The Xanadu of surveillance: Report on security perceptions in the British online media

Jessie Hronesova (ISASCR), Tristan Caulfield (ABDN), Petra Guasti (ISASCR)

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1. Introduction

Security has become a defining feature of contemporary public discourse, permeating the so-called ‘war on terror’, problems of everyday crime and disorder, the reconstruction of ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states and the dramatic renaissance of the private security industry. (Loader and Walker 2007).

In 1949 Eric Arthur Blair published a novel set in London describing a totalitarian state under the constant surveillance of a state run by the omnipresent and omnipotent “Big Brother”. The author presented his vision of the world in 1984 as a totalitarian community. He is better known under his pseudonym George Orwell and his perennial bestseller “1984” has once again lived through a renaissance in 2013. Orwell’s popularity in the past year is not a mere coincidence. A series of high-profile cases related to leakages of top secret information from the intelligence services have shaken the public confidence in the legality of security practices applied by national governments. Americans Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden as well as Julian Assange have embodied the growing and secretive intrusions of the state into private lives, justified by the war on terror and carried out under the vestige of counter-terrorism. The charges raised against these three now prominent figures have intensified debates about the extent of powers a state secret service can and should exert over its citizens. The question of who controls the controllers has once again re-emerged. Negative connotations of security, which had previously been neglected, have slowly come to the forefront of comprehensive analyses of state security and risk management.

Social sciences have produced a plethora of security and risk related literature but the field of enquiry and practice is by no means novel. Risk was in fact coined in the 16th century by first western sailors-explorers who were referring to precarious waters (Denney 2005, 12). In pre-modern times, risks and dangers were an ample field of state concerns. Dangers were associated with disease, war, epidemic and famine, which later changed into marking a specific social class as dangerous. Risk gained a new meaning during the industrial revolution and with the advance of modernity and modern commerce and business, closely linked to uncertainty about the future and outcomes. In the past certain ethnic or national groups and religious communities were portrayed as presenting a danger or threat to other nations. In the beginning of the 20th century, such notions were also related to anarchists and Jews, and later to communists and socialists. In the 1970s, such a “dangerous group” represented young people, who were portrayed as the a new “mugging class”, related to the high number of criminal cases involving young people (Denney 2005, 8). Since the late 1980s, topics such as nuclear radiation, chemical waste and weapons as well
as the use of biological weapons have started to constitute a new post-modern set of dangers and risks, quite unlike in any other previous era. In the latest decades, international terrorism and organized crime came to substitute all threats posed by violent, non-conformist groups, which are inflicting harm on the general public in the pursuit of their political, economic or religious goals. Today’s post-modern time is facing yet another serious of threats and risks, which are associated with technological advances and the vast possibilities for misuse of the cyberspace. It is thus not surprising that already in 1995, 1.5 million people in the United Kingdom were employed in what could be termed “the risk industry“ (Denney 2005, 1), i.e. activities and services related to reducing and procuring security to the public. It would be hard to estimate to what the number has risen since then.

Based on these new types of risk, one of the most influential authors in the field of risk theory Ulrich Beck coined the term “Risk Society“ (1992), arguing that we live in society driven by “unsafety”. Internet and modern technologies have created a sphere for new types of global crimes, which have unlimited spatial boundaries. Beck bases his analysis on the recent technological changes of our post-modern and post-traditional world by enumerating an endless list of potential risks and threats we face on a daily basis. Although pre-modern societies lacked the complexity of current risks, he argues, the perceptions of the threat of hell, demons, plague and the like can be compared to our perceptions of the destructiveness of a nuclear war. To him manufactured risks are related to technology and science while external risks are related to the natural world. “Risk”, he notes, “may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself” (Beck 1992, 21). At an analytical level, risk assessment is “the process of identifying hazards which may cause an accident, disaster or harm” (Manthorpe cited in Denney 2005, 18). Since security is the state of reducing the number of risks, the theory of risk management is extremely relevant for this research.

Beck’s Risk Society is a useful starting point for the study of perceptions of security in post-modern times and the study of relations between the state and the people in terms of safety and privacy. If security is one of the fundamental “goods” procured by the state (Loader and Walker 2007), at what costs are security measures still justifiable? Shouldn't respect for privacy and the right for information be just as fundamentally demanded and observed as the provision of security? It has been established that people are willing to give up certain level of their privacy in exchange for security. This is most notably demonstrated on the case of the British people, who are irritated yet willing to accept the ubiquitous monitoring systems of the CCTV. However, the question of full body scanners, which effectively strip a person naked via 3D digitalized images is to many people bordering on what is acceptable for human dignity, especially for the vast
number of British religious minorities. The dilemma of what is the acceptable trade-off between privacy and security thus arises. Lastly, in terms of global politics, the 21st century will certainly remain a century of wars; however, a new type of wars has emerged, which is also related to the technological revolutions of the last 20 years.

Cyber wars and hacking are effective, yet non-violent types of attacks, aimed at paralyzing a country or some of its infrastructural capacities.¹ This was clearly evident in the 2010 Stuxnet worm attack on Iran. The malware Stuxnet was released to sabotage the Iranian nuclear programme by targeting its critical industrial infrastructures in 2010. Unlike its forerunners, Stuxnet was designed to achieve real-world outcomes and challenged the belief that network defences can protect facilities from software vulnerabilities. More importantly, the malware has started a new arms race and questioned the safety of national critical infrastructure (see Collins and McCombie 2012). The leakage of the cyber attack further raised questions about state powers and the limited possibility of citizens’ say in international affairs. Though a certain level of secrecy is necessary, it is important to debate what is and what is not in the interest of people to be hidden from their eyes.

These questions have not failed to interest the world media and the general public. As Barndard-Wills noted, the “the trope of Big Brother and a number of variants (“Orwellian,” “1984,” etc.) are ubiquitous in media discourse of surveillance” (Barnard-Wills 2011, 559). The growing and widening opportunity for expressing one’s views in online public arenas has also diversified the group of people expressing such views. Security-related articles and coverage have been steadily present in the British press. Since the London bombings of 7 July 2005 (henceforth referred to as “7/7”), political discourses amplified by what Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010) call “security journalism”. Traditional and new media have been the key to the unfolding and understanding of perceptions and acceptance of surveillance systems (see especially Gates and Magnet 2007). By the type of news and discourses used in the media, social anxieties can easily penetrate society as discussed by Monahan (2011) in his analysis of media as forces creating insecurities and social imaginary of safety. Despite these powers of the media, the public audiences are not merely blind media followers. In fact, “audience members alternatively accept, ignore, and reinterpret the dominant frames offered by the media” (Neuman 1992, 62). The interaction between the state, media and the public is thus a fruitful ground for analysis.

This paper operationalizes the concept of risks in its negative connotations (i.e. as dangers and threats), which impinge on our security concerns in a particular setting of the UK. We are concerned with risks both induced by science and society. In addition to approaching risks and threats, we also analyze security through the constructivist prism as mediated through social and cultural processes and realities. Epistemologically, we do not analyze security as “real” or “objective” but as a constructed phenomenon. We study advanced modern technologies and its consequences such as cyber-warfare together with security inducing technologies such as closed circuit systems and body scanners. In this respect, two other institutions come to play: the state and the media. Related to the concept of power, the state as a regulatory body is important for enhancing security and safety of its citizens. Yet whether in what ways such safety and security is accepted and understood by the public is mediated through newspapers and broadcasting companies. Since there is not enough quality research on how media tackle the issue of security perceptions in their reporting, this paper is an important contribution to the growing field of security studies.

Motivated by the changing nature of security-related issues, the expanding role of online journalism and the importance of studying the topic of security within interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research projects, this report presents a partial outcome of a cross-national research titled SEconomics: “Socio-Economics meets Security”. The broad aims of the project are to identify security threats in transport and critical infrastructure, which overarches the analysis presented below. This case study of the UK is the product of a Graduate School organized by the Academy of Sciences in Prague (13-18 May 2013), which focussed on security-related topics and their perceptions presented in the media online. Qualitative social science approaches were the main methods taught and applied during the Summer School. For the purposes of producing several national reports, the Summer School provided an extensive training in qualitative coding national newspaper articles on three selected topics. In particular, the focus was given to CCTV, 3D Body Scanners and Stuxnet as the three highly relevant topical themes, while being representative of broader global trends. Closed circuit camera systems are a good proxy for the study of the national and individual security vs. privacy trade-off, similar to the topic of full body scanners, which further tackles the topic of human dignity. Lastly, Stuxnet touches upon much broader questions regarding national security and the limits of cyber-wars and state’s interference in another state’s state sovereignty through new non-violent technological means.

