,160 | 634,327 | 596,446 | 535,506 | 533,775 | 481,143 |
| Gazeta Wyborcza | Electoral Gazette | Left, liberal | 11.2% | 561,575 | 489,665 | 446,588 | 416,288 | 359,131 | 310,299 |
| Super Express | Super Express | Tabloid | 5.0% | 341,676 | 315,928 | 318,214 | 296,002 | 282,502 | 270,402 |
| Rzeczpospolita | Republic | Right, conservative | 2.9% | 209,824 | 187,113 | 198,060 | 175,801 | 162,881 | 93,920 |
| Gazeta Polska Codziennie | The Polish Daily Gazette | Right | n.d. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 142,226 | 116,061 | 93,310 |
| Dziennik Gazeta Prawna | The Daily Law Gazette | Centre-right | 2.2% | 0 | 118,206 | 137,672 | 121,365 | 113,581 | 74,150 |
| Przegląd Sportowy | Sports Review | Sports daily | 2.1% | 116,680 | 105,238 | 93,183 | 86,059 | 78,736 | 71,542 |
| Express Ilustrowany | Express Illustrated | Tabloid | n.d. | 64,798 | 64,550 | 60,316 | 54,750 | 50,767 | 45,530 |
| Dziennik. Polska-Europa- Świat | The Daily. Poland-Europe- World | Centre-right | - | 242,972 | 115,177 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Gazeta Prawna | Law Gazette | Specialized in law and economics | - | 110,908 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Note: Press Circulation Audit Reports Data from www.zkdp.pl – Polish Association for the Control of Press Distribution (Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy – ZKDP). Readership data from the Polish Readership Analysis (Polskie Badanie Czytelnictwa, www.pdc.pl), data for September 2012 – February 2013.

4. Methodology

The method applied in the study is qualitative media content analysis. This choice has been made on the assumption that in order to analyze the relationship between privacy and security, which are conceived as social products, and technology, a space where social meanings are negotiated and produced, a discursive approach seems the most appropriate (Dourish and Anderson 2006). In order to be able to analyze the most salient debates on security, privacy, and new technologies in the Polish media, two leading nationwide newspapers have been selected for our case study. The selection has been made mainly based on the circulation rates (see above) but also taking into account the profile, quality, and papers' reputation as opinion-shaping media. The two selected newspapers are the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza* and right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita* (see above for the detailed characteristics of each selected source).

In order to select the articles for the analysis, for each topic we have conducted a search within the electronic archives of both newspapers with the search terms specified in the table below.

Table 4.1. Overview of search terms, search results and sample composition

| Topic | Search terms | Search results (GW/RZ) | Sample (GW/RZ) | Sample N (%) |
|------------------------|--|------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| CCTV | Monitoring Monitoring wizyjny Kamery monitoringu | 21/37 | 10/16 | 26 (59%) |
| Body scanners | Skanery ciała Skanery lotniskowe | 3/6 | 1/3 | 4 (9%) |
| Stuxnet | Stuxnet | 15/16 | 7/7 | 14 (32%) |
| Total articles: | | 98 | 44 | 44 (100%) |

Note: Number of articles which include the search terms. GW – *Gazeta Wyborcza* (left-leaning paper), RZ – *Rzeczpospolita* (right-leaning paper).

Due to the specificity of the Polish language and the limited search options of both databases²² both for 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras more than one search term has been used, as well as its variations which might be caused by grammar. For the period under analysis (1 January 2010 and 31 April 2013) we found a total of 98 articles which addressed the analyzed topics in a substantive way (see Table 4.1).

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The electronic archives of the newspapers under analysis, though accessible only upon payments, have very limited search options which made the article search a quite arduous task. *Gazeta Wyborcza's* archive did not even allow for the use of Boolean operators.

This number was so large, though, only because many of CCTV camera articles included the search term in a non-substantial way. Mainly they mentioned CCTV records as a source of evidence in court hearings and police investigations. Because they lent no insight to the research, have been discarded, it is also important to note that the access to the articles published was not the same in both newspapers. While *Gazeta Wyborcza* offers one point of access to its archives with different durations and prices, *Rzeczpospolita* divides its archives into separate sections, namely main news and opinion articles, as well as specialized law and economy sections. While the general access to the main news and opinion articles is quite inexpensive (as compared to *Gazeta Wyborcza*), access to the other two sections requires a separate and quite substantial payment which clearly indicates that these articles are targeted at a specific, well-off group of people, mostly lawyers, entrepreneurs, and policy-makers, among others. This structuring of access was important to this study in so far as almost all of the debate regarding the use and regulation of CCTV cameras appeared in the specialized law sections, and thus we can only expect that it reaches a narrower, but a more specific audience. This is important to bear in mind when considering its ability to influence public opinion.

In terms of salience of the issues under scrutiny, we can assert that overall the least important issue in the Polish media has been that of 3D body scanners. Both newspapers mentioned the issue in less than 10 articles over the period of the last 3 years. The number was especially low in the case of *Gazeta Wyborcza* (3 articles). Most articles concerned with full body scanners were published in 2010, with one exception (an article in *Rzeczpospolita* in March 2011). The issue did not receive further coverage in 2012 or before April 2013.

The Stuxnet virus received more coverage in Polish leading newspapers. We found approximately 15 articles in each newspaper analyzed. While *Gazeta Wyborcza* paid less attention to the issue initially (in 2010) than *Rzeczpospolita*, in the following year the situation reversed. In 2012 the interest in cyber wars and cyber espionage, and, thus, mentions of Stuxnet, peaked (with similar coverage in both newspapers) (see Table 4.2.). In 2013 two articles in each newspaper reflected the interest in the issue. However, since we are not yet able to analyze the full year, it remains to be seen how the importance of the topic will evolve further. In any case, it seems that cyber war and references to Stuxnet, while not extremely important, remained a constant topic of interest for the Polish media.

As expected, of the three topics analyzed it was CCTV cameras which drew the most attention from the Polish media. Fifty-eight articles addressing the issue were published in the two leading Polish newspapers over the period of our analysis, though the distribution was not even. The coverage was more extensive in *Rzeczpospolita*. However, almost half of the articles were published in the specialized law sections, the so-called yellow pages, and not in the main body of the newspaper, which focuses on news and opinion.

Over the past three years one can see that the topic of CCTV cameras has not been of equal importance to both papers. While the number of articles both papers published in 2010 was similar, in 2011 and 2012 *Rzeczpospolita* published many more articles on the topic than *Gazeta Wyborcza*. In 2013, though, they have published two and one articles on the topic respectively. However, the analysis of press for the following months (a period not included in the present research project) confirms a trend towards more and more interest in CCTV cameras in relation to issues of privacy and security, especially following recent declarations by Prime Minister Tusk. Therefore, we are able to see how the debate emerges and foresee possible ways in which it might develop further.

Table 4.2. Saliency of debates - number of articles published (2010-2013)

| Topic | 2010 (GW/RZ) | 2011 (GW/RZ) | 2012 (GW/RZ) | 2013* (GW/RZ) |
|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| CCTV | 6/7 | 4/13 | 9/16 | 2/1 |
| Body scanners | 3/5 | 0/1 | 0/0 | 0/0 |
| Stuxnet | 2/5 | 5/2 | 6/7 | 2/2 |

Note: Number of articles which include the search terms. GW – *Gazeta Wyborcza* (left-leaning paper), RZ – *Rzeczpospolita* (right-leaning paper).

* Only January-April 2013

From the total set of 98 articles found in the Polish media on the three topics, a sample of N=44 articles was selected for the qualitative analysis. The selection is representative, in the case of each of the three issues, with regard to coverage by year in each newspaper, and the overall percentage of coverage in each newspaper over the whole period of analysis. Thus, only 9% of the selected articles concern body scanners, 32% refer to the Stuxnet virus, and more than half addresses the issue of CCTV cameras (59%) (see table 4.1.). The articles in the sample represent the principal debates and actors for the issues under scrutiny. The main criterion for the selection was relevance to the public debate (especially in terms of opinion articles, and those reflecting the debates). However, it was also important that these articles reflect the principal contexts of the topic. This latter criterion was especially relevant when it came to CCTV cameras, where a variety of aspects have been raised. This is why we also included articles on the Warsaw CCTV system from *Życie Warszawy*, a section of *Rzeczpospolita* which deals with local issues of the capital city of Warsaw.

Having selected the articles for the sample, we then analyzed them and selected the relevant statements concerning our topics of interest. In total, 318 statements have been selected and coded. The coding and content analysis of the statements has been developed with the assistance of the *Atlas.ti* software. The coding for all three topics followed the general *Seconomics* coding scheme for the issues under research (see Table 4.3.). For all statements we coded the actor and its origin, the topic (or topics) and the argumentative strategy and its direction. Most definitive statements, statements which define a point, have been coded as neutral statements. On the other hand, almost all evaluative and argumentative statements have been coded as either positive or negative, unless the statement was ambiguous and included justification in both directions (which was rather rare). Argumentative strategy and direction could have only one code per statement, while other codes, especially topic and justification, could include various codes in one statement. Wherever there were more than two actors, interaction between the actors was coded (either cooperation or confrontation), however it was rather rare to encounter these kind of statements in the material analyzed.

Table 4.3. Coding Scheme

| | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Actor: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1. Institutions 1.2. Individuals 1.3. Others 2. Topics 3. Argumentative strategy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.1. Definitive 3.2. Evaluative 3.3. Advocative | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Direction of the argument <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4.1. Positive 4.2. Negative 4.3. Neutral 5. Justification 6. Interaction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6.1. Cooperation 6.2. Confrontation 7. Origin of the actor |
|--|--|

Several issues arose as this rather straight-forward coding scheme was applied to the empirical material gathered. The solutions adopted have been agreed upon by the entire *Seconomics* research team in order to ensure the comparability of the case studies. In order to discern the actor in statements which were not direct quotes, a simple rule of thumb was applied - the actor was whoever was an agent in the statement. Therefore, in a statement such as “European experts will discuss the use of body scanners on European airports next Thursday” the actor is clearly “experts” who will discuss the issue. When no direct agent could be discerned the actor coded was the journalist, such as in the statement, “Stuxnet is so complicated that it must have been developed by a state.” In terms of topics, whenever possible we looked for more specific codes than the general “body scanner,” “Stuxnet,” or “CCTV” code, in order to more accurately reflect the richness of the debates and avoid over-coding the main topics. After all, all the statements selected contained a reference to the issues under analysis, as that was the basis of our selection in the first place. Therefore in a statement like, “*The New York Times* announced yesterday that Stuxnet was developed for the US government,” the topic is not coded as Stuxnet, but as “development of Stuxnet by a state” and “state accused of attack: US.”

Once all the statements were coded we developed a content analysis of the material with the help of the Atlas.ti software. The first steps were to identify who were the main actors for each issue under consideration, what were the main topics raised, and what were the prevalent argumentative strategies used. This descriptive approach offered a simple but quite informative overview of the main outlines and characteristics of the debates under analysis. The same descriptive approach was applied to justifications. However, those did not appear in all the statements, and it was already of interest to see in what percentage of statements we could actually appreciate any kind of justification. The exploration of codes concurrence was a further step in the analysis. In this way we could compare the actors to their national

origins, the argumentative strategies with their direction, or see what kind of argumentative strategies were most common in relation to which topic. In order to make all this information comparable across topics we calculated percentages over the total number of codes or statements. Finally, depending on the topic, we included a list of the main actors quoted or a list of the cases of interaction encountered in the statements. In some cases it was also useful to group actors in order to compare the importance of state versus civil society actors.