This paper engages with news media coverage of three selected security-related topics through a content analysis of online versions of two UK
newspapers: *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*. It focuses on the representation and evaluation of CCTV, 3D Body scanners and Stuxnet in mass media and examines diversity in attitudes along politically motivated media divisions. As a national report on the United Kingdom, it aims to answer some overarching questions guided by the *SECONOMICS* project. In particular, it examines the perceived trade-offs between security and privacy. It further looks upon whether media coverage of terrorism made the public more sensitive to security issues and discusses the various threats presented in the media. Lastly, it also tackles the topic of new technologies and their influence over security and new post-modern risks, in line with Ulrich Beck’s notions of the “Risk Society” (1992). This national report makes use of qualitative content analysis methods, researching the news media coverage in the period from January to May 2013.

The present national case study of the United Kingdom divided into six sections, providing contextual, methodological and analytical content. Section 2 offers some necessary background information about the latest political development in the UK as well as an overview of the British media landscape. It discusses security policies in the United Kingdom in the past decades and the British national experience with violent terrorist attacks, which have determined its current policies. It further provides some necessary background to the nature and role of British national press and media as the main transmitters of political communication. Section 3 is dedicated to the applied qualitative methods and in detail explains the sample selection. Section 4 provides the actual analysis of the selected articles divided by the three selected topics. Last two sections provide succinct summaries and conclusions to the British case. The overarching findings of this research aim to contribute to the fields of security studies and communication studies by their original and focussed analysis of three specific topics, which have been stirring public concern about the latest of technologies on state and personal security. As a partial output of the *SECONOMICS* project, this report provides and in-depth analysis of the British case only, which should be understood and interpreted alongside the other national cases presented in the full outcome of this project. The British case is especially relevant for an analysis of the discrepancies and similarities in terms of EU and US security policies.
2. Framing the study: security, politics, and media in the UK

2.1. Security and Politics in the UK

The security of our nation is the first duty of government. It is the foundation of our freedom and our prosperity (Cabinet Office 2010, 9).

The new British Coalition Government led by David Cameron gave security the highest national priority in 2010 and created a new National Security Council summoned by the Prime Minister. Similarly to the citation from the Cabinet Office’s statement from 2010, we conceptualize security as a public good necessary to the functioning of a developed democratic system both at the individual and national level (inspired by Loader and Walker 2007). Security as a public good procured by the state is critical to the attainment of people’s self-actualization. Only if certain about their levels of security, citizens can invest their resources and energy into their private, professional and economic goals (Ericson 2007), rather than feel threatened by their co-nationals. Loader and Walker (2007, 8) argue that security is a “‘thick public’ good, one whose production has irreducibly social dimensions, a good that helps to constitute the very idea of “publicness”’. Security, in other words, is simultaneously the producer and product of forms of trust and abstract solidarity between intimates and strangers that are prerequisite to democratic political communities.” The concept of security is thus conceptualized at two levels - the individual (public) and the national (state) - which are connected by the public media sphere. For a citizen, the feeling of safety and certainty creates a notion of security. Similarly, state security as goods is procured by national institutions (police and intelligence services) and involves not only delivering the feeling of safety but also physical protection of national borders, territory and a state’s citizens from any external threat.

By all available indicators, the United Kingdom is a full-fledged democracy with relatively low state fragility potential and highly developed governance structures. The OECD 2013 Economic Survey provided some important quantitative indicators about the level of physical, economic and social security of British citizens. According to their findings, 71% of people feel safe walking alone at night, which is above the OECD average of 67%. OECD national surveys are compared to other countries, assigning the lowest score 1 to states with poor services and 10 with the highest. The United Kingdom scored 9.6 on the variable “Safety” while only 7 on the variable “Life

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3 See for example the State Fragility Index, Freedom House Index, Economist Index, Polity IV indices.
Satisfaction”. These findings are interesting especially in view of the recent historical experience with terrorism and separatist groups. Given the economic crunch of the past five years, life satisfaction can be interpreted in economic rather than societal terms. Overall, OECD findings confirm results of similar indicators, which assign Britain as one of the safest countries in the world.

The high level of safety is also highly correlated with the fact that Britain is the most watched state in the world. According to the July 2013 data, Britain has a CCTV camera for every 11 people. As early as in 2004, the Information Commissioner Richard Thomas warned that UK was “sleepwalking into a surveillance society”. The British Security Industry Authority (BSIA) published a staggering number of 5.9 million closed-circuit television cameras installed in the country since the 1980s. Although 98% of these devices have been installed by private companies or for private usage, the level of surveillance in the UK is truly unprecedented. Not even New York and Chicago, with significantly higher crime rates than any city in the UK can compete with the level of surveillance in London. In a recent CCN article, London was titled “the Xanadu of winking, digital eyes”, again referring to the sheer number of monitoring devices. Britain has become the paradigmatic example of a “CCTV state” (see Hier, Walby, and Greenberg 2006) where surveillance is now taken for granted as part of daily life.

Surveillance, as one aspect of security procurement, can be according to David Lyon (2002) positioned along a spectrum from “care” to “control” – from watching over society for purposes of protection to scrutinizing people’s behaviour to enforce discipline and order. Surveillance is in his view the systematic monitoring of people and groups in order to regulate their behaviour, for example through CCTV. Moving on to the discourses about perceptions of security and surveillance, Barnard-Wills in his analysis of media practices on surveillance found out that there are two lines of argumentation presented by the press. The first is framed around a discourse of “appropriate surveillance”, which plays upon prevention of crime, terrorism, and national security. The second, which he calls the a “discourse of inappropriate surveillance”, mobilizes discourses of privacy, the “Big Brother”, and personal liberty (see Barnard-Wills 2011).

Surveillance has some serious the implications with regard to human rights

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5 “5.9. million CCTV cameras in the UK“, 11 July 2013, BBC, accessed on 28 August 2013, online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/23279409


7 “5.9. million CCTV cameras in the UK“, 11 July 2013, BBC, accessed on 28 August 2013, online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/23279409

and privacy. CCTV by its very nature undermines citizens’ fundamental right to privacy as anchored in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Some CCTV devices even record voice, which further increases their level of invasiveness in a person’s private life (Schlehahn et al. 2013, 14). Although the British public is very sensitive to issues of privacy, the press has been according to several studies analyzed by Barnard-Wills very positive about the installation of CCTV and often present the successes of surveillance practices. A good example is the reporting about the July 7, 2005 London bombers and the Soho pub bomber in 1999 (Ibid.).

The general British attitude to CCTV has changed over years, though. From the initial outrage at living in “one nation under CCTV”, watched by the Orwellian “Big Brother”, CCTV has become a point of ridicule, mockery and humour. The urban sign: “Smile, you are on CCTV” has to many Britons become a daily “fact of life” (see Goold, Loader, and Thumala 2013). Moreover, the crime statistics with a steep downward slope are seemingly supporting the CCTV-ing trend although a clear positive correlation has not been proven in any existing research (see Reid and Andresen 2012). According to the UK Peace Index 2013 report, both crime and homicide rates have fallen significantly in the UK.9 In England and Wales, the rate of first-time offenders has fallen by nearly a half since 2007. The report lists “Changes in police practices and technological improvements” as one of the four potential causes for these changes in criminality rates. CCTV can function as a deterrence mechanism but also crime-solving tool: in 2009 the majority of Scotland Yard murder cases used CCTV footage as evidence.

The importance of CCTV images was demonstrated both for London bombing in 2005, where images of the perpetrators were obtained from Luton railway station, and for the aborted attack on 21 July, where the police were able to rapidly issue images of the alleged culprits captured on buses, tube trains and stations.10 Many high-profile cases were solved with assistance from CCTV or other surveillance video. Despite these benefits, the ubiquitous nature of surveillance in Britain poses threat on people’s human right - “right to be let alone” - and their private lives (Joinson 2013, 120). Some Muslim communities, in particular in Birmingham, have voiced their disagreement in the installation of CCTV cameras around their neighbourhoods without their consent (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011, 173). The reaction was quite contentious:

There were angry public meetings in the city last week, after The Guardian, disclosed the cameras were paid for by the Terrorism and Allied

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Matters (Tam) fund, administered by the Association of Chief Police Officers. Its grants are for projects that “deter or prevent terrorism or help to prosecute those responsible”. Police sources said the initiative was the first of its kind in the UK that sought to monitor a population seen as “at risk” of extremism (Lewis 2010).

The scheme was eventually scrapped, and the cameras removed, but the attempt shows a response to domestic fears. Though accepted as inseparable part of life in Britain, the Ianus-faced CCTV often raises public concern for state infringement on civil rights.

The somewhat relaxed attitude of the British public to surveillance can be partially explained by security concerns related to Britain’s historical experience with terrorism of the Irish Liberation Army (IRA) and recent terrorist attacks in London. The late 1960s onwards IRA terrorist acts have cost over 3000 lives with the highest death tolls in Birmingham and Guilford in 1974 (Breau, Livingstone, and O’Connell 2002, 1). Violent clashes over Northern Ireland and its separation or unity with the United Kingdom have played major roles in drafting security policies in the UK. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 between the British and Irish governments put an end to direct violent terrorist acts in England; however, a series of new terrorist threats emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. With the advent of a new Labour government in 1997, the British political landscape has undergone some major security reforms. In 2000 a new Terrorism Act was enacted, which repealed previous terrorist legislation mainly directed at Irish nationalists. Among other things, the 2000 Act allows people to be arrested in the UK for inciting terrorism abroad and broadens the definition of terrorism “to include the use or threat of action, designed to influence the government or intimidate a section of the public, for a political, religious or ideological cause where this action or threat of action involves violence or damage to property or creates a serious risk to the health or safety of a section of the public” (Ibid., 3). The 2000 Terrorism Acts has created a backbone of what can be considered one of the strictest anti-terrorism measures in the world (together with the US) (see Hewitt 2008).

The response of the United Kingdom to the events of September 11 has taken several forms. In addition to the support of the US military action in Afghanistan, the Labour government of Tony Blair introduced new anti-terrorist legislation and prioritized the prevention of terrorism in the work of its security and intelligence agencies. The 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act involves serious restrictions on rights such as privacy and liberty and reintroduces internment without trial into UK law. Despite increased security measures and the new legislation, the United Kingdom experienced a direct terrorist attack on its territory in July 2005. On 7 July 2005, four bombs detonated across central London transport system, killing
53 people and injuring over 700 people.\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Al Qaeda} claimed partial responsibility for the attacks but its actual involvement still remains unclear. The Blair government reacted by yet again outlining new anti-terrorism measures and by reaching out to Muslim communities in the UK, which could be more prone to terrorist tendencies. The new 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act instituted control orders as restrictions imposed by the Home Secretary on anyone of a “terrorism-related“ activity. Deportation of foreign citizens were included in the act as desirable solutions and as a prevention measure (H. Office 2009). In the wake of the attacks and the growing public concern for tough security measures bordering on breaches of human rights the Director General of MI5 in 2005 stated:

\begin{quote}
I think that this is a central dilemma, how to protect our citizens within the rule of law when intelligence does not amount to clear cut evidence and when it is fragile. We also, of course, and I repeat in both our countries and within the EU value civil liberties and wish to do nothing to damage these hard-fought for rights. But the world has changed and there needs to be a debate on whether some erosion of what we all value may be necessary to improve the chances of our citizens not being blown apart as they go about their daily lives. Another dilemma.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

Her speech tackled upon the main dilemma of security studies, i.e. the balance between protection and safety on the one hand and respect for human and civil rights together with privacy on the other. In 2006, the Amnesty International criticised the UK government for “sacrificing human rights for state security” (Beckman 2013, 51). The trend towards strict measures and zero tolerance towards any extremist views, which could potentially lead to violent terrorist acts, was only reinforced in the latest enactments to the previous acts - Terrorism Act of 2006, Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008 and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act of 2011. These acts punish even support for terrorist acts and greatly expand state powers in monitoring its citizens through access to private information and tapping personal conversations. Moreover, any suspect of terrorism can be detained for 28 days without any legal consequences if charges prove unsubstantiated.

The 9/11 and 7/7 experience further led to increased security measures in transportation. In addition to restrictions on items carried onboard and

\textsuperscript{11} For a media coverage of the events see the multimedia section in The Guardian: “7 July Attacks in London", \textit{The Guardian}, accessed on 28 September 2013, online at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/july7

metal detectors, the UK Home Office and the US Transportation Security Administration introduced full body scanners in 2009 as a response to the failed attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines aircraft by a Nigerian Muslim, who had sown the explosives into his clothing. The scanners are believed to increase security in aviation by detecting liquids and non-metallic objects. Manchester and Heathrow airport were the first to introduce millimetre wave and backscatter X-rays devices, while the rest of the UK airports awaited a clear decision on the legal controversies surrounding their application. The scanners are potentially regarded as hazardous for health as the most commonly used body scanners techniques are millimetre waves, X-ray backscatter, and X-ray transmission imagery, which produce high doses of radiation. Moreover, some tests and studies presented equivocal results regarding their effectiveness while revealing a generally high rate of false alarms (Schlehahn et al. 2013, vi). The European Parliament even launched an open debate on body scanners and the operation of intelligence services in the context of counter-terrorism strategies in 2010. While acknowledging the usefulness of the body scanners in protection of passengers since commercial aircraft continue to be a fundamental target for terrorists, the EU has not found a common position of their application. Concerns prevail whether the scanners are compatible with people’s right to privacy and intimacy. Furthermore, the Commission issued a regulation in 2011 prohibiting the use of body scanners which utilise ionising radiation in the EU (Schlehahn et al. 2013, 62).

Furthermore, body scanners have been criticised for their breaches of human rights, with regard to human dignity, privacy and data protection (Ibid., 63). In the UK a public enquiry established that 80% of British citizens reject the UK’s body scanning at airports. In addition, existing cost-benefit analyses suggest that body scanners are not an effective way how to invest resources into fighting terrorism (Stewart and Mueller 2011). Such results have been largely ignored and plans to buy more scanners for Stansted, Glasgow, Edinburgh, London City and Birmingham as body scanners have gradually become compulsory for all UK airports. More importantly, concerns have been raised whether counter-terrorism laws and policies have been targeting and alienating Muslims and this way feed and sustain terrorism. To many members of the Muslim religious community, full body images are humiliating and impinging upon their behaviour codes of modesty (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011, 159). The existing research on the use of body scanners suggest that there is an overall lack of publicly available information with regards to the use of body images produced by the scanners (Ibid.).

CCTV and the 3D Body scanner are technologies used to prevent traditional crime and modern terrorism as well as detect perpetrators. However, another area in the field of security studies, criminology and counter-terrorism has become salient in the discourse over modern security risks - cyber-crime. Cyber-crime has become a typical high-volume crime in the UK, which often outnumbered burglary and robbery cases (see Wall and Williams 2013). There has been a tenfold increase in malware attacks in the period from 2008 to 2009, whereby as many as 60,000 per day were registered in 2009 in the UK (Cornish et al. 2011, 6). Cyber-crime uses information systems and technology to commit extortion, identity theft, espionage or even paralysation of critical infrastructure. Among many others, in June 2010 a worm was developed by the USA and Israel to interfere with uranium enrichment in the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz, which opened a new era of cyber wars. Stuxnet was designed as a highly sophisticated malware, which targets a very particular section of the Iranian nuclear facility (see Collins and McCombie 2012).

In response to the media reports about the attack the British government called for international coordination on cyber security strategy while securing advantage in cyberspace (Farwell and Rohozinski 2011, 31). The reason why Stuxnet has shaken the public views about cyber security is that it was unprecedented in its scope and effectiveness. It is a “sophisticated computer program designed to penetrate and establish control over remote systems in a quasi-autonomous fashion” (Farwell and Rohozinski 2011, 24). It has also shown that cyberspace is less costly and risky to use against enemies than traditional military means. In response to these developments, the British Government responded with the release of National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 and devoted over £650 million to increase cyber security (Cornish et al. 2011, viii). However, a clear roadmap, which would structure best practice and transparency in cyber protection, is still underway.

The British historical experience with domestic separatism and violent attacks, combined with the most recent terrorist attacks on its territory has shaped the current British security policies. Surveillance and improved transportation security measure have been on top of the governmental priorities, especially since the 9/11 attacks in New York City and the 7/7 attacks in London. The current trends towards installing more monitoring systems and scanning devices in airports have prioritized security at the cost of human rights, intimacy and privacy. The “one nation under CCTV” slogan has been a very succinct mockery of the excessive use of monitoring cameras in the UK. Their installation in elevators and even dressing rooms often leads to controversies about the use of such footage, similar to debates about whether the benefits of the use of 3D body scanners outweigh the social and ethical costs of their usage. In addition, some
groups have been particular targets of increased security measure in public transportation, which could have potential negative effects on further radicalization of the growing immigrant communities in the UK. On the front of cyber space, the UK has not been pioneering any path-breaking research or technological development as cyber security has still not been duly appreciated as the main security priority. However, new strategies and approaches to increasing best cyber practices are underway and it can be expected that with the rise of cyber-attacks, cyber security will be moved up the list of governmental priorities in the next decades.
2.2. British Media Landscape

The Daily Mirror is read by people who think they run the country;
The Guardian is read by people who think they ought to run the country; The Times is read by people who actually do run the country;
the Daily Mail is read by the wives of the people who run the country;
the Financial Times is read by people who own the country;
The Morning Star is read by people who think the country ought to be run by another country; and
The Daily Telegraph is read by people who think it is.
(Yes Prime Minister, Conflict of Interest, BBC 1986, cited in Temple 2008, 190)

British press, “the feral beast”, as Tony Blair famously called journalism, has one of the oldest traditions in the world with the first daily published in 1702 (Temple 2008, i). Already in the 18th century, the United Kingdom pioneered a new approach to public communication with a greater territorial scope and a new type of public messages. The German sociologist Jurgen Habermas saw Britain as the first country to develop what he called the “public sphere”, i.e. a “realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox 1974, 49). In particular, to him newspapers in Britain attained their modern function of not only reporting about events but also about creating and forming public opinions by the exposure of individual views in the public realm (Ibid). Newspapers in Britain thus started early on (and earlier than elsewhere) to play an important role in public opinion making processes, quickly earning the title of a Fourth Estate by Edmund Burke. Yet their primary function can be summarized as to inform, to educate, to give platform for the formation of a political discourse, to channel political viewpoints and to hold authority accountable (watchdog role) (Ibid., p.19). The above-cited mockery of the political and societal divisions of the readership of the press is a case in point. In order to perform these functions, which are so crucial for any viable democratic system, media need to be accessible to all citizens and they need to be free from political or economic constraints. These and other aspects of how media function in the UK are discussed below.