Below, the subsequent sections describe the main findings of the analysis on each topic separately, focusing on the actors, topics, and argumentative strategies, as described above. In the last section, these empirical findings are analyzed in connection to the specific Polish context and the broader project research questions.

5. Analysis

The following section includes an overview and discussion of the findings of the qualitative analysis of Polish media for the *Seconomics* project. Its focus is on the media coverage of the three selected topics: 3D body scanners, Stuxnet virus, and CCTV cameras, as reflected in the two leading Polish newspapers: *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita* over the period under analysis (January 2010 until the end of April 2013). For each of the issues we develop a descriptive analysis of the results - discussing the main actors, topics, argumentative strategies, and justifications. In the last part of this section we draw together the results from the analysis and discuss them in relation to the broader national context and the project's research questions.

5.1. Body scanners

5.1.1. Overview of the sample

The issue of body scanners received less attention in the Polish media than the other two topics. The articles regarding body scanners constitute only 9% of the sample. I analyzed three articles from 2010, and one from early 2011. The issue has not received further coverage in the newspapers under analysis in 2012 and 2013. In total 28 statements have been detected in relation to the issue of body scanners and coded according to the coding scheme of the *Seconomics* project.

The analytical quality of the chosen articles is quite poor, they are mainly descriptive pieces and do not include a very in-depth analysis of the issue. The discussion of the issue of body scanners is part of a broader debate on the increasing security measures in international airports as a response to the global terrorist threat. This is clear from the lines of the chosen articles, which include states like, "Airports under special surveillance"²³ and "Travelling in the times of terror."²⁴ The articles do not offer any specific national context for the debate on the issue. Instead journalists present the issue as external to the Polish context, reporting on the measures taken in the US and other European airports (mostly in the Netherlands and the UK), as well as the debates regarding the introduction of the scanners within the European institutions. This is why all four articles appeared in the world news sections of the newspapers, two of them written by correspondents from Washington (one in each of the analyzed newspapers).

The articles' titles also reflect the perception of body scanners as a foreign concern.

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24 GW - 2010 JAN - Lotniska pod specjalnym nadzorem [Airports under special surveillance]
RZ - 2010 JAN - Podróże w czasach terroru [Travelling in times of terror]

For example, the newspapers speak of the “EU row over scanners,”²⁵ referring to the fight over the rules and regulations for the use of body scanners in European airports. They also mention the “Big Brother [who] wants to see a naked crowd,”²⁶ reporting on the plans for further development of the technology in the US. Reflecting the overall coverage of the issue in the two newspapers, in the sample there are three articles from January 2010 and one from March 2011. Two of the articles appeared on the same day (January 5, 2010) in each of the newspapers, alerting to the increasing security checks at US airports and pointing to the plans to purchase more full body scanners both in the US, as well in the UK and the Netherlands.

Three out of four articles mention the failed attempt to explode a bomb on board of a plane from Amsterdam to Detroit by a Nigerian citizen during Christmas 2009, framing the discussion on the full body scanner technology as a response to this failed terrorist attack. *Rzeczpospolita* follows up on the issue more thoroughly, reporting further on the issue of a planned EU expert meeting to regulate the use of full body scanners in European airports. Finally, in March 2011 an article appears which mentions the plans of the US Department of the Interior to develop the technology further and widen its use.

5.1.2. Body scanners - content analysis: actors, topics, and argumentative strategies

Due to the low importance of the issue in the Polish media, the sample of articles regarding body scanners is not only the smallest part of the overall sample of articles, but also includes the smallest number of coded statements (N=28). Within the coded content the journalist is the actor in a quarter of the statements, however these are mostly statements which define something. When the journalist is not the actor, state institutions (25%) and states (11%) constituted the most relevant source of information on the topic (see Table 5.1.).

Citizens/passengers have no direct voice in the debates. Instead activists (11%) and advocacy groups in general (7%) represent their potential concerns. However, actors representative of civil society have only half as many statements as actors who represent the state. Representatives of transport companies offer only two statements (7%), the same number as experts. However, even when experts are mentioned, they are cited very generally as, “experts agree that...” or “European experts will discuss...” In one instance, the article quotes a US news media outlet. Therefore, the debates are very much state-centered and mostly reflect the news from press agencies. It seems that the journalists do not make much effort to consult other sources, such as independent experts or European-based activists.

²⁵ RZ - 2010 JAN - Unijny spór o lotniskowe skanery [EU row over airport scanners]

²⁶ RZ - 2011 MAR - Wielki Brat chciał widzieć nagi tłum [Big Brother wanted to see a naked crowd]

Table 5.1. Body scanners - Actors and actors' origin

| Actors | # | % of the statements | US A | UK | D E | IT | P L | International | E U | Actor mentioned generally | Other* |
|---------------------------------|----|---------------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------------|--------|---------------------------|---------|
| Journalist | 7 | 25% | | | | | 7 | | | | |
| State institutions | 7 | 25% | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | |
| Activists | 3 | 11% | 2 | | | | | 1 | | | |
| States | 3 | 11% | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | 1 |
| Transport Company | 2 | 7% | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Advocacy Group | 2 | 7% | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Experts | 2 | 7% | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | |
| National security agency | 1 | 4% | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| Other** | 1 | 4% | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| Total: | 28 | 100% | 9 (32%) | 4 (14%) | 1 (4%) | 1 (4%) | 7 (25%) | 1 (4%) | 2 (7%) | 1 (4%) | 3 (11%) |

Note: Percentages in actors' origin do not sum up to 100% since there is one case of states cooperation, where two countries are actors in the same statement.

*The Netherlands, ** Media: USA Today

In terms of actors' origin, all the actors in all of the coded statements are foreign, except when the actor is the journalist. This confirms our general expectation that the debate on full body scanners' use in airports is considered external to the Polish context and is represented as such in the media. If we look at the frequency of actors' national origins, it is quite clear that sources from the US dominate the discussion. Almost one-third of the actors are from the US, be they state-related or actors from civil society. However, we find that actors from fellow EU countries are also mentioned quite often: mostly the UK (14% of the statements), the Netherlands (11%), as well as Germany, Italy and the EU in general. Altogether, sources from other European countries and the EU make up 40% of all the actors, outnumbering the US actors. Actors of EU origin are almost solely state-related. The only exception is a British advocacy group - the Association for Airport Passenger Rights *FlyersRights.Org*. In terms of interaction between actors, there is one instance where the articles mention a British-Dutch common action vis-à-vis the European Union, in favor of the introduction of full body scanners.

Most statements directly concern the scanners (38%), though a few statements combine this concern with other issues. Privacy and security rules and regulations are also important, each accounting for 18% of the topics raised, as well as the increase in the number of body scanners (15%). Terrorism was the topic of about 12% of the statements (see Table 5.2.).

Table 5.2. Body scanners -Topics

| Topics | # | % of topics |
|---|----|-------------|
| Body Scanner | 13 | 38% |
| Privacy | 6 | 18% |
| Security related rules and regulations | 6 | 18% |
| Increase number of body scanners | 5 | 15% |
| Terrorism | 4 | 12% |
| Total: | 34 | 100% |

Body scanners as a topic appear mostly in definitive statements describing the functioning of the scanners. In the European context, body scanners are the topic of statements regarding the announced intention of purchasing the scanners for the Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam. While these are some examples of definitive statements on the topic of body scanner, slightly more often these statements are evaluative, mostly negative in direction, as we will see below.

Privacy is one of the most important topics in relation to the scanners. Most of the analyzed articles include references to the alleged nudity of passengers in full body scanners, including statements like, “Are you flying to the US? You are in for personal pat-downs, explosive-detector checks, and even ‘naked’ scans (...) their operators can see what is underneath passengers’ clothes.”²⁷ In some cases this topic is raised in a neutral way, referring to the procedure and how the person who views the body scan images is separated from the actual passenger being scanned, and how the images are immediately destroyed, preserving privacy. However, more often it is the activist groups that raise this issue in a non-neutral way, drawing attention to potential threats to privacy which may come with the use of the scanners.

When the issue of security-related rules and regulations is brought up it is mostly in the US context. For instance, one article mentions the debate in the House of Representatives in which scanners were deemed only acceptable as a complementary security measure.²⁸ But mostly it is the civil society actors -US and UK based- that refer to security rules and regulations and how the introduction of body scanners infringes on certain basic rights (see below for justifications). In the European context, only one article covers the debate over the use of full body scanners within the EU. It states that back “in 2008 the EU requested in-depth analysis to check whether these machines endanger in any way the EU regulations concerning privacy” and, further that “the EU experts will discuss on Thursday the possibility of using the scanners in the airports of the 27 EU countries.”²⁹ Here the EU is represented as an actor preoccupied with privacy rights, while in the US context it is primarily civil society actors that raise the issue of how security-related rules and regulations affect these rights.

²⁷ RZ - 2010 JAN - Podróże w czasach terroru [Travelling in times of terror]

²⁸ GW - 2010 JAN - Lotniska pod specjalnym nadzorem [Airports under special surveillance]

²⁹ RZ - 2010 JAN - Unijny spór o lotniskowe skanery [EU row over airport scanners]

The increase in the use of full body scanners is a third important topic, raised in the US context, describing the actual increase in their use. In the European context we find statements related to the intention of the Netherlands and the UK to purchase them, as well as statements from the Schiphol Airport announcing the intention to implement their use as a reaction to the failed terrorist attempt on the plane to Detroit.

Finally, the issue of terrorism, although it frames the whole debate, is mentioned explicitly in only 12% of the statements. The statements make references to terrorism when discussing the failed terrorist attack by a Nigerian citizen on Christmas 2009. One also find references in state-related actors' statements, such as that of the Italian Interior Ministry, which asserts that the scanners will prevent terrorist attacks with explosives on the body of the terrorist³⁰(see below for the full quote).

When analyzing the argumentative strategies we can see that more than half of the statements are definitive - they refer both to the functioning of the scanners, as well as the developments in other countries. The evaluative and advocative statements make up for 46% of the coded statements. Looking at the direction of the argument in these claims, we can see that among the evaluative statements those making negative evaluations predominate. Advocative statements are quite scarce - they occur only twice in the analyzed articles. However, both are positive (see Table 5.3.).

Table 5.3. Body scanners - Argumentative strategies

| Argumentative strategies | # | % |
|--------------------------|----|------|
| Definitive | 15 | 54% |
| Evaluative | 11 | 39% |
| Advocative | 2 | 7% |
| | 28 | 100% |

When considering the negative evaluations of the body scanners, one finds a number of actors. Some are state-related actors, such as Peter Schaar, the German Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information. He asserts, "I have never seen a scanner which would preserve privacy."³¹ But there are also activists from civil society, such as a representative of the Association for Airport Passenger Rights and *FlyersRights.Org*, who argues that, "the price is too high. These scanners will not necessarily detect criminals, but for sure will expose us to an insulting peeping."³² Other advocacy groups quoted for negative evaluations include the activist group Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC, USA) and Action for the Rights of Children (ARCH, UK).