Historically, there are three categories of newspapers published in the UK: 1. Broadsheets as more serious, quality publications (originally referring to the wider and larger formats, which has now adopted to its smaller counterparts); 2. middle-market papers offering a combination of serious news and entertainment but focussing on information rather than analysis; and 3. Tabloids, stressing entertainment and often referred to as trash news.
or “red tops” (Temple 2008, 86-92). There are 23 national newspapers, including the Sunday editions, in all three categories, while there are hundreds of regional and local newspapers (OfCom data from 2013). It is a general knowledge among the readers which part of the political spectrum these newspapers represent. The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, The Times, and The Sunday Times lean to the right. The Guardian, The Observer (the Sunday paper of The Guardian), The Independent, The Independent on Sunday and i, a paper aimed at younger readers and commuters, published by the owners of The Independent, lean to the left. The Financial Times is politically centrist, but economically liberal. The middle-market tabloids, Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday, Daily Express, and Sunday Express are all right-leaning. The tabloid papers The Sun, The Sun on Sunday (the replacement for News of the World), Daily Star, and Daily Star Sunday are right-leaning. Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, and The People are left-leaning. The political slant of the newspapers does not always determine which party they back in elections. For example, The Sun backed Tony Blair’s New Labour, became critical of Gordon Brown, Blair’s successor, and eventually backed David Cameron and the Conservatives in 2010.

Regarding journalistic quality of the published news, there is a great diversity in journalistic principles and editorial policies. Alan Rusbridger, the Editor of The Guardian, maintains that the paper upholds the dictum of “Comment is free, fact is sacred” and that the paper “took a decision not to follow the fashion of blurring the lines between fact and comment”. Regarding the political and editorial influence of owners on the content of their papers, it seems unequivocal that owners exert serious influence over what is and is not permissible to be published. There is now a vast array of literature analyzing how media frame and report about events and how laden they are with subjective value judgments and opinions, which are often in line with their ownership guidelines (see McNair 2013). According to the House of Lords enquiry, Rupert Murdoch admitted that regarding his media outlets he did have an “editorial control on major issues”. The Sunday Times openly described how Mr Murdoch decided to switch the allegiance of his two Tory tabloids The Sun and the News of the World to the Labour Party during the 1997 general election. Public broadcasters such as the BBC are controlled by their trusts, which can also steer the content of their publishing activities.

15 Ibid., p. 33.
Media in the UK score differently in terms of trustworthiness. According to OfCom, most TV news viewers and radio listeners rate their sources highly in terms of trustworthiness. The BBC in particular scores very highly. Ratings are more varied for newspaper readers, with broadsheet readers rating their newspapers particularly highly as being trustworthy. Online users rate websites in more differentiated ways than other platforms as there is more scope for diversity and rating often applies to technological features as well. These findings are quite interesting especially since the 2013 MORI poll suggests that 72% of people in the UK have no trust in journalists, which ranks this profession as the third least-trusted after politicians and bankers. This might be caused by the discrepancy by the actual profession—a journalist portrayed as an aggressive and unscrupulous scandal seeker—and the respect entrusted into traditional broadcasters such as the British Broadcasting Company (BBC).

With the advent of new online media types and technological advances, journalism has undergone several important transformations. Traditional media have been under considerable pressure across the world as newspapers, television and radio are losing finances to the Internet. New electronic means of distribution have resulted in a proliferation of news sources and the traditional print press lost its dominant position on the news media market, which has led to financial difficulties. The overall number of adults reading at least one of the top ten national daily newspapers on an average day in the UK has been reduced by 19% between 1992 and 2006 (from 26.7 million to 21.7 million). In March 2012, all major UK print newspapers announced a year-on-year decreases in headline circulation. Public media and traditional broadcasting services such as BBC have faced serious budgetary cuts, which have had a negative influence on their territorial and analytical coverage. Although readership of print press in its traditional form has been steadily decreasing, online readership has been increasing, especially among younger generations. The available statistical data on circulations are provided by OfCom and include a period immediately preceding this study. See Tables 2.1. and 2.2.
Table 2.1. UK newspaper readership with their online versions, March 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Readership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>7,289,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>6,232,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro</td>
<td>3,621,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>3,149,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>2,316,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>2,094,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening Standard (London only)</td>
<td>1,822,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>1,344,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Star</td>
<td>1,299,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>902,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>408,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.2. Online Reach of top 10 news sites in March 2013 (in %)


One of the strategies how to lower costs has become multi-skilling of staff and cutting specialist correspondents, foreign bureaux and investigative
journalism, which has again only reinforced the trend of journalistic “dumbing down” (Temple 2008, 172). To many commentators, technology is blamed for forcing journalists to stress entertainment and abandoning investigative and analytical journalism. This trend, often referred to as “infotainment” and “tabloidization”, has in the UK led to the rise of entertainment-focused papers and lower circulations of broadsheets (McNair 2011, 60–63). However, as Fenton (2009, 4) and also Temple (2008) noted, this trend is by no means new in the media industry and should not be blatantly framed around financial constraints imposed by freely available online resources. The positive influence of new technologies was especially in terms of quantity, speed, and space: an endless number of news can be produced by journalists and bloggers, who can update their reports within seconds. Moreover, the geographical reach of news produced in the UK is no longer dependent upon distribution contracts but only Internet accessibility and literacy.

After a small adoption period, the print press has managed to adjust its strategies to the new trends by offering multimedia platform of their online versions and introducing Android and iPad versions of their titles. Hence despite the fall of the paper-based high-street press, e-newspapers reported as high as double the amount of visitors per day (in the case of The Times). In the UK, the first paper to introduce online content was The Daily Telegraph (Fenton 2010, 4), whose web content was also coded in this analysis. Office of Communications (OfCom), the UK regulator of broadcast media, showed in 2013 that news are still a popular media product in the UK. 90% of all UK adults say they follow news, whereby TV is the most important mode of news consumption (78% UK adults use the television to access news). Traditional newspapers are used by 40% people, radio by 35%; and the internet by 32% of UK adults to access news. As for newspaper readers, 24% read broadsheet newspaper and the same proportion read a mid-market title, while 37% read tabloids. As 80% of all British adults have access to the Internet at home and nearly a half of all British Internet users connect via their phones, it can be expected that the popularity of e-media will be rising. The same survey also suggests that 54% of those who use the internet for news read e-news while only a quarter read the relevant comments on blogs or social networks.

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23 Ibid., p. 17.
25 Ibid., summary.
The expansion of social media also brought about a change in journalism as a vocation. Any citizen can this way become a journalist by informing and spreading news via social networks or blogs (i.e. the so-called User Generated Content). The so called civic journalism merges the producer and the consumer often into a “prosumer” (for more see Tumber 2001). The murky line between real and fake information is especially precarious on networks such as Twitter and Facebook. Twitter can be easily used for spreading invented messages. This revealed itself especially in April 2013 when the Associated Press’s Twitter account was hacked and news about an alleged White House bombing for some time caused havoc.26 Yet the second consequence is that even information that the journalists are banned on making public, any private citizens has means to spread globally. This is especially interesting in the case of the so-called superinjunctions in the UK. Superinjunctions “forbid the media from reporting certain information and even from reporting on the existence of the injunction itself“ (Freedom House 2013). This has often led to the fact that the privileged elite are exempt from investigative journalism. The government has already asked social networks such as Google, Facebook and Twitter to introduce a monitoring system, which would catch any posts violating the superinjunction restrictions (Freedom House 2013).

Regulation and “rules of the game” are important factors in the assessment of the media sector in the UK. Print media are based on a voluntary basis and are only self-regulated. Each newspaper representative can sit at the Press Complaints Commission, which assess individual cases of complaints. The Press Complaints Commission is an independent, non-governmental body, comprised of a number of serving editors, as well as a majority of independent, public members. It deals with complaints about published content and serves to hold newspapers to the Editors’ Code of Practice.27 The code lays out standards for ethics that balance and protect the rights of individuals as well as the freedom of the press. The Commission accepts complaints for free and strives to make it easily accessible, lowering the barrier for individuals to make complaints. When a complaint is upheld, the adjudication is published in the offending newspaper or magazine. Most notably, after the 2011 phone-hacking scandal (often referred to as “hackgate”) at the weekly News of the World, the government launched a public inquiry into the general regulatory framework of the British media market. One of the discussed topics was the excessive power of the media mogul Rupert Murdoch and his influence over British politics. News of the

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World was owned by Rupert Murdoch, whose total newspaper holdings account for over 30% of sales in the UK.