³⁰ RZ - 2010 JAN - Unijny spór o lotniskowe skanery [EU row over airport scanners]

³¹ RZ - 2010 JAN - Unijny spór o lotniskowe skanery [EU row over airport scanners]

³² GW - 2010 JAN – Lotniska pod specjalnym nadzorem [Airports under special surveillance]

Positive evaluations of the use of body scanners are almost solely expressed by representatives of state institutions, namely the British Transport Ministry, the US House of Representatives, and Franco Frattini, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.³³ The latter is quoted for asserting that “[the scanners] can even detect a capsule with explosives swallowed by a terrorist, detect whether he is a living bomb. Normal airport detectors could never do that.”³⁴ Also, a journalist from *Gazeta Wyborcza* offers a positive evaluation of the efficiency of full body scanners, asserting that they would have prevented the failed terrorist attempt by a Nigerian passenger on Christmas 2009.³⁵ The two advocative statements are both in favor of using the full body scanners. On the one hand, the UK and the Netherlands are quoted as announcing that they would ask the EU to introduce these scanners to European airports. On the other hand, the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is quoted for speaking in favor of the full body scanners in the face of activists’ protests over privacy issues. Again, it is only states and state institutions that lobby for the introduction of the scanners.

Table 5.4. Body scanners - Argumentative strategies and direction of the argument

| | Argumentative strategies | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|-----|------------|------|
| | Evaluative | | Advocative | |
| | # | % | # | % |
| Positive | 4 | 36% | 2 | 100% |
| Negative | 7 | 64% | 0 | |
| | 11 | | 2 | |

Justifications for actors’ assertions have been provided in half of the coded statements, though in a few cases there was more than a single justification. Most justifications are negative (50% of coded justifications) (see Table 5.5.). Privacy and efficiency were the most often quoted justification, with each accounting for around one third of all justifications coded. Privacy and efficiency were used as an argument in both a positive and negative sense. In positive sense, privacy is used as justification in quotes from the British Transport Ministry and the US TSA, the latter quoted as asserting that, “[t]he use of full body scanners has limits - the face and intimate parts of the body are blurred, and the images in the computer are destroyed immediately after checking that the passenger is ‘clean.’”³⁶

Issues of privacy are mentioned in negative evaluations by the German Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (see quote above), while the activist from the Association for Airport Passenger Rights *FlyersRights.Org* (see quote above) mentions privacy, dignity, and efficiency as the main justifications for a negative evaluation of full body scanners. Finally, legality is a justification

³³ Fratinni was wrongly quoted by *Rzeczpospolita* as the Italian Interior Minister.

³⁴ RZ - 2010 JAN - Unijny spór o lotniskowe skanery [EU row over airport scanners]

³⁵ GW - 2010 JAN – Lotniska pod specjalnym nadzorem [Airports under special surveillance]

³⁶ GW - 2010 JAN – Lotniska pod specjalnym nadzorem [Airports under special surveillance]

solely used by activist groups. An EPIC representative denounces US Interior Security Department plans to increase the use of scanners together with CCTV cameras to detect terrorist as “inadmissible level of surveillance.”³⁷ Meanwhile ARCH is quoted for their rejection of full body scanners on the basis that it infringes on the British laws concerning the prohibition of images of children’s naked body.³⁸

Table 5.5. Body scanners - Justifications

| Justification | # | % of statements | % of justifications | Direction of argument # of statements coded (total % of justifications) | | |
|---------------|-----------|-----------------|---------------------|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| | | | | Positive | Negative | Neutral |
| Privacy | 4 | 14% | 29% | 2 | 2 | |
| Efficiency | 4 | 14% | 29% | 2 | 2 | |
| Security | 3 | 11% | 21% | 1 | | 2 |
| Legality | 2 | 7% | 14% | | 2 | |
| Dignity | 1 | 4% | 7% | | 1 | |
| Total: | 14 | 50% | 100% | 5 (36%) | 8 (50%) | 3 (14%) |

In general, the discussion of the 3D body scanners in relation to airport security is rather limited in the two newspapers analyzed. While the issue of security in international airports is considered in general relevant to the Polish citizens, the discussion regarding full body scanners is framed as external to the Polish context. The scanners are mostly mentioned in relation to privacy issues, but somewhat anecdotally as the “naked body scans” and discussed in terms of their ambiguous efficiency.

5.2. Stuxnet

5.2.1. Quality of the articles and main topics covered

The Stuxnet virus and cyber war in general received moderate attention in the Polish media - significantly more than the full body scanner issue, but less than the CCTV camera debate. Articles mentioning Stuxnet constitute 32% of the sample. In total I analyzed 14 articles, seven articles from each newspaper under consideration. In total I coded 62 statements according to the *Seconomics* coding scheme. While Stuxnet received most direct coverage in 2010, the year of its discovery, it continued to be referenced in articles dealing with cyber war and the dangers of new internet technologies up until 2013. The general topic received most attention from the two newspapers in 2012. But the number of statements directly referencing Stuxnet was significantly lower in the most recent articles. More than half of the total number of

³⁷ RZ - 2011 MAR - Wielki Brat chciał widzieć nagi tłum [Big Brother wanted to see a naked crowd]

³⁸ RZ - 2010 JAN - Unijny spór o lotniskowe skanery [EU row over airport scanners]

statements regarding Stuxnet has been coded in the four articles published in 2010 and early 2011, just after the discovery of the virus.

The analytic quality and depth of the articles varies. Most of them appeared in the world news section. However, *Rzeczpospolita* also published a number of articles about cyber war in its science section. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, on the other hand, reported on cyber espionage in its economy section. Some of the articles, especially those discussing more general issues of cyber espionage and cyber war, are long and mention a number of sources, particularly relying on expert opinions. The articles directly addressing Stuxnet in 2010 and early 2011 are longer and better researched in *Rzeczpospolita*, while *Gazeta Wyborcza* offers shorter articles and seems to rely more on press agency releases. Yet the debate that follows on the general topic of cyber war and cyber espionage in the industry is of comparable quality in both news outlets.

In terms of the development of the topic over time, we find that articles from 2010 and early 2011 focus solely on Stuxnet as an attack on Iran and its infrastructure. They are also more descriptive in character, with titles such as, “Iran is defending itself from a virus,”³⁹ or, “Cyber-attack of a new generation on Iran.”⁴⁰ In the following years Stuxnet is referenced in more general discussions concerning cyber espionage (political, as well as in the industry) and cyber war and its rules. Especially in 2012, a number of articles focus on the topic of espionage, including, “Virus, worse than a spy,”⁴¹ “Cyber spy, at your service,”⁴² and “China-USA: a battle of spies?”⁴³ focusing especially on industrial espionage. Stuxnet is also mentioned in subsequent reports concerning other types of malware, particularly the Flame virus.

5.2.2. *Stuxnet - content analysis: actors, topics and argumentative strategies*

Among the 62 coded statements, journalists constitute one third of the actors. However, most of their statements (more than 90%) are merely definitive, so it seems that they simply describe the debate and do not try to shape it in any active way. Without a doubt, experts are the main source of information on Stuxnet- a quarter of the coded material constitutes their opinions. However, in almost a third of the cases they are mentioned generally in statements such as, “[s]pecialists from all over the world agree that...” Another significant portion of the statements quote states or state institutions. These two categories alone constitute 23% of all actors (including the US president and representatives of the Israeli secret service). Other actors include Stuxnet itself and the media (each mentioned 5 times). Finally, a private

³⁹ GW - 2010 OCT - “Iran broni się przed wirusem” [Iran is defending itself from a virus]

⁴⁰ RZ - 2010 SEP - “Cyberatak nowej generacji na Iran” [A cyber-attack of a new generation on Iran]

⁴¹ RZ - 2012 JUN - “Wirus gorszy niż szpieg” [Virus worse than a spy]

⁴² GW - 2012 OCT - “Cyberszpieg do usług” [Cyber spy, at your service]

⁴³ GW - 2012 OCT - Chiny - USA walka szpiegów [China and USA: battle of the spies]

company is an actor in two statements, and in one instance we find that the actor is an “other” - in this case, alleged hackers from Israel and the US (see Table 5.6.).

Table 5.6. Stuxnet - Actors and actors’ origin

| Actors | # | % of the statements | USA | Israel | Actor is mentioned generally | Iran | Other | Russia | UK |
|--------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Journalist | 20 | 32% | | | | | | | |
| Expert | 16 | 26% | 2 | 1 | 6 | | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| State(s) | 11 | 13% | 3 | 4 | | 3 | | 1 | |
| State institutions | 6 | 10% | 2 | 1 | | 3 | | | |
| Stuxnet | 5 | 8% | | | 5 | | | | |
| Media | 5 | 8% | 5 | | | | | | |
| Private company | 2 | 2% | 1 | | | | 1 | | |
| Others | 2 | 2% | 1 | | | | | | |
| Total: | 67 | 100% | 12 (19,4%) | 6 (9,7%) | 6 (9,7%) | 6 (9,7%) | 6 (9,7%) | 2 (3,2%) | 1 (1,6%) |

Note: Where origin is not specified (journalist) it is a national actor (Polish). We find interactions between actors, thus, the number of statements does not equal the total number in actors’ origin. State institutions include all types. Percentages in actors’ origin indicate the % of occurrence over the total number of statements and do not add up to 100%.

In terms of the origin of the actors, all journalists are national, but one can find no other actors of Polish origin in the material analyzed. This fact points to the framing of the issue as, once more, external to the Polish context. Almost 20% of the actors are from the US, 10% are from Israel, and another 10% are from Iran. Experts come from a variety of countries, though their origin is not generally mentioned. These experts are from the US, specifically the US Naval War College, and Israel, specifically a security expert without known affiliation. They are also from the United Kingdom, with one statement from MWR InfoSecurity, Russia, with another from the Kaspersky Lab, and other countries, including Finland with a statement from F-secure. Among the states and state institutions, the statements identify the US as an actor four times, Israel five times, and Iran six times. These three countries are the origin of all state-related actors, except for one mention of Russia. Also, it is interesting to see that while the US and Israel are represented by different types of actors, sources from Iran are limited to those that are state-related. All references to US media refer to *The New York Times*. The private companies mentioned are a US Laboratory in Idaho and the German corporation Siemens.

As far as the topics are concerned, more than a third of the statements coded refer to the Iranian uranium enrichment programme, and a quarter refers to an attack on a company, so we also coded for industrial espionage and attacks on infrastructure. The deployment of an attack using Stuxnet appeared in 24% of the statements. Development of Stuxnet by a state and attack on Iran were the topic of statements slightly less frequently. Each appeared in around 20% of the coded material. Cyber war was the topic of eleven statements (18%). Interestingly, Israel was as an attacker slightly more often than the US (the former 10 times, the latter 8). Finally the Stuxnet and Flame viruses were the topic of around 15% of the statements. It is also worth mentioning that terrorism was the topic of only one coded statement. Also, a

discussion of the legality of the attack was mostly absent from the Polish coverage of the Stuxnet attacks (mentioned only once, in 2013, in relation to the Tallin Manual development).

Table 5.7. Stuxnet - Topics

| Main topics | # | % statements | % topics |
|--------------------------------------|----|--------------|----------|
| Uranian uranium enrichment programme | 21 | 34% | 17% |
| Attack on a company | 16 | 26% | 13% |
| Deployment/attack using Stuxnet | 15 | 24% | 12% |
| Development of Stuxnet by a state | 13 | 21% | 11% |
| Attack on Iran | 12 | 19% | 10% |
| Cyber war | 11 | 18% | 9% |
| State accused of attack: Israel | 10 | 16% | 8% |
| State accused of attack: USA | 8 | 13% | 7% |
| Stuxnet | 7 | 11% | 6% |
| Flame | 3 | 5% | 2% |

Therefore, the Polish media at times portrayed Stuxnet as an attack in the context of the Iranian uranium enrichment programme. However, more frequently the media framed it as an attack on infrastructure itself (24% of the statements), than explicitly an attack on Iran (20% of the statements). One example of this framing is an assertion made by a journalist that, “the virus attacked in 2009 and 2010. It destroyed the devices in Natanz laboratory, where, according to the West, work has been underway which would lead to obtaining a nuclear weapon. It also delayed the startup of the nuclear plant in Busher.”⁴⁴ Also experts initially focus more on the attack on a particular part of infrastructure. In the same vein, representatives of Iran quoted in the Polish media coverage downplay the importance of the attack, framing it as a mere problem of industry espionage and not a political attack on Iran. For instance, the Iranian Vice-Minister of Industry is quoted as saying that Stuxnet has been sent around the world to steal information from computers in the industry.⁴⁵ So in the initial coverage Stuxnet presents it as capable of overtaking key infrastructure, such as factories and power plants. It also emphasizes that it does not constitute a danger to personal computers. In spite of a stronger focus on Stuxnet’s capacity to attack infrastructure in general, and the Iranian uranium enrichment programme in particular, the reports frequently refer to the virus as an attack on the state itself. Already in 2010 some reports quote experts who argue that it was in fact an attack on Iran. “The virus can infect random computers. The fact that 80% of them have been in Iran indicates that it was this country that was the main target of the attack.”⁴⁶

Later articles, which focus more broadly on the issue of cyber war, mention Stuxnet

⁴⁴ GW - 2011 JAN - “Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom” [Who let the virus in to the Iranians]

⁴⁵ GW - 2010 OCT - “Iran broni się przed wirusem” [Iran is defending itself from a virus]

⁴⁶ RZ - 2010 SEP - “Cyberatak nowej generacji na Iran” [A cyber attack of a new generation on Iran]

more often as a cyber-weapon in the context of the attack on Iran. Also, the direct implication of the US in cyber war is largely recognized in later statements. In a 2012 article we read that, “it would be naïve to believe that USA acts only in cyber-defense. Not so long ago, it became known that the famous virus, Stuxnet, which was successfully introduced into the Iranian nuclear plants, was the common project of US and Israeli secret service.”⁴⁷ Therefore, in articles which refer to Stuxnet in the following years the US is characterised as an active player in the global cyber war, and Stuxnet is thought to mark the starting point of cyber-attacks between countries.

The details of the workings of Stuxnet are mentioned quite frequently in the Polish press. The main focus is on how it can access the industrial operating systems and remain harmless to personal computers. Furthermore, it is often referred to as the first tool developed for the purpose of “espionage and re-programming computers in the industry”⁴⁸ and it was created for the sabotage of the Iranian uranium enrichment programme, indicating its development by a state.

The development of Stuxnet by a state is another important topic. We frequently find assertions which point to the fact that individuals would not have the financial means to develop such a complicated worm. For instance, one statement asserts, “Experts from the start argued that the programme is so complicated that it had to be developed by people without financial limitations, thus, working for a government.”⁴⁹ However, it is in early 2011 when the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza* quotes the revelations published by *The New York Times*, indicating Barack Obama continued a programme developed by George Bush. Quoting the same source it asserts that Stuxnet was tested for two years in an Israeli nuclear laboratory Dimon by the Israelis and Americans.⁵⁰ *Rzeczpospolita* also quotes *The New York Times* in an article, though with a significant delay, in 2012.

The issue of who exactly was the author of the attack is subject of speculation from the beginning of the coverage. Already in 2010 a journalist notes that, “on the list of countries which would be interested in attacking the Iranian infrastructure, we can find the USA and Israel.”⁵¹ However, initially it is asserted that “Israel denies its involvement in the attack on Bush,”⁵² while in later articles Israeli involvement is taken for granted. As noted above, Israel appears as the state that developed the Stuxnet attack a bit more frequently. For instance, in a 2012 article in *Rzeczpospolita* we read that, “it was commonly believed that Stuxnet was the *oeuvre* of the Israelis, who try to do whatever they can to prevent the ayatollahs’ regime from obtaining nuclear missiles”.⁵³ However, in most of the statements the USA and Israel appear together as the states accused of developing Stuxnet and deploying the virus to

47 GW - 2012 OCT - Chiny - USA walka szpiegów [China and USA: battle of the spies]

48 RZ - 2013 JAN - “Operacja ‘Czerwony październik’” [Operation “Red October”]

49 GW - 2010 OCT - “Iran broni się przed wirusem” [Iran is defending itself from a virus]

50 GW - 2011 JAN - “Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom” [Who let the virus in to the Iranians]

51 RZ - 2010 SEP - “Cyberatak nowej generacji na Iran” [A cyber-attack of a new generation on Iran]

52 GW - 2010 OCT - “Iran broni się przed wirusem” [Iran is defending itself from a virus]

53 RZ - 2012 MAY - “Wirus zamiast bomb i rakiet” [Virus, instead of bombs and missiles]

attack Iran. In one instance, it is the “US and Israeli hackers” who are accused of the attack.⁵⁴ The other country which is quoted in connection to the development of Stuxnet is Germany, as Siemens apparently contributed to the development of the virus. However, they note that their collaboration may have been without full knowledge of the project's ultimate goals.

As mentioned above, the development of the debate in the Polish media over time points towards the rising importance of malware such as Stuxnet and Flame for political and industrial espionage. Articles mention Stuxnet a few times as the precursor of programmes capable of such cyber espionage. Also, the alleged cyber espionage between the US and China receives coverage in two articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s economics section, where Stuxnet is evidence that US government does not only act in defensive, but also develops attacks using cyber weapons.⁵⁵

In terms of argumentative strategies, the discussion of Stuxnet in the Polish media has been to a large extent a descriptive report of the attack and the following developments related to cyber war. Over 90% of the statements are purely definitive. In the articles mentioning Stuxnet, we find only four evaluative statements and one advocative. The latter is a statement by the US Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, who asserts, “[cyber-attacks], together with a conventional attack, would constitute a cyber-Pearl Harbor, which could paralyze the nation and give an impression of defenselessness... The US has to be able to act against those who want to attack us, to protect our nation.”⁵⁶ This assertion is made in 2012 in relation to alleged Iranian cyber-attacks on the US which are considered, by the journalist, a response to the Stuxnet attack.

⁵⁴ GW - 2012 NOV - “Irańskie cyberoddziały uderzają w USA i ich sojuszników” [Iranian super troops hit the US and its allies]

⁵⁵ GW - 2012 OCT - Chiny - USA walka szpiegów [China and USA: battle of the spies], GW - 2012 OCT - “Cyberszpieg do usług” [Cyber spy, at your service]

⁵⁶ GW - 2012 NOV - “Irańskie cyberoddziały uderzają w USA i ich sojuszników” [Iranian super troops hit the US and its allies]

Table 5.8. Stuxnet - argumentative strategies

| Argumentative strategies | # | % |
|--------------------------|----|------|
| Definitive | 57 | 92% |
| Evaluative | 4 | 6% |
| Advocative | 1 | 2% |
| Total: | 62 | 100% |

Among the evaluative statements, two are negative, one is positive, and one is neutral. The negative ones concern the stances of USA and Israel on the Iranian Uranium enrichment programme, which are evaluated as dangerous for Israel.⁵⁷ The positive statement is a quotation from the former Mossad Director, who evaluates positively the fact Iran has lost its capacity to develop nuclear weapons, at least until 2015.⁵⁸ The evaluative neutral statement is an expert opinion on whether the attack with Stuxnet could be considered a reason enough for armed retaliation on part of Iran. Prof. Michael Schmitt of the US Naval War College, who coordinated the work on the so-called Tallinn manual prepared by the NATO, says that, “the opinions of the experts are divided on this issue.”⁵⁹ This also the only instance when the legality of the attack is discussed in the analyzed material.

Table 5.9. Stuxnet - Justifications

| Justification | # | % of statements | % of justifications |
|--------------------------|----|-----------------|---------------------|
| Preemptive strike | 5 | 8% | 38% |
| Defense | 3 | 5% | 23% |
| Efficiency | 3 | 5% | 23% |
| Costs | 2 | 3% | 15% |
| Total: | 13 | 21% | 100% |

We found justifications in only 21% of the statements. This was by far the smallest number of all three topics considered. Most often “preemptive strike” was mentioned as a justification for Stuxnet, together with defense, especially in relation to the fears of Israel concerning the possibilities of Iranian nuclear weapons, “which would constitute a deadly danger for Israel.”⁶⁰ Efficiency is mentioned in relation to the successful delay of the

⁵⁷ GW - 2011 JAN - “Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom” [Who let the virus in to the Iranians], RZ - 2010 SEP - “Cyberatak nowej generacji na Iran” [A cyber attack of a new generation on Iran]

⁵⁸ GW - 2011 JAN - “Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom” [Who let the virus in to the Iranians]

⁵⁹ GW - 2013 MAR - “NATO Można zabić hakera” [NATO: One can even kill a hacker]

⁶⁰ GW - 2010 OCT - “Iran broni się przed wirusem” [Iran is defending itself from a virus], RZ - 2012 MAY - “Wirus zamiast bomb i rakiet” [Virus, instead of bombs and missiles]

programme by Iran due to Stuxnet attack.⁶¹ Also, experts mention the drama and efficiency of Stuxnet, stating that, “[Stuxnet] is something like in Hollywood movies. It opens the doors to some of the most guarded objects and makes it possible to take control of them.”⁶² Finally, costs of the development of such a complicated programme as Stuxnet are the justifications in statements which assert that the malware must have been developed by a state.⁶³

Table 5.10. Stuxnet - Cooperation of actors

| Cooperation | Type of actor | Topic |
|---------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| USA & Israel | States | Attack on Iran |
| Iran & Russia | States | Iranian uranium enrichment programme |
| USA & Germany | Private company | Development of Stuxnet |

Finally, in comparison to the other topics under consideration, we find the highest number of occurrences of cooperation between the actors in the material concerning Stuxnet. While the cooperation between USA and Israel in the development of Stuxnet and its deployment in Iran appears most frequently in terms of the topic, we can also find statements where both states are the actors, and, thus, cooperation has been coded. Other instances of cooperation between actors include Russia helping in the development of nuclear installations in Iran⁶⁴ and the German private company Siemens collaborating in the development of Stuxnet (albeit, allegedly without full knowledge of the project's details).⁶⁵

5.3. CCTV Cameras

5.3.1. Overview of the sample

The articles concerning the use of CCTV cameras in Poland constitute the biggest share of the sample under analysis - 59% of selected material, a total of twenty-six articles. Six articles were published in 2010, seven in 2011, eleven in 2012 and two in early 2013. Clearly, the debate peaked in 2012. This is also the year when most high

⁶¹ GW - 2011 JAN - "Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom" [Who let the virus in to the Iranians]

⁶² RZ - 2010 SEP - "Cyberatak nowej generacji na Iran" [A cyber-attack of a new generation on Iran]

⁶³ GW - 2011 JAN - "Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom" [Who let the virus in to the Iranians], GW - 2010 OCT - "Iran broni się przed wirusem" [Iran is defending itself from a virus]

⁶⁴ GW - 2010 OCT - "Iran broni się przed wirusem" [Iran is defending itself from a virus]

⁶⁵ GW - 2011 JAN - "Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom" [Who let the virus in to the Iranians]

quality material was published (see below). Overall 228 statements have been coded according to the *Seconomics* coding scheme in relation to CCTV cameras in the Polish press.