The so-called “Leveson inquest” investigated and, in November 2012, produced a report containing recommendations about press regulation. On the opening of the hearings in November 2011, Lord Justice Leveson summarized the aim of the inquiry as follows: “The press provides an essential check on all aspects of public life. That is why any failure within the media affects all of us. At the heart of this inquiry, therefore, may be one simple question: who guards the guardians?” According to the report published a year later, “media plurality is the cornerstone of a healthy democracy”. That is why, among other things, the result of the inquiry was a series of recommendation in terms of regulations of ownership and the establishment of a new regulatory body, which would put an end to the purely self-regulating mechanisms. The creation of such a regulatory body is still under discussions, especially in terms of its statutory powers. As for now, the 2011 scandal uncovered an important malfunctioning of the British media in terms of ownership. Unlike public media such as BBC, which can afford to be independent, private media outlets and companies are often in hands of a few business monopolies with political interests.

Concentration of media ownership has been viewed as dangerous for democracy as lower numbers of opinions setters curb the scope of public opinion and might limit the diversity of political debates (see Doyle 2002). To James Curran, this is nothing new as the British media has always been in the hands of a few powerful “press barons” in its history such as Lord Northcliffe, Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere (Curran 2002). In his analysis, he noted that in 1937 four powerful men owned 50% of the UK media. As of 2013, the national newspaper industry in the UK is run by eight companies, whereby one has over 35% of the national newspaper market. The regional and local press is owned by four publishers with almost 70% of the market. *Trinity Mirror* is the largest newspaper group in the UK, publishing 240 smaller, local and regional papers in addition to its national papers. *News Corporation* is a multinational media company, which owns papers around the world, including *The Wall Street Journal* and *The New


29 Included on the homepage of the “The Leveson Inquiry“ at Leveson Inquiry: Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press, accessed on 15 September 2013, online at: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/


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York Post in the United States and many papers in Australia. Independent Print Limited is a company owned by Alexander Lebedev, a Russian oligarch. The Daily Mail and General Trust plc is a large British Media company; in addition to its national papers it also has stakes in regional papers, radio, and television. Northern and Shell is owned by Richard Desmond, a British businessman, and publishes national papers and magazines, and also owns television channels. Radio news is dominated by the publicly funded BBC and national television news in the United Kingdom is produced by three companies: the BBC, ITN and BSkyB. In other words, the British media sector is highly centralized and captured by a small number of companies or individual businessmen, most notably the News Corporation of Rupert Murdoch.

Table 2.3. Newspapers and Owners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Papers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph Media Group</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, The Spectator (weekly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson PLC</td>
<td>The Financial Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Trust Limited</td>
<td>The Guardian, The Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent News &amp; Media (Alexander Lebedev)</td>
<td>The Independent, The Independent on Sunday,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail and General Trust plc</td>
<td>Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and Shell (Richard Desmond)</td>
<td>Daily Express, Sunday Express, Daily Star, Daily Star Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity Mirror</td>
<td>Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, The People, Sunday Mail</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “The ownership of the news”, House of Lords, pp. 43-47.

After “Hackgate”, proposals have been suggested to limit the ownership of any one person or company to 30%, with special permission needed from Ofcom to gain control of more than 20%. Also of concern is the level of ownership of different types of media. News Corporation, owned by Murdoch, had its attempt to purchase full ownership of broadcaster BSkyB

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blocked in 2011.  

The framework for UK commercial TV and local radio was anchored during the 1980s in the Broadcasting Acts of 1980 and 1981 and its revised version in 1990, which established the Independent Television Commission and the Radio Authority. All of these acts, as well as subsequent 1996 and 2000 revisions discussed relaxing the limit on ownership of the nominated news provider, originally set at 20%. In 2003, the limit was raised to 40% on TV and 55% on radio. The 2003 Communications Act further set the so-called 20/20 rule on cross-media ownership, i.e. that “no one controlling more than 20% of the national newspaper market may hold more than a 20% stake in any Channel 3 service”. However, no definite decisions had been made at the time of this analysis.

Save the troublesome ownership disputes, the British media sector is extensively free without any serious limitations; however, security concerns always win over media freedoms. Though famous for its quality reporting, which was only reinforced by the abolishment of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in 2008, UK journalism is also limited by several restrictive legal provisions. Under the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, any media outlet is required to turn over its material to the police as happened during the 2011 London riots, among other (Freedom House 2013).

Security thus has direct impact on the nature of the published material. After the 2005 London bombing, where 52 people were killed and 700 injured, the government introduced a new Terrorism Act (2006), which criminalized speech inciting terrorist actions. A similar act in the same year outlawed any encouragements of racial and religious hatred and violence. This legislation is of course applicable to any type of online content and publicly accessible website. Since its adoption, several cases appeared whereby bloggers or owners of websites were charged with encouraging racial or religious violence.  

36 Ibid.  
37 The most famous one is the case of a 23-year old blogger, Bilal Zaheer Ahmad, who was sentenced to 12 years for calling for the murder of MPs supporting the war on Iraq. See “Blogger who encouraged murder of MPs jailed“, BBC, 29 July 2009, accessed on 28 August 2013, online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-14344199.  

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Similarly, the number of cases where a person is accused of posting offensive comments on social networks has been growing. To some commentators, this poses further restrictions to the freedom of speech since even online comments such as “UK soldiers should go to hell” or showing a burning poppy (the symbol of the UK remembrance day for World War I) have resulted in arrests and convictions. These charges were raised in line with the 2003 Communications Act (Section 27), which prohibits any public and publicly accessible online statements, which are “grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character”.

With the expansion of social online networks, even a seemingly harmless joke tweeted online can result in terrorist charges and have serious consequences since Twitter is a publicly accessible platform for anyone (unlike Facebook).

British press with its old tradition and renowned quality journalism has a very particular position on the European media market. Fleet Street in London, the historical center of British newspapers symbolizes the longstanding tradition of serious and good journalism aimed at empowering people, strengthening democracy and allowing a “collective view to evolve” (Temple 2008, 188). Although only one traditional generic broadsheet remains - The Daily Telegraph - the British press still offers a variety of respectable papers covering political issues.

Moreover, unlike in the past, the mainstream media now cut across all political allegiances and partisanship although newspapers still align themselves with specific political views. The most recent technological changes have slowly been moving the readership onto electronic platforms while decreasing the number of traditional press readers. The advance of online media has also spurred discussions about changes in the field of press regulation and ownership transparency since the media have been historically functioning on a self-regulating basis. British press, just like any other in the 21st century is thus currently undergoing some major structural and editorial changes to reflect the challenges of the altering nature of the public sphere. This is also the reason why this paper discusses topics related to these modern technological changes while using online platforms.

3. Methodology


The selected methodological approaches for this analysis were chosen in the scope of the Seconomics project and are uniform for all case studies. The main used method is qualitative textual content analysis of a purposively selected sample of articles from The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. For comparative purposes, only articles published between 1 January 2010 and 31 April 2013 were selected and coded by the use of a set coded scheme (Guasti 2013). The SECONOMICS project identified three topics of analysis, which all branch out into different fields and disciplines. The topic of CCTV and surveillance is closely related to the transport case study of the SECONOMICS project, but also political science in terms of its relevance for power relations and regulation. Similarly, 3D body scanners are examined in security studies and the field of public policy due to its relevance for air transport security. The topic of Stuxnet reaches out to the field of state intelligence and international relations, and in the SECONOMICS comparative media research it plays the role of proxy for studying critical infrastructures vis-à-vis printed media. Combining these three topics through the prism of media content analysis, we aim to present and analyse the primary trade-offs of security management and how these are portrayed in the media and various stakeholders.

This approach allows us to meaningfully study the range of topics but also discourses, which surround the three studied themes. Media frame topics and transmit messages about events, which are accepted or critically evaluated by the readers. Studying content of a large number of newspaper articles would be impossible without research software such as Atlas.ti7, which we use to code a sample of carefully selected articles in two newspapers per country. The articles analysed were representative to the overall coverage in the given country over time, per topic and per newspaper. Codes were assigned to any statements about CCTV, 3D body scanner or Stuxnet respectively, studying related topics, actors, argumentative strategies, justification and line of argumentation (see Guasti 2013).

This report is based on a selection of articles from two national newspapers from the United Kingdom, one left-leaning and one right-leaning. Due to their availability online and the possibility to search through their archives freely, we have focused on their electronic versions. The left-leaning paper is the quality newspaper The Guardian and the only remaining generic broadsheet, the right-leaning paper The Daily Telegraph. In order to select which newspapers to use, circulation data about national newspapers was gathered and evaluated. The highest-circulated left- and right-leaning quality papers were selected.

The Guardian was founded in 1821 under the title Manchester Guardian and in 1959 changed its name into the Guardian. Alan Rusbridger is its current editor in chief. The Guardian is part of The Guardian Media Group and is
currently in the ownership of Scott Trust Limited, a limited company. However, the paper is also supported by a number of external investments. The management of the paper is unlike any other in the UK, as it is answerable only to the Trust and has no shareholders or a proprietor. There is a public ombudsman, who assess complaints and comments from readers on the paper’s content. Regarding its readership, *The Guardian* is a daily of the young and liberal readers, who are also in majority Labour voters (Anderson, Williams, and Ogola 2013). Given its downfall in the print edition sales, the management of the paper invested heavily in its online version, which has over 3.4 million daily visits (Ibid, 106).

*The Daily Telegraph* is regarded as the “Conservative Party House Paper” and is predominantly a paper of the British middle class (Anderson, Williams, and Ogola 2013, 105). It was founded in 1855 as *The Daily Telegraph and Courier*. Tony Gallagher is its current editor in chief. *The Daily Telegraph* was a pioneer in digitalized online newspapers. In 1994, it launched the first multi-platform digital newsroom in the UK and as the first paper in the UK introduced a paywall to its content in 2011. Since 2004, it has been in the private ownership of David and Frederick Barclay and it is currently the only profit-making quality paper.

Once the newspapers were selected, articles on each of the three topics—CCTV, Stuxnet, and 3D body scanners—were then downloaded from the newspapers’ websites. The articles were located by using the search functions available on the websites. The phrases used to search were simply the name of the topic: “CCTV” for CCTV, “stuxnet” for Stuxnet, and “body scanner” for body scanners. From the search results, the articles in the selected time range of the analysis (January 2010 - April 2013) actually relevant to the topics were downloaded. Some articles only mentioned the search terms in passing and were not actually relevant to the topic. This occurred most often for the CCTV topic, where a large number of articles mentioned CCTV in passing, as a reference to how a crime was observed, for example, rather than discussing it as a topic.

**Table 3.1. Number of Articles by Topic and Year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>Body Scanner</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Daily Telegraph</em></td>
<td>Body Scanner</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>38</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In total, 167 articles were selected and downloaded from both websites on all the topics (see Table 3.1.). The largest number of articles came from 2010, a year during which *The Guardian* published 34 articles about body scanners. This is significantly more than any other year or topic. This was due to the fact that at that point the topic of 3D body scanners was widely discussed by the public and media. The number of articles in 2013 is much lower than other years as it was near the beginning of this year when the articles were collected. The number of articles for each topic and year was scaled so that the total number of articles was close to 40, the target number of articles for each of the country reports. The proportion of articles for each year for each topic in the adjusted numbers was kept close to the original ratio. This resulted in a total of 43 articles (see Table 3.2.). Using the adjusted numbers, articles were then selected from those downloaded. For example, seven articles were selected on the body scanner topic from *The Guardian* for 2010. The articles were chosen to reflect the varieties of opinion and writing style present in the original sample as much as possible. In other words, we used the purposive sampling method to choose articles for coding as random sampling would not yield the required diversity of themes and opinions.

**Table 3.2. Adjusted Number of Articles by Topic and Year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>Body Scanner</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Daily Telegraph</em></td>
<td>Body Scanner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SECONOMICS UK sample
4. Analysis

4.1 Descriptive Analysis

4.1.1. 3D Body Scanners

The main actors in the debate about body scanners are journalists, government entities and politicians, such as departments and ministers, and civil liberties advocacy groups. There are also individual passengers, transport companies, and health experts.

Figure 4.1. Actors and argumentative strategies

![Figure 4.1. Actors and argumentative strategies](image)

Source: Seconomics UK sample

The civil liberties advocacy groups most often present in the analysis
include: 1) Action for Rights of Children, an UK non-profit group working for the human rights of children; 2) Liberty, an UK-based group that protects civil liberties; 3) Privacy International, an UK-based group focused on protecting privacy rights around the world; 4) Electronic Privacy Information Center, an American group for the protection of privacy and civil liberties; 5) Equality and Human Rights Commission, a public body in Great Britain which promotes and protects human rights; and 6) Big Brother Watch, an UK civil liberties and freedoms group.

Government actors most often present in the analysed articles include: 1) Gordon Brown; 2) Department for Transport; 3) Barack Obama; 4) Transport Minister; 5) Counter-terrorism Minister; 6) The Transportation Security Administration.

Over the course of the studied time period, there were three main issues discussed in the articles about body scanners. The first is the legality of the introduction of the new types of scanners in regards to privacy rights. The second is whether the images produced by the scanners violate child pornography laws. The third is possible health issues related to the scanners.

The first issue is most dominant and is present from the beginning of the time period articles were selected from, 2010, and is discussed in articles all the way through 2012. The second is also present in several articles at the beginning of 2010, but only remains a topic for a short time period. The final issue, the possible health dangers of scanners, is introduced into the debate in a small number of articles from 2011.

The relationship between two of the main groups of actors, government institutions and the advocacy groups is readily apparent. The government is very much in favour of the introduction of body scanners, and the civil liberties groups oppose them on the basis of privacy and legality. A good example of the governmental position was presented in The Guardian:

*Speaking on BBC One's Andrew Marr programme, Gordon Brown pre-empted the findings of his own review by saying future passengers must expect to be scanned by the controversial scanners.* (Stratton 2010)

The reaction from a civil liberties group also from The Guardian point towards apprehensions that the body scanners will be used sensitively in respect to passengers’ religious views and that it might target some racial groups:

*But Shami Chakrabart, of Liberty, had concerns over the “instant” introduction of scanners: “Where are the government assurances*
that electronic strip-searching is to be used in a lawful and proportionate and sensitive manner based on rational criteria rather than racial religious bias?” she said. (Alan 2010)

There is a dialogue between the two sides of the debate, as the government responds to the questions about privacy. From The Daily Telegraph:

A Department for Transport spokesman said: “We understand the concerns expressed about privacy in relation to the deployment of body scanners, which is why we have drawn up a code of practice for their use. This will ensure operators are separated from the passengers being screened, and these anonymous images are destroyed after scanning is complete. (2010 Airport body scan images)

The argumentative strategies used in the articles are indicative of the interaction between the government, trying to introduce the new scanners, and its opponents, the civil liberties groups. Politicians made 21 definitive statements in the articles, and just 2 evaluative statements. In contrast, advocacy groups made 12 definitive statements, and 11 evaluative statements—all of which were negative. The politicians set out their policy, as in The Guardian:

The transport minister Paul Clark told MPs a random selection of passengers would go through the new scanners at UK airports. (Travis and Milmo 2010)

Which was then subject to criticism by the advocacy groups. The negative evaluations were not limited to just the civil liberties groups. Experts had three negative evaluative statements, and passengers had two. The experts were commenting on the effectiveness of the new machines:

The prime minister’s evident decision to support the installation of new £100,000 body scanners will be criticised since many industry insiders believe the machines are flawed. (Stratton 2010)

Journalists had the highest number of definitive statements, 86, of any of the actors in the coding scheme, which is not surprising as these statements are mostly informative. The four evaluative statements from journalists were in editorial articles, such as this one from The Guardian:

When a whole-body scanner in an airport falls foul of child pornography laws, my immediate thought is that those laws are wrong. (Williams 2010)

The justification of privacy is the most used from the coding scheme, with
12 statements. This is followed by legality and freedom/liberty with four statements each. Below this are health, dignity, and efficiency, with three each. This makes sense, as a greater number of articles were concerned about privacy than health. The privacy justifications are present throughout the whole time range, and the health justifications occur only with the articles concerned with the impact of x-rays, which start from 2011.

Table 4.2. Number of occurrences of topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Body scanner</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security related rules and regulations</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security general</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health issues</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased number of body scanners</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SECONOMICS UK sample

4.1.2. CCTV

In the articles on CCTV, the main actors—after journalists—are politicians and police, with the most statements, followed by city councils and advocacy groups.

Figure 4.3. Actors and argumentative strategies
Source: SECONOMICS UK sample

The figure above can be summed up as follows: there are several different topics of discussion in the CCTV articles. First is the inappropriate use of CCTV. Then there are several articles that discuss the fact that Britain is becoming a surveillance society. Other articles discuss the potential dangers of new monitoring and camera technology. Rules and regulations surrounding the use of CCTV are also a topic.

The inappropriate use of CCTV topic includes articles that discuss the installation of CCTV cameras for counter-terrorism purposes in a Muslim neighbourhood in Birmingham, but under the guise of crime prevention, as well as an article about the use of CCTV for monitoring behaviour of students in schools, and an article about the installation of CCTV into taxis.

The actors involved in this topic are city councils, with 10 statements, the
police, with 9, journalists, with 8, politicians, with 7, and advocacy groups, state institutions, and non-state institutions with 2 each.

In the Birmingham case, the local politicians attacked the scheme, about which they had been misled. From The Guardian:

Tanveer Choudhry, a Lib Dem councillor for Springfield ward, said they should be “taken down immediately” rather than mothballed. “What the community wants to see is the cameras removed and a full investigation into how they were put up in the first place without consultation…

Parliament has been asked to denounce Project Champion as a “grave infringement of civil liberties” … by the Labour MP for Birmingham’s Hall Green constituency, Roger Godsiff (Lewis 2010).