In terms of the quality, the articles concerning CCTV cameras include far more in-depth analyses and interventions from national actors than in the other two other topics. Overall, articles regarding CCTV cameras appear more frequently in the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita*. However, half of them were published in the specialized law sections and specifically addressed the issue of the non-existent regulations for the monitoring of public and private spaces (with slightly more focus on the monitoring of private spaces). Though the articles published by the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza* were fewer, they were longer and better-researched than those in *Rzeczpospolita*. They also contained interviews with key actors and clearly hoped to increase the importance of security-privacy issues on the public agenda.

As mentioned above, debate over CCTV camera use has been virtually non-existent in the Polish press prior to 2010. In the first year under analysis, 2010, articles discussing the use of CCTV often focus on the entitlements of Special Services to access private information. This is because a scandal broke out at the time over the surveillance of prominent Polish journalists (see section 2). Another relevant issue is the use of private CCTV systems to complement public monitoring systems and the lack of any regulations regarding such “civic monitoring.” This issue is more frequently raised in the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita*. In 2011 the topic was almost absent from the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza*, while *Rzeczpospolita* published some articles in its law section. These focused on the lack of regulation of public and private monitoring. The paper's *Życie Warszawy* section also focused on Warsaw's CCTV system. Nevertheless, one must note that neither section of the right-leaning newspaper are really targeted at the wider national audience, as the former has a specialized target audience (lawyers and entrepreneurs), and the latter has a local scope limited to the capital city. Therefore, we can assert that in 2011 the discussion of CCTV in Poland has been very limited.

This stands in contrast to the following year, when the debate over CCTV systems peaks. In 2012 the articles address more directly the need for regulation of the use of CCTV cameras in Poland in both newspapers. Furthermore, *Gazeta Wyborcza* publishes some of the most important interventions in 2012. These long articles about new technologies and the security/privacy dilemma include interviews with Irena Lipowicz, a Polish ombudswoman, and Jan Hartmann, a lecturer at the University of Warsaw. *Rzeczpospolita* publishes one similar piece in 2012, a shorter interview with Katarzyna Szymielewicz from the *Panoptykon* Foundation, but kept on publishing articles in its law section focused on the lack of regulations for private and public monitoring. As a result there is a significant qualitative difference between the two news outlets. While *Gazeta Wyborcza* publishes articles which discuss the use of new surveillance technologies in a more general way and in relation to values such as privacy/intimacy, *Rzeczpospolita* tends to focus more on a narrower discussion of private and public monitoring regulations in its law section, as well as on the efficiency of CCTV as a crime-prevention technology, especially in relation to Warsaw's public monitoring system.

Overall the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita* considers CCTV through a lens of security and legality. It maintains a particular focus on the development of the Warsaw CCTV system and specialized legal discussions of the use of public and private monitoring, the latter targeted at a more specialized audience, as they appear in the law sections of the newspaper. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, on the other hand, offers articles which are less frequent (they appear in 2010 and 2012) but present longer and more general discussions of the issue, focusing on the limits of security technologies and their threats to privacy rights. This differential agenda-setting in both newspapers under analysis is clear also from the titles of the articles. *Rzeczpospolita* publishes articles with titles like, “Private cameras, instead of public,”⁶⁶ or, “Costly city peeping,”⁶⁷ setting the focus of the debate on public and private monitoring, the purchase and installation of CCTV cameras and its costs. It also has headlines such as, “The legality of monitoring still unregulated” or “Real estate cameras, outlaws” in its law section, focusing on different legal aspects of private and public domain monitoring. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, on the other hand, publishes, among others, stories with headlines like, “A controlled life,”⁶⁸ “One can see everything,”⁶⁹ “Poles watched,”⁷⁰ and, “We need courage, not cameras,”⁷¹ drawing the attention clearly much more towards the discussion on the social consequences of the surveillance technologies for the privacy of Polish citizens.

Without a doubt we are currently witnessing an emerging debate over the issue of CCTV in Poland, as noted in the previous section. While in 2010, the issue of surveillance technologies (CCTV included) has been mostly problematized in relation to the irregularities in the workings of the Polish National Intelligence Agency (ABW), in 2011 the topic has been less prominent and the articles focus on the use of CCTV for crime prevention in different areas. It receives most attention in 2012 in relation to the debate over the necessity of regulating the use of private and public domain monitoring in Poland. Articles from early 2013 addresses the concerns over the use of private domain monitoring (workplace and prisons), an issue which is not regulated in Poland, and thus it remains in line with the focus of the 2012 debate. We can expect that the importance of the debate over CCTV cameras will continue to gain momentum in Poland, especially after Prime Minister Tusk’s declaration in June 2013, announcing the government’s plans to regulate the use of CCTV cameras. Therefore, here we can analyze the content of the debate leading up to this important declaration, which, without a doubt, constituted a response to some of the interventions in the leading Polish dailies, analyzed below.

⁶⁶ RZ - 2010 FEB - “Kamery prywatne zamiast miejskich” [Private cameras instead of city cameras]

⁶⁷ RZ - 2012 MAY - “Kosztowne miejskie podpatrywanie” [Costly city peeping]

⁶⁸ GW - 2010 OCT - “Życie kontrolowane” [A controlled life]

⁶⁹ GW - 2010 NOV - “Wszystko widać” [One can see everything]

⁷⁰ GW - 2012 OCT - “Polacy na podglądzie” [Poles, watched]

⁷¹ GW - 2012 OCT - “Nie kamer nam trzeba ale odwagi” [We need courage, not cameras]

5.3.2. CCTV Cameras - content analysis: actors, topics and argumentative strategies

In line with the clearly stronger importance of the issue of CCTV cameras in the Polish media, the sample regarding this topic includes the highest number of coded statements compared to the other topics (N=228). Within the coded statements the journalist is the actor in less than one third of the statements. The most important actors apart from the journalists are state-related: state institutions (23%), city councils, mainly the Warsaw City Council (10%), the police (3%), and a government security agency (1 statement). State institutions include most prominently the Polish Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) and Polish Ombudswoman, but also representatives of the Department of Woods Protection and Spokesperson for Patients' Rights Protection. Altogether state-related actors appear in more than one third of the analyzed statements (around 37%) (see Table 5.11.).

Actors from civil society have a voice in around 7% of the statements, and citizens in only about 2%. Activists include representatives of the *Panoptykon* Foundation, and a Polish activist from the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. Experts appear as actors in 7% of analyzed content, while politicians in only 2%. Experts include mainly professors from the University of Warsaw and a psychologist. Other actors, which constitute 6% of the actors in the sample, include a variety of individuals such as representatives of housing estates, public hospitals, supermarket owners, and CCTV camera operators. Representatives of private companies appear in only 3% of the statements. One of them is a Polish company, which is developing a system similar to the INDECT project, a system of cameras capable of detecting suspicious movements of citizens on the street. The other is a bank, which announced that it will install a workers' surveillance system in its offices. Finally, it is important to note the absence of any actors related to transport companies. The issue of CCTV's use in public transport is virtually non-existent in the Polish debate, despite the fact that CCTV is present in Warsaw's buses and metro, as well as train stations. This is due to the institutional set-up of the CCTV control in Warsaw. As mentioned before, it is rather difficult to discern the urban transport CCTV systems from the general public domain monitoring network in the city, and as such the discussions of the transport security regime are subsumed in the debates over the use of CCTV by the municipality in general.

Table 5.11. CCTV Cameras - Actors and actors' origin

| Actors | | | USA | Poland | EU | Actor is mentioned generally |
|----------------------------|------------|-----|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|
| Journalist | 78 | 34% | | 78 | | |
| State institutions | 53 | 23% | | 51 | | |
| City council | 22 | 10% | 1 | 21 | | |
| Experts | 17 | 7% | | 15 | 1 | 1 |
| Activists | 16 | 7% | | 16 | | |
| Others | 14 | 6% | | 14 | | |
| Police | 7 | 3% | 1 | 6 | | |
| Private company | 6 | 3% | | 6 | | |
| Politicians | 4 | 2% | | 4 | | |
| Citizen/Passenger | 4 | 2% | | 3 | | 1 |
| CCTV Cameras | 3 | 1% | | | | 3 |
| Municipality | 2 | 1% | | 2 | | |
| Non-state institutions | 2 | 1% | | 2 | | |
| Government security agency | 1 | 0% | | 1 | | |
| Total | 230 | | 2 (0,9%) | 220 (96,5%) | 1 (0,4%) | 5 (2,2%) |

We can clearly see that the Polish debate on CCTV cameras is dominated by state-related actors, while civil society actors and citizens are rather marginalized. Journalists are also quite present in the debate when compared to the other two topics. They do not only restrain themselves to definitive statements, but also offer evaluations of the issue (we find 51 definitive and 27 evaluative statements) and also attempt to actually influence the debate. It is interesting to note how few politicians one finds voicing their opinions on the issue of CCTV cameras in the selected media. CCTV cameras are clearly not a topic of interest for the national political debate, as has been noted in previous sections. Moreover, it seems plausible that their opinions on the issue are more visible at the local levels in the cities where these CCTV systems are being introduced by the city councils. It is to be expected, though, that their opinions on the issue of CCTV cameras in nation-wide media will increase in the following months, since the Prime Minister announced recently that the government will be working on a law regulating the use of monitoring in public and private spaces (see section 2).

In terms of the origin of the actors, in contrast to the other two topics analyzed, the debate is very much framed in the national context with almost 97% of the actors being Polish. There are two mentions of US actors, the New York city council and New York police, in one of the first articles analyzed (January 2010). There is also a 2011 reference to the EU Article 29 Working Party,⁷² a body of experts composed of a representative from the data protection authority of each EU Member State, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Commission. Afterwards, the

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Its name comes from the Data Protection Directive and it was launched in 1996

debate solely retreats to national actors, and is thus very different from the other two issues.

Table 5.12. CCTV Cameras - Principal actors

| Actor | Type of actor | Institution/organization | # statements coded | # articles | Position |
|---|-------------------|--|--------------------|------------|-----------|
| Michał Serzycki (2006-2010) Wojciech Wiewiórski (2010-...) | State institution | Polish Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) | 23 | 9 | Adverse |
| Prof. Irena Lipowicz | State institution | Ombudswoman, Poland | 19 | 6 | Adverse |
| Katarzyna Szymielewicz, Małgorzata Szumańska | Activists | <i>Panoptykon</i> Foundation, Poland | 11 | 4 | Adverse |
| Ewa Gawor | City council | Bureau for Security and Crisis Management, Warsaw City Council | 7 | 3 | Favorable |
| Jacek Gniadek, Jacek Lukomski | City council | Centre for Management of CCTV Systems, Warsaw City Council | 8 | 6 | Favorable |

Another notable aspect in this debate is that there are several individuals the articles quote repeatedly with authoritative statements concerning the use of private and public monitoring. Without a doubt, and as mentioned in the section regarding the Polish national context of these debates, Wojciech Wiewiórski, the Polish Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO), and Irena Lipowicz, the Polish Ombudswoman, remain central actors in the Polish debates surrounding issues of privacy and security in general, and the use of CCTV cameras in particular. Wiewiórski (and to lesser extent, his predecessor, Michał Serzycki) is the actor in 23 of the statements in nine different articles. Lipowicz, on the other hand, is quoted in 19 statements in six articles. Actors from the Warsaw City Council departments dealing with the issues of security and CCTV systems are prominent in the articles published in *Rzeczpospolita*. They are the actors in a total of 15 statements, in nine different articles, but only one of them was published in *Gazeta Wyborcza*. In terms of civil society actors, we find several quotes from the representatives of the major activist group on issues of privacy and surveillance - the *Panoptykon* Foundation. They appear as actors in 11 statements, in four different articles (one in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, three in *Rzeczpospolita*). Therefore, both newspapers give more space to authoritative statements regarding public and private domain monitoring from state-institutions and experts, (*Rzeczpospolita* is a bit more focused on the opinions from city councils, due to its stronger coverage of the development of Warsaw's CCTV system) and leave little space for the voices of civil society actors and almost none to citizens.

In terms of the main topics which are raised in relation to CCTV cameras, more than a quarter of the statements address the issue of security related rules and

regulations, another quarter that of public domain monitoring, and slightly more than 20% that of private cameras. The agenda is clearly set up around these three issues, and the need for the regulation of the use of public and private domain monitoring sums up most of the material published in relation to CCTV in the Polish media.

Table 5.13. CCTV Cameras - Topics

| Main Topics | # | % statements | % topics |
|--|----|--------------|----------|
| Security related rules and regulations | 61 | 27% | 18% |
| Public domain monitoring | 56 | 25% | 17% |
| Private domain monitoring | 47 | 21% | 14% |
| Surveillance | 30 | 13% | 9% |
| Cameras CCTV | 25 | 11% | 8% |
| Purchase/Installation of CCTV cameras | 21 | 9% | 6% |
| Crime Detection | 14 | 6% | 4% |
| Surveillance Increase | 12 | 5% | 4% |
| Indect Project | 12 | 5% | 4% |
| Costs | 10 | 4% | 3% |
| Crime Prevention | 8 | 4% | 2% |
| Personal data protection | 8 | 4% | 2% |

Note: A number of statements address more than just one aspect of the issue, and thus the number of topics does not add up to the same number as the number of statements identified for analysis.

Surveillance and its increasing prevalence are the next most important topics of interest, mentioned in around 18% of the statements coded. The CCTV cameras themselves are the topics of 11% of statements, and together with the purchase and installation of CCTV cameras (9%) and its costs (4%) this issue appears in less than a quarter of the statements. Crime detection and prevention include only 10% of the topics in relation to CCTV cameras. Finally, a number of statements discuss CCTV in terms of personal data protection, again indicating the debate over the necessity of establishing clear rules and regulations regarding the use of cameras. But it is equally interesting to note the topics which are absent from the debate, as CCTV monitoring is not discussed primarily in terms of counter-terrorism or national security. In fact there are only five coded statements for the former and two for the latter.

Without a doubt security rules and regulations -that is the need for a comprehensive regulation of the use of video surveillance- is the most relevant point in relation to CCTV cameras in Poland. The beginning of a wider debate on the topic can be seen in about 2010 when a scandal broke out concerning how Polish Special Services access sensitive private information (see section 2 on the Polish national context). This is the year when we find two long articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on the topic of state surveillance and the entitlements of Special Services to gather information about the citizens. Interestingly, we find no references to former communist state surveillance in this material. Instead the debate is framed solely in terms of the

dangers of new technologies and the lack of their proper legal regulation in Poland. In this sense the main difficulty seems to be the lack of clarity, whether the data obtained from CCTV constitutes personal data. GIODO argues, for example, that “the image of a face constitutes personal data... The necessity to regulate the issue of monitoring is of the issue which we want to settle.”⁷³ Also, activists are present in this debate. A member of the *Helsinki Committee for Human Rights* points out that

the constitution and international standards of human rights allow for a limitation of privacy for the sake of protection of safety or public order. But only when it is really necessary. A situation where part of surveillance methods is in practice out of any control violates this rule.⁷⁴

Rzeczpospolita, on the other hand, publishes in 2010 an article on the need to regulate the issue of the so-called “civic monitoring,” the installation of private cameras in order to increase one’s safety.⁷⁵ However, here the focus of the debate is quite different. The main point of discussion is the legality of private video surveillance as a safety measure. The main problem is the lack of a comprehensive law, especially in the context of private monitoring. Therefore, already in 2010 there are voices which call for a regulation of the use of surveillance technologies in Poland and recognize the need for a change in the Polish legal order which would precisely delineate the rules for all types of surveillance and allow for a measure of control over its legitimate use. In 2011 we find three more articles in *Rzeczpospolita* which are published in its law section and discuss the legal implications of a lack of regulation of the issue. Some of the legal issues they raise are the legal basis for public monitoring, the legality of the use of private cameras, and the issue of personal data protection. However, this debate emerges most strongly in the analyzed media debates in 2012. In this year we find three articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza* and three in *Rzeczpospolita* where representatives of state institutions and the civil society argue for the urgent necessity of regulating the use of video monitoring. Here we find a number of strong advocative statements in favor of a comprehensive law on the issue, mostly on part of state actors such as the GIODO and the Polish Ombudswoman (they constitute the actors in 50% of all statements regarding security related rules and regulations), but also by actors from civil society (mostly activists from the *Panoptykon* foundation). The interesting qualitative difference between the two news outlets is that while *Gazeta Wyborcza* deals with the topic in its opinion pieces and interviews with key actors and frames the discussion in terms of a general debate on the social consequences of the all-encompassing new surveillance technologies, *Rzeczpospolita* seems to focus much more on the specific legal aspects, and puts more emphasis on the necessity of regulating the use of cameras for private monitoring as the main issue to be addressed. Moreover, two out of three articles are published in its law section, and as such have a much more limited impact on the general public opinion, as noted above. Interestingly, again, we find no reference to communist state surveillance

⁷³ GW - 2010 NOV - “Wszystko widać” [One can see everything]

⁷⁴ GW - 2010 OCT - “Życie kontrolowane” [A controlled life]

⁷⁵ RZ – 2010 – Legalność monitoringu wciąż nieuregulowana

practices in any of the articles analyzed, confirming the observations made by earlier studies. The communist past is entirely absent from the Polish debates regarding surveillance technologies.

Public domain monitoring is mentioned most frequently in the context of the necessity of regulating its use, but also in relation preventing, detecting, and solving crimes. In the latter case, the actors tend to be the representatives of the city councils. The main tone of their statements is pride in the overwhelming presence of public monitoring in Warsaw. As the president of the city notes, its Centre for Security, which centralizes various security systems, including CCTV, is “the most modern site of this type in Poland,”⁷⁶ and it is proudly termed as “the Pentagon” of Warsaw.⁷⁷ As we mentioned in the beginning, in Poland the perception that the use of CCTV cameras helps to prevent crime is rather unchallenged. In this line, in an article which tries to assess the importance of CCTV cameras for the diminishing crime rates, an expert from the University of Warsaw asserts (in reaction to the crime statistics released by the police in early 2012) that, “street fights and assaults have become less numerous because more and more cities have public monitoring systems and criminals are afraid that they will be recorded by the cameras.”⁷⁸ However, statistics from other cities are less impressive in terms of CCTV systems efficiency in fighting crime. In an article that evaluates public monitoring by comparing the costs and results of CCTV in the biggest Polish cities, one finds a report issued by the police in Krakow, Poland's second largest city. It states that in 2011 public monitoring systems detected only two felonies and four misdemeanors. It also only helped identify the perpetrators of five felonies and four misdemeanors.⁷⁹ These low rates of crime detection and prevention are due to the small number of cameras (27 in Krakow in 2012), which cannot be further extended due to financial constraints, a city council member from a right wing party (PiS) explains in the same article. Other CCTV city monitoring systems mentioned in the article are in Gdańsk, Wrocław, Poznań, and Bytom, all with plans to further extended the CCTV systems in order to increase the rate of successful crime detection, prevention, and solution.

The last case is especially significant, as Bytom is a Polish city where a private company together with a private University is developing a system similar to the INDECT project - a system of cameras capable of detecting suspicious movements of citizens on the street.

“[it can] detect people who are smiling or sad, find people with a limp [sic] and then follow them on the street. The system has only advantages and constitutes the technology of the future. It can detect behavior which is untypical or dangerous and notify the public services”⁸⁰

⁷⁶ RZ - 2012 MAR - “Pentagon przetestowany” [Pentagon, tested]

⁷⁷ RZ - 2012 MAR - “Pentagon przetestowany” [Pentagon, tested]

⁷⁸ RZ - 2012 JAN - “Mniej rozbojów, więcej kradzieży” [Less mugging, more thefts]

⁷⁹ RZ - 2012 MAY - “Kosztowne miejskie podpatrywanie” [Costly city peeping]

⁸⁰ GW - 2012 SEP - “Kamery sprytne aż strach” [Cameras, scary smart]

This is the assertion of the spokesperson for the company which is developing the system on the streets of Bytom. The “smart” cameras have been installed in Bytom after a favorable decision by the city council. The city’s previous mayor (dismissed in a referendum a few months before) asserts that, “there is nothing wrong in being able to more quickly spot a fight or count the people who are taking part in an event on the main square.”⁸¹ Therefore, both the representatives of the company and the city council see only advantages of such a technology in terms of increased security. This view is not shared by the Vice-President of *Panoptykon* Foundation who notes that, “systems which are based on automatic detection of dangers can constitute meddling with our privacy. We have no control over what is considered suspicious behavior.”⁸² Similar concerns are voiced by GIODO over the development of the INDECT project when he states that “a gun is being developed. For now it is hanging on the wall, but in could be used in a way a gun is used. The ammunition in this case are the databases.”⁸³ Nevertheless, this issue does not receive extensive coverage in the Polish press. This is in spite of the fact that the Coordinator of the INDECT project is a Polish University and the Polish Ministry of Interior has initially announced that it would collaborate in the project. Yet we find only 12 statements which mention the project. However, when it is mentioned, it mostly the topic of negative statements (8 out of 12) and none positive.

Positive considerations of public monitoring prevail (17 statements are positive, versus 11 negative). In these terms it is important to note how Polish cities actually publicize the fact that CCTV cameras are in place on their streets, as if their installation was a special accomplishment of the city council. This is noted by some of the detractors of an extensive public monitoring system - the representative of the *Panoptykon* Foundation notes that,

[in Poland] cameras are nowadays a symbol of social status. We are proud that we can use a camera to watch a nanny or a cleaner. Also a city that has public monitoring is considered to be modern. This is very interesting, as in the rest of the world the trend is quite the opposite.”⁸⁴

In the same vein, the Polish Ombudswoman makes the following observation:

In other countries at the entrance to a city you can see signs ‘University city,’ ‘City of culture,’ in Poland - ‘Monitored city’ - My foreign guests ask me why Poles are so proud of surveillance? Is it a post-communist trauma?⁸⁵

These remarks clearly point to the fact that public domain monitoring constitutes a social status symbol in Poland and that surveillance technologies are not only not

81 GW - 2012 SEP - “Kamery sprytne az strach” [Cameras, scary smart]

82 GW - 2012 SEP - “Kamery sprytne az strach” [Cameras, scary smart]

83 RZ - 2012 MAY - “INDECT wciaz budzi watpliwosci” [INDECT still causes doubts]

84 RZ - 2012 APR - “Cała kupa wielkich braci” [A whole bunch of Big Brothers]

85 GW - 2012 OCT - “Polacy na podglądzie” [Poles, watched]

perceived as linked in any way to the traumatic communist state surveillance, but, more importantly, they form an important part of what is considered to be the process of modernization of the country. This process entails the embracing of the liberal market economy in the framework of a discourse on “catching up with the West,” as mentioned in the beginning. This “catching up” requires the adoption of Western social practices and values in order to complete the process of post-socialist transformations.