The police and council initially defended the installation of the cameras:

Although the counter-terrorism unit was responsible for identifying and securing central government funds … the camera sites were chosen on the basis of general crime data – not just counter-terrorism intelligence. Day-to-day management of the network was always intended to become the responsibility of local police. (Lewis 2010a)

But eventually reached the decision to remove the cameras:

We can fight crime and the threat posed by terrorism far more effectively by working hand in hand with local people, rather than alienating them through a technological solution which does not have broad community support. (Lewis 2010b)

The civil liberties group Liberty had joined in the debate:

The civil rights organisation Liberty wrote to the force last week, threatening to commence judicial review proceedings at the high court unless the force agreed within 14 days to “dismantle the full surveillance infrastructure”. (Lewis 2010b)

In contrast to this case, the article on the use of CCTV in schools contains doesn't contain evaluative statements reacting to the use of CCTV. Instead, the article in The Daily Telegraph uses only definitive statements to report on a study:

The latest study, which features contributions from a series of academics, said: “The use of CCTV has migrated from perimeter
security and access control to monitoring pupil behaviour in public areas such as in corridors and playgrounds, and to more private realms such as changing rooms and toilets.” (Paton 2010)

It is interesting that there is no commentary from politicians or civil rights groups about the privacy issues in this case, merely a statement saying “cameras should only be used to monitor behaviour in exceptional circumstances.”

The last case, the installation of CCTV cameras in taxis, does contain strong responses from civil rights groups. The justification of crime prevention is used by the local council in defence of the scheme in the Telegraph article:

*The risk of intrusion into private conversations has to be balanced against the interests of public safety, both of passengers and drivers.*

(2011 “Recording taxi conversations”)

The response is a strong, negative evaluative statement with the right to privacy and freedom/liberty the justifications in the coding scheme.

*Nick Pickles, the [Big Brother Watch] campaign group's director, said: “This is a staggering invasion of privacy, being done with no evidence, no consultation, and a total disregard for civil liberties.”*

(ibid.)

The next topic is the increase in CCTV cameras in the UK and its movement towards becoming a surveillance society. The actors in these two articles are experts, with 7 statements, journalists, with 4, politicians with 3, police with 2, and advocacy groups and state institutions with 1 each. There are 12 definitive statements, 2 evaluative, and 3 advocative.

The first article, from *The Guardian*, is about a report by the Surveillance Studies Network. It uses definitive and evaluative statements to describe the contents of the report:

*There continues to be a major problem with CCTV systems and automatic number plate recognition [APNR] cameras that read thousands of car number plates an hour and identify their owners through a live DVLA link. The authors say this undermines transparency and accountability.*

(Travis 2010)

It has an advocative statement describing the information commissioner's response:

*Information commissioner Christopher Graham is pressing ministers for new privacy safeguards in the wake of a report that suggests...*
moves towards a surveillance society are expanding and intensifying.  
(Travis 2010)

The next article, also from The Guardian, describes a study to estimate the number of CCTV cameras present in the UK by physically counting the cameras in one area and then extrapolating to the rest of the country. The results estimate about 1.85 million cameras in the UK, or one camera for every 32 people. The article only contains definitive statements, the majority from the police, who commissioned the report:

*Cheshire's deputy chief constable, Graeme Gerrard, said the data undermined more sensational estimates, such as the widely-repeated but dubious claim that the average Briton passes under 300 cameras a day.* (Lewis 2011)

The article contains a response to the study, in the form of a definitive statement, from a civil rights group:

*Isabella Sankey, director of policy at the campaign group Liberty, echoed the wider concern. “Who cares if there is one camera or 10 on their street if that one camera is pointing into your living room. Concerns about CCTV are not a simple numbers game; what's required is proper legal regulation and proportionate use.”* (Lewis 2011)

Another topic is the use of newer, more advanced CCTV technology. There are two articles from The Guardian on this topic. The actors in these articles are journalists, with 8 statements, experts, with 2, and politicians, private companies, and individuals with 1 statement each. The statements are mostly definitive (10), with 2 evaluative statements and 1 advocative.

The first article describes a new surveillance system called Trapwire, which is capable of recognising people on CCTV camera and analysing their behaviour to identify possible terrorist threats. The article uses purely definitive statements from the company that designed the system as well as other experts to describe the technology:

*Stratfor describes Trapwire as “a unique, predictive software system designed to detect patterns of pre-attack surveillance and logistical planning”* (Arthur 2012)

The next article is an editorial about the danger to privacy from new technology. As an editorial it has a number of statements by the journalist, using the definitive, evaluative, and advocative argumentative strategies. Advances to software mean that cameras that previously just recorded could be used to identify and track:
All the cameras currently operating “for your security” can be updated and converted to recognise faces. Wherever you go, someone will be logging your movements - whether it is the police or the big supermarket chains that are anxious to monitor the behaviour of customers in their stores. But the vital fact to remember is that all private CCTV cameras may be accessed by the authorities and are therefore, in effect, part of the state’s surveillance system. (Porter 2012)

The author concludes the article by advocating for a privacy law:

We need a privacy law ... a bill in parliament that asserts our right to guard our privacy against the state, corporations and the malevolence of future governments. (Porter 2012)

The final topic in the articles about CCTV is the rules and regulations that govern CCTV use. A number of the articles discussed previously have mentioned the need for new or improved regulations about CCTV, such as Porter (2012), Lewis (2011), and Travis (2010). There are two articles not yet mentioned that are about this topic, both from the Daily Telegraph. The actors in these two articles are journalists (13 statements), politicians (7), advocacy groups (4), and police (2 statements). There are 24 definitive statements, and just 1 evaluative and 1 advocative.

The first article is about the introduction of regulations for traffic (ANPR) cameras. All but one of the statements is definitive, and the actor is largely the journalist. The regulations are designed to increase transparency and help control the data generated by the system:

However, the Home Office will now introduce new regulations forcing police to be more transparent with the public about locations and numbers of cameras, as well as clarifying and limiting who has access to the database. (Watt 2010)

The only non-definitive statement in the article is a negative evaluative statement from a civil rights group:

Dylan Sharpe, the campaign director of Big Brother Watch, said: “APNR cameras are an unnecessary and indiscriminate invasion of privacy.” (Watt 2010)

The other article is about the introduction of the Protection of Freedoms Bill, part of which allows the public to challenge their local councils in court if cameras are being used inappropriately. Most of the statements are definitive, and the article has statements favourable to the bill from
politicians and advocacy groups:

Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister, said the bill is an unprecedented move to restore personal liberties and will put “the brakes on the surveillance state”.

David Green, director of the think-tank Civitas, said it was the largest redress of civil liberties since the 1689 Bill of Rights.

Table 4.4. Number of occurrences by topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameras, CCTV</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security related rules and regulations</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter terrorist system</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance increase</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime solution</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime detection</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal data protection</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal freedom</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase/installation of CCTV cameras</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public domain monitoring</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security general</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SECONOMICS UK sample

4.1.3. Stuxnet

In the third topic, the Stuxnet computer virus, there are two categories of actor that have many more statements than others: journalists and experts. This reflects the topic and the style of writing around it: it is highly
The articles on Stuxnet concentrate on a few different topics. In the earlier articles, the purpose of Stuxnet is a main topic. The question of the identity of the worm’s creators is also present in a large number of the documents, as well as its relation to another sophisticated virus, Flame. And finally, the topic of cyber-warfare and the UK’s preparedness and capabilities becomes a topic in later articles.

In the earliest articles, relatively little is known about the creator or target of the worm:

David Emm, a senior security researcher at Kaspersky Lab, told the Guardian: “We think that Stuxnet’s sophistication, purpose, and the intelligence behind it suggest the involvement of a state. (Halliday

Source: SECONOMICS UK sample

Technical, with a lot of commentary by computer security researchers.
“The fact that we see so many more infections in Iran than anywhere else in the world makes us think this threat was targeted at Iran and that there was something in Iran that was of very, very high value to whomever wrote it,” Liam O’Murchu, an expert at Symantec, told the BBC. (Beaumont 2010)

Subsequent articles have more information about the target of the attack, the Iranian nuclear enrichment program:

Now new research by cyber security firm Symantec shows definitively that Stuxnet was built to target uranium enrichment equipment used to fuel Tehran’s controversial nuclear programme. (Halliday 2010)

It became suspected that the US and Israel were behind the development of Stuxnet:

“It was most likely developed by a Western power, and they most likely provided it to a secondary power which completed the effort,” Tom Parker, a security research, told the Telegraph, naming the IS and Israel as the most likely pairing. (Williams 2011)

And this suspicion was eventually confirmed in 2012:

The disclosures about Obama’s role in the cyberwar against Iran appear to show beyond doubt that the US, with the help of Israel, was behind the Stuxnet virus, which sent some of Iran’s centrifuge machines - used to enrich uranium - spinning out of control. (Beaumont and Hopkins 2012)

The discovery of Stuxnet and its sophistication created discussion about the future of cyber-attacks and cyber warfare.