Finally, the third most important topic is private monitoring, e.g. installing cameras in hospitals, prisons, housing estates, and workplaces. Neither is regulated by Polish law, and, thus, a topic of important debate, more frequently raised in the articles in the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita*. Their articles focus particularly on the lack of regulations for the so-called “civic monitoring” and the use of CCTV systems and individual cameras in housing estates and workplaces. This type of video surveillance, termed by an expert, prof. Paweł Waszkiewicz, as the “little sisters,”⁸⁶ has become very extensive in Poland and a source of many complaints to GIODO.

In terms of the argumentative strategies used, we can see within the CCTV sample the highest share of evaluative and advocative statements, as compared to the other two issues under analysis. Together they constitute more than half of the statements coded. Definitive statements constitute only 44% of coded content, evaluative 43%, while advocative 13%. This is the highest share of advocative strategies for all three topics analyzed and clearly reflects a greater salience of this debate in the Polish media.

Table 5.14. CCTV Cameras - Argumentative strategies

| Argumentative strategies | # | % total |
|--------------------------|-----|---------|
| Definitive | 101 | 44% |
| Evaluative | 97 | 43% |
| Advocative | 30 | 13% |
| | 228 | 100% |

If we look at how argumentative strategies are used in relation to different topics, we can conclude that surveillance and different aspects of CCTV use (public and private monitoring, CCTV cameras, their purchase and installation, as well as costs) are most often presented in neutral, definitive terms. Evaluative statements predominate where the articles discuss crime detection and prevention, as well as when different aspects of CCTV use are discussed. Thus we can conclude that CCTV is more often mentioned in evaluations of how well it fulfills its job of guaranteeing public safety. Advocative statements are most frequent where the need for security related rules and regulations are raised. This clearly reflects the emerging debate in the Polish context concerning the use of CCTV cameras, on the one hand in terms of their purchase and installation, and, on the other hand, in terms of the necessity to

⁸⁶ RZ – 2012 – “Kamery obserwują bez przepisów” [Cameras are watching without legal regulations]

regulate their use, as discussed above.

Table 5.14. CCTV Cameras - Main topics & argumentative strategies

| Main topics | Argumentative strategies | | | |
|--|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | # occurrence | Definitive | Evaluative | Advocative |
| Working of CCTV cameras | 159 | 47% | 45% | 8% |
| Security related rules and regulations | 61 | 38% | 21% | 41% |
| Surveillance | 42 | 67% | 33% | |
| Crime detection and prevention | 22 | 36% | 64% | |

Note: Only ten principal topics considered. Use of CCTV includes codes: Public and private domain monitoring, CCTV cameras, purchase and installation of CCTV cameras, costs. Percentages calculated over the total number of argumentative strategies coded.

In terms of the direction of the arguments, we can see that negative evaluative statements are more frequently found in the articles regarding CCTV cameras than those positive, while crime detection and prevention is the topic of more positive statements. The advocative statements are all positive - as we have seen above - they refer to the need for a regulation of the use of private and public domain monitoring, and the working of CCTV cameras in general.

Table 5.15. CCTV Cameras - Argumentative strategies and direction of the argument

| | Argumentative strategies | | | |
|----------|--------------------------|------|------------|------|
| | Evaluative | | Advocative | |
| | # | % | # | % |
| Positive | 35 | 36% | 30 | 100% |
| Negative | 57 | 59% | 0 | |
| Neutral | 5 | 5% | 0 | |
| | 75 | 100% | 15 | 100% |

If we look more in depth at the topics raised in advocative statements, we find that the most significant topic raised in the advocative statements is the need for rules and regulations regarding the use of CCTV cameras in Poland. This indicates the emerging debate on the issue, especially in 2012, as mentioned above. Here we find statements from civil society activists such as the *Panoptykon* Foundation representative who asserts that, “there is a need for regulations for anyone who installs monitoring systems - it does not matter whether it is a big company or a neighbor who wants to monitor her [sic] own staircase.”⁸⁷ The two most prominent advocates of introducing the law are GIODO and the Polish Ombudswoman. Lipowicz

⁸⁷ RZ - 2012 APR - “Cała kupa wielkich braci” [A whole bunch of Big Brothers]

notes that the fact that anyone can install a camera almost anywhere constitutes an “unacceptable intrusion into our private lives.”⁸⁸ In general, Lipowicz frames her interventions most often in terms of privacy as intimacy. GIODO, on the other hand, refers to its constitutional obligation to safeguard the personal data of Polish citizens. It even warns the Interior Ministry that if no regulation is introduced on the issue of public/private monitoring, in January it will order an audit of the Ministry. “We will check whether they gather images from monitoring cameras, and if it is so, why the Ministry has failed to inform GIODO about this personal data database. The image of a person is considered personal data.”⁸⁹ Other actors who voice advocative statements in favor of a regulation of the issue of CCTV use in Poland are experts, mainly University professors.

Table 5.16. CCTV Cameras - Justifications

| Justification | # | % justifications | Direction of argument (% of justifications coded) | | |
|--------------------|-----|------------------|--|----------|---------|
| | | | Positive | Negative | Neutral |
| Right to Privacy | 25 | 24% | 8% | 84% | 8% |
| Efficiency | 23 | 22% | 43% | 52% | 4% |
| Safety | 17 | 16% | 71% | 12% | 18% |
| Transparency | 11 | 10% | 27% | 55% | 18% |
| Crime Prevention | 8 | 8% | 88% | 13% | |
| Quality of service | 8 | 8% | 50% | 38% | 13% |
| Crime detection | 5 | 5% | 100% | | |
| Trust | 3 | 3% | | 100% | |
| Crime solution | 2 | 2% | 100% | | |
| Costs | 2 | 2% | 50% | 50% | |
| Security | 1 | 1% | 100% | | |
| Freedom/Liberty | 1 | 1% | | 100% | |
| | 106 | 46% | | | |

Among the statements analyzed, justifications for the arguments have been found in less than half of them. We can observe that, where justifications are offered, most often the debates on CCTV are framed in terms of efficiency versus right to privacy. The efficiency of CCTV technology as justification is present in 22% of all justifications coded. It is evoked slightly more frequently in negative terms. For instance, one journalist in *Gazeta Wyborcza* states that “[t]he usefulness of monitoring to identify the perpetrators of crimes constitutes a myth, the images from the cameras are most often low-quality, or one cannot see the face.”⁹⁰ Therefore, in spite of the apparent unchallenged perception of CCTV as a security-enhancing measure, we can find quite a large number of statements which actually

⁸⁸ GW - 2012 SEP - “RPO: Ostrożnie z tymi kamerami” [Ombuswoman: Careful with those cameras]

⁸⁹ GW - 2012 OCT - “Polacy na podglądzie” [Poles, watched]

⁹⁰ GW - 2012 OCT - “Polacy na podglądzie” [Poles, watched]

question this assumption.

But such ambivalence does not exist when it comes to privacy rights. Discussion of privacy accounts for a slightly bigger share of justifications overall (24%), but if we look at the arguments' directions, it becomes clear that it is used almost exclusively to highlight negative aspects of CCTV monitoring. GIODO summarizes the dangers of public monitoring in relation to privacy, stating, "Public domain monitoring infringes on our privacy, because somebody is peeping at us, seeing what we do without us realizing that. These recordings are gathered, processed and put together in some place, and an unknown 'somebody' has access to it."⁹¹

Safety, on the other hand, seems to be the justification of preference for those who wish to offer a positive image of the CCTV cameras implementation. It is used in a positive sense in almost 71% of the cases. This is also true of crime detection, solution, and prevention. As the Warsaw chief of police argues, the cameras' records are the best way to ensure citizens' safety during sports events as well as deter perpetrators of crimes.⁹² Finally, freedom/liberty, transparency, and trust are mentioned solely in relation to the negative aspects of CCTV cameras use. The latter is brought up in a recent article in *Gazeta Wyborcza* where the journalist notes, "The presence of the cameras demoralizes people. Trust disappears."⁹³ This seems to be slowly becoming a source of preoccupation, especially on part of the experts who assert that the use of CCTV cameras in, for instance, schools might be detrimental for the psychological development of children.⁹⁴

5.4. Summary of the analysis

Having analyzed all the three issues under consideration, we can summarize some general patterns from our analysis. Overall, issues of security and privacy do not constitute central topics for the Polish media. They become relevant mostly in relation to the monitoring of public and private spaces, while the other two topics receive much less coverage.

The articles regarding 3D full body scanners, for instance, are rather scarce in the two newspapers under analysis, indicating the low salience of the issue in the Polish media. The issue of body scanners is treated as something external to the national context, as evidenced that none of the actors are Polish, except for the journalists. In the statements concerning the scanners, states and state-institutions prevail. Citizens and passengers are given no direct voice. Rather, their concerns are represented by civil society groups from the US and UK. Furthermore, the articles

⁹¹ GW - 2012 OCT - "Polacy na podglądzie" [Poles, watched]

⁹² RZ - 2012 MAY - "Kosztowne miejskie podpatrywanie" [Costly city peeping]

⁹³ GW - 2012 OCT - "Polacy na podglądzie" [Poles, watched]

⁹⁴ RZ - 2012 - "Kamery obserwują bez przepisów" [Cameras are watching without legal regulations]

represent two different debates rooted in geography. On the one hand, is the US, where the full body scanners are already in use as part of the increasing security checks and are already an object of civil society groups' protests. On the other hand is the European debate. Here the UK and the Netherlands are presented as strong supporters of this technology, together with actors such as the Italian Interior Ministry, while the EU requires further discussion of the legality and efficiency of the scanners and a German actor speaks against it.

The analyzed newspapers opinion of full body scanners is not very clear, as the articles are more informative than evaluative. The main focus is on the alleged nudity of the passengers in the full body scanners, pointing to issues of privacy as intimacy. Other issues, such as health concerns or costs, are absent from the discussion. Full body scanners are discussed against the backdrop of the global terrorist threat, especially in relation to the failed terrorist attack on a flight during Christmas 2009, but the topic is rarely brought up directly in statements concerning the scanners. The debate here is more focused on the implementation of the scanners in terms of privacy and efficiency. Finally, due to the low salience of the topic in the Polish media, we cannot really establish any conclusions regarding trends and tendencies over time - it seems that the issue sparked some debate around early 2010 and has not received much attention since.

The topic of cyber security has attracted some attention in the Polish leading newspapers during the period under research, though it is also largely framed as an external problem. While Polish citizens might be considered vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as identity theft, Poland is not feared to become a target of cyber-attacks or likely to take part as an actor in a hypothetical cyber war. As such we do not find a lot of debate on the issue or evidence from Polish actors. Also, we find no mention of potential exposure of critical Polish infrastructure to such attacks. The discussion of Stuxnet in the Polish media, though, is still quite exhaustive. While initially reports refer to it as an attack on Iranian infrastructure, later on it appears in more thorough pieces concerning the rules of cyber war, cyber security, and cyber espionage. There is not much difference in the coverage between the newspapers analyzed. The only significant aspect is that while *Rzeczpospolita* published a few articles regarding cyber war and Stuxnet in its science section, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, focused more on the issue of industrial espionage with articles published in the economics section. In terms of actors it is the topic where the main protagonists are the experts, together with state-related actors. The USA, Israel, and Iran are the most frequently cited countries of origin of the actors, as expected. The debate is mostly framed in descriptive terms. Thus, the occurrence of evaluative and advocative statements is very low. The topics coded include mostly the issue of Iranian uranium enrichment programme, together with attack on infrastructure and attack on Iran, the former appearing slightly more often. Terrorism and legality are largely absent as topics of discussion in relation to Stuxnet.

The material analyzed concerning CCTV cameras in Poland is quite distinct from that encountered on the other two issues. First of all, the topic of CCTV cameras constitutes the most salient issue of all three topics under analysis, with the highest number of statements coded. It is also overwhelmingly framed as a national debate,

with over 97% of actors being Polish. It is dominated by state-related actors, with little space for citizens' direct voice on the issues, and a little bit more voice given to activists and experts. Politicians do not seem very present in the nation-wide debates on the issue, at least not yet. Another interesting aspect of the Polish case is the absence of transport companies in the debate, or any references to the use of CCTV in public transport. This is probably due to the fact that there the urban transport security regime is integrated into the city CCTV systems and, as such, it is discussed in more general terms. Also, there is very little mention of CCTV cameras in reference to terrorism or national security. The debate is overwhelmingly framed in terms of the use of CCTV systems for public and private monitoring for the sake of security understood as crime prevention, detection and solution. The need for a comprehensive regulation of public and private monitoring is the focus of the debate, both among state and civil society actors.

The articles concerning CCTV cameras have also the highest share of evaluative and advocative statements (more than half of all coded statements) which points to a higher salience of the topic of CCTV cameras than the rest of the issues analyzed. The most important point seems to be that we are witnessing an emerging debate on the need for a comprehensive law which would regulate the use of public and private monitoring systems in Poland. Therefore, we can expect that the importance of the topic will continue to grow, especially after the recent declarations by Prime Minister Tusk regarding government plans to propose a comprehensive law on the issue. In terms of the differential focus of the two newspapers under analysis, we can assert that the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza* has published a smaller number of articles on the topic but more frequently they are long and well-researched opinion articles which aim at putting the issue of privacy vs. security on the agenda in the Polish media in more general terms. While the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita* covers the issue of CCTV cameras much more extensively in its law section - clearly targeting a more specialized audience, and discusses in depth the benefits of public domain monitoring in relation to the Warsaw city surveillance systems, and does not focus so much on more general dilemmas of privacy versus security as abstract values.

6. Discussion

The present report constitutes a description of the findings of Polish media content analysis in relation to the three issues under analysis in the *Seconomics* project. The main purpose of the analysis was to understand risk perceptions, as well as debates about privacy and security in Poland. The methods applied in the study are grounded in a comparative qualitative media content analysis, which we use to understand the perceptions of privacy and security as the outcomes of social interactions embedded in a specific national context. The focus of the *Seconomics* project is on the definition and perception of risk and security in different settings, namely airport security and air travel, critical infrastructure, and urban transport. For each of these settings a topic has been chosen which could make it possible to compare the debates on these issues in different national contexts - 3D body scanners, the Stuxnet virus, and CCTV cameras. The aim of the country case studies is to describe and analyze the ways in which these topics are discussed in the leading national media.

This report analyzed the content from two leading reputable Polish opinion-shaping dailies: the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza* and the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita*. Our main research question was how the Polish media frame the implications of security technologies for the issues of citizens' privacy and safety. The findings of the analysis offer an interesting picture of how risk is perceived in Polish society and what kind of trade-offs between privacy and security people deem acceptable. Despite the fact that Poles are increasingly convinced of the possibility of a terrorist attack in the country, the debates concerning the 3D body scanners and the Stuxnet virus are framed as external to the Polish context, dominated by foreign actors. The articles remain mostly descriptive in terms of argumentative strategies and Polish media coverage of these issues followed events and debates only in the international context. The discussion of 3D body scanners received a very limited coverage in the Polish press, and was focused mostly on the issue of privacy. The Stuxnet virus attracted more attention from the Polish media, but mostly in terms of cyber war and cyber espionage. No mention of Polish critical infrastructure appeared in the media analyzed.

Unequivocally, topic of CCTV cameras was the issue which received most coverage in the Polish media under analysis. The debate was almost entirely focused on the domestic context and dominated by national actors. Moreover, it contained the highest number of evaluative and advocative statements, suggesting the strongest debate on the issue, as compared to the other two topics. Furthermore, the issue of CCTV cameras is the only one where we find a significant difference in treatment of the topic between the two newspapers analyzed. While the right-leaning *Rzeczpospolita* tends to focus more on the legal aspects of public and private monitoring targeted at a specialized audience, the left-leaning *Gazeta Wyborcza* offers more general opinion pieces which hope to put the issue of privacy vs. security on the public agenda. As far as the topics raised are concerned, the most important point seems to be that we are witnessing an emerging debate on the need for a comprehensive law which would regulate the use of public and private monitoring systems in Poland. Therefore, we can expect that the salience of the topic will

continue to rise, especially after the recent declarations by Prime Minister Tusk regarding government plans to propose a comprehensive law on the issue. Another interesting aspect of the Polish case is the absence of transport companies in the debate, or any references to the use of CCTV in public transport. Also, there is very little mention of CCTV cameras in reference to terrorism or national security.

The Polish debate regarding security and privacy stems from the need to regulate the use of CCTV systems for public and private domain monitoring. However, we find no specific mention or link of these issues to the communist state surveillance practices. Rather, in view of the media content analyzed, we can argue that the fact that surveillance techniques, such as the CCTV cameras, are largely unquestioned and met with approval of the Polish society, remains closely linked to the ramifications of post-socialist transformations. The social perception of these modern surveillance techniques as part of “modernity” is embedded in the discourse of “catching up with the West,” that is, adopting Western social practices and values. The resulting situation is that where a society busy with modernization in order to overcome its non-democratic past, failed to note that contemporary Poland seems to have become “surveillance Eldorado” where state and non-state actors’ surveillance of the citizens has little legal limits.

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8. Annexes

2.1 Overview of analyzed articles, by topic

3D Body scanners

| Title (Polish) | Title (English) | Author | Newspaper | Date |
|--------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| Lotniska pod specjalnym nadzorem | Airports under special surveillance | Marcin Bosacki | Gazeta Wyborcza | Jan- 2010 |
| Podróże w czasach terroru | Travelling in the time of terror | Piotr Gillert / Wojciech Lorenz | Rzeczpospolita | Jan- 2010 |
| Unijny spór o lotniskowe skanery | The EU row over body scanners | Wojciech Lorenz | Rzeczpospolita | Jan- 2010 |
| Wielki Brat chciał widzieć nagi tłum | Big Brother wanted to see a naked crowd | Jacek Przybylski | Rzeczpospolita | Mar-2011 |

Stuxnet

| Title (Polish) | Title (English) | Author | Newspaper | Date |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------------|------------------------|----------|
| Iran broni się przed wirusem | Iran is defending itself from the virus | Roman Imielski | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Oct-2010 |
| Kto wpuścił wirusa Irańczykom | Who let the virus in to the Iranians | RPS | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Jan-2011 |
| USA mogą nawet zbombardować hakerow | USA can even bomb hackers | Mariusz Zawadzki | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Jun-2011 |

| | | | | |
|---|--|--------------------|------------------------|-----------|
| Irańskie cyberoddziały uderzają w USA i ich sojuszników | Iranian super troops hit the US and its allies | Marta Urzędowska | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Nov-2012 |
| Chiny - USA: walka szpiegów? | China and USA: battle of spies? | Tomasz Gryniewicz | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Oct-2012 |
| Cyberszpieg, do usług | Cyber spy, at your service | Tomasz Gryniewicz | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Oct-2012 |
| NATO: Można zabić hakera | NATO: One can even kill a hacker | Mariusz Zawadzki | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Mar-2013 |
| Idzie cyberepidemia | A cyber epidemics is approaching | Piotr Kościelniak | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Dec-2010 |
| Cyberatak nowej generacji na Iran | A cyber attack of new generation on Iran | Wojciech Lorenz | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Sept-2010 |
| Londyn próbuje powstrzymać cybernetyczną wojnę | London is trying to stop the cyber war | Wojciech Lorenz | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Nov-2011 |
| Wirus gorszy niż szpieg | Virus worse than a spy | Piotr Kościelniak | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Jun-2012 |
| Wirus zamiast bomb i rakiet? | Virus, instead of bombs and missiles | Piotr Zychowicz | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | May-2012 |
| Wirus państwowy | State virus | Piotr Kościelniak | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Sept-2012 |
| Operacja „Czerwony październik” | Operation "Red October" | Krzysztof Urbański | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Jan-2013 |

CCTV cameras

| Title (Polish) | Title (English) | Author | Newspaper | Date |
|---|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------|------------|
| Wielki Brat na Manhattanie | Big Brother in Manhattan | Piotr Siergiej | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Jan-2010 |
| Kamery prywatne zamiast miejskich | Private cameras instead of city cameras | Agata Sabała | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Feb-2010 |
| Pacjent w szpitalu jak uczestnik „Big Brothera” | Patient in a hospital, just like a Big Brother contestant | Janina Blikowska / Ewa Zwierzchowska | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | May-2010 |
| Legalność monitoringu wciąż nieuregulowana | The legality of monitoring still unregulated | Aleksandra Tomczyk | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Jul-2010 |
| Życie kontrolowane | A controlled life | Ewa Siedlecka | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Oct-2010 |
| Wszystko widać | One can see everything | Ewa Siedlecka | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Nov-2010 |
| Złodzieje karkówki | Meat thieves | Ewa Furtak | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | April-2011 |
| Las pod okiem kamery | Woods watched over by a camera | Joanna Bosakowska | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | May-2011 |
| Gminny Wielki Brat patrzy | Municipal Big Brother is watching | Michał Cyrankiewicz | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Aug-2011 |
| Kamery śledzą ludzi bez jakiegokolwiek kontroli | Cameras follow people without any control | Stawomir Wikariak | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Sept-2011 |
| Kamery i bazy danych mogą być zagrożeniem | Cameras and databases might be a threat | Danuta Frey | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Oct-2011 |
| Stołeczny Big Brother Full HD | Capital city Big Brother Full HD | Janina Blikowska / Marek Kozubal | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Nov-2011 |
| Podglądanie na osiedlu | Peeping on the housing estate | Marek Kozubal | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Nov-2011 |
| Mniej rozbojów, więcej kradzieży | Less mugging, more thefts | Grażyna Zawadka | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Jan-2012 |
| Pentagon przetestowany | Pentagon, tested | Izabela Kraj / Marek Kozubal | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Mar- |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|-----------|
| | | | | 2012 |
| Cała kupa wielkich braci | A whole bunch of Big Brothers | Michał Płociński | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Apr-2012 |
| Kamery na klatkach wyjęte spod prawa | Cameras on the house estate halls, outlaws | Renata Krupa-Dąbrowska | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Apr-2012 |
| Kosztowne miejskie podpatrywanie | Costly city surveillance | Ewa Łosińska | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | May-2012 |
| Nie kamer nam trzeba, ale odwagi | We need courage, not cameras | Aleksandra Szytło | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Oct-2012 |
| INDECT wciąż budzi wątpliwości | INDECT, still causes doubts | Oskar Górzyński | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | May-2012 |
| Kamery sprytne aż strach | Cameras, scary smart | Przemysław Jedlecki | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Sept-2012 |
| RPO: Ostrożnie z tymi kamerami | Ombudswoman: Careful with the cameras | Przemysław Jedlecki | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Sept-2012 |
| Polacy na podglądzie | Poles, watched | Ewa Siedlecka | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Oct-2012 |
| Kamery obserwują bez przepisów | Cameras are watching without legal regulations | Danuta Frey | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Oct-2012 |
| Wielkie ucho Alior Banku | Alior Bank's big ear | Maciej Samcik | <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i> | Feb-2013 |
| Kamerowanie w kryminale | Cameras in prison | Agata Łukaszewicz | <i>Rzeczpospolita</i> | Apr-2013 |