The strategic defence and security review said: “Over the last decade the threat to national security and prosperity from cyber-attacks has increased exponentially ... We will also work to develop, test, and validate the use of cyber capabilities as a potentially more effective and affordable way of achieving our national security objectives.” (Hopkins 2011)

There is concern that the UK might be falling behind in its ability to defend itself in terms of more sophisticated cyber-attacks:

What concerns the Government is the remaining 20 per cent - those products of more sophisticated criminal minds, intelligence services
and military establishments that are specifically designed to breach the defences either of companies or of the so-called Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). And this is where we might be falling behind. (Glenny 2012)

Attacks of the complexity and sophistication of Stuxnet are going to become more regular:

Professor Peter Sommer, a computer forensics expert at the London School of Economics and Political Science, said the Stuxnet attack's complexity in both the digital and physical realms was very impressive. However, he added that the virus itself heralds only an evolutionary stage in the cyber security threats that nations will face in the future.

“We should see this as another type of tool in statecraft,” Professor Sommer, who advises the OECD on cyber security, said. (Williams, 2011)

If attacks of this level are going to become common then it is imperative that the UK respond to the threat. Indeed, one of the only advocative statements in all the articles about Stuxnet urges that Britain increase its spending and offensive cyber capabilities:

Not only do we need to spend more, the [Commons select committee on intelligence and security] implies for the first time that Britain should ramp up its “active” defence strategy to keep pace with the proliferation of cyber-attacks that rain down on our institutions, companies and citizens every day. (Glenny, 2012)

Table 4.6. Topics, number of occurrences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack on Iran</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian uranium enrichment program</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Stuxnet by a state</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security general</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Stuxnet</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber war</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.2 Analysis of General Tendencies

In order to identify general tendencies in reporting on security issues in the UK between January 2010 and April 2013, we will now compare the three above analyzed debates. In the British press, each topic represents different patterns - various sets of actors were involved in each debate, different types of interaction among these actors took place and most importantly, the intensity of the debates varied. Overall journalists played the most important role in all three debates - in the body scanner debate they were followed with a significant gap by advocacy groups and politicians; in the CCTV debate, journalists were followed with a significantly smaller gap by politicians and police. The exception to this pattern is the Stuxnet debate, where experts replaced journalists as the dominant actor, followed by journalists and with a significant gap by the state institutions.

In terms of the main themes of the debates, these also varied - the body scanner articles' main topics were the legality of introducing such a security measure - in terms of privacy rights, but interestingly question was also raised whether or not the scanners violate child pornography laws. Last but not least, health issues related to the scanners were raised. The positions to the introduction of body scanner varied among the actors involved - politicians were pushing for the introduction of the new scanners, which ought to provide additional security and reduce terrorist threats. On the contrary, civil rights advocacy groups were rejecting the body scanners using arguing that the scanners violated privacy laws. There was a dynamic and intense debate between these two types of actors on the subject of privacy and the breach of human rights in terms of “leaving citizens alone” as discussed in the background section.

In articles discussing CCTV, the main topics were several instances of inappropriate use of CCTV, Britain’s movement towards becoming a surveillance society, the dangers to privacy of new technology, and changing rules and regulations about the use of CCTV. The CCTV debate was significantly more substantive than the body scanner debate. Major
issue was misleading of the public in the case when cameras to be used for anti-terrorism purposes were installed, but claimed to be for crime-prevention purposes. This fact was discovered by The Guardian, which continuously addresses this issue. In this debate aside of journalists and politicians, civil rights groups were also involved. Another exchange took place between journalists, civil rights groups and city council in debate regarding the installation of CCTV in taxis. Aside of these two themes, the rest of CCTV articles involves significantly less debate and less disagreement. The most agreement is found in the articles about Britain becoming a surveillance state and the dangers of newer technology. The actors here are the government and civil rights groups, who seem to be jointly aware of the dangers of excessive surveillance and move to enact new legislation to regulate its use.

In the Stuxnet articles, the main topics were the explanations of the purpose of the virus, the attempts to uncover identity of its creators, and the implications of this type of attack on defence and cyber warfare. The Stuxnet articles are about a highly technical subject, and the actors in this reflect that: a large number of statements by experts explaining details of the virus’s operation. The expert and technical character of this debate is further characterized by almost full absence of any debate. The articles were mostly straight reporting of new information about Stuxnet, and a large part of most articles was devoted to explaining technical details of its application.

The use of argumentative strategies in the three debates also differs: evaluative statements dominate the body scanner debate - reflecting the criticism of this security measure by civil rights groups; advocative statements dominate the CCTV debate, stemming from politicians or state institutions and advocating for increased safeguards for privacy, this reflects the strong consensus between rights organisations and the government on this topic. The Stuxnet debate was dominated by definitive statements - as explained above due to the expert and technical character of the debate. However, the Stuxnet debate also included some advocative statements - advocating for use of cyber-attacks instead of conventional attacks, and advocating for an increase in spending on cyber defences.

Overall, most definitive statements were by journalists, with the exception of Stuxnet articles, where journalists were the greatest number was by experts. The lack of debate in the Stuxnet articles explains why definitive statements has the highest percentage, 91%, of all three topics, compared to *1% and 82% of statements for CCTV and body scanners, respectively. The intensity of debate correlates to the use of evaluative statements.

In terms of direction of the debate, the topic of privacy in the body scanner
and CCTV debates was most often framed negatively by the civil rights
groups, criticising policy that threatens privacy and individual freedoms.
The strongest debate, about body scanners, has the highest level of
negative evaluative statements, and Stuxnet, with the least debate, has the
lowest.

**Table 4.7. Number of instances of topics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Body scanner</th>
<th>CCTV</th>
<th>Stuxnet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security related</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rules and regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security general</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SECONOMICS UK sample

The articles on body scanners and CCTV share a common focus on privacy
and security, and security rules and regulations, and to a lesser degree of
terrorism. The focal point of the body scanner and CCTV debate is security
and privacy vis-à-vis individual In contrast, the Stuxnet articles security
and security rules and regulations, refer to national security—critical
national infrastructure, and (international) laws about cyber warfare (and
lack thereof). Cyber terrorism is here seen as a specific form of terrorism.

**Table 4.8. Major actors and argumentative strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Body scanner</th>
<th>CCTV</th>
<th>Stuxnet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Body scanner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Institution</td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Body scanner</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>Body scanner</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Body scanner</th>
<th>CCTV</th>
<th>Stuxnet</th>
<th>Body scanner</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy Group</td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>Body scanner</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SECONOMICS UK sample

**Table 4.9. Argumentative strategies per topic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body Scanner</th>
<th>Definitive (82%)</th>
<th>Evaluative (17%)</th>
<th>Advocative (1%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuxnet</td>
<td>95 (81%)</td>
<td>16 (13%)</td>
<td>7 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SECONOMICS UK sample
Conclusions

To summarize, the three security debates in the British press show interesting similarities and differences. The most important difference is the object of security. In the case of CCTV and body scanner debates the individual is at the heart of the debate. Individual in a modern world, to whom various security measures provide security from terrorist threat with a trade-off in bridging on privacy and civic rights. In the Stuxnet debate, the object of security, to which cyber warfare provides security from potential cyber terrorism, is the state (national security, security of critical infrastructures).

In the British debate, we see a strong presence regarding the trade-off between privacy and security. This debate is closely related to civil rights groups objecting to an unregulated introduction of the body scanner, referring to privacy but also raising issues such as human dignity, respect for religious freedom and diversity in opposition of to the governments’ attempts to increase security at the cost of privacy. This clearly demonstrates that new technology and security measure can also raise new issues and that acceptance of such measure is conditioned culturally, but also by belief that new measure will be used in a regulated way.

To a lesser degree this trade-off is also present in the CCTV debate. Increasingly, the use of CCTV under general security label is questioned and clear delineation between crime prevention and anti-terrorism is required. This distinction is important and rather clear, the public acceptance of the use of CCTV in crime prevention was used as a smoke screen for anti-terrorism. The civil rights organisations try to moderate the ways in which the vast use of CCTV in combination with increasing technological possibilities impinge on privacy and civil liberties. And so in the body scanner debate the national government that is pressing for the new technology, and in the CCTV debates the police and local councils that are implementing the potentially privacy-reducing measures, face increasing opposition.

The Stuxnet debate with its absence of discussion also raises important questions, yet on another level of abstraction - shifting from domestic to an international arena, from the relationship between the state and the citizen and its regulation by law to the relationships among states and its regulation by international law, from the conventional to cyber warfare. The Stuxnet debate also shows another potential danger - the higher the degree of technical complexity of an issue the lesser debate. However, as we demonstrate here, complex issues relate to key issues, which, while not concerning citizen directly, have far reaching implications to critical national infrastructures and the ways in which modern states interact with each other in the vacuum of international law and behind the smoke screen.
of anti-terrorism.
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